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1ABSTRACT
The meaning of secularization and the question whether a so-ciety has secularized or not are still very controversial subjects 
in the academic world. A profound lack of agreement regarding 
the definition and measurement of secularization is characteris-
tic of contemporary intellectual life. With this in mind, this thesis 
claims that Steve Bruce’s secularization paradigm (that the mod-
ernization process increases secularization and that the Protestant 
Reformation is the fountainhead of this transformation observed 
in Western Europe) is valid not only for West European countries 
and their offshoots, but may also provide valuable insights into the 
secularization processes in other modern or modernizing parts of 
the world. But to render Bruce’s paradigm valid for non-Protestant 
societies, his paradigm had to be slightly extended. In this regard, 
aspects of his paradigm that relate to the history of Europe have 
to be downplayed (dynamics related to the Protestant Reforma-
tion), while those with more universal relevance, such as scientific 
advancements, industrial capitalism and urbanization, have to be 
highlighted.
The contribution of scientific advances to the secularization pro-
cess seems to have taken place not directly, but indirectly. Develop-
ments in science increase the level of human rational consciousness, 
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and reduce the number of cases where religion touches upon the 
lives of people. Capitalism is a very powerful dynamic that can turn 
societies characterized by collective consciousness, hierarchy, simple 
division of labour, homogeneous-small-isolated communities, pow-
erful customs and traditions that are mingled with religion, into 
societies characterized by specialization, individualization, rational-
ization, advanced transportation, split-second communication, and 
mass production. Urbanization tends to undermine functions of the 
supranatural forces in three ways: by increasing mobility, offering 
more alternatives in almost every aspect of life, and lastly by creating 
and protecting supranatural-free private spaces. The key hypothesis 
is the following: Three factors, viz. scientific advancements, industri-
al capitalism, and urbanization can lead to secularization in societies 
irrespective of the prevailing metaphysical realm.
To illustrate the hypothesis developed in this thesis empirically, 
the proposed extended secularization paradigm based on scientific 
advancements, capitalism and urbanization has been applied to the 
Alevi communities in Turkey. There are two fundamental reasons 
behind this choice: 1) Turkey is not part of Europe or one of its 
offshoots, and has not experienced the Protestant Reformation in 
its history. 2) There are many publications which seem to suggest 
an Alevi revival in Turkey after 1980s. Therefore, this study chose 
the Alevis in the Adana, Çorum and Tunceli regions as its focus, 
with premarital dating, mate selection, marriage rituals, divorce, the 
institutions of spiritual brotherhood and the people’s court in these 
communities as the topics to be explored, since these are all direct-
ly influenced by the religious culture. The institutions of spiritual 
brotherhood and the people’s court are dealt with in this study as 
far as they are concerned with marital issues. During the fieldwork, 
28 core questions with regard to marriage were posed to a total of 
30 pairs of persons in three cities (with each city having ten pairs) 
from two generations (parents and children) in semi-structured in-
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terviews to acquire insights into the generation gap with regard to 
faith and its impact on marital issues.
To analyze these large data, a qualitative data analysis software 
called MAXQDA which is very beneficial, particularly for a large 
number of files, has been used. In light of those interviews, it can be 
said that the transformation among Alevi communities in Turkey 
may also be explained by the extended secularization paradigm as 
elaborated here. Interestingly enough, the topic of Alevi revival has 
been the object of academic studies in Turkey since the 1980s. These 
studies suggest that, among others, Alevis have established associa-
tions to promote their identity in public areas; Alevi beliefs and rit-
uals have begun to reach a wider audience through their television 
and radio channels. The new generation of Alevis, unlike the previ-
ous generations, does not hide its identity. The Alevis have become 
more recognized at the state level compared to the past. However, 
despite the Alevi revival, the Alevis seem to have distanced them-
selves from their traditional Alevi beliefs and rituals due to scientific 
developments, capitalism, and urbanization. Specific to this thesis, 
it has to be stated that, Alevis in Turkey have become much more 
modern compared to bygone days, and at the same time a rather 
pervasive secularization process touches upon all marital issues due 
to the very structure of modern life.

5NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING
De betekenis van secularisering en de vraag of een samenleving geseculariseerd is of niet, zijn nog steeds zeer controversiële 
onderwerpen in de academische wereld. Een groot gebrek aan over-
eenstemming aangaande de definitie en de bepaling van de mate 
van secularisering is kernmerkend voor het hedendaagse intellec-
tuele debat. Met dit in gedachten claimt dit proefschrift dat het 
seculariseringsparadigma van Steve Bruce (dat stelt dat het proces 
van modernisering de secularisering versterkt en dat de Protestantse 
Reformatie de oorsprong is van deze transformatie die in West-Eu-
ropa waar te nemen valt) niet alleen voor West Europese landen en 
hun voormalige koloniën en andere door het Westen beïnvloede 
landen geldt, maar ook waardevol inzicht kan bieden in secular-
iseringsprocessen in andere moderne of moderniserende delen van 
de wereld. Om echter het paradigma van Bruce te laten gelden 
voor samenlevingen die niet overwegend Protestants zijn, moet het 
enigszins uitgebreid worden. Om deze reden moeten sommige as-
pecten van dat paradigma, namelijk die welke te maken hebben met 
de geschiedenis van Europa, gerelativeerd worden (die dynamiek 
die direct met de Protestantse Reformatie in verband te brengen 
is), terwijl die aspecten die universeel relevant zijn, zoals weten-
schappelijke vooruitgang, industrieel kapitalisme en verstedelijking, 
benadrukt moeten worden.
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De bijdrage van wetenschappelijke vooruitgang aan het proces 
van secularisering lijkt niet direct, maar indirect te hebben plaats-
gevonden. Ontwikkelingen in de wetenschap vergroten het menseli-
jk rationeel bewustzijn en verkleinen het aantal gevallen waarin 
religie de levens van mensen beïnvloedt. Kapitalisme is een erg 
krachtige factor die samenlevingen, welke gekarakteriseerd worden 
door collectief bewustzijn, eenvoudige arbeidsverdeling, homogene 
kleine geïsoleerde gemeenschappen, alsook sterke gewoonten en 
tradities die gemengd zijn met religie, kan veranderen in samen-
levingen die gekarakteriseerd worden door specialisatie, individual-
isering, rationalisatie, transport over grote afstanden, snelle commu-
nicatie en massaproductie. Verstedelijking ondermijnt de functies 
van bovennatuurlijke krachten doorgaans op drie manieren: door 
verhoogde mobiliteit, door het bieden van alternatieven binnen bi-
jna elke sfeer van het leven, en door het creëren en beschermen van 
private gebieden die vrij zijn van het bovennatuurlijke. De centrale 
hypothese is de volgende: drie factoren, te weten wetenschappeli-
jke vooruitgang, industrieel kapitalisme en verstedelijking kunnen 
leiden tot secularisering in een samenleving ongeacht de heersende 
metafysische of religieuze overtuigingen.
Om de hypothese die in deze dissertatie ontwikkeld wordt em-
pirisch te illustreren, is het voorgestelde uitgebreide secularisering-
sparadigma, gebaseerd op wetenschappelijke vooruitgang, kapital-
isme en verstedelijking, toegepast op de Alevi-gemeenschappen 
in Turkije. Er zijn twee fundamentele redenen voor deze keuze. 1) 
Turkije is geen onderdeel van Europa of een voormalige kolonie en 
heeft in haar geschiedenis de Protestantse Reformatie niet doorge-
maakt. 2) Er zijn vele publicaties die een opleving van Alevi-ge-
meenschappen in Turkije na 1980 lijken te suggereren. Daarom 
maakt dit onderzoek de keuze zich te richten op de Alevi’s in de re-
gio’s Adana, Corum en Tunceli, met afspraken [dating] voor het hu-
welijk, partnerkeuze, huwelijksrituelen, echtscheiding, de instituties 
van de spirituele broederschap en de volksrechtbank in deze ge-
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meenschappen als objecten van onderzoek, aangezien deze allemaal 
direct beïnvloed worden door de religieuze cultuur. De instituties 
van de spirituele broederschap en de volksrechtbank komen in dit 
onderzoek in bod in zoverre als ze betrekking hebben op huwelijk-
skwesties. Gedurende het veldwerk zijn achtentwintig kernvragen 
aangaande het huwelijk gesteld aan in totaal dertig paar mensen in 
drie steden (in iedere stad tien koppels) van twee generaties (oud-
ers en kinderen) in semigestructureerde interviews, om inzichten te 
verkrijgen in de generatiekloof betreffende religie en haar effect op 
huwelijkskwesties.
Om deze data te analyseren is gebruik gemaakt van kwalitatieve 
data analyse software genaamd MAXQDA, die erg bruikbaar is met 
name voor een groot aantal bestanden. Op basis van deze interviews 
kan gezegd worden dat de transformatie onder de Alevi gemeen-
schappen in Turkije verklaard kan worden vanuit het uitgebreide 
seculariseringsparadigma, zoals het hier uiteengezet is. Opvallend 
is dat de opleving van Alevi-gemeenschappen sinds 1980 onder-
werp is van academische onderzoeken in Turkije. Deze onder-
zoeken suggereren onder andere dat de Alevi’s associaties hebben 
opgericht om hun identiteit in het publieke domein te promoten; 
Alevi overtuigingen en rituelen hebben een groter publiek weten 
aan te trekken door televisie- en radio-uitzendingen. De nieuwe 
generatie Alevi’s verstopt haar identiteit niet, dit in tegenstelling tot 
eerdere generaties. De Alevi’s worden  tegenwoordig meer erkend 
door de overheid in vergelijking met het verleden. Maar ondanks 
deze opleving van hun religie lijken de huidige Alevi’s zich te heb-
ben verwijderd van hun traditionele Alevi overtuigingen en rituel-
en als gevolg van wetenschappelijke ontwikkeling, kapitalisme en 
verstedelijking. Specifiek voor dit proefschrift moet gezegd worden 
dat Alevi’s in Turkije veel moderner zijn geworden in vergelijking 
met het verleden, terwijl tegelijkertijd een zeer indringend proces 
van secularisering aan alle huwelijkskwesties raakt als gevolg van de 
structuur van de moderne leefwijze.
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INTRODUCTION
At the very beginning of my graduate programme in Europe-an Studies at the Catholic University of Leuven, I decided to 
write my master thesis on the secularization process in Western Eu-
rope. The question that my thesis tried to answer was simple: “Why 
is Europe considered the most secular region in the world?” In this 
study, the word “Europe” will refer to particularly to Western Eu-
rope, unless otherwise is stated. However, while writing my thesis, I 
noticed that before anything else, i.e. before dealing with the Euro-
pean secularization process, the concept of secularization needed to 
be discussed in detail, since there was no agreement on the meaning 
of the term among scholars. Particularly after the first half of the 
20th century, dozens of books and hundreds of articles have been 
devoted to the seemingly endless debate on what the concept of 
secularization means (Martin, 1965; Shiner, 1967; Wilson, 1979; 
Luckmann, 1979; Lechner, 1991; Casanova, 1994; Yamane, 1997; 
Stark, 1999; Bruce, 2002).
The first thing that strikes the eye in this discussion is the deep 
disagreement among scholars with respect to the definition of the 
concept and the proper methodology to measure it. In the early 21st 
century, two scholars have been at the heart of these discussions: 
Steve Bruce and Rodney Stark. The claims of these two scholars 
VOLKAN ERTİT
14
have been reviewed in numerous academic works. Some of these 
works attempt to find a middle way between Bruce and Stark or else 
side with one of them (Pollack & Pickel, 2007; Norris & Inglehart, 
2008; Warner, 2010; Roberts & Yamane, 2012).
To explain the reasons behind the secularization process as seen 
in societies, Bruce and Stark use different models, i.e. the Classical 
Secularization Theory and the Religious Market Model, respective-
ly. The Classical Secularization Theory claims that the process of 
secularization is intrinsically connected to the process of modern-
ization, namely that the decline in religious practices and beliefs in 
Western Europe is an inevitable result of historical progress due 
to modernization, i.e. “industrialization of work; the shift from vil-
lages to towns and cities; the replacement of the small community 
by the society; the rise of individualism; the rise of egalitarianism; 
and the rationalization both of thought and social organization” 
(Bruce,1999a: 266). The Religious Market Model, by contrast, ar-
gues that the decrease in religious activity can be explained by the 
lack of a free market in religious goods as well as by the lack of 
significant competition between the providers of such goods. Com-
petition is seen as a stimulus for religious growth. Well-respected 
publishing houses and journals have published the works of Stark 
and Bruce in an effort to pit one against the other. The article by 
Stark (1999), “Secularization R.I.P.”, and the book by Bruce (2002), 
God is Dead, became peak-points of these discussions. It would 
seem that for Stark, almost everything asserted by Bruce had been 
interpreted wrongly by historians. While Bruce claims that mod-
ernization is the cause of the secularization process, Stark adamant-
ly rejected this idea on the basis of statistics from another modern 
country, the USA, and further asserted that beyond the USA there 
is a worldwide religious revival which should be accepted as a very 
strong sign for the rebuttal of Bruce’s renowned argument, viz. that 
modernization and secularization go hand in hand. The abstract of 
Stark’s sensational article states it as follows:
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From the beginning, social scientists have celebrated the secular-
ization thesis despite the fact that it never was consistent with em-
pirical reality. More than 150 years ago Tocqueville pointed out that 
“the facts by no means accord with [the secularization] theory,” and 
this lack of accord has grown far worse since then. Indeed, the only 
shred of credibility for the notion that secularization has been tak-
ing place has depended on contrasts between now and a bygone Age 
of Faith. In this essay I assemble the work of many recent historians 
who are unanimous that the Age of Faith is pure nostalgia –that lack 
of religious participation was, if anything, even more widespread in 
medieval times than now. Next, I demonstrate that there have been 
no recent religious changes in Christendom that are consistent with 
the secularization thesis - not even among scientists. I also expand 
assessment of the secularization doctrine to non-Christian societies 
showing that not even the highly magical “folk religions” in Asia 
have shown the slightest declines in response to quite rapid mod-
ernization. Final words are offered as secularization is laid to rest 
(1999: 249).
The following excerpt from Stark asserts that Bruce himself ac-
cepted his mistake and does not believe anymore that there was a 
Golden Age of Faith during Medieval times:
Steve Bruce of the University of Aberdeen has long been one of 
the most die-hard proponents of the secularization thesis. Recent-
ly, even he admitted that, in terms of organized participation, the 
Golden Age of Faith never existed. Indeed, Bruce (1997: 674) pro-
poses that the medieval church was not even especially concerned 
to bring the people to mass as “was clear from the very architecture 
of churches and forms of service” (1999: 263).
However, in God is Dead, Bruce accused Stark of distorting his 
views:
It is an unfortunate feature of Stark’s style that he often misinter-
prets those with whom he disagrees. On this point he says of me: 
“Recently, even he [Steve Bruce] admitted that, in terms of organ-
ised participation, the Golden Age of Faith never existed.” (2002: 
243).
Since the focus of the theoretical part of this thesis is based on 
the ongoing discussions among these two scholars, an extensive dis-
cussion regarding their views is provided in the theoretical part of 
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the thesis. Why? Because, after all the criticisms raised by Stark and 
his followers, Bruce restricted himself to a certain place and time. 
He admitted that he does not make his claims for all societies in 
the world; whatever he claims is related geographically to Western 
Europe and its offshoots1, and historically is based on the beginning 
of the Protestant Reformation:
Instead, I take the secularization story, like Weber’s Protestant Eth-
ic thesis, to be an attempt to explain a historically and geograph-
ically specific cluster of changes. It is an explanation of what has 
happened to religion in Western Europe (and its North American and 
Australian offshoots) since the Reformation (Bruce, 1999a: 265).
The secularization paradigm combines two things: an assertion 
about changes in the presence and nature of religion, and a collec-
tion of related explanations of those changes. It is not a universally 
applicable scientific law, but a description and explanation of the 
past of European societies and their settler offsprings (Bruce, 2006: 
35).
However, the present dissertation claims that Bruce’s seculariza-
tion paradigm is not only valid for West European countries and 
their offshoots, but also may provide valuable insights into the sec-
ularization processes in the other parts of the world. But to render 
his paradigm valid for other modern or modernizing societies that 
have not experienced the Protestant Reformation in their own his-
tory, Bruce’s paradigm needs to be extended. In this regard, aspects 
of his paradigm that related to the Protestant Reformation need to 
be downplayed, while those with more universal relevance need to 
be highlighted. For illustrating it, the extended secularization par-
adigm is then applied to the Alevi community in Turkey, which is 
not part of Western Europe or one of its offshoots, and has not ex-
perienced the Protestant Reformation in its history. The sole reason 
for the selection of a community from Turkey is not the need for a 
non-Protestant group. The outcome of this study may also provide 
1 By using the word “offshoots”, Steve Bruce refers to Canada, USA, Australia 
and New Zealand. 
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some impressions concerning an issue that had preoccupied Turkish 
public opinion for years. Many academics, journalists and opinion 
leaders in Turkey claim that Turkey has been getting more religious 
especially ever since the AK Party came into power in 2002 (To-
prak, Bozan, Morgül & Şener, 2010). For example, during rallies 
in cities such as İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir in 2007, criticism of a 
Turkish society that was becoming more Islamized has been openly 
voiced. Millions of people at these demonstrations (called Republic 
Rallies) have screamed out slogans saying that they would not al-
low Turkey to become another Iran and openly invited the Turkish 
Armed Forces to intervene in Turkish politics (Sivil Media, 2009, 
December 2). Consequently, another reason for selecting a com-
munity in Turkey as part of this study is the domestic and inter-
national perception of a country that keeps getting more and more 
religious such as Turkey vis-à-vis Bruce’s claim that a society that 
gets modernized will inevitably become secular. Does the “Islamiza-
tion” of Turkey mean that Turkish society is going through a process 
of “desecularization” or can Turkish society become more religious 
while at the same time becoming more secular?
This study chose the Alevis in Adana, Çorum and Tunceli re-
gions as its focus, with premarital dating, mate selection, marriage 
rituals, divorce, and the instituions of spiritual brotherhood and the 
people’s court -as far as they are concerned with marital issues- as 
the topics to be explored.
THE RESEARCH PROBLEMS / ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Present dissertation investigates whether or not the extension of 
Steve Bruce’s secularization paradigm could give plausible explana-
tion for the social transformations in other modern or modernizing 
countries apart from West European countries. Therefore we will 
analyze the modernization process among Alevi communities in 
Turkey as well as the changes they encounter on marital issues in or-
VOLKAN ERTİT
18
der to ascertain the answer to the above question. Accordingly, this 
thesis seeks to find plausible answers to the following ten questions:
1) What does the concept of secularization mean?
For a discussion of whether the claims of the secularization par-
adigm can be extended and whether it can provide a reasonable 
explanation for the Alevi communities’ situation in Turkey, first of 
all it is crucial to clarify secularization as a concept. For that rea-
son, at the outset of the thesis, the concept of secularization will be 
discussed and defined. Then, in order to indicate the inadequacy of 
the general perception of “secularization = disappearance of religion” 
which has been put forward by many prominent scholars (Hadden, 
1987; Stark & Iannaccone, 1994; Cox & Swyngedouw, 2000) and 
which also finds support in Turkey (Küçükcan, 2005; Köse, 2006; 
Yapıcı, 2012), and also in an effort to differentiate the concept of 
secularization from laicization (the two terms are often confused in 
Turkey due to Turkey’s own peculiar history), it is necessary to dis-
cuss how the concept of secularization differs from being irreligious 
and why it is mistaken wrong to use the two terms (secularization 
and laicization) interchangeably. Although they should not be used 
as substitute terms for historical and etymological reasons, Turkish 
intellectuals, scholars, editors of dailies and interpreters have contin-
ued to use the two terms alternatively (Duran, 1995; Akşit, 2005).
2) Is it possible to explain the secularization process among 
modern or modernizing societies in light of an extended 
paradigm?
According to Bruce’s secularization paradigm, modernization is ac-
cepted as the main reason behind the vigorous secularization pro-
cess in Western Europe. In this case, a vital question of this thesis 
is “whether it would be possible to come up with a Secularization 
Paradigm in order to understand not only the secularization process 
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experienced by modern West European societies but also the secu-
larization processes that take place in other modern or modernizing 
societies which have not experienced the Protestant Reformation 
in their own histories?” The answer of this study to this question is 
affirmative. But there is no need for a new paradigm that is totally 
independent of Bruce’s. This study is convinced that if his paradigm 
is revised and extended, we can come up with a key paradigm that 
may provide a coherent explanation for the secularization process of 
other modern or modernizing societies apart from West European 
societies. Therefore, in the theoretical part, after exploring secular-
ization as a concept, I will shed some light on what Bruce’s secu-
larization paradigm asserts. Then, in a clear departure from Bruce, 
I will argue that his paradigm is not only valid for West European 
societies, but also for Alevi communities in Turkey. However, to ex-
tend the scope of his paradigm in its relevance, aspects of the para-
digm that belong to the history of Western Europe and its offshoots 
will be somewhat downplayed while those with more universal rel-
evance will be upgraded.
3) Why is the Protestant Reformation vital for Bruce’s 
paradigm?
By presenting more details on the extended paradigm’s pillars, my 
aim is to show that Bruce’s paradigm may provide us with insights 
into the secularization process in other societies besides Western 
Europe and its offshoots. However, I still think it crucial to explore 
the vital place of the Protestant Reformation (which is not part of 
the extended version) in Bruce’s paradigm. Bruce used his para-
digm “to explain a historically and geographically specific cluster 
of changes” (Bruce, 1999a: 265) in Western Europe which started 
with the Protestant Reformation. Therefore, Chapter II will shed 
some light on why the Protestant Reformation is vital to Bruce’s 
paradigm.
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4) Why not use other models as a starting point (i.e. Religious 
Market Model, Secure Secularization Theory and Religious 
Individualization Theory) rather than Bruce’s paradigm?
Apart from Bruce’s secularization paradigm, there are other theories 
that bring to light cause-effect relations on the subject of the secu-
larization process of societies. Although these theories have dom-
inated contemporary thinking on the question of secularization as 
much as Bruce’s paradigm, I have not chosen them as my starting 
point because of their premises which will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter II. Therefore, before discussing the details of the extended 
secularization paradigm, I will explore the main assumptions and 
inefficacies of three alternative theories: the aforementioned Reli-
gious Market Model advanced by Stark et al., the Secure Secular-
ization Theory of Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, and lastly the 
Religious Individualization Theory proposed by Thomas Luckmann 
and later advanced by Grace Davie.
5) What are the pillars of such an extended secularization 
paradigm?
The historical dynamics behind the West European secularization 
process consists of the following seven dynamics: the Renaissance 
(15th century), the Protestant Reformation (16th century), the emer-
gence of absolute monarchs (16th and 17th centuries), the Scientific 
Revolution (17th century), the Age of Enlightenment (18th century), 
industrial capitalism (from the middle of the 18th century to the 
middle of 19th century), and urbanization (19th century). The major 
and vital social, economic, political, and cultural changes that came 
about with these historical dynamics are regarded as the segments 
of modernization. This modernization process has also led to a de-
cline in religion’s prestige and power in Western Europe. Howev-
er, although these historical factors did play a vital role in Western 
Europe’s secularization process, it does not necessarily mean that 
all these seven factors are indispensable for secularization in other 
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parts of the world. For even though the seven historical dynamics 
do not seem to occur in other countries as they did in Western Eu-
rope, still, some of them could be sufficient to trigger the process of 
secularization regardless of the peculiar histories of those non-Prot-
estant societies. This dissertation suggests that these three factors 
of Bruce’s secularization paradigm, 1) scientific advancements 2) 
industrial capitalism 3) urbanization, might be sufficient to trigger 
an increase in the secularization level of societies regardless of the 
dominant religious culture.
6) Why does the secularization process accelerate with the 
diffusion of scientific knowledge and advancements in daily 
life?
To answer this question, I will first emphasize that it is not abnor-
mal for religious people to trust science or that a scientist can be re-
ligious since there is no zero-sum relationship between science and 
religion according to the secularization paradigm asserted in this 
study. Secondly, I aim to explain how scientific advances accelerate 
the secularization process in the absence of a zero-sum relationship. 
The section concludes that the impact of scientific developments 
on the secularization process is twofold: (i) the increase in rational 
consciousness by which human beings start to explain the natural 
phenomena in a rational cause-and-effect relationship, and (ii) the 
spread of technology which has reduced the number of areas and 
issues previously occupied by religion.
7) Why does the secularization process seem to be accelerating 
in capitalist countries?
As an economic system, in capitalism, the means of production are 
supposed to be tied to private ownership. The government does not 
intervene in the economy wherein goods and services are freely ex-
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changed2 (Barry, 2002; Hazlitt, 2012; Machan, 1993). Capitalism 
is one of the main dynamics that led to Western Europe becoming 
the world’s most secularised region (Casanova, 1994). Moreover, if 
we look at the world map, it can be seen that religion recedes into 
the background where capitalism becomes the dominant economic 
model (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 77, 104). Therefore, my aim is 
to build a theoretical framework for the regression of a dominant 
religious culture at the social level in different regions of the world 
on account of capitalism.
Because of the peculiarities of capitalism, rational and organic3 
societies come into the picture, while the power and social prestige 
of religion, folk-religions, religion-like mechanisms and supersti-
tious beliefs are restricted. Notwithstanding the absence of a ze-
ro-sum game between capitalism and religion, at least on paper, sta-
tistically it can be shown that countries with a free market economy 
are more secular than countries with a command economy (Norris 
& Inglehart, 2008). In this section, it will be examined in detail 
how the capitalist mode of production reduces the social power of 
religion under four subheadings:
1. Rules of Economy and Secularization (Weber, 1930/2005; 
Mises, 1981)
2. Disintegration of Traditional Family Structure and Secular-
ization (Finer, 2007; Chartsbin, 2009).
2 How and why a country is called capitalist has been detailed in Chapter III. 
But, briefly, it might be said that capitalist countries have an economic system 
where there is private or corporate ownership of the means of production. It 
should be noted that in this study we are not talking of “pure capitalism” which 
is an idea that private markets are most efficient and functional if government 
does not interfere in the economy. Today, although there are many countries 
that call themselves capitalist, there is no “pure capitalist” country in which the 
government does not play any role in the economy.
3 The term “organic” is here used in a Durkheimian sense, meaning that inter-
dependence of the component parts of society emerged with the industrial 
revolution (Durkheim, 1893/2014).
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3. Increase in Welfare and Secularization (Hartwell, 1965; Skou-
sen, 1994; Kasper, 2002)
4. Downsizing of the State and Secularization (Dal Lago, 1999; 
Berlin, 2004)
8) Why does urbanization lead to an increase in the level of 
secularization?
Religion turns into something “alien” in urban life every passing day 
(Bruce, 2014). Young people who have had some kind of religious 
life in their rural communities just before tertiary studies start to 
have less religious life after enrolling at university (Kirman, 2005a; 
Amman, 2010). Alevi and Sunni religious leaders, who are regard-
ed as the representatives of God in rural areas, lose their prestige 
and social clout in the face of urban life mechanisms (Balkanlıoğlu, 
2012). With urbanization, estrangement towards anything beyond 
the material world increases, while the impact of religious identity 
on daily life decreases. Sexual minority groups (e.g. homosexuals, 
transsexuals), which do not have the opportunity to exist or express 
themselves freely in rural areas, are becoming part of everyday life 
due to the structure of urban life (Harry, 1974; Yılmaz, 2012, Oc-
tober). The number of inter-denominational marriages, dates and 
pre-marital sexual intercourse, all of which are mostly forbidden in 
traditional communities intertwined with Abrahamic religions, also 
increases in urban life (Yılmaz, 2005; Dinçer 2007). In short, reli-
gion loses its power and prestige for providing guidance in urban so-
ciety. But why? The basic argument for such a link is that urbaniza-
tion accelerates secularization by creating problems for religion, folk 
religions, religion-like mechanisms and superstitious beliefs. That 
is, as urbanization increases, secular and rational solutions begin to 
replace religious regulations, values, and teachings which normal-
ly handle the problems of daily life in rural society. Therefore, the 
following three dimensions will be elaborated in this section, in an 
effort to build a theoretical framework for the decline of dominant 
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religious culture at the social level where urbanization increases: 1) 
mobility (Cox, 1965), 2) access to Different Alternatives (Dobbe-
laere, 1985), and 3) privatization of personal life (Wirth, 1938).
9) What does the extended secularization paradigm not assert?
To avoid possible confusion, it is essential to concisely mention 
what the extended secularization paradigm does not assert. This will 
be examined in the Chapter III under six subdivisions: 
1. The extended secularization paradigm is not limited to particular 
parts of the world.
2. The extended secularization paradigm is not a secularist or a pro-
gressivist ideology.
3. The extended secularization paradigm does not claim that the 
end point is atheism. 
4. The extended secularization paradigm is not “synchronized swim-
ming”.4
5. The extended secularization paradigm is not based on the fre-
quency of worship -or lack thereof- only.
6. The extended secularization paradigm is not relevant for mono-
theistic religions only.
10) Can the extended secularization paradigm provide a 
plausible explanation for Alevi communities in Turkey even if 
there has been a revival of Alevism?
According to the secularization paradigm proposed in this thesis, 
the level of secularization of societies may increase if the effects of 
scientific developments can be seen in people’s daily lives, the cap-
italist economic system becomes prevalent, and urbanization rate 
4 In synchronized swimming, athletes try to accomplish a synchronized routine 
of intricate moves in split-second accuracy in the water. Based on this, the 
secularization paradigm does not claim that secularization comes into being 
under modernization in the same way or within the same time frame for all 
parts of society.
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increases. Turkey has experienced these three processes since the 
1960s as will be illustrated in Appendix A. Since Alevi commu-
nities are part of Turkey, they are supposed to be affected by these 
structural changes as well. However, according to the hypothesis of 
this study, while secularization of the Alevis was expected as a result 
of the modernization process experienced in Turkey, many academ-
ic works published in Turkey and also abroad (Çamuroğlu, 2003; 
Çaha, 2004; Shah, 2013) have pointed to an Alevi revival in Turkey 
especially since the 1980s. Alevis, who previously were assumed to 
be nil at the state level and also at the social arena, have become 
one of Turkey’s most important agenda items. Alevis’ struggles for 
their rights when they arrived in cities, establishment of Alevi as-
sociations, the opening of Cem houses for worship in the center of 
large metropolitan areas, broadcasting their rites and rituals in Cem 
houses to millions via state televisions, and the new generation of 
Alevis expressing their Alevi identities without hiding in contrast to 
previous generations – are some examples presented as part of the 
Alevi revival.
So, the field research of this study has been designed for Alevi 
communities in an attempt to find answers to the following ques-
tions: If Alevi revival is a fact, then how have Alevi communities 
been affected by the rise of scientific developments, capitalism and 
urbanization? And, how has this influenced their secularization lev-
el? Is it possible for Alevi communities to experience secularization 
and revival at the same time?
Why are Alevis chosen as the subject of this study?
Although the findings part of the thesis provides detailed informa-
tion about the history and the position of Alevis in Turkey, it should 
be briefly discussed here why Alevis have been preferred for present 
dissertation. As an illustration case for the extended secularization 
paradigm, initially, my aim was to study the secularization process 
of Turkish society instead of the Alevi communities. However, since 
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the scope of such a study would be far bigger than a PhD thesis can 
cover, it would create insurmountable problems in terms of bud-
get and incompatibility in terms of scope and sampling. For that 
reason, choosing one single community in Turkey as a focus seems 
much more convenient for the objective of the thesis. This commu-
nity would have to be a religious one, because the aim of the thesis 
(application of a secularization paradigm in Turkey) necessitates 
this. Sunnism and Alevism are the two prominent denominations 
in Turkey. The Sunni denomination was not chosen because it is 
the most common religious community and the official faith of the 
Turkish state. These features would have also pushed the boundaries 
of the thesis. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA, Diyanet 
İşleri Başkanlığı) is an institution serving only Sunni Muslims since, 
for the state, being a Muslim is automatically interpreted as being 
a Sunni Muslim. Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge (Din 
Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi Dersi), which is lectured as compulsory sub-
ject in the public schools, is based on the Sunnite belief. Since the 
sub-religious groups are not officially recorded, data on the precise 
number of the Sunnite population are not available. Nonetheless it 
would not be an exaggeration to say that their population amounts 
to tens of millions. For this reason, selecting a religious group with 
fewer adherents was more convenient in terms of the limited char-
acter of the dissertation.
However, even though there are fewer Alevis than Sunnis in 
Turkey, they still constitute the second largest religious sub-group. 
They live in cluster-like structures in different parts of the country. 
As I will explain in more detail in chapter IV, from past to present, 
they have always been a minority and identified themselves with 
their belief. Alevi identity is not only a religious belief, but also an 
identity. Several massacres were carried out against Alevis in Ana-
tolia in the last quarter of the 20th century (the massacres in the 
cities of Çorum, Maraş and Sivas). All these massacres, as well as 
the resulting state of introversion, living out their beliefs behind 
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closed doors, the obligation imposed by the state to take part in 
classes where the compulsory subject of religion based on Sunni 
belief is taught, non-recognition by the state, being humiliated in 
society, and the difficulties they experience within the bureaucratic 
apparatus to reach administrative positions, have rendered them all 
the more sensitive in comparison to Sunni people in terms of their 
identity. In other words, because of both late urbanization and the 
above mentioned social problems, Alevis are supposed to secularize 
rather slowly and they are likely more connected to their religious 
sense of belonging. Alevis have been known to be self-enclosed and 
sensitive about their faith-based identity as Alevis (Erdemir, 2004; 
Erdem, 2010).
Another reason why Alevis have been chosen as the focus group 
despite being part of a modernizing country is the sheer number 
of academic works concerning an Alevi revival in Turkey especially 
since the 1980s. Better organization by Alevis, their efforts to in-
crease societal awareness regarding their rights, owning their own 
television and radio channels and lobbying efforts at the state level 
for recognition have made Alevis part of Turkey’s agenda as never 
before. Such an Alevi revival, hand in hand with the secularization 
of Alevis, seems contradictory on paper, making Alevi communities 
a more interesting subject, at least for research.
Finally, although it is not easy to define what Alevism is, at least 
it will not be difficult to denote what Alevism is not.5 For all these 
reasons the Alevi communities of Turkey has been considered a 
proper example for the application of the extended secularization 
paradigm to a religious group.
Why does the present dissertation focus on the generation 
gap with regard to the subjects of premarital datings, mate 
selection, marriage rituals, divorce, the institution of spiritual 
5 The detailed discussion on Alevism is made in the PART B.
VOLKAN ERTİT
28
brotherhood (musahiplik) and the institution of the people’s 
court (düşkünlük meydanı)?
Due to its position in the center of Alevi belief and rituals, the mar-
riage institution has become the subject of this thesis. The marriage 
institution is for Alevis of utmost importance as it concerns pos-
terity and continuation of their community. The direct relationship 
between some vital Alevi institutions (the institution of spiritual 
brotherhood and that of the people’s court) and marriage is not 
coincidental. For an Alevi individual, being married and sustain-
ing it in accordance with Alevi belief and traditions means being 
a complete Alevi. Consequently, individuals who are thought to 
have harmed the marriage institution face enforcements that may at 
times include death and being an outcast. Due to the vital position 
of marriage in Alevi faith, it has thus been chosen as the issue to be 
illustrated in this thesis’ field research.
Premarital datings or non-matrimonial relationships are con-
ducts that are not at all approved in traditional Alevi communities 
and perceived as one of the most severe religious sins ever to be 
committed. What’s more, not only the lovers, but also the engaged 
pairs are not allowed to stay by themselves in a room or they cannot 
go out together without being accompanied by a relative. Conducts 
that can harm a matrimony may result in social exclusion and peo-
ple pay, in certain places, for such conducts with their lives (Bayatlı, 
1957). The information we got during the field survey in the present 
study has also confirmed the strict structure of Alevi traditions with 
respect to dating in the premarital phase. Elderly participants stated 
that the bride and the groom especially did not see each other until 
the wedding night. An elderly participant from Tunceli, 64 years 
of age, said that conditions were so conservative in his youth that 
girls and boys were not allowed to communicate with each other; 
it was even prohibited to see the face of their fiancées/fiancés. An-
other participant from the city of Çorum said that they always got 
cold feet in front of elderly family members and they always did 
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whatever they were told. He further said that he did not see his wife 
before the matrimony, and that it was his mother who chose her as 
his spouse.
Divorce is another sensitive issue relating to matrimony in tra-
ditional Alevi communities. Divorce is always a frightening event 
for Alevi families. Divorced people are regarded as incompetent 
and incomplete in Alevi communities. It is seen as damnation when 
married women return to the house they lived in as maiden. It used 
to be expected that Alevi girls would obey their husbands and never 
return to their maiden home, even if the result would be their death. 
Young people in an Alevi community, be it girls or boys, had no 
other option to choose (Yaman, 2007). Divorce was an event that 
resulted in social exclusion.
Whether there has been an increase or decrease in the social 
prestige and power of the institutions of spiritual brotherhood and 
the people’s court will also be investigated in this thesis. These two 
institutions are directly associated with the matrimony in an Alevi 
community, and it was these two institutions that enabled Alevis to 
re-create themselves and maintain their traditions for centuries. For 
this reason, the changes in the social effects of these two institutions 
will provide significant information in terms of the secularization 
process of Alevi communities.
Spiritual brotherhood is a concept which could be referred to as 
the development of a relation between two Alevi men by means of 
a contract after they get married. The two men become closer than 
real brothers after going through certain social processes and rituals. 
Thus, it is not a blood relation, but they become even closer than 
that. Spiritual brotherhood could also be known as “holding broth-
erhood,” “fellowship of the road,” and “hereafter fraternity” (Yaman, 
2007). The traditional Alevi faith requires that every man should 
have a spiritual brother after he gets married. Otherwise, it would 
not be suitable for him to be part of any religious ceremonies. It 
is mandatory for spiritual brothers to help each other throughout 
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their entire lives. This includes addressing even private matters of 
each other’s family, and paying the other’s debt if required (Me-
likoff, 2012). The concept of spiritual brotherhood goes back to the 
times of the Prophet Muhammed. The information present in the 
sources and the statements of the respondents both are well aligned 
with regard to the origin of the concept of spiritual brotherhood. 
The prophet Muhammed developed the concept of social solidarity 
when he announced brotherly association between a Muslim who 
had migrated from Mecca to Medina and another Muslim who 
was from Medina (Tiryaki, 2013). It is stated by the Alevis that 
each person had found a spiritual brother except for ‘Alī, and so the 
Prophet Muhammad had announced that he would be ‘Alī’s spiritu-
al brother. Since that time, the Alevis have been using this concept 
to revive their own customs. 
Finally, in Alevi communities, the institution of the people’s court 
is one of the main social institutions related to marriage. When tra-
ditional Alevi communities are considered, their institution of the 
people’s court was similar to that of current courts. This indicates 
that the court ensures correct law and order. The places in which 
the institutions of people’s court functions are known as the Houses 
of Cem (sacred place of Alevis for gathering, religious rituals and 
other social issues). The issues which are dealt with and resolved in-
clude parental discord, rural planning, inheritance issues, and other 
community related problems. If a person is found to be guilty by 
the religious guides and judges (the dedes), then, depending on the 
degree of the crime, the social sanction applied on the person could 
include “excommunication”. People who have been excommunicat-
ed are not allowed in the House of Cem as they become known as 
decayed (düşkün). 
In case a person is announced to be decayed, s/he would not be 
allowed to live in the community at all. This means when someone 
is declared as decayed, s/he has to face the disastrous consequence 
of social hatred and exclusion. The overall community ends all ties 
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with the decayed person and they cannot be invited to the House of 
Cem either. Nobody visits the decayed person and they are not even 
helped if required. Sacrificing animal to God is not permitted to 
them and nobody eats their lokma (highly symbolic dessert offered 
in religious ceremonies). There is no communication with the de-
cayed person, meaning s/he is completely excluded. The boycott is to 
such an extent that even family members cannot stake a claim on 
him/her. Moreover, in case a spiritual brother is announced to be de-
cayed, his other spiritual brother and immediate relatives are directly 
affected. Their lives become morally troubled (Üzüm, 2009: 170-71; 
Tiryaki, 2013: 144-45). As David Zeidan (1999: 76) explains, the 
Alevis tried to ensure strict endogamy so they could avoid penetra-
tion by hostile outsiders, which ultimately made them a quasi-eth-
nic group. The Alevi taboos restricted any communication with the 
leading Sunni political-religious centre. Those who married outsid-
ers, ate with outsiders, or had economic cooperation with outsiders, 
were threatened with the ultimate punishment of excommunica-
tion. Use of the state (Sunni) courts was also not permitted. 
Considering this given information, it should be evident that 
in Alevism, marriage, as a social institution, has an extremely im-
portant position. Marriage is used as a tool to keep the communi-
ty growing. In their entire history, Alevis have gone through strict 
sanctions and social elimination any time they caused damage to 
this institution. For this reason, this study focuses on understanding 
the institution of marriage and issues related to it with respect to the 
process of secularization.
RESEARCH METHODS
This thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part provides a 
theoretical discussion of the concept of secularization and the secu-
larization paradigm on the basis of the relevant literature. The sec-
ond part (Part B), includes a fieldwork study conducted to illustrate 
the theory put forth in the first part.
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For the conceptual framework of the theoretical part, Steve 
Bruce’s works and the works of Bryan Wilson by whom Bruce is 
influenced mostly, have been used as the main sources. Furthermore, 
the theories opposing Bruce and interpreting the secularization 
process from the perspective of different dynamics have also been 
discussed.
The aim of the second part is to investigate possible transitions 
in terms of three elements of modernization, i.e. scientific advanc-
es, industrial capitalism, and urbanization, among Alevi generations 
and their effects on the institution of marriage and related subjects 
such as dating, mate selection, marriage rituals, divorce, spiritual 
brotherhood, and the people’s court. I conducted in-depth inter-
views with 60 Alevis in total (30 parents and 30 children) during 
field studies in Adana, Çorum and Tunceli. While identifying the 
persons to be interviewed, I preferred the snowball sampling meth-
od as those persons are not easily accessed due to socio-political rea-
sons. In this method, respondents were chosen by the previous ones.
As the purpose of this study is to examine the transforming ef-
fect of belief on marriage issues, I opted to do interviews with one 
parent and one of his/her children. I also applied a special coding 
for them in order to protect their privacy.
In semi-structured interviews, I posed 28 core questions to the 
parents and to their children.6 Inherent to semi-structured inter-
views, sometimes it was not possible to ask the same questions in 
the same order. At times, I needed to add questions or did not need 
to ask questions that I had planned. I grouped the questions in two: 
I posed the first group of questions to learn about the generation 
gap in terms of the modernization level; I then asked the second 
group of questions, in order to understand the transformations and 
impacts of belief on marriage. After decoding the interviews, I used 
a qualitative data analysis software called MAXQDA to organize, 
6 These questions can be seen in Appendix D.
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encode, take notes, and analyze hundreds of pages of Word docu-
ments. 
RELEVANCE OF THE THESIS
This study, which aims to understand whether the extended secu-
larization paradigm can provide a reasonable explanation for the 
Alevi communities in Turkey, is important for a couple of reasons. 
As previously mentioned, Bruce restricted his paradigm to Western 
Europe and its offshoots, while admitting that his paradigm is based 
on the Protestant Reformation and covered geographically some 
particular parts of the world. By contrast, the present dissertation 
claims that Bruce’s paradigm could be applicable to non-Protestant 
societies. Therefore, his paradigm is here applied to a non-Protes-
tant community in a non-European country. As such, this study sets 
out with a fairly new approach.
This study further intends to investigate the secularization pro-
cess among the Alevi communities without either a religious or 
secularist agenda; it also avoids a Eurocentric or Islamic bias. In 
addition, it has an integrated interdisciplinary thematic profile: it 
does not treat its subject from an exclusively philosophical, socio-
logical, theological, political, or historical standpoint. Moreover, this 
study can encourage new academic studies that could contribute to 
the discussion on the subject of secularization in Turkey or in other 
non-Protestant communities.
Besides, this research sheds light on an important social debate 
in Turkey. According to many scholars and public opinion leaders 
Turkey has become more conservative and has been losing its sec-
ular roots over the years (Toprak, Bozan, Morgül & Şener, 2010). 
Although this study claims that Alevi communities have been sec-
ularized due to scientific advances, industrial capitalism, and the 
urbanization process that Turkish society has experienced for de-
cades, the general impression in both domestic and international 
public opinion is quite the opposite. For example, in 2007, to raise 
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public opinion against the gradual promotion of Islamists and Is-
lamism by AKP government, several mass rallies were organized in 
the big cities of Turkey. Millions of demonstrators gathered in city 
centres in support of the secular society of Turkey. “We don’t want 
to become another Iran, another Afghanistan” was one of the most 
verbalized slogans. Those millions of demonstrators, several popular 
dailies, many scholars, and secularist opinion leaders all regard the 
Turkish Armed Forces as the protector of Turkey’s secular identity. 
The impression of a more religious Turkey is very tangible, partic-
ularly among secular people, and even they do not find it necessary 
to discuss the opposite claims since it is pretty obvious for them 
(Fırat, 2003, June 23; Medya Radar, 2009, December 2). The army 
has been both implicitly and explicitly asked to stage a coup against 
the pro-Islamic government.
If my dissertation would succeed in showing that at least one 
part of Turkish society is in fact more secular than it has been in the 
past, and that there are no signs of a reversal in this transformation, 
then the general public may be encouraged to let go of the idea that 
a militarily controlled Turkey is a necessary part of the process of 
secularization. What is more, this study might reveal that it is not 
an easy job for a conservative or an Islamist government to trans-
form society by just passing some pro-religious laws since scientific 
advancements, industrial capitalism, and urbanization are strong 
triggers of the process of secularization regardless of the laws and/
or intentions of conservative politicians.
LIMITATIONS
This study investigates the generation gap in terms of premarital 
dating, premarital sex, marriage rituals, divorce, spiritual brother-
hood, as well as the subject of the people’s court in relation to mar-
riage and divorce issues among Turkey’s Alevi communities. It tries 
to find answers to the question which generation is more in touch 
with religion regarding the aforementioned subjects in light of the 
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secularization paradigm. However, it should be stressed that this 
paradigm is neither new nor original. On the contrary, it is based for 
the most part on Bruce’s secularization paradigm.
Besides, it should be stressed that this study also has limitations 
in terms of its scope. I conducted in-depth interviews with 60 peo-
ple divided into 30 pairs from the three regions of Adana, Çorum, 
and Tunceli. Therefore, we should be careful about generalizing the 
result of the research to all Alevi communities living in other parts 
of Turkey. The Alevi denomination is perhaps not the largest de-
nomination in Turkey, but it is still the second largest denomination, 
consisting of millions of people. The total Alevi population is not 
exactly known since sub-religious identity is not officially required 
at the governmental level. As a result, the number of Alevis varies 
according to different authors. Sunni authors’ numbers are gener-
ally lower than those of their Alevi counterparts. But despite these 
diverse figures, it is generally accepted that their number amounts 
to several millions and Alevism is the second largest denomination 
in Turkey. Therefore, it should be emphasized once again that the 
result of this study has to be supported by other studies before gen-
eralization on this subject can duly be made.
In addition, since Alevis are being studied in their own lands, the 
impact of internal or external migration to big cities on the secular-
ization process among Alevi communities in Turkey and Europe is 
omitted in this study. Due to the chain referral sampling method, 
there is a risk of involving only a certain kind of people and being 
overly directed by previous respondents. My control over the sam-
pling was very limited due to the nature of the chain referral sam-
pling method. As Chaim Noy neatly summarizes:
The fact that all of the information about informants available in 
snowball sampling is supplied solely by the informants themselves 
has a crucial consequence. Unlike the bulk of sampling procedures 
and designs, in snowball sampling the researcher relinquishes a 
considerable amount of control over the sampling phase to the in-
formants (2008: 332).
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This method could lead researchers towards a sampling bias. Since 
respondents are chosen by previous respondents, they might recruit 
only people who are very well-known to them. Therefore, it is quite 
possible that the interviews are conducted with people who would 
be classified in a rather similar way. In addition, although face-to-
face in-depth interviews help researchers acquire insight into their 
field subject, respondents will be likely to give more politically cor-
rect, rather than truthful answers to the questions, and they might 
behave differently than normally due to the face-to-face nature of 
the interviews.
Also, since I am unable to communicate in the Kurdish lan-
guage, it is possible that this may have created some very minor 
problems for respondents in the Tunceli region. Despite the fact 
that I only managed to contact them via my reference, due to the 
thirty-year-long conflicts in the Eastern Turkey between Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party and Turkish Armed Forces, some respondents could 
have been a bit skeptical. Therefore, it is not abnormal that my two 
respondents already gave up and cancelled our meetings in the last 
minute. However, when my respondents from Tunceli realize that 
the questions were not related to any political issues, they become 
more relaxed while answering the questions. Therefore, this study 
should be evaluated with these limitations in mind. Also, it must be 
supported by other related studies.
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
The following parts of the thesis consist of three main units: Part A, 
Part B, and Part C. There are three chapters in Part A which con-
tains the theoretical skeleton of the thesis. The first chapter includes 
a debate as to what secularization is, and what it is not, as a concept. 
The second chapter includes a detailed review of Bruce’s secular-
ization paradigm which is a source of inspiration for the extended 
secularization paradigm. This chapter will put forward why Bruce’s 
paradigm is Christianity-based, and later discussion shall clarify 
why Bruce’s paradigm has been taken as the basis (and not others’) 
for the extended secularization paradigm. The third chapter, the 
last chapter of PART A, will include arguments concerning what 
the extended secularization paradigm is and what it is not. Part B 
contains field research done to illustrate the theoretical framework 
created in Part A. In this part, after providing historical information 
concerning Alevis, and discussing the Alevi revival since the 1980s, 
data obtained from the field research will be presented. Part C con-
sists of the Discussion and Conclusion sections where data from 
both theory and area are merged and discussed. 
PART A
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CHAPTER I
SECULARIZATION AS A CONCEPT
If we want to find out whether the extended secularization para-digm can provide a plausible explanation for the transformation 
of Alevi communities regarding their belief system and its effect 
on the marital issues, first of all, it is crucial to elaborate what sec-
ularization as a concept means. For that reason, at the beginning 
of this chapter, the concept of secularization will be fleshed out. 
Two fallacies, i.e. the general perception of “secularization = disap-
pearance of religion” (which has been put forward by well-known 
sociologists of religion like Peter Berger, Grace Davie, Rodney Stark 
et al. and which also finds support in Turkey) and the identification 
“secularization = laicization” (the two terms are often confused in 
Turkey by scholars and media) are fairly widespread. Therefore, in 
this chapter, after discussing secularization as a concept, I will argue 
how the concept of secularization differs from being irreligious, and 
also why it would be a mistake to use the concepts of secularization 
and laicization interchangeably.
WHAT DOES SECULARIZATION MEAN?
According to Evert Van der Zweerde (2014: 132), there are two 
basic senses of any –ization: process and policy. Secularization could 
thus be “an objective process that can be observed, analysed, etc.” 
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or “an active policy”. In this dissertation, I will explore the term 
as a process rather than as a policy, since the aim of this study is 
to examine whether changes in the three elements of moderniza-
tion have any kind of effect on the secularization process in Alevi 
communities. However, it should be noted in the beginning of this 
chapter that, “the concepts of ‘secular’ (…) are hard to pin down, 
and far from neutral. Notions in the conceptual field of ‘secular’ 
may seem neutral or objective, but they never are: they are always 
also polemical notions” (Van der Zweerde, 2014: 137). Therefore, the 
concept of secularization in this thesis is not exempt from polemics.
Etymologically, the word secularization goes back to saeculum 
of Ancient Rome, and the word has been used in different senses 
since then. First of all, in Ancient Rome and early Christendom, 
it refers to a long period of time as in a century or age (Bremmer, 
2008). The word secular was still used in the first half of the 17th 
century as an adjective to define “long-lasting”. John Donne, a poet 
from Oxford, used the term in one of his sermons in this way: “If 
I had a secular glass, a glass that would run an age” (Burnett, 1807; 
Donne, 1840). This usage corresponds to secolo (Italian), siglo (Span-
ish), segle (Catalan), século (Portuguese) and siècle (French) in the 
Romance languages of today. Jan Bremmer (2008) argues that the 
term, which had been used to define a period of time equal to an 
age, underwent important changes in the early Middle Ages. He 
says that the notion of saeculum was defined by Christian theolo-
gians “as the world in which we live, a world that is characterized by 
sin and the rejection of God” (Bremmer, 2008: 432). The contribu-
tion of Christian theologians to the concept of saeculum in Ancient 
Rome is rendered by Yehoshua Arieli as follows:
It is a new era [nova aetas] structured on the rejection of the belief 
in the determining force of transcendence as an actor in history as 
the idea was formulated in the Bible and in the Augustinian scheme 
of the two cities. It is a new era that denies the claim of the Church 
to be the lawgiver and foundation of all values, truth and meaning 
for man, living in the world, the saeculum, or city of man (1994: 
205).
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Another usage in the history of the word secular is within can-
on law for ecclesiastics who abandon monasticism in favour of the 
“world.” However, these “secular” ecclesiastics did not cut off their 
ties with the Church. Different from the radical ecclesiastics, who 
shut themselves up in their monastery and lived in seclusion, these 
men continued to maintain their relations with the world out there. 
Hence, they attempt to find solutions to the everyday problems of 
society from a religious perspective and through dialogue with the 
people (Casanova, 1994: 12-13). Yet another usage, as a noun (secu-
larisation) and as a verb (seculariser), is found in French in the sec-
ond half of the 16th century, and refers to “transfers of goods from 
the possession of the Church into that of the world of the lay peo-
ple” (Bremmer, 2008: 433), i.e. “the massive expropriation and ap-
propriation, usually by the state, of monasteries, landholdings, and 
mortmain wealth of the Church after the Protestant Reformation” 
(Casanova, 1994: 13).
Today there seems to be no agreement among scholars over what 
secularization is and what it is not. José Casanova argues the follow-
ing for the concept on the basis of contemporary usage:
(…) the concept itself is so multidimensional, so ironically revers-
ible in its contradictory connotations, and so loaded with the wide 
range of meanings it has accumulated through its history. The con-
cept’s very range of meanings and contradictions makes it practical-
ly non-operational for the dominant modes of empirical scientific 
analysis (1994: 12).
According to Larry Shiner (1967: 207), one of the characteristics 
of the contemporary academic world is a profound disagreement in 
terms of defining and measuring secularization. While the disagree-
ment referred to by Shiner used to be found between sociologists 
like Bryan Wilson and David Martin in the middle of the 1960s, 
the debates seem to continue unabated today between scholars such 
as Steve Bruce and Rodney Stark. In these debates, to which other 
sociologists of religion also contribute significantly,7 what secular-
7 Grace Davie (1994; 2002), Peter L. Berger (1997; 2008), José Casanova (1994; 
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ization is and whether it defines the relationship between society 
and religion (especially in West European countries, but also in the 
USA and other developed countries) are discussed in detail.
In an environment in which scholars tend to consolidate their 
positions on issues on the basis of their own and sometimes con-
trasting definitions, the concept of secularization is in a position 
akin to that of a servant who has more than one master (Shiner, 
1967: 207). Therefore, it would seem fairly clear that whenever the 
word secularization is used, it is important to know first of all what 
the author means by using the concept.
Martin (1965) has argued that the concept of secularization was 
used as an ideology in the 1960s, and that for this reason it should 
not be used in sociological literature to explain the relationship be-
tween religion and society. By contrast, Wilson (1966: 11) argued 
that secularization did not have an ideological aspect, but was used 
to express the decline in the impact of religion in Europe and the 
USA as a mode of thought guiding daily practices. The term it-
self did not support this transformation in religion-society relation. 
Peter Berger (1967a: 107), in his early writings, uses the term for 
“the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed 
from the domination of religious institutions and symbols. (...) the 
decline of religious contents in the arts, in philosophy, in literature 
(...).” Richard K. Fenn (1969: 112) summarizes what had been said 
of secularization until 1969 as follows: “expropriation of ecclesiasti-
cal property; renunciation of powers; declericalisation of structures; 
deconfessionalising of social services; desacralization of cultures; the 
de-ideologising of traditions; the demythologizing of sources (…).” 
Wilson (1979: 277) also stated that religion, having gradually lost 
its authority, has been reduced to the same status as any other item 
to be consumed in a consumer society as well as being marginal-
ized in day-to-day activities. In addition, Thomas Luckmann views 
as hallmarks of secularization people’s endeavour to find solutions 
2003; 2007), Mark Chaves (1994), Karel Dobbelaere (1985; 1999), Jeffrey K. 
Hadden (1987; 1995) among others.
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for the problems they come across in their daily lives without con-
sulting religion or religious figures, the restriction on the control of 
religion in non-religious areas, the estrangement of any religious 
belief from being the dominant culture and means of expression 
within society and the ensuing confinement of religion to the pri-
vate sphere (Luckmann, 1979: 12; Tschannen, 1991: 398). Frank J. 
Lechner (1991: 1104) emphasizes the concept of cultural plural-
ism that emerges with rationalization, the formation of different 
social strata, and the assumption of social tasks by different groups 
which previously belonged to religious institutions. Mark Chaves 
(1994: 750) argues that secularization should not be understood 
as the decline of religion, but as the declining power of religious 
authority. Casanova (1994: 19) highlights functionalist differentia-
tion and, just like Lechner, sees social modernization as liberation 
of the secular sphere (state, economy, art, science) from the reli-
gious sphere. Karel Dobbelaere (1999) explains secularization on a 
social level as the replacement of traditional society with complex, 
pragmatist and modern society, the loss of the power of religious 
knowledge in favour of rational knowledge, and the replacement 
of the religion-moulded traditional jurisdiction by the secular le-
gal order. Bruce (2002: 3), finally, sees secularization as a decline 
of behaviours and thoughts whose reference point is religion, not 
to mention breakdown in the previously prevalent power of reli-
gion, just as many have already pointed out above, in non-religious 
spheres – economy, health, education.
These scholars define the term secularization either as a decrease 
in religion and religious authority or restriction of religion into the 
private sphere. However, unlike them, there are other prominent 
scholars who perceive secularization as the complete disappearance 
of religion, total disengagement of the modern person from reli-
gion, or as the equivalent of laicization – a view that is especially 
prevalent in Turkey. For example, Berger, one of the world’s most 
reputable sociologists of religion, argues the following with respect 
to the concept of secularization:
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I think what I and most other sociologists of religion wrote in the 
1960s about secularization was a mistake. Our underlying argument 
was that secularization and modernity go hand in hand. With more 
modernization comes more secularization. It wasn’t a crazy theory. 
There was some evidence for it. But I think it’s basically wrong. Most 
of the World today is certainly not secular. It’s very religious. So is 
the U.S. The one exception to this is Western Europe. One of the 
most interesting questions in the sociology of religion today is not, 
How do you explain fundamentalism in Iran? But, Why is Western 
Europe different? (1997: 974)
Harvey Cox, who is recognized as one of the key theorists of sec-
ularization in the 1960s with his book The Secular City, later claimed 
that the theory of secularization had collapsed,8 because there were 
religious revivals all around the world (Cox & Swyngedouw, 2000). 
Stark and Iannaccone, by contrast, accept the following sentences by 
F. C. Wallace as the anticipated impact of secularization:
The evolutionary future of religion is extinction. Belief in supra-
natural beings and supranatural forces that affect nature without 
obeying nature’s laws will erode and become only an interesting 
historical memory. Belief in supranatural powers is doomed to die 
out, all over the World, as the result of the increasing adequacy and 
diffusion of scientific knowledge (1994: 230).
Jeffrey K. Hadden (1987; 1995) states that the concept of secu-
larization ostracizes the sacred, and that various intellectuals since 
the Enlightenment have wished for the disappearance of religion. 
Moreover, many have tried to prove that religion belonged to primi-
tive people and would therefore perish completely with moderniza-
tion. Hadden argues that these hostile sentiments against religion 
and wishes for non-religious societies have been sacralized as secu-
larization theory. Therefore, Hadden sees secularization as becoming 
irreligious, and claims that there are totally opposite developments 
(due to the presence of religious people in modern societies), and 
the theory of secularization should be seen as an outdated theory.
8 Cox criticizes the idea that modernization creates problem for religion by loo-
king at modern countries.
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Seeing secularization as the total disappearance of religion has 
been taken up by reputable scholars in Turkey such as Ali Köse and 
Talip Küçükcan. Köse (2006) defines secularization as the erasion 
of religion from the earth due to modernization, while Küçükcan 
(2005) defines it, following the founding fathers of sociology like 
Claude Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and Auguste Comte 
(1798-1857), as the gradual disappearance of religion in industri-
alized societies. But then he goes on to claim that there is indeed 
religious revival all around the world, and that there has not been 
secularization in most parts of the world at the beginning of the 21st 
century. While a more detailed critique of this understanding (i.e. 
perceiving secularization as the disappearance of religion) merits be-
ing the subject of another dissertation, we will consider this approach 
critically below when discussing what secularization does not mean.
I stand closer to scholars who define secularization as a process 
through which the influence of religion on society declines, partly 
because its final end is not specified in the process of secularization 
itself. That religion’s decline in power and prestige coincides with 
the modernization process does not mean that they have or would 
become totally extinct. In this sense, we can say that sociologists 
of religion such as Stark, Hayden, Davie, and Berger, who define 
secularization as the extinction of religion due to the modernization 
process, present a rather crude definition of the term.
At this point, I tend to agree with those who define seculariza-
tion as a process whereby the power and prestige of religion declines, 
rather than those who advocate for the disappearance of religion. 
However, I am also of the opinion that the definitions put forward 
above are rather religion-centric (with a focus on Christianity) and 
for that matter also church-centric. We need a concept with a more 
comprehensive framework rather than reducing a concept with a 
universal character to a specific religion or to an established insti-
tution within that religion. Nonetheless, a decline in the power of 
religion is certainly associated with secularization, but earthly struc-
tures that have been sacralised and gained religion-like characteris-
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tics are also within secularization’s field of interest. In addition, not 
only the social power and influence of religions and religion-like 
structures, but also folk and superstitious beliefs constitute part of 
the discussions on secularization.
That being said, I define secularization in general terms as fol-
lows: Secularization is the relative decrease in the social prestige and 
social influence of dominant metaphysical realm, i.e. religions, folk re-
ligions, religion-like mechanisms and superstitious beliefs, within a de-
fined period of time and in a particular place.
In this study, the concept metaphysical realm is used as an em-
bracing concept and covers the field of reasoning and thinking on 
the concepts and events based on belief and intuition rather than 
experiment and observation. For example having attitudes, com-
mitments, believes and approaches with regard to nature without 
an observable connection to experiences are considered part of the 
metaphysics (Steup, 2011: 21-22). Since metaphysical realms vary 
across societies, the word “dominant” is used to point out there is no 
one way or unique experience of metaphysics.
Here, the phenomenon called religion has been used, in the first 
place, as a paradigm in its entirety based on metaphysical references 
and having an influence on daily practices, ethical values, aesthet-
ical perceptions, ontological (existential) problems, the perceptions 
about social norms of the communities in which they are practised 
as in monotheistic religions ( Judaism, Christianity, Islam, etc.). I 
think Durkheim’s definition will be helpful at this point. “A reli-
gion” says Durkheim (1912/2008: 46), “is a unified system of beliefs 
and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart 
and surrounded by prohibitions - beliefs and practices that unite its 
adherents in a single moral community.” Such an entity, being an 
ethical system presenting proper and correct conduct modes, can 
also function as a social control mechanism, and contributes to the 
maintenance of the social order, thereby encouraging those attitudes 
and conducts that are socially acceptable (Atay, 2012: 25).
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The concept of folk religion is used to mean “the totality of all 
those views and practices of religion that exist among the people 
apart from and alongside the strictly theological and liturgical forms 
of the official religion” (Yoder, 1974: 14).
The notion of religion-like mechanisms, on the other hand, has 
exclusively been used in this thesis to indicate the structures emerg-
ing as a result of the sacralisation, deification and sublimation of the 
secular domain. The religion-like structures are those that emerge as 
a consequence of the belief that a political leader, a singer, a fashion 
icon, a nation, a community, a football player, even a particular loca-
tion possesses supranatural characteristics or powers and the conse-
quential glorification, deification and sacralisation of such entities. 
For example, some world leaders may be deified, sublimed, ascribing 
to them a superhuman character. People have sometimes seen such 
leaders even as more dignified than prophets, ascribing to them the 
character of a semi-prophet. Everything they say is passed from one 
generation to another over decades or centuries, like the verses of a 
holy book. Their influence is not limited to the period in which they 
live, but their ideas offer solutions to problems in a timeless manner. 
Furthermore, laws are enacted to protect them from criticisms; and 
quite often, it becomes impossible to criticise them because of social 
sanctions. A divine characteristic is attributed to their arguments 
and they gain a transcendental characteristic.
A superstitious belief is “defined as a strong conviction based on 
the erroneous perception of a cause-effect association between two 
independent events” ( Joukhador, J., Blaszczynski, A. & Maccal-
lum, F., 2004: 171) and inconsistent with the known laws of nature 
(Kramer & Block, 2008). The term superstitious has a pejorative 
meaning in daily usage and presupposes that there is a true belief 
(generally the dominant religious belief ) and other beliefs apart 
from this true belief are considered false, irrational, and incompat-
ible with truth. However, it should be stressed that in this thesis 
the term is not used in this pejorative meaning but just to describe 
a belief or practice that is not in harmony with orthodox religious 
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understanding as it arises from holy scriptures and that is not ex-
plained with the laws of nature. Therefore, for lack of a better term, 
despite its weaknesses, the term superstitious is used in this study 
without its pejorative meaning.
The phrases relative and a defined period of time and particular 
place in the definition are used in order to prevent an absolute un-
derstanding. In other words, they are used to indicate the weaker 
social power of religions, folk religions, religion-like mechanisms 
and superstitious beliefs “in comparison to the past” in a “particular 
place” rather than indicating an absolute value or level. We can say, 
for this reason, that even a rather faithful community may undergo 
a “secularization” process or may become more secular compared 
to the olden days. In the same way, it can also be said that a quite 
religious individual may also be secularised in comparison to for-
mer times or may become part of a more secular life. To sum up, to 
decide whether any person or community becomes more secular or 
not, a reference point (time and place) is needed.
The crucial point of this definition is that it will help us explain 
the relationship between different forms of the “sacred” and human 
beings in various parts of the world. For, as the above definition 
states, secularization denotes the decrease in the social impact not 
only of religion, but also of secular “things” that are religion-like, 
sacralized, deified or exalted into a supranatural realm.
In short, if religion is able to penetrate social life and to influence 
daily activities more than it did in the past, then it is argued that 
this society has become less secular. By the same token, if a society 
distances itself from religion compared to what was the case in the 
past due to some new dynamics, and if religion, folk religions or 
religion-like things are mentioned less often and have less influence 
in daily life, then it can be stated that this society is becoming more 
secular.
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WHAT DOES SECULARIZATION NOT MEAN?
Up until now, we have examined some definitions which for the 
most part express what secularization is. However, in order to better 
express the concept of secularization and to demonstrate the fallacy 
of the mainstream perception, I find it necessary to explain what the 
concept of secularization is not.
Secularization does not Equal Becoming Irreligious
It has been stated that certain scholars writing on secularization in 
English as well as Turkish academia see secularization as “becoming 
irreligious,” and interpret the presence of various religious people 
in today’s modern world as an absence of secularization. However, 
secularization does not mean becoming irreligious or faithless. In a 
secularized society, as defined in this study, individuals can still have 
religious faith and can still perform religious rituals. Sociologists of 
religion who perceive secularization as becoming irreligious have 
often put forward a very crude interpretation of secularization and 
a highly simplistic perception of religion.
It could be claimed that changing one’s belief system in favour of 
another religion is not a sign of secularization, since the individual 
is still said to be under the influence of another religion. However, 
secularization should not be confused with atheism or deism. What 
is important as far as secularization is concerned is the softening up 
of a religion up to a point where it becomes an entity that can be 
preferred or rejected. If a religion, which is supposed to be carried 
from birth to death, turns into something that is selectable, this is 
called secularization (Bruce, 1998: 229).
The process of secularization may result in many people distanc-
ing themselves from religion or losing their faith altogether. Bruce 
(2002; 2011a) remarks that these two processes are interrelated in 
that the decline in the social importance of religion may also lead to 
a drop in the number of people interested in religion. Nevertheless, 
the two processes are not identical, and this standpoint does not 
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necessarily suggest that the final point of secularization is becoming 
irreligious or that religion will vanish. It is not easy, or even possible, 
to make such a direct correlation in the light of the current presence 
of religion in secular societies.
The absence or presence of religious belief for that matter is not 
the primary parameter for measuring secularization’s pervasive im-
pact. The real issue here is the estrangement of religion from being 
a positive (as exemplified by an authentic religious life) or negative 
(as exemplified by certain militant atheists) reference point in so-
ciety. Max Weber’s concept of being religiously unmusical (Weber, 
2009: 324) will help us in this context: “It is true that I am abso-
lutely unmusical religiously and have no need or ability to erect any 
psychic edifices of a religious character within me. But a thorough 
self-examination has told me that I am neither antireligious nor 
irreligious.” In terms of secularization, even if the decline in the 
social impact of religion may result in an increase in the number of 
atheists or agnostics, what needs to be emphasized is not being ir-
religious, but becoming indifferent to religion. Because, seculariza-
tion questions the ways in which religion penetrates society’s fabric, 
sometimes certain religious people can even act in a more secular 
way than certain atheists. Some atheists, even if they do not believe 
in a higher power or creator, can act in a less secular manner because 
of their connection to religion. We can collate these theoretical ar-
guments in Table A1 in the context of the cafés at Nişantaşı, a very 
popular district for white Turks (elite Turks) in İstanbul.9
9 The reaction against the conservative AKP government, especially between 
2007-2009, focused on headscarfed women in the streets. At the beginning of 
2008, the political discussions which emerged because of the law that allowed 
the wearing of a headscarf at universities started to position themselves over the 
issue. The most caricaturized forms of these discussions were the reactions to the 
visibility of the headscarf in places where they were not previously visible. The 
journalist Ayşe Arman, from the Hürriyet daily, spent time in the famous Nişan-
taşı cafés such as House Café and Beymen Brasserie while wearing a headscarf 
and wrote her impressions in order to examine the claims about the laic-neigh-
bourhood’s pressures against the headscarfed women in the cafés of Nişantaşı 
(Arman, 2009, July 12). In addition to this, these discussions have continued until 
recently. At the beginning of 2013, the wellknown theatre actress Gülriz Sururi 
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Table A1. A café (previously frequented only by those who had a 
secular lifestyle) and secular way of action.10111213
Person Faith & ideology The act of going to a 
Nişantaşı café which 
is “now” frequented 
also by those wearing a 
headscarf
Is this 
action 
secular?
First Woman 
(No headscarf)
Militant Kemalist10 
or Militant 
Atheist11
She does not go to 
this café anymore, 
because she does not 
feel comfortable going 
to a café where there 
are people wearing a 
headscarf.
No
Second Woman 
(Headscarfed)
Moderate 
Muslim12
She goes to this café 
because she loves 
very much the caramel 
macchiato that is served 
there.
Yes
Third Woman
(Headscarfed)
Radical Muslim13 She goes to this café 
even though it is not 
to her taste. She thinks 
that by going there she 
is taking revenge upon 
those who had despised 
her for years.
No
said the following in an interview: “Look, people can veil themselves according 
to their free will. I accept that. But where were they ten/twelve years ago? They 
have come out systematically. They were commanded to sit in the cafés of Nişan-
taşı, so they did. They spread everywhere, to the most unexpected restaurants, the 
most unexpected cafés, cinemas, theatres” (Sururi, 2013, February 19).
10  In this study, a militant Kemalist has been defined as an individual claiming to 
be a Kemalist who expects that everyone she/he coexists, or must coexist, in the 
public sphere should conduct in compliance with her/his own ideology.
11 The notion of militant atheism has been used in this study for situations where 
the reaction given against seemingly religious people in particular has an influ-
ence on the daily life of an individual.
12 In this study, the term of moderate Muslim has been used to refer to the indi-
viduals the religions of whom play no crucial role in their daily life activities.
13 The notion of radical Muslim has been used in this study to characterise the 
individuals whose religious beliefs have a radical and constant influence on 
their daily life activities.
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From this table, we can see that sometimes a religious person 
can act more “secularly” than an atheist person. This is because sec-
ularization is not about becoming irreligious, but is rather about the 
social contexts where religion is less and less taken as a positive or 
negative reference point. In this example, the daily behaviour of the 
First Woman (to go or not to go to a café she used to frequent) is 
influenced by her relationship with religion. Although she does not 
have any religious faith or does not have much connection with re-
ligion in her daily life, her reaction towards religion, religious people 
or religious symbols provides direction for her daily life. At times, 
her negative relationship to religion or religious people restrains her 
from doing the things she likes (such as going to her favourite café). 
The Third Woman, who is a radical Muslim, wants to go to that 
café from where she had been excluded for years because of her 
outfit, this time only because of the rejection she had to endure in 
the past, even though she does not care much about the menu of 
the café. Just like the First Woman, the Third Woman also decides 
to go to that café due to her relationship with religion. Even if one 
of them goes to the café and the other does not, both of them act 
on the basis of their relationship with religion as a reference point. 
Whether the action is positive or negative does not change the fact 
that the action arises from their relationship with religion. However, 
the Second Woman, who also wears a headscarf just like the Third 
Woman, goes to that café mainly to have caramel macchiato. She has 
this coffee not on the basis of her relationship with religion, but 
according to her taste, irrespective of religion or religious discussion, 
and she prefers a place where she can, but must not wear a head-
scarf. When we juxtapose these three people – in the context of one 
and the same café – we can state that the Second Woman, who is a 
moderate Muslim, acts more secularly than both the First Woman, 
who is an atheist, and the Third Woman, who is a radical Muslim.
Therefore, it should be stressed once more that secularization is 
not to be equated with becoming irreligious. On the contrary, peo-
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ple do not have to lose their faith when they become secular. They 
can still regularly go to churches, mosques, synagogues or other sa-
cred places of their faith, baptize their children, sacrifice animals, go 
on Hajj, celebrate Thanksgiving Day in crowded and appropriate 
places, perform prayers, fast, and carry out all their religious duties 
and rituals. When it comes to secularization, how the individual 
cares about religion positively or negatively in matters such as pre-
marital relations, abortion, sexual orientation, birth control, educa-
tion, health, divorce, euthanasia, having premarital or extramarital 
children, choice of work and friends, marriage between people of 
different religions or denominations, choice of city or neighbour-
hood to live in, understanding of vacation, etc. seems more import-
ant than how often s/he prays or the faith s/he adheres to. Certainly, 
changes in the frequency of religious rituals or changes in the num-
ber of people who have a faith are also important in discussions on 
secularization. However, the concept of secularization in this thesis 
focuses on how religion, religious-like structures, folk beliefs and 
superstitious practices are reflected in societal life. Therefore, it is 
crucial to emphasize the difference between a faith, which has lost 
its power to influence people’s daily practices after having been re-
duced to certain rituals during specific times of the year, and other 
forms of faith which still hold the power to regulate societal life in 
terms of discussions on secularization. For that reason, the secular-
ization concept in this thesis is not related to the number of believ-
ers, but to the functions of faith in daily practices.
Secularization does not Equal Laicization
The concept of secularization is discussed frequently in academic 
studies and even in daily life, especially in countries where German-
ic languages (English, German, Dutch, etc.) are spoken. However, 
when it comes to Turkey, the concept has not received the attention 
that it deserves due to historical and etymological reasons. Turkish 
scholars and media have preferred to use the terms derived from the 
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Greek word laïkós meaning “from the people” and the Latin word 
laicus meaning “not related to religious affairs” (Küçük, 2011: 46), 
namely, terms such as laic, laicism or laicization to describe what 
secular, secularism and secularization mean, respectively. It would be 
very common in Turkey for two people to vehemently argue on cer-
tain topics related to religion and society without using - even once 
- the terms derived from saeculum. And that is because the terms 
derived from laïkós have already been used to express all those ideas 
related to the issues of religion-society-state. Therefore, for the sake 
of this dissertation, the ambiguity and confusion regarding these 
terms should first be clarified by highlighting the key differences 
between them. In doing so, the following thus contributes to the 
discussions on these issues by liberating them from the “laicization 
– Islamisation” dichotomy prevalent in Turkey.
In contrast to the concept of secularization that aims to define 
an objective process between religion and all other entities, laiciza-
tion is an active policy, implemented in France and Turkey, which 
projects the relation between the state and religion. In its broadest 
sense, laicization denotes the separation of the state from religion, 
the state being equidistant to all religious groups, and religious 
groups not being allowed to have a voice in education, health, secu-
rity, law, or economy, all of which are under state supervision. It also 
signifies the state not looking after the interests of certain religious 
groups when taking decisions on internal and external affairs, peo-
ple not being suspended from state institutions or promoted on the 
basis of their religious beliefs; in short, the state is irreligious.
Even if this can be considered a definition of laicization, it is 
not enough to merely provide a definition when it comes to laici-
zation since the practices of it differ throughout history. Because 
of the 1789 French Revolution and the 1923 Kemalist Revolution, 
laicization has been held to mean not only the separation of state 
from religion as defined above, but also the struggle of the state 
to establish hegemony over religious institutions. The Turkish word 
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laiklik comes from the French word laïcité. After the French Revo-
lution, one key purpose of the revolutionaries was to make people 
worship not the Church, but the State. The primary objective was to 
eliminate the Church or at least hinder its progress so as to always 
remain under the hegemony of the State. Soon after the revolution, 
many priests and nuns were shot, hung, or mutilated with axes if 
they were believed to have been collaborators of the previous regime 
(Souvay, 1923: 489). The ecclesiastics who refused to pledge loyalty 
to the new regime were threatened with death and the revolution’s 
laws replaced the laws of the Church (Brunner, 1991: 76). In brief, 
the French revolutionaries separated religious affairs from those of 
the state and aimed their revolution at eliminating the Church by 
replacing it with the state.
Inspired by the French system of thought and state structure, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the politically active intellectuals of the 
young Turkish Republic adopted the French style for their new state. 
Like the French Jacobins, they wanted to redesign society through 
a highly centralized structure. Just as the Jacobins had managed to 
eliminate the Church from the state affairs under the concept of 
laïcité, Atatürk also wished, in the name of laiklik, to remove all 
religious symbols from social life and render everything religious 
under state control. Until he died in 1938, Atatürk continued to 
either change the Islamic symbols or eliminate/nationalize them so 
as to liken Turkish society to contemporary (Western) secular so-
cieties. He wanted to found not only a laic state, but also to create 
a secular society. He passed radical laws both to laicize the state 
and to prevent religion from penetrating Turkish life (the policy of 
secularizing).
In 1922, the Ankara Government14 abolished the sultanate, 
which was probably the first step by the young Republic on its way 
14 In 1922, there were two governments in the territory then known as Turkey. 
The Ankara Government was established by Atatürk and his friends. The Is-
tanbul Government, on the other hand, was set up by the supporters of the old 
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towards laicization. In 1924, the caliphate and the old ministry of 
religious affairs (Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekaleti) were abolished. A laic 
system of education was introduced with the removal of any distinc-
tion between madrasah (Islamic religious school) and school. The 
contents of the courses were cleansed of anything that smacked of 
religion. In 1925, monasteries, zawiyahs (Islamic religious schools), 
and shrines were closed down. A year later, the Swiss Civil Code 
and German Commercial Law formed the backbone of the new 
Republic’s laws which were free of religion. The French revolution-
aries had lengthened the days in a week from 7 to 10, so that people 
could not pray on Sundays and even banned the word “Sunday”. 
Maybe not in that level and extent, but Atatürk also changed the 
weekend holiday from Friday to Sunday.
In 1928, the provision “Religion of the State is Islam” was de-
leted from the Constitution. Arguably, the most far-reaching move 
towards laicization of the state occurred in November of the same 
year. Atatürk changed the alphabet from Arabic to Latin and al-
most the whole nation had to learn the new written language from 
scratch overnight. In 1932, Arabic and Persian words were removed 
from the glossary under the name of purifying the Turkish language 
(Stirling, 1958: 399-403). According to Nilüfer Göle (1997: 50), 
all these efforts were aimed at estranging Turkish society from the 
Qur’ān and other religious sources in Arabic. In 1933, all religious 
educational institutions were closed down and religious education 
in primary schools was forbidden (Stirling, 1958: 396). Women, 
who previously had been given the right only to vote in local elec-
tions, received in 1934 the right to vote and be elected in the general 
elections.
And finally, in 1937 laiklik was formally added to the Constitu-
tion. Thus, the process which started with the abolition of sultanate 
and caliphate15 was officially completed with the formal adoption 
regime.
15 The modernization process of Turkey cannot be thought of independently 
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of laiklik into the Constitution after ground-breaking decisions had 
been made in the fields of education, law, commerce and politics. 
Just as the French revolutionaries had founded a new republic by 
eradicating all traces of the old regime and by implementing laïcité, 
the Turkish revolutionaries removed religion from public domains 
and restricted it to private homes, degrading it to a point at which 
they could easily control it. Unlike the way the term is defined in the 
dictionaries, in both cases the exact situation is not like separation 
of two entities, but that one of them goes under the control of the 
other.
Another problem concerning the definition of the concept is et-
ymological in nature. The Germanic languages (English, German, 
Dutch, Danish, etc.) do not use laicism to express the separation be-
tween state and religion. In these languages, the term that expresses 
this division is secularism rather than laicism. But in the dictionaries, 
the word laïcité is translated into English as secularism, German as 
Säkularismus, Danish and Norwegian as sekularisme and Dutch as 
secularisme although these two terms (laicism and secularism) refers 
to different things. If a person who speaks one of the Germanic 
languages uses the word laicism, s/he is primarily referring to the 
relation between state and religion in France or Turkey in particular. 
Because, as opposed to secularism which merely implies the separa-
tion of state and religion, religious institutions or religion itself has 
been controlled in the public sphere under the name of laicism.16
from the modernization process of the Ottoman Empire, that is, from the re-
forms which took place in the 18th and 19th centuries. Therefore, it would not 
be an exaggeration to say that the roots of the new country, which Atatürk tried 
to build by modelling it on the West, were based on the military reforms of 
the 18th and 19th centuries, in the Imperial Edict of Gülhane in 1839, in the 
Royal Edict of Reform in 1856, and in the other regulatory laws on education, 
jurisdiction and the economy (Berkes, 2006).
16 Those Germanic languages do have the words derived from “laïkos”: lay in 
English, Laie in German, leek in Dutch. However, instead of using it for a 
specific political move like in France and Turkey, they are used with the general 
meaning of non-ordained or, more generally, non-initiated.
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While the state is not supposed to favour or disfavour religious 
positions in the so-called laic countries, the case is strikingly dif-
ferent when it comes to Turkish laicism. For example, Sunni Islam 
is taught in the public schools of Turkey as a requirement. Stu-
dents, be they Alevi or atheist, have to take that course and learn 
how to pray like Sunni people. Besides, all mosques belong to the 
Turkish state and all the costs of mosques are paid for by the state. 
The sermons given each Friday in mosques are sent to all mosques 
from one centre, The Directorate of Religious Affairs, located in 
the capital city, Ankara. Therefore, it is not abnormal to learn that 
the contents of the sermons are directly linked to the government’s 
interests (Gürpınar & Kenar, 2016).
In light of these different structures, it would not seem appro-
priate to use laicism and secularism or secularization and laicization 
interchangeably. For example, the regime of the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Sweden (until 2000) and Norway, where the head of state 
is also the head of an established state church or religion, is not one 
of laicism, but of secularism. These are not laic, because the state 
does have a religion, even if it is only a figurative one. However, sec-
ularism is the political principle that the state is relatively equidis-
tant to all groups of faith, which means that religion has no word in 
the state of affairs. The fact that these countries have secular judicial 
systems does not mean that they are therefore laic.
To overcome this etymological difference and confusion, Man-
oranjan Mohanty (1989) uses the concepts of “hegemonic secu-
larism” and “democratic secularism”. Ahmet Kuru (2007), on the 
other hand, uses the concepts “assertive secularism” and “passive 
secularism” to explain the different structures. In this case, we can 
say that according to Kuru and Mohanty, assertive/hegemonic sec-
ularism has been experienced in Turkey and France whereas other 
non-laic West European countries have been experiencing passive/
democratic secularism. In the same vein, Van der Zweerde (personal 
communication, May 23, 2014) uses Catholaicité, New Englaicité 
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and Muslaicité to stress that what is being experienced in France, 
the USA and Turkey with regard to state-religion affairs is not one 
and the same thing and depends on the religious tradition in place.
In this case, if we can summarize the difference between secular-
ization and laicization (as it has been implemented in Turkey and 
France), it will be the following:
Secularization is the process of gaining independence from religion 
(…) without having an aggressive and antagonistic attitude against 
religion, on the other hand, laicization is the process where a di-
rect hostile attitude is assumed against religion in an effort to elim-
inate all the rituals, realms, individuals and public conducts hav-
ing religious character and substitute them with pure earthly and 
non-religious factors. As a stern attitude is taken against religion 
and religious institutions in the laicization process, this process will 
necessarily be accompanied by oppression, totalitarian inclinations, 
assimilation and projects of social liquidation (Duran, 1997: 13).
In other words, while the defenders of laicization in Turkey try 
to alienate religion from various aspects of social life, theorists of 
secularization do not seem to have such an objective. While laici-
zation has pillars such as transforming and changing society, for-
bidding and enforcing things, theorists of secularization do not 
expect anything from either society or state. Laicization expresses 
the transformation desired at the state level, whereas secularization 
refers to the overall transformation mostly as an objective process. 
While laicization is the active policy of a politico-judicial principle, 
Wilson (1966), by contrast, stated that secularization is not an ide-
ology and does not have as objective either to applaud or condemn 
the transformation of the relationship between religion and society. 
I think that the following summary by Hasan Yücel Başdemir of 
Turkish laicization is instructive:
The implementation of Turkish-type laicism as a project of enlight-
enment and modernization has revealed another problem in terms 
of the freedom of religion. Laicism has been implemented as a life-
style which has encompassed all the domains of life and which is 
alternative to the religious life. Laicism, which is fundamentally a 
legal and political thought and value (…) (2011: 148).
VOLKAN ERTİT
60
In brief, secularization is not something that can be imposed 
upon society, as is the case with laicization in Turkey and France. 
On the contrary, it is a process that has its own internal dynamics 
and emerges by itself. Now, it is necessary to look at examples of 
how these two concepts, which do have different meanings, are used 
in the Turkish media and academic world to mean the same thing.
Two Concepts Used Interchangeably
It should normally be taken for granted that the concepts derived 
from the word laïkos may be used far more frequently than the 
concepts derived from the word saeculum in a country where the 
principle of laicïty has been used to build a new system and then 
adopted in its constitution. However, the main problem in Turkey is 
not which concept is used more or used less, but that one of the con-
cepts may be used to encompass the other. There are two pillars of 
such misuse: media and – parallel to it – academia. Turkish colum-
nists, newspaper editors and some scholars have used the words laic, 
laicism, laicization instead of secular, secularism, and secularization 
for quite some time now, either because they think that the vast 
masses will not understand it, or because they are not themselves 
familiar with the concept. I think that it is no coincidence that there 
are still people asking, “Do you mean laicization?” whenever I try to 
explain what secularization is.
For example, journalist Mustafa Armağan (1997, September 26) 
opts for the title, “The Legend of Secularization (Laicization)” for 
his article in which he criticizes the secularization thesis. Armağan 
considers it more appropriate to use “laicization” in parentheses, 
probably so as not to scare off people from using an unknown word, 
secularization. Nuray Mert (2009, March 29) uses the title, “Do 
They Get Laicized as They Prosper?” for her column in Hürriyet 
with a discussion on the estrangement of prospering conservatives 
from religion. The content of the article exhibits a certain conceptu-
al confusion because of the writer’s bias against the word seculariza-
tion. Özdemir İnce (2012, March 4), in his column in Hürriyet, uses 
SECULARIZATION OF ALEVIS IN TURKEY
61
expressions such as “the social culture is laicized” or “the laicization 
of the individual.” However, social culture can be secularized, but 
not laicized. Moreover, contrary to what İnce implies, individuals 
cannot be laicized. They can defend a laic state system, but by that 
fact cannot be considered laic. If we want to express the notion that 
individuals are living a life away from religion, it would seem more 
appropriate to say that they have been secularized, but not laicized.
In addition to the columnists, the editorial preferences of news-
papers do not favour the word “secularization” either. If one searches 
how often big daily newspapers use the terms, the outcomes are 
very interesting. Table A2 demonstrates how often these terms have 
been used in a period of more than ten years by four top newspapers 
in Turkey. There are two main reasons why I have chosen these four 
newspapers. First, these four newspapers address quite large audi-
ences, i.e. millions of people from different segments of society. The 
second is that due to the technical infrastructure they possess, re-
search into the past is possible for Zaman, Hürriyet and Sabah until 
1997, and Milliyet until 2001. This finding is related to concepts 
that render the claims above more concrete. 
Table A2. Frequency of Usage of the Concepts “Laic-Laicism-La-
icization” and “Secular-Secularism-Secularization” by Four Mass 
Newspapers
Newspaper Time Scale Laic-Laicism-
Laicization
Secular-
Secularism-
Secularization
Zaman October 1997 – 
September 2015
26.166 times 1.844 times
Hürriyet July 1997 - 
September 2015
19.336 times 507 times
Milliyet January 2001 – 
September 2015
12.180 times 325 times
Sabah January 1997 - 
September 2015
2.950 times 444 times
VOLKAN ERTİT
62
Even if it can be agreed that the concepts derived from the word 
laïkós have dominated the Turkish agenda (due to historical pro-
cesses) more than the concepts derived from the word saeculum, 
where the frequency is 26.166 to 1.844 (Zaman) or 19.336 to 507 
(Hürriyet), we need a different dynamic from that of Turkish polit-
ical history or the mere existence of a word in the constitution in 
order to explain these figures. The reason for the apparent lack of 
enthusiasm in Turkish society for the word secularization is really 
not the indifference of Turkish public opinion concerning this issue. 
On the contrary, discussions on matters such as “becoming conser-
vative,” “Malaysianization,” or “Iranianization,” which have ranked 
among the most important issues of the Turkish agenda for so many 
years, do in fact address the realm of secularization. Even in these 
discussions, words such as laic, laicism, and laicization have been 
wrongly used instead of secular, secularism or secularization. For 
example, laicization of the social order is talked about in Hürriyet 
(2003, December 20) in this way: “(…) it has been understood that 
the social order will not laicize before schools are laicized.” Laiciza-
tion is also mentioned in Milliyet (2004, February 17): “Especially 
in Islamic societies which are in the midst of laicization process 
(…).” However, neither the laicization of social order nor the la-
icization of society is a meaningful expression. Laicization is not 
related to society but a concept related to the state.
Even if the academic world uses the concepts secularization - la-
icization interchangeably less often than the media, it is quite possi-
ble to still come across many wrong examples in Turkish academia. 
For example, although Anthony Giddens uses the word “secular-
ization” as the subtitle in his famous book Sociology, the word was 
translated into Turkish as “laicization” and currently many universi-
ties still use that book for all freshmen. In the book Şerif Mardin’e 
Armağan (Companion to Şerif Mardin), Bahattin Akşit, who is one 
of the more notable sociologists in Turkey, writes:
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Casanova (1994) who questions and reformulates the laicization 
thesis in terms of the historical process (…). (…) to research the 
relationship between Islam and laicization. According to Casanova 
(1994) our evaluation rests on three separate moments when we say 
that a country or a society is laicized: differentiation, retreatment to 
the private sphere and the decrease in religiosity (…) (2005: 68).
[Laikleşme kuramını Protestanlığın dışındaki Katolikliğin geçirdiği tar-
ihsel süreçler açısından sorgulayan ve yeniden formüle eden Casanova 
(1994) İslamiyet’in laikleşme ile olan ilişkisini araştırmamızı (...). 
Casanova’ya göre (1994), bir ülkenin veya toplumun laikleşmiş old-
uğunu söylediğimiz zaman üç farklı boyutta değerlendirme yapıyoruz: 
farklılaşma, özel alana çekilme ve dinselliğin azalması (...).]
However, the statements made by Casanova in the book Public 
Religions in Modern World (1994) differ from those cited by Akşit. 
Casanova talks about secularization, not laicization, and discusses 
in his book the fundamental argument of the secularization theo-
ry. While Casanova (1994: 19) uses the subheading Three Separate 
Moments of the Theory of Secularization,17 Akşit (2005: 68) translates 
this as “the three separate moments of laicization [laikleşmenin üç 
farklı boyutu].” While it is “the theory of secularization” which is 
prevalent throughout Casanova’s book, Akşit adapts it to his article 
in terms of laicization. Yet another professor, Bünyamin Duran, uses 
laicization and secularization interchangeably in his early writings, 
and sees secularization as part of a project such as saving, purifying, 
liberating someone from something:
Laicization (secularization) can be defined as the process of libera-
tion of the human mind and thought – in general – from the control 
of religion and metaphysics. It is the purification and liberation of 
all the branches of social life, of politics, culture and science from 
religion-based values (1995: 29-30).
[Laikleşme (sekülerleşme); insan aklı ve düşüncesinin-genel olarak-di-
ni ve metafizik denetimden kurtarılması süreci olarak tanımlanabilir. 
17 In his book, José Casanova, after a statement on “the core and central thesis 
of the theory of secularization,” explains the three dimensions that Akşit talks 
about. 
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Toplumsal hayatın tüm branşlarının; siyasetin, kültürün, bilimin dine 
dayanan değerlerden arındırılması ve bağımsızlaştırılması olayıdır.]
In addition, “secularism”, as an ideology, is also confused with 
secularization in Turkey. The book entitled Secularism on Trial 
(Sekülerizm Sorgulanıyor), edited by Prof. Ali Köse and published 
in 2002, contained articles criticizing the theory of secularization, 
such that the title should indeed have been Secularization on Tri-
al. This book, which focused on West-oriented literature, includes 
important articles by well-known scholars who have criticized the 
theory of secularization over the past 30 years, such as Peter Berger, 
Rodney Stark, Grace Davie and Harvey Cox. Unlike secularization, 
secularism, however, denotes an ideology which affirms a structure 
distant from religion at the level of both the state and the individual.
As can be understood from these examples, the scholars and 
journalists in Turkey have used laicization and secularization to 
mean the same thing many times for some understandable reasons. 
However, I think that these two concepts should not be used inter-
changeably, because they do have very different meanings. As will 
be seen below, states which are not laic may have societies which 
follow secular lifestyles, just as there are laic states which have high-
ly religious societies.
Laic States with Religious Societies or vice versa
Laicization, in its broadest sense, only refers to the relation between 
religion and state, whereas secularization is also used to define the 
relation between religion and society. Therefore, a laic state may have 
non-secular societies, while non-laic states may have societies with 
a secular lifestyle. The founding fathers of the United States, such 
as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Franklin, 
all of them faithfully religious, separated religion from state affairs 
when the newly formed nation was being set up, grounding it upon 
the principle of “freedom of religion” (İmga, 2010). However, even 
though in the USA the state does not adopt a positive or negative 
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position towards any particular faith, the level of religious sensibility 
in American society is very high because of the peculiar dynamics 
within American society.18 The ratio of church-going is much high-
er in the USA than in European countries even if all have a similar 
level of modernity.19
In addition, although the Islamic Republic of Iran has been gov-
erned by shari‘a law since 1979, a considerable proportion of Iranian 
society has a secular lifestyle. The research carried out by Abdolmo-
hammad Kazemipur and Ali Rezaei (2003: 357) shows that Iranian 
society has not become as religious as its state. Iranian women can-
not take off headscarves in public places and Iranians cannot drink 
alcohol outside because of state law. However, in realms where the 
state does not interfere – especially inside the homes – they fol-
low a secular lifestyle. The Iranian house parties (since they do not 
have the opportunity to have parties anywhere else) are places where 
women wear clothes with cleavages, where all kinds of alcohol are 
consumed, and where women and men are free from the religious 
laws imposed upon them by the state (Farid, 2013; Maxfux, 2013). 
The present religious regime seems to have a society which adheres 
to a more secular lifestyle day by day (Lotfi, Kabiri & Ghasem-
lou, 2013). The fact that the state is not laic and that it is governed 
18  There are important works written about the USA and Europe which have 
pursued different processes of secularization despite having the similar degrees 
of modernity. I think that it is not a coincidence that, while different from 
Europe, the USA did not go through the Protestant reform and did not ex-
perience the absolute monarchy, and as a country of emigration is therefore 
more religious. For related sources, see: Berger, Davie & Fokas, 2008; Casano-
va, 2003; 2007).
19 “American church membership rates have risen throughout the past two centu-
ries—from 17% at the time of the Revolution to more than 60% in the 1990s.” 
(Frejka & Westoff, 2008: 12). On the contrary, church membership rates in 
United Kingdom decreased from 27% at the beginning of the 20th century to 
10% in the 2000s (Bruce, 2002: 67). In addition to this, while 12 % of Ameri-
can women between 18-44 years old go to church more than a week this ratio 
decreases to 3 % for European women. While 21 % of American women go to 
church once in a week, again, this percentage also decreased to 12 % for Euro-
pean women (Frejka & Westoff, 2008: 27).
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by shari‘a law does not make many Iranians more religious; it only 
makes them look more religious in the public domain.
Turkey is an interesting case in this respect as well. Although 
Turkish society experienced an exclusionary/hegemonic laicism 
throughout the 20th century, it has not been able to isolate itself 
from religion as much as the state wished. Atatürk and the govern-
ing elite thought that they could secularize Turkish society by abol-
ishing the sultanate and dynasty, by changing the hats and clothings 
of the people, by closing down the monasteries, the zawiyahs and 
the shrines, and by changing the alphabet. But while it is possible to 
make the state laic with a law that is made part of the constitution, 
diminishing the presence of religion within society is not as easy 
as laicizing the state. If societies could be secularized by means of 
changes to the law, it should also be possible to divest oneself of 
this secularity with a single law. The secularization of society is not 
something that can be realized simply through the law or with a 
certain project. For this reason, we should state that although Tur-
key has tried to establish itself as a laic state and the laws enacted 
by the governing elites in the 1930s have caused people to practice 
their religion for a long time in places where the state cannot see it, 
this is just the opposite of what happened and is happening in Iran.
I do not for a moment wish to claim that there is not any in-
teraction between laicism and secularization or between laicization 
and secularism. Certainly, Iran becoming a religious state has caused 
a group within Iranian society to become more religious, while the 
exclusionary laicism in Turkey has led to a group there becoming 
secularized. However, neither Iran was able to make its people more 
religious by using force, nor was Turkey able to estrange its people 
from religion, as the Kemalist elites had wanted, with top-down 
laws. The reason why these states have failed in their projects is that 
for secularization to take place, much more is needed than the pow-
er of the law.
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Conclusion
There is no consensus within the social sciences with regard to the 
definition of secularization. For that reason, the academics who work 
on the concept of secularization need to clarify their understanding 
of secularization with their readers at the beginning of their studies. 
In addition, there is no consensus in the academic world on how 
secularization would be measured. Therefore, specifying the social 
dynamics that would be assigned priority in measuring seculariza-
tion would prevent many misunderstandings. Since the following 
sections of the thesis are based on the secularization concept, what 
secularization is and what it is not had to be explained to the reader 
in detail.
Secularization, as far as it is defined in this study, is not only a 
concept used to explain the relationship between religion and soci-
ety. Secularization means the decrease in social prestige, power and 
visibility of the metaphysical realm within a specific society at a cer-
tain period of time. The concept of metaphysics used here is not just 
religious but also encompasses (together with religion) folk beliefs, 
religion-like mechanisms and superstitions. Additionally, secular-
ization should not be used as being synonymous with separation 
of state and religion or becoming irreligious. If secularization is de-
fined as such, the frequency of prayers, the rates of going to church 
or changes in the number of believers will not be primal in measur-
ing secularization because how metaphysics reflect itself on daily 
practices might be different in different societies or belief systems. 
From this point of view, the thing expressed here is not that change 
in religious rituals or in the number of believers is not important in 
measuring secularization. However, it should be emphasized one 
more time that the common feature of secularized societies is that 
the metaphysical realm now touches daily life practices less than in 
the past. 
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CHAPTER II
THE SECULARIZATION PARADIGM OF STEVE BRUCE
In the previous chapter, I have discussed the concept of secular-ization and argued how this concept is different from being ir-
religious, and why laicization should not be used as a substitute for 
the term. In this chapter, I will explore the secularization paradigm 
of Steve Bruce, which is based on classical secularization theory and 
remains one of the most controversial paradigms in social science.
According to Bruce’s paradigm, modernization is the main rea-
son behind the aggressive secularization process now pervading 
Western Europe and its offshoots. There are two main issues of 
discussion among sociologists and theologians in this regard. First, 
there is an ongoing debate on the meaning or scope of classical 
secularization theory, in which scholars have yet to reach consensus 
regarding the answers to the questions “What does the theory as-
sert?” and “What does it not assert?” The second discussion, which 
cannot be considered separate from the first, is whether the theory 
is able to put forward a clear explanation for the bumpy relationship 
between religion and society in the European context and in other 
parts of the world. Therefore, in this chapter, I will attempt to pro-
vide some answers to the questions mentioned above. Firstly, I will 
try to shed some light on what Bruce’s secularization paradigm does 
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assert. Then, I will explain why Bruce’s paradigm, rather than other 
secularization theories was chosen as the starting point.
A PARADIGM THAT BELONGS TO PROTESTANTISM
It is true that to understand the underlying causes of the seculariza-
tion process in a certain region, the internal dynamics of that region 
should be studied. Although the central claim of the secularization 
paradigm of Bruce – a direct correlation between modernization 
and secularization - is related to West European countries and their 
offshoots at least as a general statement, the fact that modern soci-
eties in and outside Europe have very different levels of seculariza-
tion suggests that there is more at stake.
For example, is it really possible for anyone to examine the his-
tory of secularization regarding French society without taking into 
account the French Revolution? For any discussion on the secular-
ization of French society, the elimination and removal of religious 
symbols from the public sphere by the revolutionary leaders as well 
as the closely connected relations between high clergy and the for-
mer regime (the monarchy before the revolution), should be on the 
table. In parallel, when it comes to the countries of the former War-
saw Pact,20 a different dynamics beyond the modernization process 
is needed to explain the very harsh and rigorous secularization.
Likewise, it would not be wise to suggest that the lack of secular-
ization of Irish society compared to other West European societies 
is directly linked to the modernization process alone. The war of in-
dependence waged by Irish Catholics against English Protestants in 
the years 1919-1921 rendered Catholicism more than just a matter 
of faith for the Irish. Similarly, the armed struggle carried out by the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) between 1969 and 2005 for a reunit-
20 People’s Republic of Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, Hungarian Pe-
ople’s Republic, Romanian People’s Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, People’s Republic of Albania, Polish People’s Republic, Czechoslovak 
Socialist Republic.
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ed Ireland rendered mainly Protestant Northern Ireland more sen-
sitive to its religious identity and symbols. If the secularization his-
tories of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are studied, 
it is obvious that such histories cannot be regarded independently 
from those bloody struggles.
To give another example, “Czechs are some of the least religious 
people in Eastern Europe, (…) [but] their close neighbours and 
one-time compatriots, the Slovaks, are vastly more religious. (…) 
the religious differences between Czechs and Slovaks are rooted in 
the historical relationship between religion and nationalism in both 
regions” (Froese, 2005: 269), but not in their different moderniza-
tion levels. A third example can be found in the Polish religious 
involvement. It is not a coincidence that Polish society, which has 
struggled for independence from Soviet Russia for years and re-
ceived support from the Roman Catholic Church and its clergy, is 
more religious than most other European societies (Arnold, 2012: 
228).
The feelings among the Polish people towards religious rituals, 
symbols and clergy who placed themselves at the forefront of the 
battle against Soviet Russia for 40 years after World War II, or the 
feelings within French society towards religion and the French re-
ligious class who had supported the old regime until 1789, cannot 
be dissociated from their own histories. Although years have passed 
since both cases, it is likely that social consciousness was deeply 
influenced by each nation’s unique course of history.
In fact, it should be stated that not only do different modern or 
modernizing countries tend to have various degrees of seculariza-
tion; different regions within the same country may also have differ-
ent degrees of secularization due to various distinctive factors. For 
example, the Eastern and Western parts of Turkey show different 
secularization levels. In particular, a form of feudal culture is still be-
ing experienced as part of social life in some regions of Central, East 
and Southeast Anatolia. Religion still has the capacity and power to 
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penetrate society in these regions with its rules, bans and sanctions. 
On the other hand, a secular lifestyle, akin to that in West Europe-
an countries, can be easily observed in some cities of the Western 
regions of Turkey. Another solid example at this point would be 
Germany. The secularization level in East Germany, as shown in 
Table A3 (Pollack & Pickel, 2007: 613), is much higher than that in 
West Germany, and to understand this striking difference, we need 
a more detailed explanation than the dynamics of a universal theory.
Table A3. Increase and decrease of belief in God, Western and East-
ern Germany, 1991 and 1998 (%)
Belief in God West Germany East Germany
1991 1998 1991 1998
Have never believed in God 10 13 50 58
Have previously believed in
God but do not do so now
23 25 25 17
Have not believed in God
previously but do so now
9 11 5 7
Always believed in God 58 51 20 18
Source: ISSP 1991 (West n = 1346; East n = 1486) and 1998 (West n = 1000; 
East n = 1006); statements are summing up to 100 per cent.
At the same time there are differences in terms of religious life 
even between the Catholics and Protestants living in the same re-
gion. As seen in the Table A4 (Pollack & Pickel, 2007: 615), there 
are significant differences in terms of frequenting church services 
between the Catholics and Protestants in Western Germany.
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Table A4. Regular church attendance among Catholics and Protes-
tants in Western Germany, 1952-1999 (%)
Regular Church 
Attendance 1952 1963 1967/ 69 1973 1982 1991 1999
Catholics as a whole 51 55 48 35 32 33 26
Catholics in the age of:
16-29 52 52 40 24 19 17 10
30-44 44 51 42 28 26 21 15
45-59 50 56 53 46 29 34 24
60 and older 63 64 62 57 54 54 50
Protestants as a whole 13 15 10 7 6 8 7
Protestants in the age 
of
16-29 12 11 6 3 4 4 4
30-44 7 10 6 3 4 4 3
45-59 13 16 11 7 6 7 6
60 and older 23 24 22 12 12 17 15
Sources: Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach 1978ff., in general n:1000
In addition, native Germans across the country have by and 
large adopted a more secular lifestyle, while religion has become 
very important for those who migrated to Germany – particular-
ly first and second generation of migrants from Muslim countries. 
Hence, immigration itself might well be a reason for being more 
attached to religion, during especially the first years of settlement in 
a new country. Being broken off from their ancestral roots and hav-
ing to live in a culture of uncertainty and unfamiliarity may partly 
explain the very central role these immigrants attribute to religion 
(Casanova, 2007: 66). 21A similar social difference with respect to 
immigration is also observable in France. Michèle Tribalat (cited in 
21 For example, one in every ten people living in the United States was born out-
side the United States, and most of this immigration came from non-modern 
countries. I think this reality may offer us some insight in respect to the very 
different secularization levels now seen in European countries and the USA.
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Fetzer and Soper, 2005: 77) argues that “French Muslims as a whole 
appear more likely to practice their religion than are French Catho-
lics, the nominal religious majority.” Besides, it would not be wrong 
to claim that one of the main reasons that the Southern Länder are 
less secular today than the Northern ones is because Germans have 
experienced two different forms of Christianity since Martin Lu-
ther: Protestantism and Catholicism. The Catholic majority in the 
Southern states is, by the very nature of their religion, more sensitive 
to religious rituals and symbols and resists secularization in compar-
ison to its counterpart (Greenberg, 2014).
Against this background, it seems to become more and more 
difficult to defend secularization theory, when almost all districts 
or regions of the world have different levels of secularization. As 
we have seen above, each country, and even different regions within 
a country, due to its peculiar history and circumstances, deserves a 
separate study. However, notwithstanding this, I think we are still 
able to make some generalizations even if some particular social 
changes come into focus due to reasons already outlined. When it 
comes to secularization, certain time–frames as well as geography 
should be considered, while keeping in mind that various factors 
at different times can change the relationship between religion and 
society. In 2002, Bruce outlined his secularization paradigm in God 
is Dead. Nine years later, he published a book entitled Secularization 
(2011a: VI), partly to clarify some misinformation relating to his 
secularization paradigm among young scholars “who have read no 
further back than the work of their supervisors, who caricature the 
secularization paradigm as predicting the rapid eradication of all 
religious sentiment, who present a small case study as rebuttal of 
a story about large-scale social change”. In this book, Bruce used 
the same figure which he had used nine years ago to explain the 
secularization paradigm as “an attempt to explain a historically and 
geographically specific cluster of changes” (Bruce, 1999a: 265). This 
historical period begins with the Protestant Reformation and en-
compasses the history of modern Europe. Geographically, the para-
digm also mentions Western Europe and its offshoots:
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Instead, I take the secularization story, like Weber’s Protestant Eth-
ic thesis, to be an attempt to explain a historically and geograph-
ically specific cluster of changes. It is an explanation of what has 
happened to religion in Western Europe (and its North American and 
Australian offshoots) since the Reformation (Bruce, 1999a: 265).
But why is the Protestant Reformation so pivotal in Bruce’s 
paradigm? According to Bruce, the secularization of Europe is the 
result of the European modernization process, and historically he 
sees the Protestant Reformation as the starting point of this dras-
tic transformation. Referring to Weber, Bruce (2011a) claims that 
the Reformation drastically and unintentionally changed the work 
ethic, and brought about the accumulation of capital. Before the 
Reformation, “other-worldly” asceticism and being cut off from 
“this world” had been seen as the very attitudes that could gain the 
mercy of God. Martin Luther focused his attack precisely on this 
form of piety and eradicated the division between religious and or-
dinary people by claiming that to be blessed there is no need to 
withdraw from “this” world. God would already be glorified if all – 
legitimate - work is done in a diligent manner. According to Luther, 
human beings had already been divided into the saved and unsaved, 
and worldly success was accepted as the sign of being chosen: a 
good person does good works (McKim, 2001: 113-14; Allen, 2010: 
75-77). Weber (1930/2005: 19) uses Benjamin Franklin’s autobi-
ography to bolster this idea: “Benjamin Franklin (…) answers in 
his autobiography with a quotation from the Bible, which his strict 
Calvinistic father drummed into him again and again in his youth: 
‘Seest thou a man diligent in his business? He shall stand before 
kings.’”Anthony Giddens (Weber, 1930/2005: XV) summarizes 
Weber by saying that “the Calvinist ethic introduced an activism 
into the believer’s approach to worldly affairs, a drive to mastery in 
a quest for virtue in the eyes of God (…).” With all the other re-
forms, i.e. arguing against the Catholic way of confession, devotion, 
atonement, absolution, and affirming work in a religious manner, 
the Reformers created a new ethics and transformed other-worldly 
asceticism into one of this-world.
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Figure A1. Bruce’s Secularization Paradigm
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In addition, according to Bruce (2002: 10), the Protestant Refor-
mation was one of the main reasons behind the rise of individualism, 
a crucial element in the secularization process. Unlike Catholicism, 
the religious culture that came with the Protestant Reformation was 
extremely open to fragmentation since the Church was no longer 
seen as the primary authority between the celestial and terrestrial 
world. Since Christ’s authority was institutionalized in the office 
of the Pope for Catholics, the papacy could thus claim that it had 
full control of the means of salvation, and it could decide all contro-
versies in the name of God’s will. However, after the Reformation, 
many different perceptions and religious organizations, claiming 
different ways of attaining salvation, came onto the scene. Unlike 
Catholic countries, the social differentiation in Protestant ones did 
not take the shape of a drastic split between religious and non-reli-
gious elements, but of many different sects from the main tradition. 
Maybe reformers could not be called democrats, or men who were 
sensitive towards freedom of religion or freedom of conscience, but 
individuals who were relatively free to choose their own church, un-
like in Catholic countries. Having rejected the privileged status of 
the clergy, they then claimed that they (individuals) were all equal 
in the eyes of God. Equality in the eyes of God then laid the foun-
dation for equality in the eyes of fellow humans and before the law. 
Equal obligations eventually became equal rights.
Bruce claims that another dynamic that indirectly emerged out 
of the Protestant Reformation is the cultural diversity which pres-
ents itself in three phenomena. First of all, people carried along their 
languages, faiths and social characteristics to the places they moved 
to. Secondly, parallel to the emergence and spread of nation-states, 
new groups of people began to live under the roof of these states. 
Thirdly, the modernization in the economic field that came into the 
picture especially in the Protestant dwelling units led to the emer-
gence of groups that entered into competition with each other. He 
believes that some Protestant sects removed the social support for 
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any particular culture or religion. “Especially in Protestant societies” 
says Bruce (1999b: 19), “nation states were having to come to terms 
with increasing religious diversity. A society that was becoming in-
creasingly egalitarian and democratic and more culturally diverse 
had to place social harmony before the endorsement of religious 
orthodoxy.”
For Bruce, religious diversity has serious social-psychological 
consequences for the secularization process. In a particular society 
where there is only one religion in which the overwhelming ma-
jority believes, and the rituals of which are adhered to by almost 
every member of society, it would not be wrong to assume that the 
position of such a religion would be seen as most vital. In religiously 
authoritarian and hierarchical societies, religious minorities would 
be disregarded, kept under control or, at best, tolerated. Noncon-
formist minorities are not allowed to exist, and are most likely to be 
expelled or oppressed. However, if that society becomes more egal-
itarian, and starts to enjoy religious diversity, then it is likely to see 
social harmony instead of religious orthodoxy. In addition, diversity 
challenges the truthfulness of religion to which believers commit 
themselves. As Bruce (1999b: 20) asserts, ideas are most persuasive 
if they are unanimously shared. Universal or social acceptance of 
a belief system makes it “an accurate account of how things are.” 
Therefore, any alternative to this universally acknowledged truth 
could be seen as a startling objection.
This does not mean that adherents to the dominant religion will 
fall on hard times simply because alternatives have come into being. 
But clashes over diverse views on beliefs bring about very serious 
secularizing effects. People who had been absolutely sure of the 
truth of their faith now start wondering whether it might not be 
different after all, precisely, hence Augsburg, 1555.22 One authority 
22 With the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, different belief doctrines become official 
in various princedoms. The establishment of principle cuius regio eius religio 
gave to ruling people, be it king, prince, bishop or whoever, the right to create 
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with force is always seen as more prestigious, convincing and pow-
erful than two authorities claiming the same thing(s), but without 
force.
In addition, different sects and churches did more than merely 
break the hold and power of the dominant belief system; they were 
also left with no choice but to moderate themselves, thereby losing 
their radical character in the course of time:
(…) that diversity weakens religious commitments by removing the 
social support for any one religion and by encouraging people to 
confine their religious beliefs to specific compartments (…) and to 
remove the specific and contested elements from their beliefs. The 
sect, by proliferating competing alternatives (…), is thus its own 
grave-digger (Bruce, 2002: 22).
For example, although the Quaker movement in England was 
first set up as a marginal sect whose founders were punished for in-
fraction of the traditions of the established Church of England, not 
long after, the movement moderated its own condemnations due to 
requests from its own members (Bruce, 2002). This kind of trans-
formation was observed among Methodists as well. Bruce, using 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s argument, has astutely depicted the dynamics 
behind this transformation:
Commitment is inevitably reduced because increasingly large parts 
of generations subsequent to that of the founders inherited rather 
than chose their faith. The first generation (and subsequent adult 
joiners) elected to be sectarians and did so in the full knowledge 
of the penalties that their dissent would incur. Hence they began 
with very high levels of commitment and, to the extent that they 
were victimized, their subsequent experiences of suffering for their 
God strengthened that commitment. Those who were born into the 
uniformity of faith within their own territories. That is to say, differently from 
the practices until then, secular leaders in Europe were given the right to de-
termine the religious doctrine his/her people would believe in. The Peace of 
Augsburg, says Willaim Monter (2002: 10), created the legal recognition of 
confessionalism, and made the confessional states dominant theme in Euro-
pean culture.
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movement might be strenuously socialized into the tenets of the 
sect but they had not chosen it (2002: 23).
In addition to this, Bruce sets forth that industrial capitalism 
and economic development, which are both phenomena caused by 
the Protestant Reformation23, paved the way for a functional differ-
entiation as well as a differentiation in the social domain. The duties 
that were previously assumed by solely one institution began to be 
taken over, parallel to the structural differentiation, by individual 
persons or institutions specialized in their respective activity fields. 
Secular experts began to fulfil the social functions that were pre-
viously only under the monopoly of the Church (Bruce, 2002: 8). 
Structural differentiation in Europe may be summarized, as Philip 
Gorski (2003: 111) did, as follows: “(…) the establishment and ex-
pansion of secular institutions in the fields of social provision, edu-
cation, moral counseling and other fields of activity once dominated 
by the Church, a development which would be characterized as a 
loss of social functions.”
Bruce (2003) thinks that social differentiation came into the 
picture when the new social classes accelerated the dissolving of 
traditional religious community. Industrial revolution moved home-
based economic activities out of the household. Such a separation 
23 At this point, Bruce provides an interpretation by taking Weber’s well known 
work The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism as the basis. Weber 
(1930/2005: 39-50) claimed that the emergence of the Industrial Revolution 
and modern capitalism primarily in Protestant countries in Western Europe 
was not a coincidence. According to him, the legal arrangements, technological 
development, and organizational development did exist in other civilizations 
but these were not enough for the emergence of modern capitalism. He thinks 
that the Protestant ethic such as working with care and patience, being in a 
better position financially and making prudent investments became accelera-
tors of modern capitalism. The reason for work and accumulating capital in 
Protestantism is not just to meet material needs or enjoy worldly pleasures 
even more, but on the contrary because it is a moral duty and has intrinsic 
value. According to Weber, working very hard with care and self-discipline, 
entrepreneurship, pursuing economic profit to acknowledge being one of the 
chosen, individual initiative, accumulating capital according to Protestantism 
has provided opportunities for market economy and private enterprise.
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also made it necessary to establish more rational, instrumental and 
pragmatic perspectives. He argues that the economic growth caused 
by industrialization gave rise to new classes and class conflict. In 
feudal societies, where individuals were aware of their place (status 
or class), they were also expected to know that there was only one 
single moral universe. Having stated that social differentiation fol-
lows structural differentiation, Bruce says that:
(…) as the functions of society become increasingly differentiated, 
so the people also become divided and separated from each other. 
(…) With the proliferation of new social roles and increasing social 
mobility, traditional integrated organic or communal conceptions 
of the moral and supernatural order began to fragment. When the 
community broke into competing social groups, the religious-
ly sanctified vision of that community, united under its God, also 
broke up. As classes and social fragments became more distinctive, 
so they generated metaphysical and salvational systems along lines 
more suited to their interests (2002: 9)
In his scheme, Bruce theorized that the Protestant Reforma-
tion indirectly paved the way for mass literacy and the consequent 
emergence of voluntary associations which, in turn, accelerated 
the secularization process. Bruce is of the opinion that Reforma-
tion prepared the ground for a new way of thinking: answering to 
God individually. For this reason, people not belonging to the cler-
gy needed new resources to fulfil this new responsibility. The Holy 
Bible was translated into vernacular languages so that people could 
answer to God individually. Thus new developments were set in 
motion in the art of printing in an accelerated manner, the literacy 
rate rose and non-formal education was introduced. As Bruce put 
it, the rivalry and the competition between the sects to win more 
and more people for their belief enabled the acceleration of these 
developments.
Bruce further argues that the Protestant sects also contributed 
to the development of secular liberal democracy through the new 
model of social organization:
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Reformed religion was individualistic but it was not lonely. It en-
couraged individuals to band together for encouragement, ed-
ification, evangelism, and social control. As an alternative to the 
organic community in which position was inherited and ascribed, 
the sectarians established the voluntary association of like-minded 
individuals coming together to pursue common goals. (2011a: 35)
My case that the Reformation played a major part in laying the foun-
dations for liberal democracy rest on the mechanism of unintended 
consequences. What were initially religious arguments inadvertent-
ly encouraged individualism, egalitarianism, and diversity, which 
in turn combined with growing social and structural differentiation 
to shift governments in the direction of secular liberal democracy.
(2011a: 39)
Bruce argues that the structural and social differentiations, so-
cialization and pluralism that emerged as a result of the Protestant 
Reformation caused religion to become isolated in a specific area. 
While different world views continued to exist in their own area 
with their own values and logic, this process “removes much of the 
social support that is vital to reinforcing beliefs, makes the main-
tenance of distinct lifestyles very difficult, weakens the impetus to 
evangelize and encourages de facto relativism that is fatal to shared 
beliefs” (2002: 20).
This is Bruce’s secularization paradigm based on the Protestant 
Reformation. I think that it works very well for West European sec-
ularization process (it took place much later in the South) and am-
ple quantitative data indeed support his views. However, although 
Bruce historically starts with the Protestant Reformation, I think 
we should not underestimate the role played by the Renaissance in 
European secularization. It would not be an exaggeration to claim 
that modernity began in Florence and other city-states in 14th cen-
tury Italy. After Italy, it spread to other European countries such 
as England, Germany, Spain and France during the 15th and 16th 
centuries. It was “the period when man rediscovered the world and 
his own creative capacities for what they really were and fashioned a 
new civilization with nature as its basis and humanity as its source, 
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centre, and end” (Coates, White & Schapiro, 1966: 3). The new out-
look that came with the Renaissance meant a transitional period 
for Europeans and laid the foundation for modern times. Particular 
components of the medieval times attracted less and less attention, 
while classic cultural forms were being revived.
The Renaissance was the period in which an intellectual revo-
lution, known as the Revival of Learning (i.e. new thoughts about 
religion, new methods for science, new outlook on the nature of 
human beings, and a new architectural style) came into being. It 
was a phase of exploration and a period of political and social tran-
sition. Ancient Greece and Rome came to prominence as the main 
sources of inspiration, and their classic works became part of the 
educational and cultural curriculum. Gradually, Antiquity became 
a reference point for a lively and productive life at the expense of 
religious doctrines (Schevill, 1930; Mann, 1996). For example, the 
Platonists of the Renaissance period read Plato from a Christian 
perspective and they held that finding truths concerning God-cre-
ated nature is equivalent to searching information on God. Univer-
sities in Italy advocated using mathematics and music as tools to 
reach the invisible world of ideas and forms put forward by Plato 
as the subjects of reality. Reducing nature to mathematics caused 
an excitement in how to measure and experience it. The gravitation 
of the Renaissance art toward nature and specifically to the human 
anatomy, especially as the ideal form, is a product of this perspective 
(Perry, Chase, Jacob, Jacob & Von Lauhe, 1989: 374).
Another point I would like to stress is that, although what Bruce 
claims about Western Europe and its secularization process does 
make sense -rendering it somewhat tricky to refute his assertions- 
this does not mean that these same dynamics will lead to similar 
outcomes in other modern or modernizing parts of the world. For 
example, very intolerant religious cultures have emerged in many 
Muslim countries due to the struggles between different denomi-
nations. Each year, thousands of people lose their lives due to some 
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very bloody sectarian clashes in societies with different religions. 
Even in Turkey, relatively a very modern country with a huge Sunni 
Muslim majority, just at the end of the 20th century, 33 Alevis were 
burned to death in Anatolia because of their religious identity (The 
New York Times, 1993, July 3).
In contrast with Bruce’s claims, the existence of different sects 
has not led to a more moderate religious outcome in all countries. 
On the contrary, such sectarian groups are often the main reason 
behind religious persecutions and intolerance. These kinds of strug-
gles render religious belief systems or identities more powerful, 
while religion places itself more at the centre of society with each 
passing day. What is surprising at this point is that, the features 
common to these societies, wherein religious conflicts, identities, 
rituals, and struggles play vital roles in public life, include the fact 
that they are yet to be confronted with industrial capitalism, sci-
entific advances or urban life. Among others, Syria, Afghanistan, 
Ivory Coast, Iraq, Kashmir, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, 
Uganda, etc. are countries where religion-based conflicts are the part 
of daily life. That does not mean that countries with more modern 
systems are not beset by problems arising from religion. However, 
it seems nowadays, not to be possible to consider it a coincidence 
that civil unrests allegedly arising from religion come about more 
infrequently in modern societies.
Therefore, it should again be emphasized that although Bruce’s 
paradigm has been very well-established for the secularization pro-
cess in Europe and its offshoots, this approach inevitably excludes 
other societies from the secularization process that have not had the 
Protestant Reformation as part of their history. Bruce’s paradigm 
works well and seems valid for modern European countries, Cana-
da, the USA, and Australia (Bruce, 1999a; 2002). But I suggest that, 
if slightly revised, the scope of his paradigm might be extended and 
be made applicable to other societies that do not have the Protestant 
Reformation in their history or that are not predominantly Chris-
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tian. In order to make the paradigm more general I propose to tone 
down some parts that are strictly related only to Christianity, and 
enhance other parts which can be observable in almost all societies.
The key difference between Bruce’s paradigm and my own ex-
tended version, which will be explored in more detailed in Chapter 
III, lies herein: In the extended version, Christian history or culture 
does not play a role in the secularization process. From the perspec-
tive of this extended paradigm, Western Europe is one case among 
many. However, Bruce starts with a historical event that is unique 
to Christianity, and he puts it above all else as the basis of every 
other dynamic. He focuses extensively on the impact of the Prot-
estant Reformation on the expansion of capitalism, the urbaniza-
tion process, and scientific developments in the history of Europe. 
Contrary to this, I think there is no clear-cut connection between 
these three historical dynamics and the Protestant Reformation for 
other regions of the world. A social innovation may have an attrac-
tive quality in its own right. Therefore, even non-Protestant societies 
could introduce or apply the same system without the original social 
events experienced by those pioneering societies.
Such an extended secularization paradigm is not something new. 
On the contrary, it is largely based on what Bruce and Wilson have 
explained about secularization until now. The claims and explana-
tions of Bruce’s paradigm regarding the secularization history of 
modern European countries and their offshoots are fairly consistent 
and also supported by empirical data. For that reason, it is necessary 
to repeat that the extended secularization paradigm here proposed 
is almost entirely based on Bruce’s own paradigm and not in con-
tradiction with it.
Why, the reader may ask, has this extended secularization para-
digm been elaborated on the basis of Bruce’s paradigm, rather than 
on the basis of other outstanding theories? Before explaining the 
details of the extended secularization paradigm and its application 
to Alevi communities in Turkey, it is necessary to articulate why not 
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other theories, i.e. the Religious Market Model (RMM) advanced 
by Stark et al., the Secure Secularization Theory (SST) of Pippa 
Norris and Ronald Inglehart and the Religious Individualization 
Theory (RIT) first proposed by Thomas Luckmann and later ad-
vanced by Grace Davie, but Bruce’s paradigm was chosen as the 
starting point.
WHY NOT OTHER THEORIES, BUT BRUCE’S PARADIGM
Even though the theories below constitute the cornerstones of the 
secularization discussion, it has to be said that there are some dif-
ferences between the definitions of secularization and measurement 
methods of these theories on the one hand, and this thesis’ defini-
tion and measurement methods on the other. Church attendance 
rates and changes in the number of individual faithful have been 
used as the most important indicator, and at times the only criteria 
of secularization in the theories below. Of course, all parameters 
thought to provide information concerning secularization should be 
taken into consideration. However, reducing secularization to only 
the frequency of worship or being a believer or not may not provide 
sufficient information on the bigger picture in some societies. For 
example, societal expectations of Islam as experienced in 21st centu-
ry Turkey and societal expectations of Christianity as experienced in 
21st century Netherlands may be different. While the rate of church 
attendance may be accepted as a sufficient criteria for piousness in 
West European countries, not merely performing the Friday prayer 
but what someone has done throughout the whole week will pro-
vide important clues on piousness in Turkey. 
What is to be expressed subsequently is not that church atten-
dance rate should not be taken into consideration or that it is of 
lesser importance. Rather, in societies where religion’s societal vis-
ibility is reduced to frequency of church attendance, it cannot be 
denied that it would be one of the fundamental parameters in the 
secularization discussion. However, both religious culture and so-
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ciety’s own distinct dynamics should be taken into consideration 
when measuring secularization. In particular, unlike West Europe-
an societies, it may not be an accurate method to understand the 
secularization process happening in non-Christian societies only 
by measuring the frequency with which people pray. For example, 
taking into account only the change in frequency of praying or in-
crease/decrease in the number of non-believers in Turkey where the 
majority is Muslim may not be a sufficient basis for secularization 
debates. 21st century Islam, unlike Christianity, aims to touch every 
aspect of human life, from clothing, catering, wedding, friendship, 
sexuality to family relations, etc. Therefore, although changes in 
frequency of praying and number of believers are important issues 
and deserve to be analyzed, the issue that should be particularly 
examined is the degree in which the metaphysical realm is reflected 
in daily social life. However, as the theories below are evaluated, it 
has to be emphasized that this discussion is done using their own 
secularization measurement methods.
Religious Market Model (RMM)
The Religious Market Model is based on two fundamental assump-
tions. The first assumption is that a fruitful religious life is suppressed 
by a religious monopoly (Stark and Bainbridge, 1985). Advocates 
of RMM explain the secularization process via the lack of a free 
market in religious goods as well as a lack of competition among 
religious suppliers (Iannaccone, 1991). Finke and Stark (1988) con-
sider competition between religious providers a motivation for reli-
gious growth, as various religions and religious sects/denominations 
are seen as the main players in religious economies. They claim that 
competition between suppliers in an open religious economy reju-
venates religious mobilization and this “forces each religious body 
to appeal successfully to some segment of the religious market, or 
to slide into oblivion” (Finke & Stark, 1988: 47). Therefore, secular-
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ization of societies seems to be a consequence of religious market 
regulation by the state.
The second assumption of this theory is that the demand for 
religious products is constant, i.e. religious need is innate to human 
nature. Therefore, if there are enough suppliers (to satisfy different 
consumers) in religious goods, then it is highly likely that there will 
be a high degree of religious activity. Individuals are assumed, for 
sure, to choose convenient religious goods for themselves as long as 
reasonable religious suppliers are not hindered by the state. These 
two assumptions taken together can be rendered as follows: “(…) 
religious activity will be likely to increase where there is abundant 
supply of religious choices, offered by a wide range of ‘firms’ (reli-
gious organizations of various kinds.); it will be likely to diminish 
where such supplies are limited” (Berger, Davie & Fokas, 2008: 35).
In comparison to church attendance in other modern countries, 
the high church attendance rate in the USA is used by advocates to 
substantiate RMM. They argue that Americans are less secular than 
other modern nations, not because of a low level of modernization, 
but because churches in the USA are subjected to the unpredictable 
nature of market forces and have to compete to sell their goods to 
the consumer, i.e. they have to become attractive. By contrast, Eu-
ropean churches, they believe, are not subjected to market forces. 
It means that those churches do not have to attract “consumers” 
since they are already subsidized by the state though this subsidy 
differs very much from one country to another. For Stark and Fin-
ke, a socialized religious economy dominated most of Europe, and 
that is the reason for the aggressive secularization process in those 
societies:
European religion suffers from the weaknesses now well-known to 
plague socialism, because, whatever the character of their com-
mercial economies, most European nations sustain a socialized re-
ligious economy, while in all the others one (or several) religious 
groups enjoy special status and privileges (2000: 228).
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The RMM advocates the belief that having a secure income and 
certain privileges play a decisive role in the tendency towards lazi-
ness and slack among the clergy. Therefore, if it is necessary to ac-
cuse someone/something of the low level of religious activity in Eu-
rope, while assuming human beings are born de facto with religious 
need, then the men of religion have to blame themselves for not 
being able to attract people to their churches (Stark & Finke, 2000).
Although at first glance RMM seems to supply a plausible an-
swer for the different secularization levels of societies with similar 
levels of modernization, I still have some doubts about the validity 
of the theory. Of course, a diverse range of churches and a free mar-
ket religious economy might lead to an increase in the tendency 
among consumers to embrace a relatively more fruitful religious life 
in some parts of the world. However, this theory, as indicated, has 
two basic important assumptions even though there have not been 
sufficient attempts to prove whether those assumptions are indeed 
true. The first assumption is that a religious monopoly decreases re-
ligious activity, while the second is that the demand for religious 
products is innate to human nature and therefore constant.
For the first assumption, it might be asserted that examples with-
in Europe (Bruce, 1995; 2000; 2001) and the rest of the world do 
not confirm RMM’s main doctrines. As Gorski (2000) rightly ar-
gues, the lack of religious market has not played a role in the decline 
of traditional religious beliefs and involvement in institutionalized 
religion throughout European history. If the basic tenets of RMM 
would be true, then we would be entitled to expect that religious 
monopoly in European countries would have been the main rea-
son behind the aggressive secularization process that started back in 
the late nineteenth century and which accelerated after the 1950s. 
However, as Gorski (2000) stresses, it was not religious monopoli-
zation, but religious deregulation that increased during that period. 
Besides, modern day European societies do not support the basic 
tenets of RMM either. For example, although Poland and Ireland 
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do have a religious monopoly, they, contrary to what Stark and Fin-
ke claim, have been enjoying a high level of religiosity compared 
to other European societies. It seems that the examples of Poland 
and Ireland, where church attendance is high in comparison to oth-
er more pluralist countries like Netherlands or the UK, and where 
there is a solid religious monopoly, create problems for the RMM.
In addition, church attendance is higher in monopolistic Catho-
lic countries than in the Lutheran countries (Davie, 2002). Not only 
Europe, but many other countries across the world do not conform 
to the RMM. The interesting thing is that, although the USA at 
first glance seems to fit RMM, and proponents of the theory put 
the USA forward all the time to prove their theory, there is no hard 
evidence to support that increasing liberalization and state deregu-
lation work against persistent rates of religious decline even in the 
USA. By contrast, academic studies indicate that a steady secular-
ization process has already been experienced in the USA as well 
(Bruce, 1993; Norris & Inglehart, 2007).
I think that we can make some critical evaluations of the secu-
larization process in the USA at this point. First of all, contrary to 
popular myth, the rate of church attendance has steadily been drop-
ping in the USA for decades (Barna, 2001, December 17), and the 
percentage of people who do not believe has increased from 2% in 
the 1950s to 14% at the beginning of the 21st century (Bruce, 2002). 
If this rate is much higher in other modern countries, this does not 
mean that the USA has become less secular. Secondly, it should be 
noted that even deeply religious people in the USA prefer to use 
very secular language (discourse which is not based on religion) to 
impress public opinion on the subjects of many controversial topics 
like abortion, gay marriage, etc.. Instead of reading passages from 
the Bible, they choose to emphasize the right to life or wholesome 
society (Bruce, 2002).
In line with this, trends in first premarital sexual intercourse and 
changing patterns of nonmarital childbearing do not support the 
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claim of a less secular society for Americans. Should the dominant 
religion be Christianity, so it is expected that the changes in these 
two dynamics evolve in the manner as desired within the traditional 
values of Christianity. However, data from the National Survey of 
Family Growth 2002 (7,643 women and 4,928 men were surveyed) 
indicate that by age 20, 75% had had premarital sex (Finer, 2007). 
Further, “births to unmarried women totaled 1,714,643 in 2007, 
26% more than in 2002. Nearly four in ten U.S. births were to un-
married women in 2007” (Ventura, 2009 May). In addition, almost 
50 % of Christians in the USA is noted as tolerating couples living 
together without official marriage, and public support for same-sex 
marriage has also grown (Giddens, 2006: 432-447). All those trans-
formations do not picture a less secular American society.
Furthermore, this theory does not work either in other En-
glish-speaking countries, which are relatively pluralistic. For ex-
ample, religious pluralism has a negative effect on religiousness in 
Canada. As Alastair Hay (2014: 19) says “(…) religious pluralism 
was observed to have a negative effect on all three dependents (reli-
giosity, frequency of religious attendance, belief in parental religion), 
suggesting that those forms of religious pluralism operating in Can-
ada were more corrosive to belief than supportive of it.” When it 
comes to New Zealand, the claims of RRM are also not support-
ed by the empirical evidence. According to Statistics New Zealand 
(2014, April 15), since 2001 the number of irreligious people has in-
creased. The number of people reporting ‘no religion’ was 1,028,049 
in 2001, a figure that increased to 1,635,345 in 2013 (more than 
two in five people or 41.9 percent). And as obsolete and unservice-
able churches in Britain have been turned into carpet stores (Bruce, 
2002), in Australia there is a marked decrease in church attendance 
from 30 percent to 13 percent within a 40-year period (1960-1998). 
At the same time, the number of Australians with no religion has 
increased from 4% in 1961 to 15.5% in 2001, while the total num-
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ber of Christians in the country has also declined from 88% of the 
population in 1961 to 68% in 2001 (Mason, 2012).
Like the first assumption, the second assumption of RMM, viz. 
that the demand for religious products is relatively constant because 
of human nature, remains to be proven. If there would be such a 
reality in human nature, then RMM theorists should explain the 
lack of desire for different or alternative ways to salvation after Eu-
ropeans have become more secular. Against the second assumption, 
Casanova (2003: 26) argues that “the culprit is not so much the 
monopolistic laziness of the churches protected by state regulation, 
but the lack of demand for alternative salvation religions among the 
unchurched, even in the face of new, enterprising generally unsuc-
cessful, religious suppliers.”
To sum up, when it comes to the validity of RMM, it is not so 
easy to find hard evidence in support of its basic tenets across the 
world. As Norris and Inglehart (2008) put it, after studying a large 
scale of data pertaining to more than 80 countries throughout the 
world, there is no consequential connection between high religious 
activity or church attendance and state deregulation.
Secure Secularization Theory (SST)
Norris and Inglehart (2008: 4) think that the classical version of 
the secularization thesis claims that religion will cease to exist due 
to the modernization process. Therefore, since there are still people 
who believe in religion in today’s modern societies, they attempt 
to explain the secularization process by proposing what they call 
the “Secure Secularization Theory” which grounds itself on the 
conditions of existential security. They argue that social vulnerabil-
ity, anxiety and risk lead people to have more recourse to religion. 
Uncertainties and continuous substantial risks push people towards 
religion or make them keenly participate in mystical-supranatural 
activities. If a society cannot escape the threat of natural disasters, 
poverty, or disease, then it would not be abnormal to expect to come 
SECULARIZATION OF ALEVIS IN TURKEY
93
across people who are deeply religious, as in earlier centuries (Norris 
& Ingleharth, 2008: 216).
Based on this, they expect that religion plays a crucial role in the 
daily activities of poor agrarian societies (which live under non-wel-
fare states), while the rate of worship and prayer is supposed to be 
higher than those of industrial/post-industrial societies. On the 
other hand, they assert that a relatively egalitarian distribution of 
household incomes, relatively high living standards, an income that 
guards against the risk of absolute poverty and sense of security in 
a society would diminish the importance of religion or others with 
absolute power. That is to say, wealthy and secure nations can be 
expected to become more secular, i.e. if people experience higher 
levels of physical and social security, then religion or other absolute 
powers will be given a lower priority by the public (Norris & Ingle-
hart, 2008: 28).
If the feeling of vulnerability is the basic driver for being reli-
gious, then it is possible to run into elevated religious activity due 
to economic inequality even in rich nations (Norris & Inglehart, 
2007: 45). With this premise, Norris and Inglehart argue that the 
high levels of religious belief and engagement in the USA would 
be explained through the reality of the distress from losing jobs, 
inadequate medical insurance, high possibility of being subjected 
to violence, etc.. In line with this, the inhabitants of the wealthy 
and secure post-industrial nations of Europe, who have less anxiety 
about almost each aspect of life, are statistically the most secular na-
tions across the world (Berger, Davie & Fokas, 2008): “The secular 
Scandinavian and West European states remain some of the most 
egalitarian societies, with an expansive array of welfare services, in-
cluding comprehensive health care, social services, and pensions” 
(Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 108). To sum up, SST asserts that since 
Europeans, unlike Americans, are living in egalitarian, secure and 
wealthy societies, they are much more secular than all other parts 
of the world.
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Although, at first sight, SST seems to give a very coherent ex-
planation for both Europe and the rest of the world, it is not easy to 
understand at which point the theory differs from what the classical 
version of secularization theory asserts. Of course, the levels of so-
cial security and wealth do play a crucial role in the secularization 
process. But, the mere fact that SST emphasizes one particular as-
pect of the modernization process does not make it another theory. 
Whatever they mention as the causes that lead to an increase in 
the secularization level, these are actually outcomes of the modern-
ization process. SST and CST only differ from each other on the 
subject of secularization in the USA. Contrary to what Norris and 
Inglehart say about the USA, the American people are more secular 
now than in the past. Being less secular than other modern societies 
does not render Americans de facto less secular compared to their 
own past. When it comes to the secularization level of a society, that 
society has to be compared to its own past, not with other societies. 
Therefore, it seems that, apart from the USA, whatever SST claims 
seems right and is supported by hard evidence. The only problem is 
that SST, as such, seems to be extracted from the classical version of 
secularization theory.
Religious Individualization Theory (RIT)
The Religious Individualization Theory, which was developed main-
ly by Thomas Luckmann (Invisible Religion) and later by Grace 
Davie (Believing without Belonging), has attracted much attention 
particularly at the end of the 20th century. RIT assumes that the 
process of modernization has changed the social form of religion, 
but this does not mean that there is a decrease in the prestige and 
power of religion. It is true that, according to the advocates of RIT, 
there is a negative correlation between modernization and church 
attendance; however, the demise of traditional churches should not 
be confused with loss of religiosity of the individual. Actually, on the 
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contrary, the undisputable decline of traditional churches and the 
increase in individual religiosity correlate:
According to the individualization theory, traditional and institu-
tionalized forms of religiosity will be increasingly replaced by more 
subjective ones detached from church, individually chosen, and 
syncretistic in character. (…) The individualization thesis utilizes 
a distinction between church and religion in order to distance it-
self from the secularization theory. In this view, individuals are in-
creasingly freeing themselves from institutional guidelines in their 
religious ideas and behaviours, and thus increasingly making their 
own decisions about their religion. In consequence, ever more sub-
jective forms of religion are purportedly replacing institutionalized 
ones (Pollack & Pickel, 2007: 603-604).
Luckmann (1967: 68) says that due to functional differentiation 
established religious institutions are not able to represent the entire 
holy universe anymore. But a decline in the power of traditional 
institutions does not have a positive correlation with the decline in 
individual faith. Maybe the metanarratives of traditional religious 
institutions cannot offer a personally meaningful system for indi-
viduals anymore, but individuals, in their private spheres, still be-
lieve “in a relatively autonomous fashion.”
The renowned phrase of “believing without belonging” has be-
come a motto of this theory at the end of the 20th century. Not 
believing in the disappearance of the sacred, Davie (1990) argues 
that individual religious faith has been distanced from traditional 
religious belonging and Europeans do not want to put their belief 
into practice even though they still want to believe:
Why is it, for example, that the majority of British People - in com-
mon with many other Europeans - persist in believing (if only in an 
ordinary God), but see no need to participate with even minimal 
regularity in their religious institutions? Indeed most people in this 
country - whatever their denominational allegiance - express their 
religious sentiments by staying away from, rather than going to, 
their places of worship (Davie, 1994: 2).
In short, many Europeans have ceased to connect with their reli-
gious institutions in any active sense, but they have not abandoned, 
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so far, either their deep-seated religious aspirations or (in many 
cases) a latent sense of belonging (Davie, 2002: 8).
Like Luckmann and Davie, Danièle Hervieu-Leger (cited in 
Pollack and Pickel, 2007: 604) also emphasizes “an increasing loss 
of control of the established religious institutions over the belief 
systems and religious practices of individuals.” But she does not 
think that individualization in belief leads to an increase in secular-
ization or that individual religiosity is damaged.
Although RIT is widely supported by many respected scholars, 
it is not easy to find hard evidence in support of this theory ei-
ther. An empirical assessment of RIT by David Voas and Alasdair 
Crockett (2005) and by Pollack and Pickel (2007) indicates that 
neither the UK nor Germany support the claims of the advocates 
of RIT. After a statistical analysis of the data from both the British 
Household Panel Survey (conducted by the Institute for Social and 
Economic Research at the University of Essex) and the British So-
cial Attitudes Survey (conducted by the National Centre for Social 
Research), Voas and Alasdair arrived at the following conclusion:
(…) belief has in fact eroded in Britain at the same rate as two key 
aspects of belonging: religious affiliation and attendance. Levels of 
belief are lower than those of nominal belonging. The roles of peri-
od, cohort and age effects on religious change are considered; the 
conclusion is that decline is generational. In relation to the rates at 
which religion is transmitted from parents to children, the results 
suggest that only about half of parental religiosity is successfully 
transmitted, while absence of religion is almost always passed on. 
Transmission is just as weak for believing as for belonging (2005: 
11).
Pollack and Pickel (2007: 603) also studied the empirical va-
lidity of RIT “on the basis of how religiosity and church affilia-
tion have evolved in Germany over the past 50 years.” Here is their 
conclusion: “(…) the rise of individually determined non-church 
religiosity cannot compensate for the losses of institutionalized reli-
giosity, since non-church religiosity remains rather marginal and is 
interwoven with traditional Christian religiosity.” In addition, some 
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scholars have come up with a new term in opposition to believing 
without belonging: belonging without believing. Brian Mountford, 
author of Christian Atheist, defines those in the category of “belong-
ing without believing” in this way:
[these are] people, who value the cultural heritage of Christianity 
- its language, art, music, moral compass, sense of transcendence 
- without actually believing in God; or, at least without believing in 
God in a way that would satisfy Christian orthodoxy, particularly in 
the metaphysics department (2011: 1).
Like Mountford, Esther McIntosh (2015) considers the popularity 
of “virtual” religious revival as a significant move towards belonging 
without believing.
By the end of the day, it should be noted that, although RRM 
and RIT are advanced and adhered to by some very respected schol-
ars, neither of them are supported by hard evidence, nor do they, in 
comparison with classical theory, provide a better insight into sec-
ularization process of societies. SST is supported by hard evidence, 
but it is not easy to get at which point the SST differs from the 
classical version of secularization theory.
In the following chapter, in a clear departure from Bruce, I will 
argue that his paradigm is not only valid for European societies, 
but for every society at large. However, to extend the scope of the 
paradigm in its relevance, Bruce’s secularization paradigm needs to 
be revised. In attempting this, aspects of his paradigm that belong to 
the specific history of Europe and its offshoots will be downplayed 
while those with more universal relevance, i.e. science, capitalism 
and urbanization, will be highlighted.
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CHAPTER III
THE EXTENDED SECULARIZATION PARADIGM
It has been stated that there might be various causes behind the rise or fall in the level of secularization. When it comes to the 
European secularization process, it is necessary to mention seven dif-
ferent factors which are not independent from each other and have 
appeared at different times in the history of Europe: Renaissance 
(15th century) (Coates, White & Schapiro, 1966: 3), Protestant Ref-
ormation (16th century) (Casanova, 1994: 21), emergence of absolute 
monarchies (16th and 17th centuries) (Maland, 1986: 18-20), Scientif-
ic Revolution (17th century) (Perry et al., 1989: 251), Enlightenment 
(18th century) (Eze, 2002), industrial capitalism (from the middle 
of the 18th century to the middle of 19th century), and urbanization 
(19th century) (Wilson, 1976). The major and vital social, economic, 
political, and cultural changes that came about with these historical 
dynamics are regarded as the segments of modernization.
Therefore, it could be claimed that the classical secularization 
theory, which has been handled quite systematically in the works of 
Bruce and Wilson, offers the most accurate approach to the secular-
ization of Europe. However, notwithstanding these historical fac-
tors which played a crucial role in Europe’s rising level of seculariza-
tion, this does not necessarily mean that all these seven factors are 
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indispensable for secularization to take place under the roof of var-
ious religious cultures in other parts of the world. For even though 
the seven aforementioned historical factors do not seem to occur in 
other countries as they did in Europe, still, some of them may be 
enough to trigger the process of secularization. Therefore, I venture 
the hypothesis that for such an extended secularization paradigm, 
we should especially emphasize three factors derived from the old 
paradigm, viz.: Scientific Advancements, Industrial Capitalism, and 
Urbanization. This dissertation argues that these three factors from 
the old paradigm might be sufficient to trigger secularization in 
societies regardless of the dominant religious culture, be it Islam, 
Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, etc..
There are two important reasons behind my choice of these three 
factors. First, these three are already the results of other factors and 
they can all be seen in every country regardless of its religious, his-
torical, political or economic history. For example, capitalism, which 
had been triggered off by the Reformation of the 16th century in 
Christian Europe and led to a rise in the level of secularization, 
is also seen in non-Protestant countries today where the Protes-
tant Reformation did not take place. Likewise, while the Scientific 
Revolution came on the scene in 17th century Europe, its offsprings 
such as advances in technology and the expansion of technological 
consciousness have now become a reality in various non-Protestant 
countries across the world. Although modern cities24 first appeared 
in Europe and the USA, modern city life does not belong only to 
Europe or Christian countries at present. It is seen in many areas 
where the Protestant Reformation has not been experienced. For 
24 The concept of modern city, specific to this thesis, is used as a place where 
economic activity is not agriculture-based but industry- or urban-based, where 
population density has increased while rates of death and birth have decrea-
sed, where a central bureaucratic management has assumed responsibility for 
administrative work, where education has been widespread and technological 
developments get implemented quickly (Landes, 2003: 6), where commerce 
plays a vital role, and where there is not a homogenous structure but a widely 
differentiated population exists.
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instance, while Turkey did not undergo the Protestant Reformation 
in its history, modern Turkish society is quite sensitive to techno-
logical advancements; at the same time as capitalism has become 
the dominant economic model for decades and widespread urban-
ization has been steadily increasing due to the accelerated industrial 
mode of production since the 1960s. Similarly, the Japanese, who 
hardly have anything in common with Christianity, can boast of a 
country where the effects of capitalism, urbanization and scientific 
advances are seen in every corner of life.
The second reason why I chose these factors is because they in 
themselves also contain the dynamics which were mentioned in 
Bruce’s paradigm: Social Differentiation, Structural Differentiation, 
Social and Cultural Diversity, Economic Growth, Egalitarianism, 
Religious Diversity, Relativism, Technology, and Technological 
Consciousness seem to be mostly derived from these three main 
accelerators of secularization.
In brief, the hypothesis of this thesis argues that secularization 
is observable if the scientific advances have begun to spread incre-
mentally, if the dominant economic model in any society has turned 
towards industrial capitalism, and if the urbanization rate has in-
creased compared to the past. This dissertation argues that with 
these three pillars, the importance of religion, religion-like mech-
anisms, folk beliefs in any society will be reduced, indifference to 
things relating to the spiritual will increase, and religious identities 
in society as a whole will play a less decisive role. Although these 
factors had first been experienced in Europe, rendering Europe the 
world’s most secularized continent, they have become to varying 
degrees widespread in the 21st century in terms of their impact on 
societies in different parts of the world.
However, before moving on to how the three legs of the secular-
ization paradigm have expedited secularization, it has to be stated 
that the writing below are based on a sharp duality. That is, a man-
ner of telling has been selected as if there is no intermediate form 
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between the rural and urban, agricultural production and industrial 
production, scientific developments and periods when science does 
not touch people’s lives. However, it is necessary to mention that 
daily practices are not open to dichotomy as such, that there are 
intermediate or transition forms and there could be elements of the 
city within the rural and elements of the rural within the city. For 
example, the ghettoization of some communities from a certain sec-
tion in the city provides the opportunity for continuation of cus-
toms and traditions decorated with religion from the rural. Or, there 
may be many opportunities available in the rural area similar to the 
city as a result of developed networks and technology. 
What needs to be emphasized here is the main story that reveals 
the direction of change even though there are no such sharp dichot-
omies in daily practices. Therefore, these are the questions that need 
to be asked: Do scientific developments impact life more or less in 
comparison to the past? Or, is industrial capitalism which operates 
with market dynamics more dominant now than in the past? For 
which generations have cities become the center of life? Of course, 
urbanization does not mean that all the components of the city are 
or will be part of the same culture or lifestyle, as argued later in this 
thesis. During social changes, while a section of society moves in 
one direction, the other part may be moving elsewhere. The thing 
we call transformation is a new form (Yılmaz, 2012) provided to 
society by the total change formed during these movements. Con-
sequently, even though sharp dichotomies exist below, it needs to be 
emphasized that life practices are not separated from each other in 
such clear lines.
THE ROLE OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES IN THE SECULARIZATION 
PROCESS
Partly as a result of the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century 
and its successor, the Enlightenment of the 18th century, the fields 
of natural sciences and theology (ideology of the Church in those 
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times) have since largely been treated as mutually exclusive, particu-
larly in Western literature. The new ideas that came to light with the 
Scientific Revolution provided philosophers of the Enlightenment 
with ammunition in their wars against the Church and its ideology, 
theology. Since then, numerous works have asserted that theology, 
the Church, the clergy, and religion generally have lost their powers 
in the light of new scientific discoveries (Bernard, 1938; Goldmann, 
1968; Crocker, 1969; Easlea, 1980; Eze, 2002; Jones, 2009).
In the first place it must be stated that the Catholic Church 
(The Church) and religion are not the same thing and as concepts 
they should not be used interchangeably. The Church belongs to 
the world of Christianity and there are religious systems without 
a church-like organization. However, in the European context, es-
pecially in the Middle Ages, the Church did not only serve as a 
religious space where people worshipped. It was a powerful institu-
tion both in the political and intellectual sense. The Church was an 
institution that directly participated in wars, granted titles to mon-
archs, established universities, stepping, in a way, in all the spheres 
of life. For this reason, the Church was not only a worship place for 
Europeans, but it was an active representative of that religion (i.e. 
of Christianity) and it wanted to concern itself with each and every 
sphere of life. The clergy did not only consist of religious leaders 
who solely had a mediator role between the Creator and its servants, 
but at the same time they were mighty and divine characters in the 
regions they served. Theology, on the other hand, was not only an 
academic discipline, but also the ideology of the Church. 
For this reason, taking a closer look at the European history we 
would see that religion (Christianity), the Church, the religious 
leaders (the clergy) and theology were intertwined, especially in the 
Middle Ages. In such an environment, an advantage or loss of one 
of these actors was automatically also attributed to the others. For 
instance, when a claim of the theology as the ideological column of 
the Church was disproved by natural sciences, it was not only a blow 
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to the prestige of the Church naturally. In this case the religion, of 
which the Church was the representative, and the clergy, that served 
to spread the theological arguments, were also substantially hit in 
terms of prestige. It was in the modern time that the religion, the 
Church and theology entered into a path where they got separated 
from each other. For this reason, below I will advocate the argument 
that the changes inspired by the natural sciences have dealt a blow 
to the prestige and power of the Church, theology and indirectly 
to the religion due to the close association of them in pre-modern 
Europe.
Although it is an undeniable fact that the Scientific Revolution 
became a vital pillar of the European secularization process, taking a 
closer look at this historical phenomenon, as Bruce neatly explains, 
it is not possible to claim a zero-sum relationship between scientific 
advances and the belief in religion:
(…) many seventeenth-century Protestant scientists were inspired 
to natural science by a desire to demonstrate the glory of God’s 
creation, by the rationalizing attitude of the Protestant ethic and 
by an interest in controlling the corrupt world. The end result was 
the same irony that followed from the general rationalization of 
ethics. Because the Puritan scientists were able to demonstrate 
the fundamental rule-governed nature of the material world, they 
made it possible for subsequent generations to do science without 
topping and tailing their work with the assertion that “This shows 
God’s glory”. At any stage in the growth of knowledge, God could be 
summoned to fill a gap. Newton, for example, believed God period-
ically took a hand in the movement of the planets to rectify a slight 
irregularity (2002: 27).
Indeed, as history has shown, a religious man can be a scientist 
and a scientist can be religious. Stark & Finke (2000) and many 
other sociologists of religion claim that such cases expose the failure 
of secularization theory. For them, secularization theory should be 
sent to the graveyard of failed theories since there are many scien-
tists who believe in God, just as there are many religious people in 
the modern world who occupy themselves with scientific research. 
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However, according to Bruce (2002: 26-28), the contribution of sci-
entific developments to secularization cannot be reduced to the no-
tion of mutual exclusion of two spheres, namely, that religion cannot 
survive if there is development in natural sciences or that natural 
science cannot be advanced if religion remains dominant. No doubt, 
to the extent that scientific developments penetrate into daily life, 
the secularization process will continue to accelerate. But it should 
be stressed that the effect of scientific advances on the secularization 
process is not a direct effect, but rather an indirect one. If a pious 
man is busy with scientific research or a scientist believes in religion, 
this does not create any problem in terms of validity of the theory 
(Bruce, 2002: 106-117).
In light of the above discussion, this section has two main ob-
jectives. First, to explain the historical origins of the dominant, yet 
inaccurate notion of a zero-sum relationship between natural sci-
ence and religion in light of Bruce’s works. Second, to indicate that 
the role of natural sciences in the secularization process does not 
depend on the history or geography of any particular region, which 
means that the vital role of scientific advances in the secularization 
process is not unique to the history of Europe and its offshoots 
across the world.
Origins of the Inaccurate Notion of a Zero-Sum Relationship
By the 16th century, Catholic theology had been one of the reliable 
ways of accessing knowledge. Unlike today, the Catholic Church 
and other religious institutions had the authority and power to 
touch upon every corner of life: education, health, politics, diplo-
macy, marriage, birth and death. In like manner, scientific methods 
and studies were not exempt from the interference of self-reliant 
theology and all-powerful religious authorities. Many questions, 
which might be clustered under the title of natural science, were 
answered by theology without demur. For example, very clear and 
incontestable answers were searched in sacred texts and/or given by 
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clergy to questions such as: “How was the Earth created? When was 
it created? What is the substance of planets rotating in outer space? 
Are there other creatures somewhere out there in space? Do the sun 
and the moon move? What is the hierarchical order of animals?” 
Especially after the translation of Aristotle’s works from Arabic and 
Greek into Latin, Aristotle’s physics, cosmology, mathematics and 
logic were accepted by the Catholic Church as unquestionable sa-
cred knowledge (Harman, 1983: 4-5).
For example, according to the Aristotle-based Church teaching, 
the Earth was at the centre of the universe and its shape was circu-
lar as a symbol of perfection. All other heavenly bodies, including 
the Moon and the Sun, were moving around the Earth in circular 
motion. All things found between the Earth and the Moon were 
open to transformation. However, the things above the Moon were 
seen as perfect and immune from any alteration. In Aristotle’s phi-
losophy, unchangeability denotes faultlessness. While the aether was 
seen as the substance of perfect region (supralunar), the main sub-
stances of the imperfect terrestrial sphere (sublunar) were air, water, 
fire, and earth (Koestler, 1990; Shapin, 1996: 22-23).
The ongoing quasi-hostility between natural science and theol-
ogy began with the scientific refutation of Aristotle-based Church 
claims about the universe. For instance, Copernicus (1473-1543) 
objected to the idea that the Earth is at the centre of the universe. 
His hypothesis was that the Sun, not the Earth, is at the centre; the 
Earth revolves in a yearly period around the Sun while it rotates 
daily on its axis; not only the Earth but other planets as well revolve 
around the Sun. In this way, claims held to be unquestionable by the 
Church for centuries were directly challenged by Copernicus. Then, 
Kepler (1571-1630) argued that the laws governing planetary mo-
tions were different from what they had been thought to be. After 
studying the orbit of Mars, Kepler claimed that the Earth and other 
planets do not move in a circular motion around the Sun, but in an 
ellipse. But the fatal blow came from an Italian astronomer by the 
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name of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642). He observed that the Sun’s 
black spots were constantly changing in terms of their number and 
shape. That observation by Galilei spelled the end of an era, for it 
profoundly violated the Church’s claims based on Aristotle’s physics 
(Harman, 1983; Shapin, 1996).
Up until the 17th century, theology had been respected and rarely 
questioned as one of the reliable methods for accessing knowledge. 
Claims of the natural sciences were supported not to contradict the 
Church’s doctrines. However, the accuracy of the Copernican system 
was not revealed by looking at sacred texts, but through observation 
made by Galilei. Newton’s laws of motion reinforced the superiority 
of scientific knowledge over the authority of the Church at the end 
of the 17th century. Thenceforth, the authority of the Church, which 
had already been shaken by the Protestant Reformation in matters 
of theology, was shattered.
The Scientific Revolution that began with Copernicus, Kepler, 
Galileo and Newton did not only change the human perspective on 
nature, but also the method of obtaining data. Along with Francis 
Bacon and René Descartes, collecting materials, making observa-
tions, carrying out experiments, and reaching conclusions based on 
evidence became the main scientific method at the expense of rely-
ing on sacred religious texts (Tierney, Kagan and Williams, 1992). 
While man had been placed at the centre according to the Christian 
Genesis, the new planets discovered by Galileo’s telescope revealed 
the possibility of other worlds and creatures. 
For one thing, these discoveries cast serious doubts on the an-
thropocentric world view of the Church.25 In time, some of the 
most well-known religious claims about the universe and history 
completely lost their validity. Scientists proved beyond doubt that 
the Earth was much older than had been claimed by the Church. 
Biblical assertions such as “the world also shall be stable, that it be 
25  “Any view magnifying the importance of human beings in the cosmos, e.g. by 
seeing it as created for our benefit” (Blackburn, 2005: 18).
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not moved” (King James Version, 1 Chronicles 16:30) was soundly 
refuted. The understanding of a limited universe preached by the 
clergy was replaced by the perception of a universe that is infinite. 
In addition, not only did the ideology of the Church, i.e. theology, 
lose power and prestige due to advances in natural sciences, oth-
er spiritual thoughts, superstitious beliefs in miracles, and alchemy 
(miracle drugs, magic potions) also lost their prestige. Supranatural 
claims about the universe were replaced by knowledge obtained via 
secular methods. As a result, fewer people continued to pay atten-
tion to astrology, treatment with magic, or witchcraft and the visi-
bility of these supranatural phenomena in society dwindled in time 
(Perry et al., 1989).
After all these developments in natural sciences that successfully 
refuted the main claims of theology, 17th and 18th centuries Enlight-
enment philosophers and scientists added to the fire by producing 
many works that were outrightly hostile to those aspects of theol-
ogy, if not religion itself, that were not coherent with reason.26 For 
example, Comte de Buffon, an accomplished mathematician and 
biologists, argued that the Earth must be older than it said in the 
Bible. Like Buffon, the Scottish geologist James Hutton suggested 
that the Earth was older than 6000 years by commenting on the 
perpetual erosion of mountains (Tobin & Dusheck, 2005: 303).
The ongoing debates between Enlightenment thinkers and the 
clergy throughout the 18th century (Hayes, 1919: 413-14) and the 
exciting quarrels between 19th century religious leaders and ar-
dent defenders of Darwinism (Turner, 1978: 356-57; Bruce, 2002) 
helped to disseminate the perception of a zero-sum relationship in 
which the gain or loss of the Church/theology/clergy is balanced 
26 Spinoza in his the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670), John Toland in his Ch-
ristinatiy Not Mysterious (1696), Montesquieu in his Persian Letters (1721), Vol-
taire in his English Letters (1734), and Philosophical Dictionary (1764), Edward 
Gibbon in his Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776-89), David Hume in 
his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), Kant in his Critique of Pure 
Reason (1781) and Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason (1793), etc..
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in an appropriate manner by the losses or gains of secular domains. 
Indeed, Enlightenment thinkers believed that the more natural sci-
ence would become pervasive, the less Catholic theology, Cathol-
icism and the clergy would find a habitat for themselves; by the 
end of the day, religion would vanish due to scientific progress. In 
1710, Thomas Woolston argued that Christianity would vanish by 
the beginning of the 20th century. Likewise, the French philosopher, 
Voltaire, heralded the annihilation of religion within 50 years in a 
letter to Friedrich II of Prussia (Stark, 1999: 249). Hostility towards 
religion, theology and the clergy had almost become the prerequi-
site of being an intellectual during the Enlightenment. Prophets 
of the monotheistic religions were called charlatans, while religious 
beliefs, following classic atheist discourse, were seen as the expres-
sion of fear (Redwood, 1976: 34; Norris & Inglehart, 2008).
The founding fathers of sociology joined the Enlightenment 
philosophers who believed that rational thought and scientific 
knowledge are capable of occupying almost every field that was pre-
viously under the hegemony of theology. The alleged zero-sum rela-
tionship between natural sciences and theology of the 18th century 
was maintained by Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and Comte (1798-
1857) in the 19th century. Saint-Simon believed that there would 
be no need for religious men at the final stage of humanity, and 
that all supranatural beliefs and superstitions would be completely 
disregarded in the not-too-distant future. For him, religion or men 
of religion would inevitably lose out to scientists, artists, intellec-
tuals and industrialists (Simon, 1956: 320-21). Like Saint-Simon, 
Comte (1998: 41) thought that religion would totally disappear in 
the new world as a result of scientific progress. Some scientific de-
velopments at the time, like analysing water and air, the discovery 
of oxygen, new information related to blood circulation, significant 
improvements in light, the universal law of gravity, etc. convinced 
him that in the near future people would rely only on scientists and 
industrialists.
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If we go back to the founders of sociology, it is fairly common 
to come across thinkers who argued that scientific developments 
would render religious discourses invalid, and that neither god nor 
religion would have any chance of survival in the foreseeable future. 
However, such an idea or claim has not been defended or recog-
nized by the classic theory of secularization. That theory has been 
fervently discussed after the 1960s, and encountering classical sec-
ularization theorists who defend that religion will vanish with the 
advancements of natural science have become the exception rather 
than the norm. Berger (1967b), who defended a classical version of 
the theory in the 1960s, built his theory on pluralism, not on natural 
science. Likewise, when Wilson (1966) tried to explain the theory, 
he asserted that the coexistence of religion and natural science does 
not pose a problem at all for the theory. As one of the best-known 
proponents of the secularization theory, Bruce (1996: 48-49; 2002) 
explains quite clearly and comprehensively, that the so-called ze-
ro-sum relationship has no place in the theory. Working parallel 
to these authors, other scholars such as Chaves (1994), Dobbelaere 
(1985), Davie (1994), Luckmann (1967), Martin (1965; 1978) and 
Fenn (1969) have not supported the notion that scientific advances 
have a direct impact on the secularization process.
Sociological explanation, by its very nature, is not interested in 
or concerned with conflicts between two different ideas or concepts. 
What is important for sociology is the social impact of those ideas. 
The battle between the claims of natural sciences and the claims 
of theology could be zero-sum on a theoretical level. The claims, 
findings or doctrines of one may be rejected or refuted by the other. 
But if there is no social response to this battle, in other words, if 
there are those who define themselves as religious while engaging 
with science, the zero-sum relationship on the theoretical level does 
not make much empirical sense for the discipline of sociology. To-
day, while many modern communities are experiencing a process 
of change from an industrial society to a knowledge-based society, 
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many religious people are still engaged in scientific experiments in 
their laboratories. Regardless of the fact that science has permeated 
every area of life, there are countless people who still believe in the-
ology and are still practicing the rituals of their religion in modern 
countries. Therefore, to posit that religion and natural science have 
a zero-sum relationship in daily life just because of the quarrel be-
tween theology and natural science is not consistent with the facts 
of life.
So, if scientific developments do not undermine religiosity, and 
if natural science and religion continue to co-exist, how then is the 
secularization process accelerated by scientific advances?
The Role of Scientific Developments in the Secularization Process
The contribution of scientific advances to the secularization process 
seems to have taken place not directly, but indirectly. Scientific de-
velopments lead to secularization in two indirect ways. Firstly, they 
increase the level of human rational consciousness. Secondly, the 
proliferation of technology reduces the number of cases where reli-
gion touches upon the lives of people. I will discuss these two points 
in greater detail below.
Rational Consciousness and Secularization
The concept of rational consciousness refers to conceiving natural 
phenomena in the worldly cause-effect relationship, and not having 
tendency to use supranaturalism to explain them (Morrison, 1995: 
42). Weber calls this “the disenchantment of the world”. To him, 
humans began to conceive worldly events in light of observable facts 
due to the scientific progress. Science accelerated the collapse of 
enigmatic structures in the universe filled with magic, mystery and 
unknowable “facts” (Hughes, Martin and Sharrock, 1995: 120-21). 
As for the origins of natural phenomena, human technical knowl-
edge, the ability to calculate and observe, and the natural human de-
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sire to take more control of nature have resulted in fewer references 
to “metaphysics”.
Throughout the ages, when scientific advances had yet to pene-
trate radically into society, natural events such as solar eclipse, lunar 
eclipse, comets, incurable infectious diseases, and quite a number 
of deaths from devastating calamities like floods, earthquakes, and 
droughts had all been conceived as messages from the gods. While 
the sun was the symbol of justice and righteousness among the 
Sumerians, it was worshipped as a god in ancient Egypt. In the 
olden days, people tried to create various noises using pots and pans 
to ward off evil spirits during solar eclipses. The Halys War in 585 
BC between the Lydians and the Medans was ended thanks to a 
solar eclipse which was seen by the warring parties as a message 
from the gods to end the fighting (Worthen, 1997, May). Abundant 
harvest and rain, victory in battle and a safe return of the marines 
were ensured by the gods of Romans (Bagnall, 2002: 16). Trying to 
understand whether the gods supported the army by looking at the 
amount of chicken’s grain (Dillon & Garland, 2005: 189), attribut-
ing the loss of battle to lunar and solar eclipses (Leick, 2010: 28), 
ending wars, cancelling a planned invasion, or postponing retreat 
from war because of a solar or lunar eclipse, and deciding or not de-
ciding to attack because of comets (Scheckel, 2013: 132), are histor-
ical examples that indicate how “metaphysics” could easily interfere 
even in very important and influential historical events.
Picture A1. Halley’s comet was depicted as a portent of doom in the Bay-
eux Tapestry (BBC, 2013, March 15)
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However, with the advent of scientific tools and observations, 
the solar eclipse, which had been conceived of as a message from 
supranatural powers, is currently taught in all educational institu-
tions as a natural phenomenon that occurs when the Moon passes 
between the Earth and the Sun. In this day and age, it is possible to 
know with great precision when, in terms of hour and seconds, and 
where, in terms of visibility from the surface of the Earth, the next 
solar eclipse(s) will take place. Moreover, comets are now known to 
be a combination of water, frozen gases and cosmic dust. There are 
too many of them to be counted and while the trajectories of some 
can be calculated, it is not possible to make such a calculation for 
the vast majority of them which move beyond the limits of our solar 
system (NASA, n.d.).
A similar mental transformation has also taken place with re-
gard to the origin of diseases. Before the discovery of bacteria and 
the subsequent invention of antibiotics, the causes of many diseas-
es were unknown. All those enigmatic natural phenomena - solar 
eclipse, comets, diseases with unknown causes - were freed from 
being considered a mystery and turned into subjects of scientific 
inquiry. Therefore, the more scientific advances penetrated into daily 
life (invention) and natural phenomena became subject of natural 
science (discovery), the more the mechanical worldview of the 18th 
century Enlightenment philosophers was taken seriously.27 Like a 
clock, the earth was considered to be self-powered without need of 
any external influence for it to work. Likewise, the creator turned 
into a watchmaker who created the Earth and then stopped in-
27 Although the mechanical worldview became prevalent with industrialization, 
Francis Bacon, René Descartes and Isaac Newton had already introduced it 
in Europe in the 17th century. Bacon praised the scientific method based on 
observation and experiment. Descartes founded analytic geometry and argued 
that all phenomenon could be explained by mechanical philosophy. And lastly, 
Newton’s famous laws of motion laid the foundation for the mechanical wor-
ldview. It should be added that, natural science moved away from mechanism 
with the theories of evolution and relativity. But still these theories do not 
support a world designed according to divine laws.
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terfering with its mechanism: “The universe was now viewed as a 
giant machine functioning according to universal laws that could be 
expressed mathematically; nature could be mastered” (Perry et al., 
1989: 385). This idea, which suggested that the creator had created 
the universe and then retreated, is a result of the mechanization and 
cause-effect explanations for the origin of natural phenomena. Thus, 
all those natural phenomena, for which physics and mathematics 
had not been able to offer any compelling explanation, would re-
main unknown until scientists were able to solve the mystery. On 
the other hand, explanations based on metaphysics are not taken 
into consideration anymore.
As a contemporary example, we can take the self-propelled large 
rocks of Death Valley, located on the border between California and 
Nevada:
One of the most interesting mysteries of Death Valley National Park 
is the sliding stones at Racetrack Playa (a playa is a dry lake bed). 
These stones can be found on the floor of the playa with long trails 
behind them. Somehow the stones slide across the playa, cutting a 
furrow in the sediment as they move. Remarkably, multiple stones 
commonly show parallel tracks, including apparently synchronous 
high angle turns and sometimes reversals in travel direction. Some 
of the stones weigh more than 300 kg. That makes the question: 
“what powerful force could be moving them?” (Sci-News.com, Sep-
tember 14, 2014)
Picture A2. Unexplained Earth Phenomenon: The Moving Rocks in 
Death Valley National Park (Strange Sounds, 2012, December 4)
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The mystery behind their movement had not been solved until 
recently. With hundreds of pounds in weight, and although start-
ing at the same place, they each drag through different directions 
without any visible force. Many metaphysical explanations such as 
the devil, who is responsible for the grains of sand, or aliens who 
are responsible for the movements of these rocks, had already been 
offered for this quite interesting and exciting natural phenomenon. 
However, NASA scientists, Ralph Lorenz et al., put forth a very 
plausible answer to this unsolved mystery while they were making 
a comparative study of Death Valley’s meteorology and a hydrocar-
bon lake on Saturn’s moon, Titan. Lorenz et al. (2011: 2374) argued 
that heavy rocks were moving in different directions since the mass 
under the earth turns into ice in extreme cold and this ice mass in-
fluences the Earth’s surface. However, the explanation by Lorenz et 
al. has already been falsified in 2014 by further research. A weather 
station adjacent to Death Valley was set up and a number of time 
lapse camera systems were used to overlook the southeast corner of 
the playa in the Valley, and fifteen GPS-instrumented rocks on the 
playa surface (Norris, Norris, Lorenz, Ray & Jackson, 2014). Norris 
et al. visited the dry lake several times in a year to exchange battery 
packs and download weather data. Conditions were recorded hourly 
from November to March each year via the time lapse cameras in 
which exposures are taken at fewer intervals than usual. This al-
lowed researchers to view a naturally slow process at an accelerated 
pace on playback. By the end of the day, they succeeded to solve 
the mystery of Death Valley’s moving stones. Here is the mystery 
behind the moving rocks:
First, the playa fills with water, which must be deep enough to form 
floating ice during cold winter nights but shallow enough to expose 
the stones. As night-time temperatures plummet, the pond freezes 
to form thin sheets of ‘windowpane’ ice, which must be thin enough 
to move freely but thick enough to maintain strength. On sunny 
days, the ice begins to melt and break up into large floating panels, 
which light winds drive across the playa, pushing rocks in front of 
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them and leaving trails in the soft mud below the surface (Sci-News.
com, 2014, September 14).
At present time, each new disclosure about the movements of 
rock or other mysteries about nature would have to be far-removed 
from metaphysics to be taken seriously. If this natural phenomenon 
had been discovered in the 16th century, when the level of ratio-
nal consciousness was completely different from today’s, women in 
the nearest settlement to the area might have been called witches 
who were responsible for the rocks’ movement, and no one would 
have felt the need at the time to question such explanation based on 
metaphysics.
Experts who are consulted in the visual or written media on the 
effects of natural disasters or any unexpected development related 
to space or irremediable illnesses do not say that those unexpected 
developments or disasters are messages from any supreme powers 
beyond physics. On the contrary, they discuss these subjects with-
out taking supranatural explanations as a reference point, and they 
would not show any interest if someone tries to imply the involve-
ment of any supranatural power. Thus, as a result of rational think-
ing, theology is destined to lose its power and prestige in many areas 
that it had previously claimed.
Proliferation of Technology and Secularization
Compared to many centuries ago, the power of developed or de-
veloping societies with respect to nature has increased considerably 
because of technological possibilities. These developments have led 
to a decrease in the number of social fields where religion is influen-
tial. In this section, I will discuss how technology creates problems 
for religion. There are two subdivisions to this section:
1. Developments in Medical Science
2. Controlling Nature
VOLKAN ERTİT
118
Developments in Medical Science and Secularization
Here is an excerpt from a speech by John F. Kennedy at Rice Uni-
versity on September 12, 1962:
No man can fully grasp how far and how fast we have come, but con-
dense, if you will, the 50,000 years of man’s recorded history in a 
time span of but a half-century. Stated in these terms, we know very 
little about the first 40 years, except at the end of them advanced 
man had learned to use the skins of animals to cover them. Then 
about ten years ago, under this standard, man emerged from his 
caves to construct other kinds of shelter. Only five years ago man 
learned to write and use a cart with wheels. Christianity began less 
than two years ago. The printing press came this year, and then less 
than two months ago, during this whole 50-year span of human 
history, the steam engine provided a new source of power. Newton 
explored the meaning of gravity. Last month electric lights and tele-
phones and automobiles and airplanes became available. Only last 
week did we develop penicillin and television and nuclear power, 
and now if America’s new spacecraft succeeds in reaching Venus, we 
will have literally reached the stars before midnight tonight.28
It was not a coincidence that the 35th President of the USA 
mentioned penicillin while he was giving a speech on the USA space 
program. Again, it is not surprising that he commemorates penicil-
lin together with gravity, the invention of writing and the power of 
steam as factors which significantly changed the direction of human 
history. What makes penicillin historically so important is that it 
emerged as a remedy for what were until then considered incurable 
diseases. Because of penicillin, many incurable diseases became cur-
able ones.
But why is the invention of penicillin so crucial in terms of sec-
ularization? To answer this question, it is important to recall what 
people tend to do when they cannot find any solution to their health 
problems. Fervent believers go to sacred places (Vatican, Kaaba, 
Wailing Wall, Lourdes, shrines, temples, etc.) for their incurable dis-
28 Kennedy, J. F. (1962, September 12). Speech in The University of Rice. John F. 
Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. Retrieved from http://www.jfklib-
rary.org/AssetViewer/MkATdOcdU06X5uNHbmqm1Q.aspx in May, 2014.
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eases while preferring to go to hospitals for curable ones. I think this 
shows a direct correlation between secularization and developments 
in the medical field. Having the ability to cure incurable diseas-
es, coupled with an increasing number of medical centres, renders 
treatment faster and cheaper than ever before. This leads people to 
use modern ways of treatment rather than seeking alternatives such 
as supranaturalism, alternative medicines, visiting sacred places or 
invoking the clergy.
For example, in the past, those who could not give birth would 
go to holy places such as mosques, mausoleums, shrines, as a last 
resort. Or, people would perform several spiritual rituals to reverse 
what was thought to be a spell, often related to infertility. Therefore, 
it would not be implausible to claim that with the development of 
IVF methods and other newly improved techniques, there might be 
a considerable decrease in the number of such religious visits and 
rituals. For instance, to have a baby, Turks would go to the Zile dis-
trict of Tokat to visit the Huseyin Gazi Tomb. According to legend, 
if seven small stones are picked from the field near the Tomb and if 
those stones are then hidden under the pillow, Allah will help the 
couple to have a baby. However, nowadays, although people are still 
paying visits to such shrines when they want to have a baby, they 
tend to try other possibilities as well that were not available years 
ago like new medicines, IVF method, improving the quality and 
number of sperm cells, surrogacy, etc..
Diseases like mumps, measles, chicken pox, and polio have nearly 
been eradicated in the modern developed world. In the past, almost 
every 10-year old child knew what mumps are since either they had 
had mumps themselves or had seen them already on other children’s 
faces. However, today’s children, although they may know mumps 
is a child disease, do not see mumps anymore, neither on their own 
faces nor on other children’s. Knowing that Turkish children were 
still being taken to men of religion to have verses from the Qur’ān 
written on their faces up to the beginning of the 1990s would help 
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us understand why there is a direct link between secularization and 
preventing mumps through vaccination.
In addition, as a result of developments in medical science, child 
mortality rates have been drastically reduced in all regions of the 
world. Table A5 shows the child mortality rate between 1990-2010 
for children under five years old.
Table A5: Levels in the under-five mortality rate, 1990-2010 (deaths 
per 1000 live births)
Regions 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 2010 Decline (percent)
Developed Regions 15 11 10 8 7 7 53 %
Developing Regions 97 90 80 71 64 63 35 %
North Africa 82 62 47 35 28 27 67 %
Sub-Sahara 
Countries
174 168 154 138 124 121 30 %
Latin America and 
Caribbean
54 44 35 27 22 23 57 %
Caucasus and Middle 
Asia
77 71 62 53 47 45 42 %
East Asia 48 42 33 25 19 18 63 %
South Asia 117 102 87 75 67 66 44 %
Oceania 75 68 63 57 53 52 31 %
Source: United Nations Report on Child Mortality, 2011
Having changed the daily practices of societies, developments in 
medical science inevitably affect the human connection with reli-
gion. While it was quite normal to seek help from a man of religion 
for mumps just 20-25 years ago, children of today simply do not 
have mumps anymore due to vaccination in modern countries: “An 
effective national health service and global networks of information 
about alternative medical remedies have undermined local folkloric 
medical traditions” (Bruce, 2011b: 559). Thus, men of religion, holy 
places and religion-like mechanisms have lost their power and pres-
tige due to new developments in health care.
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However, these advances in medical science do not necessarily 
reduce belief in religion or supranatural forces. People who seize 
the opportunity to have a baby through modern science do not lose 
their faith or their trust in religion or religion-like places. The de-
crease in the need for religion, temples or clergy does not necessarily 
lead to a decrease in the level of trust in them. On the contrary, if 
there happens to be an increase in the number of incurable diseases 
in the foreseeable future, or if the population growth rate becomes 
higher than the growth rate in the number of hospitals due to pos-
sible structural changes, then it would not be surprising to find that 
holy places and the men of religion will be popular once again as 
the last resort for those who cannot find proper treatment. But until 
then, religion and everything associated with it seems destined to 
lose its visibility, at least at the social level.
Controlling Nature and Secularization
The unpredictability of nature may become destructive and devas-
tating in natural calamities. If human capacities are not enough to 
overcome the catastrophic results that come with such unpredict-
ability, then it would be normal to expect humans to seek out help 
from religion or supranatural powers. But technological advances 
have rendered human beings more powerful than ever, even to con-
trol nature or to handle such disasters. By the end of the day, this 
ever-increasing power of humans over nature reduces the need for 
religion-related solutions.
In the past, if nature did not supply the right conditions for ag-
riculture, this might cause heavy losses. If it did not rain enough, so 
that droughts threatened communities, this was considered a mes-
sage from the gods or God. The opposite cases were conceived as a 
blessing from God or for example a rain god. In those times, to re-
duce such losses or to relieve their pain, people needed spiritual sup-
port. At this point, the increase in technological possibilities would 
reduce how often religion is asked to intervene in everyday life.
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For example, people from 24 different villages of Malkara, which 
is a borough in one of the most modern cities of Turkey, Tekirdağ, 
collectively prayed for rain in May, 2013 (Malkara Latest News, 
2013, May 26). The crowd, which gathered to pray due to the se-
vere drought, included the district governor, mayor, county council 
members, city council members, political party representatives, the 
county Mufti, the president of the chamber of agriculture, the pres-
idents of non-governmental organizations, village leaders, and the 
local people. “We opened our hands to God. We are waiting for the 
rain. Unknown diseases have just emerged recently and damaged 
severely our wheat fields. We pray to God for rain and to bestow 
fertility on our fields,” one village headman told The Malkara Latest 
News. Those living in the villages of Malkara district wanted to seek 
refuge in Allah in such times of drought. During hard times, they 
sought help from Allah, reciting verses from the Qur’ān, sacrificing 
sheep to Allah, and performing public religious rituals. Since they 
have not overcome the problem of drought using worldly means, 
people in the 24 villages of Tekirdağ took refuge in religion to com-
bat nature’s cruelty. Taking refuge in Allah or praying for his help is 
not a mere coincidence in this case. For Malkara residents, Allah is 
considered the creator of natural phenomena. Due to the fact that 
they are deprived of technological tools to overcome such natural 
disasters, they need Allah to stop what he has caused.
On the other hand, it should be noted that the reason why there 
are enough water sources for the millions of people in big cities 
(but not in these villages of just several hundreds of people) is not 
because Allah/God has more sympathy for the millions in the city 
than for the villagers. Often with the help of technology, urban peo-
ple tend to take the necessary precautions to ensure there is enough 
water. In that way, they do not need to pray to a creator or any 
supranatural power in times of drought. Because of the use of large 
dams or artificial ponds, droughts are prevented even in situations 
where it does not rain for a certain period, or even for years. So, I 
think it would not be wrong to say that religious rituals, which often 
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crop up after natural disasters, are generally seen in places where 
technological advances are still lacking.
This kind of transformation has been experienced by the Harra-
nian people after the world’s fifth largest dam - Atatürk Dam - was 
built between 1983 and 1990. Harran, located in the south-eastern 
region of Turkey, is one of the country’s most conservative districts 
where even feudal traditions can still be observed. However, un-
like the more modern Malkara residents, the more religious Harran 
people stopped praying to God for rain after they were supplied 
water by the Atatürk Dam. If we look at satellite images of the 
Harran district, many water-deprived wastelands just outside of 
Harran could be seen in a yellow colour. On the other hand, as 
seen in Picture A3, the Harran district is clad entirely in green af-
ter water from Ataturk Dam that was built in 1992 had reached it 
through channels and pipes. Secularization comes into being at this 
point. With such technological advances, the Harranian people do 
not need to plea to Allah for rain anymore, even if it does not rain 
for years. It indicates that the Harranian people have become sec-
ularized, at least in this respect. Despite being very religious, they 
stopped asking God for rain, and they do not organize any religious 
rituals even in years without rain.
Picture A3. Satellite Images of Atatürk Dam and Harran District (Google 
Earth)
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However, this does not mean that the Harranian people are less 
religious than the people of Malkara. Proliferation of technological 
advances does not have to lead to an increase in the number of irreli-
gious people. Rather, it reduces the number of cases in which humans 
seek help from beyond the physical world. In the end, the new and 
next generations of Harranians will not even know the verses that had 
been recited during rainless times. There is no doubt that the Harra-
nian people will continue to beg Allah and seek help - but for other 
reasons. However, the ever-increasing use of technological facilities 
such as dams, hospitals, paved roads, faster and safer cars, clean drink-
ing water, etc., has clearly brought about a decrease in the number of 
cases in which these people would still see the need for Allah.
I think that, a comparison between Bangladesh and the Neth-
erlands in terms of the levels of scientific developments and secu-
larization will supply another crucial insight in this regard. Julian 
Morris (2006, September 7) rightly asks, “Why is Bangladesh so 
much more at risk of losing human life and experiencing economic 
losses from flooding than Holland?” In this, he raises the question 
of why China and India as well as Bangladesh struggle with floods, 
although they are way above sea level, while the Netherlands, with 
half of its land below sea level, does not experience similar kinds of 
flooding. Although the effects of global warming, such as very high 
temperatures, heavy rains or disproportionate colds, can bring about 
the deaths of hundreds or even thousands of people in some coun-
tries, these do not necessarily result in the loss of life in some other 
countries. As an expert on environmental issues, Morris’ response to 
this reality recalls the very famous letter of an optimistic Rousseau 
(1756, August 18) to Voltaire who had made very pessimistic com-
ments regarding the 1755 Lisbon Earthquake:
Without departing from your subject of Lisbon, admit, for example, 
that nature did not construct twenty thousand houses of six to seven 
stories there, and that if the inhabitants of this great city had been 
more equally spread out and more lightly lodged, the damage would 
have been much less and perhaps of no account (Masters and Kelly, 
cited in Dynes, 1999: 10).
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In parallel to Rousseau, Morris says that it is no coincidence that 
climate change negatively affects poor people most of the time. To 
Morris, because of technological developments, people in the Neth-
erlands are not confronted with floods even though heavy rains can 
be seen throughout the year and half of the country is below sea 
level. Contrary to the Netherlands, Bangladesh is grappling with 
floods due to poverty and lack of technological tools. Surely, this 
situation could be interpreted differently, but when it comes to the 
secularization level in Bangladesh, it would not be wrong to assume 
that there is a parallelism between the low level of secularization 
and the living conditions under which its people are continuously 
exposed to danger. Dutch people do not rely on God but on their 
infrastructure during the same heavy rains that can cause flood-
ing in other underdeveloped countries. But it should be stressed 
that having a better infrastructure does not have to make the Dutch 
people more atheistic or irreligious than the Bangladeshi people. 
What should be highlighted at this point is that although the new 
technology that accompanied scientific developments does not nec-
essarily render human beings more irreligious, people will inevitably 
need, recall or seek out orthodox religion or folk religions less and 
less in their daily lives. I think this is one of the main reasons behind 
the very different secularization levels in Bangladesh and the Neth-
erlands (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 169, 224, 226, 235, 239).
With the help of technology, humans are now capable of de-
veloping early warning systems and building very impregnable de-
fences to minimize the loss of life and reduce the impact of natural 
disasters. With the advent of new construction technology in Japan, 
even multi-storey buildings do not collapse during an eight Rich-
ter scale magnitude earthquake. During extremely cold weather, the 
number of deaths in Europe is limited to a few homeless people in 
the least modernized parts of the continent. The remaining mil-
lions of Europeans get over this kind of freezing disasters in their 
warm houses. In the same way, people in hot countries, where the 
temperature can get up to more than 50 °C during the day, over-
come this potential disaster by means of air conditioning. Today, 
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life-saving advances in the treatment of stroke, needleless injection, 
three-dimensional mammography for the early detection of cancer, 
survival of premature babies, and the gastric bypass method against 
diabetes are part of normal healthcare in modern societies. Spectac-
ular engineering structures and innovations, as well as an increasing 
variety of products with falling prices are other opportunities that 
scientific advances offer. Therefore, it could be said that the rising 
living standard that comes with scientific developments is clearly 
reducing the number of cases in which humans would still feel the 
need for supranatural powers.
Conclusion
The main argument of secularization theory is that the modern-
ization process is for the most part responsible for the loss of so-
cial power and visibility of religion at any one time. As part of the 
modernization process, scientific developments are considered the 
accelerator of this social transformation. However, contrary to com-
mon belief, scientific developments do not contribute to this trans-
formation by falsifying religious teachings or beliefs. Needless to 
say, beliefs do not require scientific evidence. As it might be seen in 
the effects of a small village dam that supplies water during times of 
drought, the contribution of scientific advances to the secularization 
process seems to have happened not directly but indirectly, namely 
through science-based technology
To sum up, scientific developments tend to increase the secular-
ization level in two ways: by advancing the level of rational con-
sciousness which allows people to describe or understand natural 
phenomena in a worldly cause-effect relationship, and by making 
technology cheaper and pervasive for their daily use. However, it 
should be emphasized once more that I do not claim that scientific 
developments increase the number of atheists or irreligious people 
even though that is also a possibility. Of course, there was some in-
consistency between the Medieval Catholic Church’s teachings and 
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some scientific findings. But these inconsistencies do not demon-
strate a zero-sum relationship between faith and science. This is be-
cause there is no universal rule whereby other belief systems have to 
conform or support the claims of the Medieval Catholic Church, 
and the Church was already able to adapt itself to a new era in which 
scientific findings are taken into consideration more than they had 
been. However, although it is not possible to claim that there is a 
zero-sum relationship between faith and science, it can be argued 
that scientific advances can be held responsible for rendering religion 
and theology less visible and/or influential in modern-day society in 
different fields such as explaining sickness and natural disasters.
THE ROLE OF CAPITALISM IN THE SECULARIZATION PROCESS
It is a truth, (almost) universally acknowledged, that industrial cap-
italism is one of the key dynamics that led to Europe becoming the 
world’s most secular continent. The aim of this section is to build 
a theoretical framework whereby it can be shown that there is a 
positive correlation between industrial capitalism and seculariza-
tion. Hence, in this section, I will briefly touch first on the meaning 
and structural characteristics of capitalism. Then, I will indicate how 
capitalism is a key accelerator of secularization at the theoretical 
level by focusing on four major corollaries of capitalism:
1. Rules of Economy and Secularization
2. Disintegration of Traditional Family Structure and Secularization
3. Increase in Welfare and Secularization 
4. Downsizing of the State and Secularization
Capitalism
Capitalism is an economic system in which labour and capital are 
separated and wherein the means of production are privately owned. 
In such a system, the state is expected not to decide how, where 
and how much to be produced; goods and services are voluntarily 
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exchanged; people are free to sell their products and labour force at 
a price determined by a largely impersonal market; and competi-
tion among producers is considered one of its main pillars (Mach-
an, 1993; Barry, 2002; Hazlitt, 2012). As Nigel Ashford (2003: 28) 
neatly summarizes it, capitalism is an economic system “based on 
the voluntary exchange of goods and services, in which the peo-
ple determine their own economic affairs, by deciding where they 
work, or invest, how to spend or save the fruits of their labour, and 
with whom they trade.” In such an economic system, the rules for 
a functioning economy do not stem from any historical-dogmatic 
teachings or dictation by political leaders.
Production for the masses and not just for a certain class in so-
ciety is another feature of industrial capitalism. The well-known 
Austrian economist Ludwig Von Mises mentions continuous im-
provement of the average standard of living and increase in wealth 
as some of the benefits of this system:
It is this ascension of the multitude in which the radical social 
change brought about by the Industrial Revolution consists. Those 
underlings who in all the preceding ages of history had formed the 
herds of slaves and serfs, of paupers and beggars, became the buy-
ing public, for whose favor the businessmen canvass (1972: 1).
Since state ownership of production is restrained as much as 
possible in favour of the private sector, it means that first the eco-
nomic power of the state and then, parallel to it, its political power 
are bound to decrease. Ashford indicates a very limited role for gov-
ernment in a free market economy:
The role of government is to provide the rules or framework that 
enables everyone to be free, to protect them from infringements 
on their freedom by others. The free market is associated with eco-
nomic freedom or freedom of choice: the freedom of the consumer 
to buy, the freedom of the trader to fix the price of his goods and 
services (and of the consumer to accept or refuse to pay it), the free-
dom of the worker to choose his job or profession, and the freedom 
of the producer to produce what he wishes and to employ whom he 
chooses (2003: 36).
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These freedoms provided by capitalism reduced the capacity of 
any one person or group to seize the state and to dictate their own 
values on society.
The aforesaid characteristic features of capitalism allow a more 
rational and organic society to emerge, reducing in the process the 
social prestige and influence of religion, folk religions, religion-like 
mechanisms and all forms of superstitious beliefs. Although there 
is no zero-sum relationship between capitalism and faith, it can 
be statistically shown that countries with a free economic system 
are more secular than those with a command economy (Norris & 
Inglehart, 2008; Gwartney, Lawson, & Hall, 2013). The data sup-
plied by World Value Survey and European Value Survey (pooled in 
1981-2001) support what has been asserted above. Table A6 (Nor-
ris & Inglehart, 2008: 105), Table A7 (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 
70) and Table A8 (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 57) indicate the direct 
correlation between capitalism and secularization.
Table A6. The Perceived Functions of Religious Authorities
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Postindustrial 39 34 39 58 1.6
Industrial 59 53 59 76 2.4
Agrarian 75 72 75 80 3.0
NOTE: “Generally speaking, do you think that the religious authorities in your country 
are giving adequate answers to … 
·	 The moral problems and needs of the individual, 
·	 The problems of family life.
·	 People’s spiritual needs.
·	 The social problems facing our country today.”
(Yes/No) Percentage who agree. 
Source: WVS data, pooled 1981-2001
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As shown by Table A6, the influence of religious authorities 
declines alongside the transition from an agricultural to industrial 
society. While individuals in an agricultural community still have 
confidence in the religious authority at a rate of up to 80% when it 
comes to moral problems, individual needs, family problems, spir-
itual desires, and social problems facing their country, the rate de-
creases as the community distances itself from structures with an 
agricultural character.
Table A7. Social Characteristics of Religious Participation 
Agrarian Industrial Postindustrial All
All 49 25 22 28
Sex
Women 49 26 26 30
Men 49 22 18 26
Age Group
Younger                                                    
(Under 30 years old)
49 22 15 26
Middle (30-59 years old) 47 23 21 26
Older (60+ years old) 47 29 35 34
Education
Low education 55 34 21 36
Medium Education 47 23 16 28
High Education 48 22 24 28
Employment Status
In paid work 49 29 26 27
Income
Lowest income deciles 56 30 22 34
Highest income deciles 45 17 22 26
Social Class
Manager/professional 52 22 23 28
Lower middle 46 22 17 22
Skilled working 42 21 17 23
Unskilled working 52 30 19 31
Marital and family status
Married 49 24 23 28
With children 48 25 23 29
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NOTE: Religious Participation: “Apart from weddings, funerals, and christen-
ings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than 
once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, 
less often, never or practically never.” The percentage attending religious ser-
vices “more than once a week” or “once a week.”
Source: World Values Survey, pooled 1981-2001.
Table A7 shows that the level of religious participation decreases 
in so far as a society distances itself from any social structure with 
an agricultural stamp. We observe and examine religious participa-
tion under headings such as gender, age, education, employment 
status, income, social class and family status. Religious participation 
is much greater within agricultural societies than within societies 
with an industrialized structure. 
Table A8. Religiosity by Type of Society
Agrarian Industrial Postindustrial Eta Sig.
RELIGIOUS 
PARTICIPATION
Attend church at 
least weekly
44 25 20 .171 **
Pray “every day” 52 34 26 .255 ***
RELIGIOUS VALUES
Religion “very 
important”
64 34 20 .386 ***
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
Believe in life after 
death
55 44 49 .229 *
Believe that people 
have a soul
68 43 32 .169 ***
Believe in heaven 63 45 44 .094 *
Believe in hell 59 36 26 .228 ***
Believe in God 78 72 69 .016 N/s
NOTE: Significance (Sig.): ***P = .001; **P = .01; *P = .05. N/s 0 not 
significant. 
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than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a 
year, less often, never or practically never.” The percentage attending religious 
services “more than once a week” or “once a week.” Frequency of prayer: 
Q199: “How often do you pray to God outside of religious services? Would say 
… Everyday (7), more than once a week (6), once a week (5), at least once a 
month (4), several times a year (3), less often (2), never (1).” The percentage 
“every day.” Religious values: Q10: “How important is religion in your life? Very 
important, rather important, not very important, not at all important?” The 
percentage “very important.” Religious beliefs: “Which, if any, of the following 
do you believe in? Yes/No.” The percentage “yes”.
Source: World Values Survey / European Values Survey, pooled 1981-2001. 
Table A8 also shows that religious beliefs are more dominant in 
agricultural communities. Communities with an agricultural char-
acter show higher rates in the criteria of belief in life after death, 
belief in heaven, belief in hell, and belief in God. The number of 
people who say that religion is “very important” tends to shrink in 
industrial and postindustrial societies compared to agricultural ones. 
As is shown in Table A8, the rates of weekly church attendance and 
daily prayer are also higher in agricultural societies.
I will now examine one by one how the aforementioned charac-
teristics of capitalism render religion less influential at least at the 
social level.
Rules of Economy and Secularization
The ethos of capitalism is incompatible with the traditional social 
structure adorned with religion. Most religions, by definition, are 
based on an other world and see this world as only temporal. Weber 
(1930/2005) saw no possibility of a compromise between bourgeois 
morality and traditional religious teachings. The success of a capi-
talist in trade is based on a number of rational decisions involving 
many religion-free factors. The reason of all decisions, choices, mea-
sures, precautions and judgments of a capitalist is only concerned 
with this world. Capitalism, largely viewed by traditional societies 
as the origin of greed, leaves no room for the supranatural or divine 
in running this world. Like Weber, Von Mises (1981) also claims 
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that traditional social structure is a barrier to a free economy, since 
the ethos of capitalism cannot compromise with old traditions, laws, 
rules and morals that are mingled with religion.
Economic success in a free market economy does not depend 
on the relationship with spiritual powers or with the ideologies of 
leaders. To be successful, what people need is to be able to make the 
right, rational, religion-free decisions regarding trade at the right 
time and place. While free market entrepreneurs have to take into 
consideration various independent dynamics to ensure success in 
trade, they have to compete not only with other entrepreneurs in 
their own city, but also with tradesmen from other cities and coun-
tries, often with other religious beliefs. When they seek to produce 
goods of good quality in a more economical way than their compet-
itors, religious teachings, doctrines, practices, rituals and methods 
play no part whatsoever in that effort. Things which were previously 
considered sinful or improper in the light of religion become an 
indispensable part of life by reason of capitalism.
The institutionalization and proliferation of “loan with interest” 
in a particular society wherein usuriousness used to be prohibited 
or conceived as a misdeed because of religion, is one clear example 
of the penetrative power of capitalism. In traditional society, the 
system of making money from money was actualized in the form of 
lending money to the poor by the rich. This process follows a differ-
ent path in the capitalist system. It is obvious that in an agricultural 
society, in which industrialization and capitalism are not dominant 
at all, people tend to need money from a “usurer” relatively less 
frequently than people living in a capitalist society. In traditional 
home-based societies, loan with interest was not used to invest, but 
to relieve one’s grief or get over the devastation caused by natural 
disasters or diseases. Loan with interest, which often happened in 
very difficult times, could result in the confiscation of all property 
by the end of the day. Since those loans with interest were not used 
to finance a particular production or produce any added value, after 
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a period of time borrowers might find themselves in a more difficult 
situation. For that reason, humiliation, degradation or vilification of 
those usurers were not unusual in traditional societies. Like money-
lender Shylock in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice, it comes as no 
surprise that moneylenders are characterized as the villains in many 
literary works. Regarding the notorious moneylenders of times past, 
the articles by Celeste Turner Wright, “Some Conventions Regard-
ing the Usurer in Elizabethan Literature” (1934) and “The Usurer’s 
Sin in Elizabethan Literature” (1938) may supply some important 
insights. As can be seen in these articles, moneylenders were con-
sidered “a fix type monster” in pre-capitalist societies. Besides, ex-
pressions like “(…) usury offends Goodness divine, and disengage 
the knot” were also frequently used in Dante’s (1555/2005) widely 
known work, The Divine Comedy. Like Dante, Balzac (1830/2013) 
characterized his moneylender in Gobseck as a cheapskate, pirate and 
petty, and those who had to take loan with interest from money-
lenders as “victims”.
Although it is understandable that interest on loan was consid-
ered diabolical and dirty money in religion-dominated societies in 
which traditional forms of production pervaded, that same interest 
has become one of the most fundamental features of the modern 
world economic system. With the increase in capital accumulation, 
moneylenders (banks) have taken up the central role in modern 
economies (Hayes, 1919: 68; Rowen, 1960: 580). Wright (1938: 
178) depicts the beginning of this transformation in English soci-
ety as follows: “About the middle of the 16th century, English law 
and business began to ignore the medieval injunctions against usury. 
Despite the continued opposition of the Church, economics was 
being gradually divorced from religion.”
With the development of capitalism, two structural differences 
arise with regard to loan with interest. First, since the middle and 
upper classes also need money for various reasons, like investing, 
increasing their living standard, producing more goods, etc., wealthy 
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people as much as poor ones start to take out loans with interest. 
And taking out loans with interest has led to the revival of econ-
omies as well as bringing about a rise in the living standards of 
people. With the help of such loans, people are able to buy houses, 
cars, properties, make investments, and establish businesses without 
having to save money for years on end in order to reach the required 
amount. The second structural difference is that although only rich 
people were able to make money from money in pre-modern econ-
omies (namely, whoever lent money was rich, and whoever took out 
loans was poor), in present times ordinary citizens can realize addi-
tional income by depositing their money with interest in banks. So, 
unlike traditional society, in capitalist economies, lending money 
with interest might happen between ordinary citizens and banks 
except that the roles have now been reversed.
In addition, religious preferences are now forced to retreat while 
usury imposes itself due to the nature of free market economies 
themselves. As the free market economy does not allow for religious 
intolerance, it leads to indifference towards different beliefs. Vol-
taire, who is one of the most influential and prominent philosophers 
of the Enlightenment, penned some letters on English religious life 
and politics during the period he had to live in London when he 
was not allowed to enter Paris. At the very beginning of the fifth 
letter, On the Church of England, Voltaire (1980: 37) depicts England 
with this sentence: “This is the land of sects. An Englishman, as 
a free man, goes to Heaven by whatever route he likes.” Voltaire 
was talking about something quite new for his native France, where 
Catholicism had been upheld as the only belief system for ages. 
For Voltaire, the reason why there was religious tolerance among 
Londoners from different religious backgrounds, and why religious 
bigotry was less prevalent in England than it was in France, had to 
do with the fact that there was no traditional economic system in 
England, but free trade. In fact, religious differences or prejudices 
tend to lose their power to guide social behaviours if humans are 
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able to come together and benefit from each other. The econom-
ic interests of societies belonging to different faiths exert greater 
weight than religious preferences. Since trade has to be impersonal 
and free from all human or religious biases, it paves the way for 
very different groups to come together to collaborate on a shared 
interest while the very impersonal character of it naturally restrains 
religious preferences from interfering with the economy. As Wendy 
McElroy (1998, June 1) states, a Jew who wishes to do business 
with a Muslim, or a Christian who wishes to trade with a Jew, has 
to ignore cultural and religious differences, and avoid the biases and 
prejudices of his own religious affiliation for such a trade to happen.
Disintegration of Traditional Family Structure and Secularization
Rural people in pre-industrial societies were able to produce their 
own clothes, foods, tools and other necessities. Agricultural produc-
tion was at the centre of life, and there was little diversity or special-
ization in the production process (Treasure, 1993: 62). By contrast, 
the capitalist mode of production renders the division of labour, pri-
vate property rights, working for a salary and private factories part 
and parcel of modern-day life. This new structure that came onto 
the scene with the advent of capitalism turns most of the population 
into a part of economically active population in factories and service 
sector and accelerates the disintegration of the traditional family 
structure:
The societal range of role performances of husbands and wives is 
structurally determined. The range of role performances and, con-
sequently, of statutes of husbands, is much broader than the range 
of role performance or statuses of wives. An important indicator of 
the husband’s performance status is his income, one of the wife’s 
performance status the “quality” of her housework (Heintz, Held & 
Levy, 1975: 862-863).
However, a cultural shift comes into play in the perception of 
women whenever there is a transition from an agricultural society, 
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where religious values, norms and bans dominate, to a capitalist 
society, in which secular-rational thinking, values and evaluations 
pervade. In traditional family structure, women had very limited 
options in terms of jobs due to the lack of available jobs and social 
expectations. The existence of women without economic freedom 
is one of the important dynamics for the continuation of the tra-
ditional family structure. Women with little education and without 
their own income tend to experience issues even in choosing their 
own spouses. In addition, these women are also expected to comply 
with the social moral principles legitimized by religion.
However, in societies dominated by the free market system, 
women tend to make the continuation of traditional family ties dif-
ficult when they start to earn their own income due to more job op-
portunities and better education. They can make friends with people 
from other cultures, which may not be easy in agricultural com-
munities; and since they have become stronger economically, they 
are also now entitled to have the last word on marriage. Unlike the 
situation in traditional societies, in which the number of children 
per family was often determined by religion-sanctioned traditions, 
in modern capitalist societies it is  no longer  tradition or religion 
but “worldly” concerns such as health and education that decide 
how many children a woman will have. Such a transformation in 
daily practices and mind-set also leads to a decrease in birth rate. 
Needless to say, women are more or less forced into having fewer 
children to maintain their working life in capitalist societies. There-
fore, it is no coincidence that one of the most serious problems fac-
ing present-day capitalist societies is a rapid decline in population 
rate. In fact, the rapid decline in childbirth (Yew, 2012, October 6; 
East-West Center, 2013) has forced governments to take serious 
measurements in this regard.
More than ever, women who become “individuals” by gaining 
economic freedom tend to get rid of the suppressions meted out by 
traditional social structures mingled with religion. Besides, the age 
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for the first sexual experience outside marriage has also gone down 
(Finer, 2007; ChartsBin Statistics Collector Team, 2009), while at 
the same time the relative number of children born out of wedlock 
has increased significantly in capitalist societies (Swinford, 2013; 
Eurostat, 2015).
Increase in Welfare and Secularization
Norris and Inglehart (2008: 109-10) showed statistically in their 
masterpiece, Sacred and Secular, that as the level of human devel-
opment increases, religious values, practices and beliefs erode. The 
transition from agricultural production to industrial production, the 
growth of the service sector, the rise in the ratio of literate peo-
ple, more comfortable housing conditions, more leisure time, the 
increase in average life expectancy, the decrease in infant mortality 
rate, reduction in health care costs, proliferation of communication 
tools, and a democratic form of government can all be counted as 
parameters of human development. Negative changes in these pa-
rameters, on the other hand, render societies more vulnerable with 
respect to life’s challenges. It is highly likely that societies which are 
exposed to the destructive power of nature, severe poverty, or state 
oppression, are more religious or more inclined towards the sacred 
than those societies which live under secure, peaceful and affluent 
conditions. As people tend to go to shrines, temples or other holy 
places for their incurable diseases while preferring hospitals for cur-
able ones, in the same way, the more societies are faced with devas-
tating physical and social risks or ills, the more they use non-secular 
ways to cope with them.
By reference to Adam Smith’s well-known metaphor of the ‘in-
visible hand’, in a system where private property and freedom of 
contract are recognized and trade is free from state intervention, 
individuals unintentionally increase the welfare of the community 
as they try to maximize their own gains on a free market. As Mark 
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Skousen (1994) points out, the idea that capitalism makes the rich 
richer and the poor poorer cannot be proved by simply looking at 
the daily life of capitalist societies. Capitalism prevents even pro-
tected groups from controlling all the resources, offers a chance to 
poor people to be able to support their families, and creates op-
portunities for disadvantaged people to become wealthy. Having 
changed the historical structure of the discipline of economy, capi-
talism has brought about a dramatic increase in the national income 
per capita of countries which adopt it (Kasper, 2002). In addition, 
it helps new technologies to be developed and become widespread 
while increasing the level of education (Hartwell, 1965: 165).
As the OECD report about international migration tendencies 
around the globe indicates, the flow of migration is from closed 
economies to capitalist ones (OECD Reports on Trends in Inter-
national Migration, 2001; Griswold, 2002, May 1). In other words, 
people tend to go where the money is, where labour is free and 
where they would have a chance to be wealthy. As Marc Swanepoel 
(1992) argues, increase in wealth occurs where the means of pro-
duction are less controlled by the state. The Annual Report of the 
2013 Economic Freedom of the World showed, once again, that 
countries governed by capitalism yield more wealth than those of 
command economies. For example, while the per capita income 
for capitalist countries is around 36,000 USD, this amount drops 
sharply to 4,382 USD for command economies such as Algeria, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Central African Repub-
lic, Angola, Chad, Zimbabwe, Republic of Congo, Myanmar, and 
Venezuela (Gwartney, Lawson, & Hall, 2013).
The infant mortality rate was over 40% in pre-industrial Eu-
rope. Due to extreme poverty, the population of Europe had not 
increased up until the 19th century. However, as Mustafa Erdoğan 
(2002) states, a significant increase in living standards of Europe-
ans could be seen in the period between 1760 and 1850 because of 
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a - relatively - laissez faire29 economy. While capitalism has led to 
a fall in death rate, it has increased purchasing power. Eating and 
drinking habits have changed dramatically; per capita consumption 
of meat, sugar, tea, beer and eggs, which had once been consid-
ered luxury food items, has increased drastically and they have now 
become ordinary consumer goods. What Erdoğan argues for the 
history of Europe regarding capitalism is perhaps not unique. Inter-
estingly, Milton Friedman (1982), recipient of the 1976 Nobel Prize 
in economic sciences, points to something similar for the history of 
the USA in terms of capitalism:
The United States has continued to progress; its citizen have become 
better fed, better clothed, better housed, and better transported; 
class and social distinctions have narrowed; minority groups have 
become less disadvantaged; popular culture has advanced by leaps 
and bounds. All this has been the product of the initiative and drive 
of individuals co-operating through the free market (1982: 164).
With the rise of capitalism, living standards of societies have sky-
rocketed; and the gap between the poor and the rich has narrowed 
with regard to basic needs. For all these reasons, the need of society 
for absolute powers (religious or non-religious) is being (or will be) 
reduced in the course of time. As Mehmet Ali Kirman (2005b) ob-
serves, the tougher the living conditions in societies, the more they 
wish to live under absolute powers. Therefore, on the basis of history, 
it would be fair to say that the secularization process is likely to be 
found in capitalist societies like those of European countries, the 
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, etc., since with the prolif-
eration of capitalism humans are bound to enjoy a higher level of 
prosperity that renders them less vulnerable to the unpredictability 
of nature (Norris & Inglehart, 2008). On the other hand, this is not 
(yet) the case in undeveloped countries or in countries with rich 
natural resources where the production of wealth is not based on the 
29 The original expression of laissez faire is “laissez faire, [laissez aller], laissez pas-
ser”. In English, it means “Let them act, let them go”. It is considered a motto 
for those who glorify the economic freedom of individuals.
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capitalist economic system. Religion, religion-affiliated institutions, 
and sacred figures/deities are more likely to be visible if not effective 
in those countries.
Downsizing of the State and Secularization
Capitalism further prevents states from imposing any particular re-
ligious beliefs, doctrines or values on societies by limiting their pow-
er of penetration. Since the means of production are owned by the 
private sector and not the state, people are hired according to mer-
it, and there is a direct proportion between their being continually 
hired and their merit within the production process. However, if the 
employer is the state instead of a private entrepreneur, employees 
will need to have the mind-set that is required for a job, or at least 
they have to pretend that they support the state or its institution. 
Since no one is responsible for the loss of state enterprises, people 
do not need to improve themselves; rather, they may tend to think, 
defend or act in accordance with government policies.
Since the most important thing for a capitalist is to make more 
profit, religious identity loses its significance when it comes to re-
cruitment. Human beings from different faiths start to work in the 
same workplace and start to live in the same neighbourhoods. John 
Hood (1998, August 1) points out that capitalist enterprises play 
a very crucial role against religious discrimination, since it would 
be against the principles of productivity or efficiency for company 
executives to exclude potential employees or customers on the ba-
sis of religious affiliation. Since capitalism is based on competition 
among companies, and surviving in a free market depends on profit, 
companies cannot run the risk of hiring or not hiring someone on 
the basis of their faith or ethnic origin instead of their competence. 
As Richard M. Salsman clearly explains:
To compete in a free economy means to create and offer better val-
ues to customers than rival firms. Successful competitors focus on 
reality, inventions, innovations, materials and methods–not on ri-
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vals per se. They’re independent, unconventional, often rebellious 
toward accepted norms and opinions. They’re first-handed. They 
don’t copy–they originate. They don’t travel well-warn paths–they 
blaze new commercial trails. They are forward-looking–not mired in 
the past or in the status quo or burdened by conventional habits. 
They’re not passive order-takers or servants of demanding consum-
ers. They invent products and processes that consumers never heard 
of nor could dream of (2000, January 2).
Linda Gorman (1993) rightly argues that religion (or political 
affiliation) can be one of the hiring criteria if state-owned enter-
prises instead of private sectors run the economy. According to her, 
while such a system can cause waste of resources and depletion, at 
the same time it aggravates the friction between religious groups 
nurtured by the state and other, discriminated ones. Since the loss 
of state-owned enterprises is compensated with taxes, it is not merit 
but loyalty to the government that is important in such economies. 
By contrast, capitalists, who want to maximize their profits, do not 
recruit staff in accordance with their religion or their loyalty to the 
boss’s ideology or faith. Capitalists are more keen on finding the 
most productive staff without taking their religious affiliation into 
account. The religious identities of workers in an automobile factory 
are of no concern to the factory owners unless, of course, friction 
among workforce reduces profit. Therefore, compared to a statist 
economy, a capitalist society is highly likely to generate less religious 
discrimination. For example, at present, it is not Muslim Turks who 
are working in privately owned mines in the city of Zonguldak 
(North Anatolia), but Taoists, Buddhists or people with folk beliefs 
from China.
As Friedman (1982) rightly argues, the more a state interferes 
in the economy, the more it becomes autocratic and totalitarian in 
a political sense. States of command economies have more desires, 
tools and possibilities to disseminate their ideologies (religious or 
non-religious) and to make them more visible even by using force 
where necessary. Owning all schools, factories and other education-
al, political and economic institutions helps states to dictate doc-
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trines, ideologies or faiths that they want to sanctify or perpetrate. 
Sometimes, this is seen via dictation of a religious identity by the 
state under the name of compulsory or elective-compulsory cours-
es in state run-schools, or via deification of a leader. Thus, having 
owned the means of production, the state, through educational and 
communicative channels, can interfere and control the lives of those 
who are at the mercy of the state in terms of job opportunities, 
for example. In particular, throughout the 20th century it has been 
observed that states with command economies dictated certain 
commonly unquestionable values, doctrines, and teachings, or they 
sanctified a particular ideology or person for the sake of creating a 
homogenous society. To those undemocratic countries, shared sanc-
tified values were necessary to hold together the entire community 
and to keep any kind of heresies from infiltrating society. Sanctifi-
cation was used and considered a guarantee of social harmony. As 
McElroy summarizes:
(…) society would collapse into open violence without the cohesion 
provided by common values. Thus, those in authority needed to cen-
trally plan and rigorously enforce the values that should be taught 
to and should be practiced by the masses. After all, if people were 
allowed to choose their own religious values, if values became a 
commodity open to competition, then civil chaos and conflict would 
inevitably ensue (1998, June 1).
By contrast, capitalism relatively prevents the accumulation of 
economic power in the hands of a few, and protects individuals 
from economic or political oppression by the political powers that 
be (Von Hayek, 1944: 46-48). In capitalism, human beings are sup-
posed to be treated as independent individuals who are responsible 
for their own thoughts, personalities, works and products (Rand, 
1986). If a state loses its control of the means of production, mean-
ing losing its status of “boss”, it also loses the power of dictating any 
belief to people, intervening in their lives, or deciding what is good 
for them. Earning a living without needing the state’s mercy liber-
ates individuals from state oppression. As the state gets smaller and 
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becomes less needed, it loses its power of imposing on people what 
to believe in, what to wear, or what to eat/drink.
For example, art is one of the areas in which capitalism has lib-
erated individuals from the hegemony of the state, and has made 
state-supported common values less visible, if not irrelevant. Ac-
cording to Tyler Cowen (2008), artists have managed to stop living 
off the state (or the Church, for that matter) with the opportunities 
they get from capitalism. The increase in the number of potential 
buyers other than state or religious institutions, and the decrease in 
the price of tools that are necessary to make art have given artists 
the chance to be engaged with artistic production as and when they 
wish. The wealth and financial security supplied by capitalism has 
allowed artists to reject the imposed values of the state. Therefore, 
it would not be an exaggeration to argue that bohemians, nihilists, 
and avant-gardists are products of capitalism itself. Likewise, when 
we look at the history of art and literature, it can be observed that 
artists, poets, authors, composers, and journalists have all to praise 
the state-supported doctrines, beliefs, and ideologies when the state 
controls the means of production or is powerful enough to impose 
certain values on society. In parallel, the 20th century has borne wit-
ness to some very deplorable tragedies, the deaths of a great number 
of intellectuals who criticized the state-supported or state-sanctified 
policies or institutions (Dal Lago, 1999; Berlin, 2000; Raw, 2011).
Conclusion
Capitalism is a fundamental pillar of the modernization process. 
In particular, economic development (one of the most important 
effects of capitalism) has played a vital role in the transition from 
a traditional society to a more modern one, most clearly illustrated 
in the history of Europe. Capitalism is a very powerful dynamic 
that can turn societies, characterized by collective consciousness, 
hierarchy, simple division of labour, homogeneous-small-isolated 
communities, and powerful customs and traditions, into societies 
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characterized by specialization, individualization, rationalization, 
advanced transportation, split-second communication, and mass 
production. With the proliferation of the capitalist relations of pro-
duction, feudal systems and values slowly disappear. This process 
inevitably leads to a decline in the power and prestige of belief sys-
tems and traditional value judgments of pre-capitalist societies; in 
other words, all those feudal features lose their ability to influence 
society. Norman Barry (2002) explains that a traditional, conser-
vative society, and all those institutions which thrive on keeping it 
alive, is in direct conflict with the spirit of openness and continuous 
mobility of the capitalist system.
However, it should be emphasized that the reason why capitalism 
seems to go hand-in-hand with secularization is not because there 
is a zero-sum relationship between capitalism and religion. Indeed, 
the withdrawal of religion from the social to the individual level in 
capitalist societies is not because people start to question their own 
beliefs and then decide to collectively move away from their faith. 
Far from it. In fact, people of whatever religious persuasion in cap-
italist societies might still spend all their money on building new 
temples, share their profit as alms, or in some other way be dictated 
in their behaviour by their own religious belief. But, when it comes 
to making money in a capitalist free market economy, they have no 
choice but to enter into a system in which secular rules dominate. 
They have to “act secularly” as it were in order to survive in that kind 
of economic system. The rules of capitalism do not allow for any 
spiritual teachings to take hold in the market. Indeed, by keeping its 
“this-worldly” focus alive, capitalism directs human attention, de-
sires, wishes, and plans from a so-called “other world” towards “this 
world”. In capitalism, employer and employee are supposed to be 
neutral with respect to religion, and their religious attitudes are not 
expected to influence their economic activity.
As old religious habits begin to change, the frequency in which 
humans continue to involve themselves with religion becomes less 
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and less while education, shopping, music, travel, clothing and other 
areas of life become more secular. Still, this life transition should not 
be interpreted as irreligiosity. Being unable to keep up with the old 
religion-dominated, traditional patterns in the new life conditions 
that emerged in capitalism’s aftermath does not necessarily mean 
moving away from religion in a conscious way. It is obvious that the 
reason why people have started to take out loans with interest to buy 
a house or a car, or for other practical reasons, is not because they 
have questioned their religious doctrines or some verses from their 
holy books, but for clearly practical reasons.
And thus, to sum up what has been discussed thus far, it can be 
argued that capitalism, whereby the means of production are tied 
to private property, indirectly restrains the social power of religion. 
Since most of the population becomes part of an economically active 
population in capitalism, religious influence will be overcome and it 
will lose its place in factories. The wealth and welfare that stem from 
capitalism will reduce dependence on absolute authorities, religious 
or other. As government loses its power to run or even influence the 
economy, its political dominance likewise will dwindle, so that its 
capacity to impose any value on society will become smaller. When 
all these are examined together, the underlying theme is that the 
capitalist economic system seems to have the capacity to restrain 
the power and prestige of religion, religion-like mechanisms, folk 
beliefs and superstitious beliefs at the social level.
THE ROLE OF URBANIZATION IN THE SECULARIZATION PROCESS
Although there is no subtitle “urbanization” in Bruce’s seculariza-
tion paradigm, almost all subtopics such as Social Differentiation, 
Structural Differentiation, Social and Cultural Diversity, Egalitari-
anism, Compartmentalization, and Privatization incorporate what I 
am about to discuss in this section.30 My claim is that even though 
30  These subtitles were discussed in Chapter II.
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Bruce holds that his paradigm is only valid within a certain time 
frame (from the Protestant Reformation until the present day) and 
territory (West European countries and their offshoots), the cor-
relation between urbanization and secularization, not unlike those 
between scientific developments and secularization or between cap-
italism and secularization, suggests that the paradigm’s validity may 
encompass a wider geography.
The basic argument for such a link is very obvious: urbanization 
accelerates the secularization process by creating problems for reli-
gion, religion-like mechanisms and folk religions. That is, as urban-
ization increases, religion-based behaviour among people declines, 
while secular and rational solutions begin to replace religious reg-
ulations, values, and teachings. With urbanization, disenchantment 
with respect to anything beyond the physical increases, while the 
impact of religious identity on daily life decreases. In this section, I 
will discuss the theoretical framework for this correlation between 
urbanization and secularization. Therefore, firstly I will indicate 
how I use the concept of urbanization. Secondly, I will elaborate the 
discussion under three subdivisions as follows:
1. Mobility and Secularization;
2. Access to Different Alternatives and Secularization;
3. Privatization of Personal Life and Secularization.
Urbanization
Although there is no agreement (yet) among sociologists on how to 
define, let alone measure urbanization, I think that a general frame-
work of urbanization could be set up using the following dynamics:
(…) the concentration of the population (…), a sharp reduction in 
both death rates and birth rates from traditional [previous] levels 
(…) the establishment of an effective, fairly centralized bureau-
cratic government, the creation of an educational system capable 
of training and socializing the children of the society to a level com-
patible with their capacities and best contemporary knowledge; and 
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of course the acquisition of the ability and means to use an up-to-
date technology (Landes, 2003: 6).
To wit, change from illiterate agriculturalism to literate indus-
trialism, increase in trade intensity, improved education, decline in 
infant mortality rate, rise in average life expectancy (Davis & Ca-
sis, 1946: 186), swift application and utilization of newly developed 
technologies and mass communication tools (Wirth, 1938: 4-5), 
political and social order in which structural and social differentia-
tions dominate, and the appropriate geographical conditions for all 
these dynamics to flourish might be counted as the core features of 
urbanization.
Unlike urban people, rural people often continue the family busi-
ness like a profession. Their assets tend not to vary that much over 
the years. And so, their social status or class remains unchanged, 
such that they are more likely to remain within the social status 
or class of their ancestors. As custodians of the customs and tradi-
tions of the neighbourhood, elderly people determine the values and 
identities that individuals should possess by offering very detailed 
prescriptions that are often mingled with religion. Religion, tradi-
tions, and customs hold a very important place in the daily social life 
of rural people, especially those who have never travelled or moved 
elsewhere. In rural areas, how individuals should live and even die, 
what they should believe in, whom they should (or should not) mar-
ry, what they should eat, drink or wear, are issues which are gen-
erally dictated by religion, tradition and customs (Cox, 1965: 22). 
Religion, religious mechanisms, and supranatural or conventional 
beliefs are at the centre of rural life. However, when people begin 
to live in a more unconfined way, with more alternatives in almost 
every aspect of life compared to what they used to have in rural ar-
eas, and in private spheres that are free from traditions and customs 
and the dominance of religion, their lifestyle can become radically 
altered, thereby accelerating the secularization process.
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Mobility and Secularization
Mobility can be understood as perpetual motion for the purpose of 
finding a better life. When it comes to urbanization, there are two 
forms of mobility. The first is migration from rural to urban areas. 
Due to rapid developments in technology, old modes of produc-
tion are replaced by mechanization and factories. New agricultural 
machineries, like combine harvesters and cotton-picking machines, 
have led to a serious drop in the number of agricultural labourers 
needed in the fields. A combine harvester can reap the crops, sep-
arate kernels, and make straw bales by itself in a field of hectares. 
Likewise, a cotton-picking machine can collect by itself the same 
amount of cotton within a matter of hours that was used to be col-
lected by a large number of people for days. Thus, technology-based 
machines can fairly quickly accomplish tasks that used to be done 
by many people.
By reason of increased mechanization coupled with the job op-
portunities that city life offers, the rural population has migrated 
to urban areas over the years. In addition, other factors have also 
pushed them towards the cities, such as being miles away from the 
nearest hospital, being more vulnerable to nature’s devastating ca-
lamities, using very basic technology, continuously being oppressed 
by powerful traditions, having limited opportunities for socializing, 
not having free partner choice, scarcity or absence of educational 
institutions, and having little opportunities for self-actualization 
activities.
The second form of mobility occurs when urban people con-
tinually move within and between cities. Humans tend to change 
their place of living within or between cities in order to find a more 
convenient neighbourhood with respect to their financial situation 
or to be closer to businesses, or to educational institutions where 
they may want to enroll their children. Additionally, to get to their 
workplaces, millions of people have to make daily travels for long 
distances, especially in metropolitan areas. While in cities like İs-
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tanbul, New York City or Tokyo, such daily travel may sometimes 
take more than two hours, people may have to drive for more than 
an hour in the mornings and evenings even in cities where trans-
portation is easily available. Although this mobility phenomenon is 
nothing out of the ordinary for urban dwellers, this is not the case 
for those who are deprived of the most usual means of transpor-
tation, living far away from industrialization in places where they 
were born, always working and living in the same place and going 
to work on foot.
Furthermore, humans tend to be more mobile in urban areas for 
reasons of socializing, having fun, shopping, etc. Cities have become 
“outdoor malls” because of the new generations with very different 
lifestyles compared to their ancestors. On an average day, millions 
of people in different cities and countries go to shopping malls to 
shop or wander. On the other hand, people in rural areas buy their 
foods - if they do not grow them by themselves - from the nearest 
grocery; their clothes are sewn by some tailor in the neighbourhood, 
and their shoes are bought from the nearest shoemaker in the area. 
Or they have to visit city centres by making long trips several times 
in a year for those family needs.
In addition, structural changes in the business world also con-
tribute to mobility. In the past, modern criteria such as “being in a 
condition to travel” or “having a driver’s licence” were usually not 
required. New technological developments necessitate ongoing 
training for people with jobs. For example, a very experienced plane 
technician, who has been working for more than twenty years, is 
required to get further training in another country due to new ad-
vances in the aeroplane sector. Firstly, such a person may have to 
travel to the city of Exeter in the UK to receive training in the 
electronics of the most recently produced Brazilian-made Embraer 
170 and Embraer 190, and then from there to other world cities 
to undergo further training on the other parts of the plane. Con-
ference halls of hotels, normally used for academic meetings, are 
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now taken up with the training programs of business firms. The new 
technologies and the increasing diversification of markets through 
competition, etc., have rendered mobility and self-improvement a 
necessity even for those who already have a profession. Being pro-
moted or finding a better job may bring along further mobility. On 
the other hand, mobility itself may in turn lead to promotion or a 
new and better job. And that is because moving to another district, 
city or country is one of the common consequences of joining a 
different company. In Turkey, for example, it is not uncommon for 
a bank supervisor in a big, vibrant city to move to a relatively small 
and dull town in order to secure promotion as a manager. Or, a sec-
ond-degree audit commissioner in an insurance company in a big 
city may be assigned as a regional manager to a rather smaller city. 
It does not happen only in relatively small countries like the Neth-
erlands and Belgium, but even in bigger countries like Turkey, that 
people have begun working in neighbouring cities on a daily basis. 
Between cities like Mersin-Adana, İzmit-İstanbul, Bursa-İstanbul, 
Ankara-Kırıkkale, İzmir-Manisa, Trabzon-Rize, Aksaray-Nevşehir, 
thousands of people make daily trips to work during weekdays as 
they do in Dutch cities.
Structural changes in the educational system have also led to 
people becoming more mobile. Millions of students now have to 
leave behind the place where they were born and raised to continue 
their education or otherwise improve themselves (e.g. internships). 
For the most part, they continue to live in another city within the 
same country or move to a different country for better opportuni-
ties. In addition, because of exchange programmes like Erasmus, 
Mevlana, Socrates, Farabi, or because of master’s and PhD pro-
grammes either at home or abroad, even the short-term displace-
ments of thousands of students in high education bring about an 
increased level of mobility.
It should be stressed that cities by their very nature render people 
more mobile through their airports, railway/bus stations, universi-
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ties, economic centres, educational and training institutions, health 
and sports centres, subways, roads and all other facilities and infra-
structures. So, how is the secularization process affected by mobility 
from rural to urban areas, or within/between urban centres as dis-
cussed above?
Three social changes that emerged with mobility further acceler-
ate the secularization process:
1. Becoming more tolerant towards different ways of life;
2. Relative decline in the prestige of power groups or knowledge 
resources;
3. Increase in distances from holy places.
Becoming more tolerant towards different ways of life
A rural person (who has mainly communicated with people from the 
same village throughout his entire life) and an urban person (who 
has had the chance to meet people from different backgrounds) can 
be expected to have different degrees of tolerance towards different 
ideas and lifestyles (Harry, 1974). Encountering different cultures 
on a regular basis leads to people becoming less judgmental towards 
other cultures. Although a single culture may be generally domi-
nant in rural areas, urban dwellers ought to learn that their cultures 
or standpoints need not be the same as those of their neighbours, 
colleagues and school friends. While almost everyone has the same 
belief system and performs the same religious rituals in rural areas, 
the city brings together people of different faiths and backgrounds. 
It should be stressed that although encountering people with differ-
ent belief systems does not necessarily lead individuals to question 
their faith or doubt their religion, what is usually a single and un-
questionable faith in a particular rural area is now only one out of a 
dozen in the city. Of course, the disinterestedness of others who do 
not believe in what we believe, who do not perform what we per-
form, or even have a different set of rituals, doctrines and teachings, 
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do not necessarily dissociate individuals from their own belief sys-
tem or traditions. However, these kinds of encounters could make 
people realize that their unquestioned holy faiths, dogmas, rituals, 
and customs might not be “the one and only” universal truth.
This kind of mental change can be illustrated by means of a co-
lour-metaphor. For example, if an individual is born into and raised 
up in a society where the colour blue is associated with goodness, 
honesty, incorruptness, love, and morality, then everybody (friends, 
family members, neighbours, etc.) will like the colour blue. It is often 
implicitly expressed that the reason why people in other lands are 
ignorant, depraved, immoral, corrupt and wicked is simply because 
they like colours other than blue. Therefore, disliking blue might 
lead to material and moral damages in such a community. In such 
an area, where the colour blue has indisputable prevalence, people of 
other colours will most likely be prevented from entering social set-
tings. For example, they would not be allowed to get married with 
blue people or else they would be the subject of harsh gossip; and 
worse, they might even be forced to leave due to pressure from the 
blue people. Interestingly enough, blue people may well experience 
the same exclusion in other rural areas. For example, not being at-
tracted to the colour blue may be a reason for exclusion from a rural 
community, while in other rural areas people may be excluded and 
exposed to ridicule or even subjected to physical violence if they are 
in favour of the colour blue. In this metaphor, colour is no longer 
just a colour in rural areas, for it represents an identity that is related 
to faith, traditions, customs, doctrines, teachings, etc.
Unlike the rural setting, the urban one may be depicted as a 
combination of different colours. Even if there is predominance of 
one particular colour due to the high number of people favouring 
it, this does not mean that differently coloured people cannot live 
there. As multiple colours can be found in the same city buildings, 
different shades of the same colour can be seen easily in the urban 
fabric, too. As love for a different colour (commitment to a differ-
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ent belief system) cannot be the reason for being thrown out from 
one’s apartment, the question of “which colour do you like most?” is 
not commonly heard when doing shopping in supermarkets, buying 
clothes, a house or car, making vacation plans or registering children 
at school. Commitment to a particular colour is not as decisive for 
one’s daily functioning and activities in urban areas as it is in rural ar-
eas. While marriages in rural areas tend to be between people of the 
same colour, the urban one blends with different colours. Because 
of this, the number of marriages between different denominations 
is higher in urban areas compared to rural areas (Erdemir, 2004; 
Fırat, 2005; Erdem, 2010; Balkanlıoğlu, 2012). The very dynamics 
of urbanization melts the strict rules of religion into thin air. There 
are thousands of people living in urban areas without knowledge of 
the rituals and/or old strict rules of their forefathers’ religion or of 
their neighbours’. Interestingly, a similar transition can be observed 
for different ethnicities as well (Mitchell, Fu, Heaton & Jacobson, 
2010; Schram, 2013: 141; Mutisya & Mutisya, 2015). The reason for 
the higher number of urban marriages between different ethnicities 
compared to rural areas is because different colours have been able 
to find a living space for themselves in the urban setting.
Relative Decline in the Prestige of Power Groups or Knowledge 
Resources
The second way in which mobility accelerates the secularization 
process is the relative decline in the prestige of power groups, insti-
tutions or knowledge resources compared to earlier times (Berger, 
1967b: 9). Being mobile necessarily puts individuals through very 
intensive intellectual, economic and psychological transformations. 
As the process of mobility leads to the estrangement of individu-
als from their beliefs, communities or thought patterns (Salisbury, 
1958: 198) which have sustained them for ages, their sense of be-
longing and esteem are naturally threatened by the mobility process. 
Thus, it is no coincidence that those who are against mobility are 
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likely to be conservative in outlook, faith, thought, and belief. The 
word conservative is not used only to depict religiously conservative 
people, but also to denote any individual or community that is op-
posed to change. Cox explains how conservatives tend to be against 
change throughout history:
The conservatives in the polis of Athens were right in their fierce 
opposition to constructing a port at Piraeus. They knew that mixed 
with the exotic products of foreign shores there would come strange 
people with exotic ideas which would shake their security. Virulent 
opposition to the building of railroads was voiced by the lords of the 
English establishment in the early nineteenth century, not just be-
cause railroads were loud or dirty, but because even lowly villagers 
would now travel to other towns. There they could not be kept from 
coming under strange influences since they would wander about 
without the normal social controls. Worst of all, it was argued, they 
would meet people who had never heard of their local squires. They 
would see their own towns in perspective and might lose all respect 
for traditional authority (1965: 65).
In other words, as long as small settlements are connected to 
each other in the countryside, worldlinization of landowners would 
occur. The story behind a Turkish movie directed by Atıf Yılmaz, 
Kibar Feyzo (1978), is based on such a transformation that took 
place in a Turkish village. Every time the main protagonist of the 
movie goes to other settlements, particularly in big cities, he returns 
to the village with new ideas. At the end of the movie, all villag-
ers rise up against the landowners spurred by the ideas that were 
brought home by the main protagonist, Kibar Feyzo. 
The years-long struggle of black Americans for equality can be 
considered another striking example of the impact of mobility on 
the dissolution and disintegration of the old order:
(…) the movement of large numbers of Negroes out of rural areas 
in the South and into urban industrial centers, plus the experience 
of thousands of young Negroes in the military service, supplied the 
indispensable social exposure which has resulted in the civil rights 
revolution. Negroes discovered that things did not have to be the 
way they were. Those who acted against oppression were young, and 
they were geographically and occupationally mobile. Their battles, 
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unlike those of the Civil War which took place at heretofore unknown 
villages (…) now took place in urban centers (…) Mobility had un-
locked the cage (Cox, 1965: 66).
Therefore, it would not be wrong to claim that the struggle of 
urban black people, who were more mobilized compared to their 
families back home, is one of the main reasons behind the decom-
position and disintegration of the old racist conservative structure 
in the USA, wherein blacks were seen as second class citizens, e.g. 
separate seats were reserved for whites and blacks, blacks could not 
use the same toilets as whites, etc..
Increase in Distances to Holy Places
The third way in which mobility paves the way for secularization is 
the tendency among people to “grow away” from holy places where 
religion regenerates itself. In rural areas, holy places are not only 
very close to people in terms of distance, they are also used for dif-
ferent social events apart from worship. Holy places in rural areas, 
usually within walking distance, tend to be located relatively far 
away from people in urban areas. When it comes to countries like 
Turkey with its majority Sunni population, it might be asserted that 
there are mosques in every corner of every city with no big distanc-
es. However, my intention here is not only to denote “space” when I 
use the word “distance”: as S. S. Aquaviva (1960: 212) rightly states, 
the new lines of business and socializing opportunities that came 
with urbanization lead to people being able to spare less time for 
religious duties. The “daily” organization of urban life brings with 
it a certain limitation on the possibilities for an active religious life. 
For example, the long working hours due to very severe competi-
tive working conditions, more (secular) opportunities to socialize 
after work, or being too tired to do anything apart from staying at 
home on the sofa, more non-religious courses for self-improvement 
(sports, music, art, yoga, tai chi, etc.) outside of work, spending more 
time with children even though having just one or two, change in 
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vacation perception, and so forth, have somehow forced the daily 
life of modern individuals to focus more on this world rather than 
on religion’s other world.
Although the conditions in rural areas help individuals to main-
tain a religious lifestyle, mobility and other (secular) dynamics have 
reversed this situation in urban areas. What is more, going abroad 
(which has become a regular situation even for the middle class in 
developed or developing countries) often means that individuals can 
end up far from their holy places of worship. We should, however, 
point out that technological opportunities can, in some places, en-
able people to perform their religious duties more frequently. More 
comfortable and cheaper transportation, for example, enables more 
people to perform their duty of Hajj. Developments in transpor-
tation enable more Christians, in a similar way, to visit holy lands. 
The fact that belief tourism is more attractive and popular than 
before is certainly associated with the developments in the trans-
portation sector. However, an important question that should be 
answered appears at this point: Did the Muslims, who could not 
manage to fulfil their duty of Hajj in previous times due to the lack 
of technological means, consider this religious duty to be unim-
portant or not-worthy just because they had not enough money or 
the conditions did not allow them to perform it? Do people begin, 
specifically in terms of Hajj, to do something that they previous-
ly found unworthy to do, that they attributed no meaning before 
or even something that they were contrary to? Do, in other words, 
people who had an atheistic world-view before decide to perform 
the Hajj due to cheaper flight tickets or are these people who had 
already attributed importance to the duty of Hajj? 
It is true that making pilgrimages with the help of technology by 
those who could not realize this visit to the Hajj may be considered 
one of the indicators of moving away from secularization. How-
ever, it has to be emphasized that the rise of flirtation rate due to 
technological advancements among children of families who were 
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against flirtation has a different weight with regard to the secular-
ization discussion compared to the rise of Hajj visits due to ease 
of transportation among children of families who did not oppose 
such pilgrimages in the past. Because in the first case, premarital 
dating, which once was a disapproved form of behavior has become 
part of daily life with the changing technology. On the other hand, 
unlike premarital dating, performing Hajj was not forbidden or 
condemned in the past in Turkish society. In other words, the first 
case (hajj) is a continuation of religious beliefs in a different form, 
whereas the other example (dating) is a diminishing of religious in-
fluence in this specific field. In addition, when an answer was being 
sought as to what the secularization paradigm is, it was stated that it 
is not like synchronized swimming. As social changes take place, all 
components of societies do not have to move in the same direction 
and at the same rate. On the contrary, there might be social com-
ponents which would evolve in a different direction during social 
changes. What we call social transformation is a new form provided 
by the social components which evolve in different directions.
Here, I do not mean an absolute disengagement or break, nor do 
I claim here that no one goes to mosques during the day to pray in 
urban areas. But the thing I would like to stress is that holy places 
are visited relatively less frequently in urban areas, which seems to 
run parallel to clerics losing their power to intervene in the daily 
lives of urban dwellers. However, this does not mean that urban 
dwellers necessarily lose their faith on account of the level of mobil-
ity they have to adopt. What should be emphasized here is that even 
for very religious people, the number of moments reserved for wor-
ship in urban settings tends to go down. The results of a survey un-
der the theme, “What would you do with an extra hour every day?”, 
carried out by the YouGov research company, which asked a number 
of questions to 1000 adults on behalf of The Huffington Post (Belkin, 
2013, August 2) seem to support the point being made here. The 
number of people who say “I use my extra hour for religious issues” 
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is less than that of those who would use that extra hour to relax, 
sleep, cook, spend time with family or friends, do housework, make 
home repairs, do office work, watch television, play music, have sex, 
engage in athletic activity, study, etc. Actually “religious issues” do 
not even appear on the chart.
Thus far, I have examined how social changes that come with 
mobility can accelerate the secularization process under three head-
ings. In sum, as Bruce (2011b: 560) puts it “increased social and 
geographical mobility, separation of work and home, decline of iso-
lated local societies, increasing cultural diversity and the globalisa-
tion of knowledge make difficult the maintenance of any distinctive 
shared belief system.”
Having looked at mobility, I am now going to examine how 
having more alternatives with respect to just about every issue may 
cause a rise in secularization.
Access to Different Alternatives and Secularization
When an urbanite wants to watch a movie or go to the theatre, s/he 
will most likely have many options. The number of movie houses, 
plays and appropriate places will be far greater in an urban setting 
than in a rural one. Rural people must either go to the nearest ur-
ban centre or go to a cinema hall in their town in order to watch 
a movie. Similar cases can be observed with regard to educational 
institutions, markets, museums, restaurants, bars, nightclubs, sport 
centres, cafés, etc. Since the city offers a variety of facilities in al-
most every aspect of daily life compared to the rural area, the places 
where life regenerates itself are not confined to a limited number of 
options as it is in a rural area. It is no coincidence that the number 
of consanguineous marriages in rural areas is much higher than in 
urban areas, since individuals have fewer opportunities to socialize 
in rural areas, whereas in urban areas people have more chances to 
make friends or find their life partners among a variety of people.
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Correspondingly, urban people get acquainted with different be-
lief systems, faiths, religious groups and denominations (or non-re-
ligious ones) in cities. Urbanites have the chance to choose their 
faith from among a number of different alternatives, a choice that 
is more often than not unavailable to rural people. The freedom of 
choice that city life offers plays a crucial role in creating a new kind 
of consciousness. The faith that everyone has to accept unquestion-
ingly in a rural setting becomes one of many alternatives in an ur-
ban setting (Dobbelaere, 1985: 382). For those who could not go to 
church in Muslim villages because there is no church or for fear of 
religious persecution, there are no such obstacles standing in their 
way when going to churches in an urban setting. If it is necessary 
to hide their belief, cities provide convenient conditions for that, 
too. Also, it is quite possible for a person who has never heard of 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses before s/he migrates to an urban setting to 
become Witness of Jehovah within a few months in such a setting 
due to the rapid and widespread communication facilities that are 
available.
It could be claimed that changing one’s belief system in favour of 
another religion is not a sign of secularization, since the individual 
is still said to be under the influence of another religion. However, 
secularization should not be confused with atheism or deism. What 
is important as far as secularization theory is concerned, is the soft-
ening up of religious identity which is supposed to be carried from 
birth to death, as is the case in a rural setting (Bruce, 1998: 229) up 
to a point where it becomes an entity that can be preferred or reject-
ed. For instance, while apostasy might result in deaths from time to 
time in rural areas, it does not create problems in an urban setting 
unless the social role of people is jeopardized in such a way that 
they can no longer properly and effectively maintain their social 
roles. Contrary to the traditional social structure where family was 
the most fundamental unit of production, in modern societies there 
is a need for institutions and experts for the continuity of the huge 
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size of economic activity, formed together with industrialization, 
and modern city life. For that reason, more institutions and experts 
are available in modern cities for specific tasks and functions than 
there are in rural areas. And the faiths of these experts, e.g. doctors, 
lawyers, mechanics, teachers, barbers, restaurant managers, bank of-
ficers, etc., do not bear any importance for the continuation of social 
life if the experts are fulfilling their obligations. It is not which faith 
a doctor belongs to, but rather his/her competency that needs to be 
looked at, not which religion a lawyer belongs to but his/her success 
at cases in court, not which sect a baker belongs to but the quality of 
his/her bread is the yardstick.
Privatization of Personal Life and Secularization
In this dissertation, the phrase “private space” refers to the times and 
spaces outside working hours and work places where individuals can 
be on their own or become anonymous. Urbanization creates such 
private spaces that are relatively free from religious duties, sanctions, 
traditions, customs, pressure from neighbour, etc.. An urbanite has 
to continuously be in communication with other people in order to 
survive for most of her/his life. Until the end of working hours, ev-
erybody, irrespective of faith, background or culture, functions like 
the proper organ of a healthy living organism31 for the continuation 
and wellbeing of a wholesome urban life. However, after work, they 
have the opportunity to enjoy some private time for themselves.
In urban areas, individuals do not necessarily come together 
again in the evenings with someone they had met for professional 
reasons during the day. For a person who wants to get divorced, for 
example, what her/his divorce lawyer does after working hours is 
of no concern. That lawyer might be a gambler, a member of a very 
marginal sex group, a Satanist, a believer in the Flying Spaghetti 
31 In a healthy living organism each organ fulfils its works no matter what they 
are doing. Likewise, in a proper urban life, each individual has to fulfil his/her 
works no matter what they believe in.
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Monster, or a homosexual; neither it is possible to know for sure 
whether these are true nor do these identities of that lawyer make 
any sense if s/he is good at her/his job.
For urban life, if individuals fulfil their duties properly during 
the day, it is of no consequence what they believe in or what their 
religion is. For instance, a deeply religious restaurant owner may 
have an atheist customer. A company with a Christian owner may 
organize a deeply religious wedding ceremony for a devout Mus-
lim couple. Individuals in a company may never know whether they 
will be part of a team led by a homosexual. A religious worker may 
receive orders from a deistic supervisor, or a religious client may 
consult someone whom s/he never shares anything with in daily life. 
Banks’ lending rates, house-car prices, the prices of electronic goods, 
or the task that must be done within a certain time period do not 
depend on religious affiliation in a city. Religious belief relatively 
becomes irrelevant in the daily activities of urbanites.
On the other hand, people in rural areas are addressed in daily 
life by their names. Cheese is bought from Mr. Ahmet, watermelon 
is bought from Mr. Mehmet. In contrast, the number of sellers who 
are addressed by their name in an urban setting is considerably few-
er. At the supermarkets, urbanites quickly pay and get their change 
back without needing to learn the details of the cashier’s life; indi-
viduals even do not bother to say “good morning”, “good evening”, 
or “hi” when they go into places or take their leave.
Having a family connection other than by chance with the gro-
cer or being the neighbour of the glassworker, electrician, mechanic, 
and serviceman who are called in for everyday problems is endemic 
to the rural setting. Getting into dialogue with the same people 
during both working hours and after-hours is not common for ur-
banites. As Louis Wirth (1938) points out, the level of relationship 
among people in urban settings is very impersonal, superficial, frag-
mented and temporary.
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The question “Which family are you from?” is heard more often 
in a rural setting. Forasmuch, if it is known “from whom” a person 
hails, then this vital knowledge will provide an idea on whether that 
individual is reliable or belongs to the same community or wheth-
er s/he might be a good candidate for marriage, etc., at the end of 
which the social borders will be determined. Since millions of peo-
ple or at least hundreds of thousands live in cities where they ought 
to be always on the move or mobile, it is not meaningful to ask a 
person “which family do you belong to?” In an urban setting, infor-
mation about professions, companies, education levels, neighbour-
hoods, football teams, girl/boyfriends and so forth is much more 
important than the question of family origin.
While an urban setting may convert social venues into private 
areas, even shops in rural areas are used as venues for socializing. 
Rural sellers and buyers become part and parcel of highly mechani-
cal32 relationships even getting into the subject of family or personal 
issues. Highly private family issues, e.g. something shameful or dis-
honourable, are quickly heard in a rural setting. In addition, when 
an unknown car is parked in front of a coffee-house in a rural area, 
people in such an area would be keen to learn the identity of their 
visitor(s). Since any place is accepted as part of the public sphere, 
whoever gets into the village must be known immediately. On the 
other hand, it would seem meaningless to try to learn who passes by 
in the street outside when the next-door neighbour already is and 
remains unknown for urbanites.
Another way in which urbanization creates private spaces for 
people is that it is free choices, common interests and common 
pleasures that bring people together, rather than traditional or 
forced associations. Urbanites decide according to their own free 
will, while in rural areas the questions “with whom”, “how”, “where”, 
32 The term “mechanical” is here used in a Durkheimian sense, meaning that 
clan-based strong sense of community in which there are the same or very 
similar beliefs, ethnic origin and social norms (Durkheim, 1893 / 2014).
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“how long” to socialize are answered by traditions, customs, duties 
or family demands and requirements. People living in urban areas 
have less difficulty when they do not want to establish a dialogue 
with their neighbours. Indeed, they have less need for neighbours 
due to rising living standards in cities. People may not need much 
neighbourliness in settlements where many services (from basic 
foods to emergency services) are quickly accessed twenty-four hours 
a day on account of advanced technology; besides, because of cities’ 
extensive transportation network, close friends can be visited within 
a relatively short time in spite of being far away.
As such, this process inevitably leads to a decline in the number 
of cases in which neighbours would intervene in the daily lives of 
others. Therefore, by its very nature, the urban setting has rendered 
customs, beliefs, friends, and guests free from neighbours’ interven-
tion. Since everybody is able to delve into the details of others’ lives 
in a rural setting, the amount and velocity of propagation, and the 
impact of “grapevines” are much bigger than in an urban setting. For 
example, while it would be very difficult for a person to invite his/
her unmarried partner to spend the night together in a rural settle-
ment (since such a case could even result in death, injuries or being 
isolated from the community), even next-door neighbours are not 
interested in visitors and prefer to have nothing to do with them in 
urban context. Private letters, court decisions, enforcement notices, 
etc., might be talked about (or rather gossiped about) in rural living 
rooms shortly after or even before the real owners get them, while 
intrinsically such a case is not at all possible in the city.
Urbanites are very protective of their privacy vis-à-vis any in-
cursions from traditions, religions, neighbours, customs, etc. –with 
the help of protection and opportunities that city life offers. Thus, 
it would be fair to say that while private and public spheres are in-
tertwined in a rural setting, this is not the case in an urban setting 
where people are more protective of their own privacy. It should be 
added that religion-free laws also allow individuals to protect their 
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private spaces and to keep traditions, customs, religion or religious 
mechanisms out of their daily life if they want (Cox, 1965: 50-59).
Conclusion
I think Wilson’s impressive article, “Aspects of Secularization in the 
West,” could help us to summarize what has been discussed thus far 
about the function and power of religion in rural areas:
Religion is an agency of social control, a system of taboos and pre-
scriptions, legitimated by reference to a supranatural order. (…) 
Control in social system depends on supranatural concepts (…). 
Religion subserves social cohesion, providing supranatural legit-
imation for the values men held in common, values they saw as 
characterizing their societal life. Religion helps to “objectify” those 
values, giving them the appearance of some supra-social authority. 
(…) Religion legitimates group ends and activities (…). And reli-
gion facilitates the expression of emotion, prescribing the circum-
stances and styles (…) (1976: 267-68).33
Urbanization tends to undermine these functions and power of 
religion in three ways: by increasing mobility, by offering more al-
ternatives in almost every aspect of life, and by creating and protect-
ing religion-free private spaces. However, this dissertation in no way 
claims that there is a direct link between the level of urbanization 
and the number of atheists or irreligious people even if that is also a 
possibility. Rather, it should be noted that urbanization is responsi-
ble for rendering religion less visible and/or influential.
Therefore, the impact of urbanization on the level of secular-
ization can be summarized as such: Urban life reduces the num-
ber of “moments” reserved for religion, and forces individuals to 
channel their energy from “the other world” to “this world” (Wei-
gert & Thomas, 1970). A secular lifestyle can be made normal and 
familiar even for very radically religious people on account of the 
mass media and the widespread use of modern communication fa-
cilities. It becomes more and more difficult for any belief system 
33  The expression in this passage is past tense in the original document.
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to be powerful enough to represent every component of the urban 
setting. For social cohesion, not common values, but pluralism and 
tolerance have become the structural elements of systems, while 
the visibility of marginal groups has increased considerably (Harry, 
1974). Urbanites make themselves available for secular spare-time 
activities rather than religious ones. Production and consumption 
patterns, coordination of everyday life, knowledge resources, meth-
ods of knowledge dissemination, etc. have become more rationally 
based and independent from religion in urban settings. It is not 
only religion but also social prestige, social influence and visibility 
of religious mechanisms, supranatural or conventional beliefs, mys-
ticism, magic and astrology which have declined in importance in 
urban life. Religious authorities do not command the same respect 
in urban settings as they do in rural areas. Technology and scientific 
advances are more common and used more frequently in urban ar-
eas than in rural ones.
WHAT DOES THE EXTENDED SECULARIZATION PARADIGM NOT 
ASSERT?
What the extended secularization paradigm asserts has been exam-
ined in detail above. However, to avoid possible misunderstandings, 
it is necessary to briefly mention what the extended secularization 
paradigm does not assert. And that is what the present section, 
which has the following six subdivisions, is about.
1. The extended secularization paradigm is not limited to particular 
parts of the world.
2. The extended secularization paradigm is not a secularist or a pro-
gressivist ideology.
3. The extended secularization paradigm does not claim that the 
end point is atheism.
4. The extended secularization paradigm is not “synchronized swim-
ming”.
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5. The extended secularization paradigm is not based on the fre-
quency of worship -or lack thereof- only.
6. The extended secularization paradigm is not relevant for only 
monotheistic religions.
I should note that the first and the fifth of these subdivisions are 
the only ones that are different from Bruce’s paradigm. The others 
are extracted from his works.
1. The extended secularization paradigm is not limited to 
particular parts of the world
Bruce’s paradigm is an attempt to clarify specific clusters of changes 
that occurred within certain time frames and geography. Historical-
ly speaking, the Protestant Reformation is invoked by Bruce to be 
the starting point, while geographically speaking his paradigm aims 
to explain what has happened to religion in Western Europe, and 
by extension, its North American and Australasian offshoots. Not 
unlike Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis, Bruce’s attempt is confined 
to a particular geography and history, so that the secularization of 
other geographical regions and historical time periods as well as the 
reasons behind them are not dealt with. For Bruce, the validity of 
his secularization paradigm for European countries does not mean 
that the same process will necessarily accompany the modernization 
of other regions of the world.
When it comes to the secularization process of socially differen-
tiated and industrial societies, Martin (1978) speaks of “particular 
historical circumstances” behind this transformation in his respect-
ed and well-known work, A General Theory of Secularization. More 
precisely Martin (1991: 467) argues that history does not hold a 
common fate for all societies, by saying that “under conditions A, 
B and C the phenomenon N is associated with Z, but under other 
conditions the association may disappear or be crucially modified”. 
Likewise, Bruce’s paradigm, which has been used to analyse the 
social transformation in Western Europe and its offshoots, cannot 
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be universalized to explain all the different experiences around the 
world, due in part to its starting point, the Protestant Reformation. 
His paradigm is neither a future projection, nor an all-encompass-
ing explanation that covers every secularization process that takes 
place in any part of the world. In addition, there are scholars who 
claim that “secularization is a product of the conflict between the 
Church and the state in Western Europe and emphasize that an 
analogous situation has not developed in the Muslim world.” (Cey-
lan, 2004: 178). 
By contrast, the extended secularization paradigm proposed in 
this study is an attempt to support the theoretical framework of 
Steve Bruce’s paradigm without the pretense that such a framework 
is one of natural laws. This extended theoretical framework claims 
that scientific advancements, industrial capitalism and urbanization 
may trigger secularization in any society regardless of the dominant 
religious culture, history or geography. However, the issue expressed 
here is not meant to suggest that all secularization processes around 
the world are the consequence of modernization. Of course, soci-
eties which have relatively become more secular deserve a separate 
study. The centerline of this study’s hypothesis does not stipulate 
that the only reason behind a secularized society is modernization; 
rather, it only suggests that the secularization of modernized societ-
ies is not a mere coincidence.
Alevi groups in Turkey are selected as the field of study. How-
ever, it should be noted that all societies, groups or countries expe-
riencing the modernization process but did not have the Protestant 
Reformation in their history should also be included in the par-
adigm’s field of study. For example, Catholic Southern European 
Countries such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and particularly their off-
shoots in South America like Brazil, Chile, Argentina etc. or Cath-
olic countries in Central Europe like Austria, Poland and the Czech 
Republic or South-Eastern European Countries and countries in 
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Eastern Europe like Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, Greece, Croatia, and 
Bulgaria all have the potential to be the field of this paradigm.
According to the paradigm, the dependency on absolute power, 
be it religious or not, is expected to be reduced if a country passes 
on to a free market economy from an economic structure where the 
state was completely dominant and as much as the current technol-
ogies can be applicable in modern urban life. For example, many 
countries in Latin America, which experience a relatively more 
modern life compared to the past, have also passed through a sim-
ilar secularization process. According to the report issued by Pew 
Research Center (2014, November 13), it is suggested that there is 
decrease in religious practices, beliefs and memberships that extends 
all along the continent. The dominant religious belief in the conti-
nent, Catholicism, is in a rapid decline since the 1950s. According 
to this report, while at least 90% of the population of Latin Ameri-
can countries were Catholic five decades ago, this rate has decreased 
to 69%. In addition, the approval rates of abortion, divorce and gay 
marriage, which were once impossible within Catholic tradition, 
are rising. The rate of acceptance for gay marriage has increased to 
over 45% in major Latin American countries like Brazil, Argenti-
na, Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay. That means almost one in two of 
people on the streets defends the legality of gay marriage in soci-
eties where 90% of the population were Catholic. Sections related 
to birth control and divorces in this report are also important for 
demonstrating the ongoing secularization process:
Regardless of their assessments of whether change is occurring, 
many Catholics think some of their church’s teachings should be re-
vised. For instance, across Latin America, a median of 66% of Cath-
olics say the church should allow Catholics to use artificial means 
of birth control, and in Chile, Venezuela, Argentina and Uruguay, 
roughly eight-in-ten Catholics favor a change in church teaching 
on contraceptives. In the U.S., 72% of Hispanic Catholics think the 
Catholic Church should permit the use of contraceptives. There also 
is substantial support among Latin American Catholics (a region-
al median of 60%) for ending the church’s prohibition on divorce. 
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Again, Catholics in Chile (82%), Uruguay (78%) and Argentina 
(77%) are among the most likely to voice support for change (2014, 
November 13: 23-24).
Mentioning the Pentecostal movement in Latin America, par-
ticularly after the 1950s, might be used to make objection to Latin 
secularization process. The Pentecostal movement is named as the 
most dynamic social movement in this region by researchers due 
to its rapid expansion (Gaskill, 1997; Gill, 1999). However, a con-
trary argument to this objection can be submitted based on three 
points. The first is that since the 1950s, the Catholic Church has 
decreased from 94% to 69%, while the rate of Protestants increased 
from 3% to 19%. That means increase in Protestants is not sufficient 
to compensate for the group that leaves Catholicism. The second 
contrary argument relates to the secularization definition given in 
this study. The definition of secularization in this study deals with 
the increase and decrease in the social impact of the metaphysical 
realm in people’s daily lives, as well as with the change in the num-
ber of believers. Social force and beliefs are decreasing in daily life as 
seen in rising rates of divorce, abortion, gay marriage, pre-marriage 
intercourse. The third contrary argument is that the emergence of 
the Pentecostal Movement can also be construed as secularization 
due to the transformation in the nature of belief. Preferring another 
belief system at the expense of the parental belief that is supposed 
to survive from birth to death indicates very dramatic changes in 
the nature of belief. When it comes to belief, opting for preferable 
or selectable fact in place of the unquestionable and unchangeable 
situation is also one of the indications of secularization.
The question of whether the extended version of secularization 
paradigm can also provide an explanation for the transformations 
experienced in former Soviet Socialist republics and East-Central 
European countries emerges as an important field of study. Howev-
er, it should be expressed that it does not seem possible to present 
a meta-narrative that provides a plausible explanation with regard 
to the secularization process for each country. Interestingly, some 
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countries experienced a religious revival after the collapse of com-
munist regimes, while the speed of secularization increased in some 
others. Besides, although a sharp fall was seen in religious affiliation 
since some states encouraged secularization during the communist 
period, this process has not been experienced in the same way in 
all countries due to their own peculiar history. Alar Kilp states the 
following using data from the work of Steve Bruce (Choice and Re-
ligion: A Critique of Rational Choice Theory) and data from the World 
Value Survey: 
Between 1937 and 1980, the number of places of worship and 
the number of full-time clergy were doubled in Poland and earlier 
rounds of the WVS [World Value Survey] testifies to some increase 
of religiosity in Hungary during the 1980s. In other societies (e.g. 
Eastern Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovenia), the levels of religi-
osity were decreasing during Communist period and the same trend 
also continued after the collapse of Communist regime (2009: 206-
207).
Religion is a body of paradigm that influences daily practic-
es, moral values, and ontological problems of a society, as well as 
their perception of social norms through metaphysical references 
in traditional societies. Answers for such issues are sought also in 
modernizing societies, and this time it is not only religion or the 
traditional world view but secular-rational values are also used to 
give plausible answers to those issues. The usual indicators of this 
value change are related to the increasing levels of justification for 
abortion, divorce, homosexuality, euthanasia, and suicide among the 
general population. While abortion and homosexuality were not ac-
cepted traditionally in Christian societies, and were even considered 
a crime until very recently, religious authorities also asserted that 
people who had abortion and/or who are homosexual are sinners. 
In the 19th century, there was no divergence between the societies 
of Europe on these issues. At this point, it is worth mentioning 
that the proportion of the population that never approve divorce, 
euthanasia and casual sexual relationships is higher in East-Central 
Europe (ECE) compared to the modernized Western Christian so-
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cieties of Europe (WEST) (Kilp, 2009: 217). Similarly, the average 
disapproval rate for homosexuality is 54.4% in ECE and 26.4% in 
WEST.
Contrary to contemporary liberal societies where the freedom 
and happiness of individuals are a priority, totalitarian communist 
states gave priority to surrounding and inclusionary ideological doc-
trines rather than the freedom of individuals. And after some time, 
this doctrine transformed into a structure similar to religion, that is, 
it became unquestionable, touched every aspect of life, and became 
sacralized in these countries. The existence of scientific atheism in 
Soviet Russia can be an example of this. Paul Froese here explains 
how scientific atheism is consecrated by the state:
Atheists waged a 70-year war on religious belief in the Soviet Union. 
The Communist Party destroyed churches, mosques, and temples; it 
executed religious leaders; it flooded the schools and media with 
anti-religious propaganda; and it introduced a belief system called 
“scientific atheism” complete with atheist rituals, proselytizers, and 
a promise of worldly salvation. (…) Scientific atheism, the official 
term for the Communist Party’s philosophical worldview, posited the 
ultimate purpose of human existence, a moral code of conduct, and 
created a collection of atheistic rituals and ceremonies that mim-
icked religious ones. In addition to developing this ersatz religion, 
Soviet officials heavily promoted scientific atheism. The doctrine 
was taught in schools, advocated in the media, and emphatically 
propagandized in books, posters, the arts, holidays and celebra-
tions. Convinced atheists could join atheist organizations and meet 
on a regular basis in lieu of church participation; the primary atheist 
organization was the League of Militant Atheist which was active 
prior to World War II and later replaced by the Knowledge Society. 
All in all, scientific atheism was omnipresent in the daily lives of 
communist citizens. Atheist propaganda and rituals in combination 
with the brutal repression of Russian religious groups produced an 
atheistic “church” similar to a state-supported religious monopoly 
(2004: 36).
Russia constitutes an interesting example with respect to secu-
larization discussions. After 70 years of state-imposed atheism, in 
the last 25 years there has been an increase both in the number 
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of Orthodox Churches and people who consider themselves as be-
lievers (Evans & Northmore-Ball, 2012: 795). According to public 
opinion polls conducted in 1991, 63% of Russians defined them-
selves as atheist, and 28% defined themselves as Orthodox Chris-
tian. Since then, that is to say from the beginning of the 1990s, there 
has been an increase in the number of people who are bound to a 
religion group except atheists. When we come to 2010, the number 
of atheists has decreased by 8%, while 75% of the population began 
to define themselves as Orthodox Christian (Kulkova, 2014: 3).
In order to discuss whether (or not) the extended secularization 
paradigm can explain any transformation experienced by a society 
with respect to its sacred values, first of all the tripods (science, in-
dustrial capitalism, urbanization) of the paradigm need to be an-
alyzed with respect to their realization in that country. It is not a 
coincidence that by consecrating its own doctrine as was the case in 
the former Soviet Union, there was no free market economy and the 
state held such absolute power.
Specific to post-communist countries, the changes and trans-
formations experienced recently will supply important data with 
respect to secularization discussions. With increase in the level of 
modernization and elimination of the underlying structure that al-
lowed the state to consecrate any social values, it might pave the way 
for a new lifestyle with respect to the metaphysical realm. It will be 
the subject of highly charged discussions in the future, where a cul-
ture, which emerged because of the collectivist communist regime 
and lower degree of modernization, tends to evolve after structural 
transformation. 
For example, the status of Slovenia, which had the most devel-
oped economy amongst post-communist countries at the end of the 
20th century, can make a contribution to the paradigm. During cen-
sus studies conducted in 1991 and 2002 in Slovenia, the number of 
Catholics in Slovenia was observed to have decreased from 71.36% 
to 57.80%. At the same time, the number of atheists increased from 
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4.35% to 10.10% (Sturm, 2004: 608). Besides, on social mores in 
Slovenia, Kilp has this to say: 
The value orientations of Slovenians are closer to the post-indus-
trial societies of WEST [Western Christian societies of Europe] than 
the usual orientations of post –communist realm. Among Slovenes, 
the level of those who find abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, di-
vorce, having casual sex, and adultery “never justifiable” is always 
lower than the average of the ten post-communist societies (2009: 
221). 
Additionally, Norris and Inglehart (2008: 127) also point out 
that people who have higher living standards and better educational 
qualifications in post-communist countries give less importance to 
religion in their lives. In particular, they examined the various levels 
of secularization experienced in the Czech Republic/Estonia and 
Romania/Albania. Norris and Inglehart claim that the higher level 
of secularization in the Czech Republic and Estonia compared to 
Romania/Albania, seem to depend on human and economic devel-
opment levels.
However, it should be reiterated that such an extended secular-
ization paradigm is not supposed to give a plausible explanation for 
all secularization cases around the world. It is only used to explain 
the transformation in modernizing societies, i.e. societies that are 
being confronted with industrial capitalism, scientific advances, and 
urbanization. Therefore, the secularization or desecularization pro-
cesses of societies that are far beyond the modernization process do 
not belong to the field of this study.
2. The extended secularization paradigm is not a secularist or a 
progressivist ideology
Scholars like Cox, Hayden and Stark see the secularization paradigm 
as an Enlightenment project. To ground their claims, they refer to 
the founding fathers of sociology like Saint-Simon, Comte, Marx, 
Weber and Durkheim, or to the founder of psychoanalysis, Freud. 
However, the interesting part in this story is that since the 1960s, 
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secularization theorists have not referred to those founding fathers 
of sociology or psychoanalysis in order to ground their claims. At 
the very least, well-known scholars like Bruce and Wilson have not 
taken Saint-Simon, Comte or others as a reference point to sup-
port their claims. Neither Wilson nor Bruce talks about heathe-
nized societies when they explain what the secularization paradigm 
is. Neither of them claims that a good endpoint for society ought 
to be atheism, as Saint-Simon and Comte did. On the contrary, 
we do not find a single sentence by these scholars in support of the 
idea that a secularized society is more peaceful and happier than a 
less secular one. The secularization paradigm does not assert that 
the secularization process will lead society to attain a higher level 
qua society. To claim that societies, wherein the social prestige and 
social influence of religion have relatively waned, become de facto 
better than less secular ones, or to defend the idea that the more a 
society becomes secular, the more it is happy and enjoys the peaceful 
conditions of life, are not the assertions made by the secularization 
paradigm. On the contrary, Wilson, being one of the more well-
known proponents of classical secularization theory, argues in no 
uncertain terms that the paradigm itself is not progressive and that 
even secularization might lead to people feeling restless or agitated:
(…) Because such developments [the breakdown of local communi-
ty and the rise of civic arena in which an individual may escape the 
social control of being a known person, and in which moral-virtue 
turns into a private preference] facilitate a variety of criminal or an-
tisocial behavior, such breakdown of moral control leads inevitably 
to the threat of more oppressive measures for the maintenance of 
public order. Modern governments, even in the most liberal states 
(perhaps especially in the most liberal states), contemplate or in-
stitute such devices as data retrieval systems, video monitoring of 
public space, the electronic tagging of offenders, “three-strikes” 
convictions, reimpositions of visa requirements for migrants, cur-
fews, boot camps, zero tolerance, and the like (2000: 46).
The secularization process does not inevitably lead to a happier, 
safer, or better world. On the contrary, the social support derived 
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from religion might still be very critical for individuals. The belief 
and faith in the existence of a god, and feeling the need for it, may 
bring a sense of relief, inner peace and happiness, at least to some. 
In addition, religion may contribute to social integration with the 
perception that it enables people to understand social and even nat-
ural phenomena, and could thus play a crucial role in the regulation 
of social relations (Akyüz & Çapcıoglu, 2005).
To sum up, the aim of the secularization theorists is just to pin 
down the spectacular transformation related to society and religion. 
Whether they personally support or oppose secularization as such, 
does not make their paradigm an ideology. For example, if there is an 
increase in the number of cars in a given society, the duty of a sociol-
ogist is to reveal why and how this transformation has come about. 
However, an endeavour as such does not render that sociologist a 
proponent of a society with lots of cars. In fact, due to environmental 
problems or other reasons, s/he, as an individual, is more likely to go 
against such a transformation. But as a sociologist, s/he would not 
hesitate to put a name on this transformation regardless of whether 
s/he likes it or not. In other words, scholars who defend the secular-
ization paradigm are not necessarily secularists, nor do they claim 
that secular societies are preferable. Whether secularization is mor-
ally good or not is a subject for other fields than sociology.
3. The extended secularization paradigm does not claim that the 
end point is atheism
The extended secularization paradigm does not anticipate atheism 
as the end point of modern societies, nor does it assume that every-
body will have a secular disposition by the end of the day. It does 
not predict that individuals will abandon or cease to hold on to 
their religion. What the extended secularization paradigm asserts is 
that religion loses its power and prestige that enables it to interfere 
in social life as capitalism, urbanization and science permeates and 
influences daily life. We are not talking here of the death of religion 
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due to the secularization process. Of course, as Bruce (2002: 43) 
claims, the decline in the social significance of any ideology, belief 
system or cult may, in turn, reduce the number of individuals who 
are attached to it. Bruce believes that “ideologies that lose relevance 
will also lose plausibility,” and because of the secularization process, 
he expects “the proportion of people who are largely indifferent to 
religious ideas to increase and the seriously religious to become a 
small minority” (2002:43). But the defenders of such a paradigm 
neither expect, nor claim that religion will vanish. The secularization 
paradigm neither hypothesizes, nor envisages an end point. It mere-
ly aims to provide a plausible explanation for the questions of why 
religion has lost its power and prestige in this modern world, and 
why religious men and women cannot persuade societies anymore 
about public-related issues as they once did.
4. The extended secularization paradigm is not “synchronized 
swimming” (Bruce, 2002)
Synchronized swimming (water ballet) athletes perform a synchro-
nized routine of intricate moves in the water. They try to produce 
the same movements in split-second accuracy with the same ar-
tistic values. However, the secularization paradigm does not claim 
that societies under modernization secularize within the same time 
frame, in the same way, at the same speed, or in every minor detail, 
like synchronized swimmers. Besides, the paradigm does not assert 
that individuals in modernizing countries become secularized in the 
same manner, within the same time period, or to the same degree. 
For instance, immigrants’ relatively charged religious lifestyles in 
any modern country should not be seen as a rejection of the sec-
ularization paradigm. Likewise, if a radical religious sect emerges 
or if several thousand people become member of a radical religious 
group in a modern or modernizing society, this does not falsify the 
secularization paradigm either. People do not become secularized 
simply because they now live in a modern society. Immigration, civil 
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war, severe economic crises, natural calamities and the like should 
also be taken into consideration, since they have the potential to 
greatly influence an individual’s connection to religion. Therefore, 
it would not be fair to claim that the secularization process occurs 
in a synchronized way, or that immigrants must lead a fruitful sec-
ular life as far as migration is concerned. What seems crucial at this 
point is that the parameter to be analysed at first glance is the differ-
ence(s) between generations within the same community. For as far 
as the different communities within the same society are concerned, 
“who affects whom” should be the question to ask when trying to 
understand the secularization tendency. Bruce neatly explains this:
It is in the nature of sociology to seek the general social changes 
that explain whatever interests us. We should never forget that such 
perceived changes are abstractions created by colour-washing the 
jagged edges of events in the real world. That, on close acquain-
tance, the history shows that things could have been very different 
is not a refutation of the secularization paradigm; it is merely the 
normal relationship between history and sociology. The jagged bits 
are a problem only if it can be plausibly argued that a different ab-
straction can be better drawn from the same material. If there are 
too many exceptions, then we should consider painting “growth” or 
even just “random fluctuations”. But some small reversals need not 
trouble the paradigm (2002: 40).
5. The extended secularization paradigm is not based on the 
frequency of worship –or lack thereof- only
The rate of frequenting a church and the increase in the number 
of believers or disbelievers are considered significant, sometimes 
unique, parameters to measure secularization in the literature relat-
ed to secularization in the Christian world. For instance, Grace Da-
vie (2002: 6-7) presents Table A9 and Table A10 in her arguments 
about secularization in Europe in her book Europe: The Exceptional 
Case. 
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Table A9. Frequency of church attendance in West Europe 
1999/2000 (some examples) %
Once a 
week
Once a 
month
Special 
occasions Never
European Average 20,5 10,8 38,8 29,5
Catholic Countries
Belgium 19,0 9,0 25,3 46,6
France 7,6 4,3 27,8 60,4
Ireland 56,9 10,5 22,8 9,7
Italy 40,5 13,1 32,5 13,9
Portugal 36,4 14,9 33,5 15,2
Spain 25,5 10,5 32,5 31,5
Mixed Countries
England 14,4 4,5 25,3 55,8
Germany 13,6 16,5 41,2 28,8
Netherlands 14,5 11,2 28,1 46,1
Northern Ireland 48,5 14,9 16,9 19,8
Lutheran Countries
Denmark 2,7 9,2 45,4 42,7
Finland 5,3 8,8 59,8 26,2
Iceland 3,2 8,8 55,6 32,3
Sweden 3,8 5,5 90,5 0,2
Orthodox Countries
Greece 22,3 20,9 53,9 2,8
Data supplied by European Values Study, University of Tilburg 
VOLKAN ERTİT
180
Table A10. Extent of religious belief in West Europe 1999/2000 
(some examples) %
Belief in: God Life after 
death
Heaven Hell Sin
European Average 77,4 53,3 46,3 33,9 62,1
Catholic Countries
Belgium 71,4 45,6 33,5 19,3 44,1
France 61,5 44,7 31,2 19,6 39,8
Ireland 95,5 79,2 85,3 53,4 85,7
Italy 93,5 72,8 58,7 49,0 73,2
Portugal 96,4 47,3 60,0 37,8 71,2
Spain 86,7 49,9 50,8 32,9 51,2
Mixed countries
England 71,6 58,3 55,8 35,3 66,9
Germany 67,8 38,8 30,9 20,1 41,3
Netherlands 61,1 50,1 37,4 13,8 39,7
Northern Ireland 93,2 75,1 86,6 73,9 90,4
Lutheran Countries
Denmark 68,9 38,3 18,4 9,5 20,6
Finland 82,5 56,7 61,4 31,4 67,1
Iceland 84,4 78,2 58,7 17,5 64,3
Sweden 53,4 46,0 31,2 9,4 25,7
Orthodox Countries
Greece 93,8 59,2 59,1 52,6 83,3
Data supplied by European Values Study, University of Tilburg 
Davie, like many other sociologists and theologians in the West-
ern world who have written extensively on the secularization of the 
Christian world, considers that the rate of frequenting churches, the 
number who believe in God, in the existence of Hell and Heaven, 
and life after death are significant criteria to measure the degree of 
secularization. To criticise Stark, almost all the statistical information 
that Bruce (2001) included in an article was about church member-
ship or church attendance. Even though the argument that “the rates 
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of church attendance should never be taken into consideration” is not 
actually and specifically advocated in this dissertation, it is argued here 
that taking primarily into account the rates of church, or mosque, or 
synagogue, or temple attendance (worship) may not supply adequate 
data to be able to properly appraise the issue of secularization.
All parameters that are likely to provide an impression of the so-
cial transformations should absolutely be taken into account in any 
discussion about secularization. However, that an emphasis is given 
to the frequency of worshipping or the carrying out of other reli-
gious rituals in order to measure the rate of secularization in coun-
tries where the majority of the population identify themselves as 
Christians, brings into focus the problem of using the same method 
for other religious groups.
In the case of Turkey, for instance, increases-decreases in the 
worshipping rates of Muslims or changes based on the numbers of 
atheist-deist people should not be given priority in discussions about 
secularization. While church attendance and the belief in God can 
be comprehensible for Christians in this sense to a certain extent, we 
need parameters for Muslims that are different from the one mea-
suring the frequency of attendance at places of worship. The exist-
ing differences between Christianity and Islam in terms of exercising 
an influence on daily life practices come to mind as the first reason. 
While Islam tries to influence daily life in all its facets by means of the 
authority of the Qur’ān, the sayings and deeds of Prophet Muham-
mad (hadith), and fatwas issued by Islamic scholars, contemporary 
Christianity exercises less influence on the social life of its adherents.
What should be put under the microscope is the extent to which 
Muslims attending the Friday prayer complies with the rulings of 
Islam during the remaining six days 23 hours; whether they take 
reference to their religious belief in their choice of friends, spouse, 
profession or a town as place of residence; whether, and to what ex-
tent, they conduct themselves in compliance with the regulations of 
Islam in terms of dressing, food and beverages, sexuality or whether 
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they arrange their conduct in line with Islamic rules to a greater 
or lesser degree compared to the past (the past of the individuals 
and their family). Because individuals who never perform the ritual 
prayer of Islam can come under the influence of religion in differ-
ent spheres of their life; religion can play a role in marriage, school 
choice, or relations within the family. Conversely, individuals who 
perform the ritual prayer every day and fasts for one month during 
Ramadan, can still be part of a relatively secular lifestyle.
It cannot, of course, be argued that the worshipping rate is thus 
a parameter of less importance, not suitable to be used in this sense. 
On the contrary, it is clear that the frequency of worship can give 
some clues in certain matters. However, it may hinder us from ob-
taining sound results if we take frequency of worship or changes 
in attendance in sacred places as the primary indicator of secular-
ization, in the way sociologists who strive to give a picture of the 
secularization process in the Christian world have tried to do.
6. The extended secularization paradigm is not relevant for only 
monotheistic religions
Some sociologists of religion, who claim that the paradigm of secu-
larization has lost its validity, assert that the influence of religion has 
increased rather than decreased when it comes to Europe. They say 
that Europe in the Middle Ages was not so religious as is commonly 
presumed. Europeans were in the dark about religion in the Middle 
Ages and people attended churches not primarily out of motivation 
(Stark, 1999). However, the position of the Church in the Middle 
Ages was powerful enough even to initiate war; people were judged 
and tortured by Inquisition courts; powerful popes could crown 
kings; thousands of people were killed by churches during the so-
called witch hunting; people notified their neighbours to authorities 
on grounds that they did not live in accordance with the norms of 
Christianity; art was monopolised by the Church; philosophy re-
garded as a discipline put at the disposal of the Church to prove 
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the existence of the Christian God instead of being a discipline that 
took interest in every sphere of life in the Middle Ages; there was an 
environment where a religious institution represented the whole of 
society and there was no liberty of religion (McCabe, 1916; Sharkey, 
1950; Perry et al., 1989; Hamilton, 2003).
All these assertions give us a rather different picture than the one 
Stark and others used in their arguments. Nonetheless, let us assume 
that Stark is right in his claim, namely, that Europe is equally reli-
gious in the 21st century in comparison to the Middle Ages. In other 
words, let us accept that Christianity was not as powerful in the Mid-
dle Ages as often supposed, and that communities in Europe did not 
attach so much importance to religion, contrary to the picture we now 
paint of it. In fact, that does not refute the claim constructed around 
the paradigm of secularization. Because the argument of Stark et al., 
that the paradigm of secularization is not related to “religion” but to 
Christianity, is an unfortunate one. In fact, secularization is not only 
about the decrease in the power of Christianity or other monotheis-
tic religions at the communal level. At the same time, secularization 
also focuses, as a sphere of interest, on the pagan rituals touching on 
the polytheistic and multi-symbol daily life of the peoples in Europe 
stemming from Pre-Christian periods and continuing within Chris-
tianity. If, as Stark puts it, only Christianity springs to mind when it 
comes to religion, in this case, people who lived before Jesus Christ 
was born, should have been secular individuals. If we limit the notion 
of religion only to religions established by those descending from the 
Prophet Abraham, in this case, we would ignore hundreds of, small 
or large, spiritual belief systems and ways of life such as Hinduism, 
Paganism, Shamanism, Buddhism, Jainism, Shintoism, Sikhism and 
Bahaism that had gained a place in the world in the past or are still 
prevailing in some societies today. In order to negate the paradigm 
of secularization, those who claim that “The Middle Ages weren’t a 
Golden Age for Christianity” should examine the religious beliefs 
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(other than Christianity) that prevailed at the time in Europe in 
terms of their influences on societies.
Folk and superstitious beliefs have also considerably influenced 
life in human societies for hundreds if not thousands of years along-
side belief systems. The belief in the existence of goddesses and gods, 
believing that witches can have an influence on daily life, deification 
of fire, water, land and air, organising festivals on days in which 
people believed that gods and goddesses got married, rituals where 
a new-born child bites a lamb’s ear, crossing fingers, spending large 
amounts of one’s income on fortune telling, avoiding whistling and 
cutting nails at night, carrying a charm to bring good luck, avoid-
ing black cats by ascribing them bad luck, avoiding walking under 
ladders, avoiding passing a scissors or a knife from hand to hand, 
avoiding handshaking through an open door, attaching a piece of 
cloth to the tombs of saints or on the branches if a tree, throwing 
money into pools, pouring molten lead into water, wearing a tal-
isman, writing wishes on a piece of paper or keeping money in a 
purse and not spending it so that it becomes more and more during 
Hıdırellez festival, placing garlic or black cumin under the bed of 
a woman bearing a child, riding on a swing at a certain time of the 
year in the belief that it makes one healthier, showing money to-
wards a full moon to become rich, mixing water and salt to get puri-
fied from evil spirits, summoning spirits by means of a cup of coffee 
or another method, and hundreds of other rituals are miscellaneous 
forms of the supranatural. A decrease in the visibility and influence 
of such beliefs ranks among the focal points of the discussion about 
secularization. Instead of Islam, Christianity or other Abrahamic 
religions, a person can deify and worship fire and regulate his/her 
daily life in accordance with the relation s/he establishes with fire. 
Such a practice does not render that individual more secular than a 
faithful Muslim or Christian.
Sometimes, the paradigm of secularization can also include, 
apart from beliefs that people profess to have, the deification of an 
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earthly leader. Some world leaders have been or are being deified, 
sublimed, ascribing them a superhuman character. People they lead 
see such leaders as superhumans who never do evil, make no mis-
takes, and do not have any human fancies or pleasures. Such leaders 
can sometimes be given a status that is more sacred and important 
than the prophets of orthodox religions. Their words can also be 
passed from one generation to the other just like the verses of a 
holy book. People can believe, without time limitation, that the in-
spirations of these blessed leaders can provide remedies to all kinds 
of social problems. Additionally, legal sanctions can be imposed or 
social pressure can be exerted to prevent that the status of these 
leaders ever be brought into question.
There are more similarities than differences between a prophet 
and a holy book sent to him, on the one hand, and Mao Zedong and 
his Red Book, on the other. The power Mao and his Red Book ex-
ercised at the social level in the time of Mao was superior to that of 
an earthly leader. Being in a sort of trance, the Chinese wished that 
their leader should live “ten thousand years” more. It is the outcome 
of the same motive when Chinese taxi-drivers put up Mao’s picture 
in their cars to “bring them good luck” and “protect them”, while 
Muslims, on the other hand, put up the Qur’ān or an amulet in their 
vehicles. That Mao was a leader in this world and Qur’ān was sent 
from another world does not render the Chinese, who deified Mao, 
more secular. And that is because old gods can make place for new 
ones and religion can gain a place in our lives in different forms and 
systems (Crippen, 1988).
At this point, the position of Atatürk in Turkey should also be put 
under the microscope more carefully. The motivation of people who 
fancy seeing the Arabic script of the word Allah in a tomato, on the 
skin of a sheep or cow, on the shell of an egg, in a walnut, on the ear 
of a baby, or on the rind of a water-melon, and then think that it is a 
miracle, and the feelings of hundreds of thousands of people who go 
to the city of Ardahan every year between the 15th of June and 15th of 
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July in the hope of seeing the silhouette of Atatürk on the Mountains 
of Damal, standing to attention in the shade of the mount as if they 
were performing a duty of pilgrimage, and asserting that it is a mir-
acle, a message from supranatural powers to their country – all these 
are also to be handled within the discussion of secularization.
Picture A4: Atatürk on a mountain
Source: Uludağ Sözlük
http://www.uludagsozluk.com/r/
atat%C3%BCrk-%C3%BCn-izinde-
ve-g%C3%B6lgesinde-damal-
%C5%9Fenlikleri-288758/
Picture A5: Allah in a tomato
Source: Uludağ Sözlük
http://www.uludagsozluk.com/
k/%C3%BCzerinde-allah-yazan-
domates/
Some of the poetry written for Atatürk is also similar in this 
sense. The following quotation is a passage from the renowned 
poem by Kemalettin Kamu titled Çankaya:
Kaaba be for Arabs,
Çankaya34 suffice for us!35
Ka‘aba (the centre of pilgrimage for Islam) and the place where 
Atatürk resides bear the same import for the general public. On the 
other hand, Behçet Kemal Çağlar, another poet, grants Atatürk the 
character of a creator in his poem The Nation on Duty:
Creator, Oh Creator!
Not four years, not a thousand years
34 Where Ataturk lived.
35 In Turkish: “Kabe Arab’ın olsun, Çankaya Bize Yeter”.
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can extirpate your flame in us
your voice just like a gleam carrying us away!
Oh eternal blue ocean!
Lying there in a piece of marble,
in a handful of soil.36
Another example in this sense is a poem titled To the New Par-
liamentarians, also written by Çağlar:
Those not bowing in the [Atatürk’s] Mausoleum
will be shocked, plump down, fall flat, one day.37
These are all expressions that are used for people with religious 
character. All these examples show that Atatürk represents a perfect, 
almighty, supreme, supranatural and divine personality for a certain 
social segment in Turkey. For this reason, if we speak about “a secu-
larization process of Turkey ongoing in recent years”, we should also 
underline that it does not only concern the social power and prestige 
of the religion of Islam, but also of Kemalism. Discussing the divine 
character of Atatürk fancified in a religion-like structure, secularising 
him and starting to criticise him in terms of his human weak points, 
mistakes, ideas and reformations in a peaceful atmosphere are all part 
of the secularization process. The same argument applies to Mao Ze-
dong in China. The decrease in power and prestige of a person, who 
is dressed up and divined like a prophet in a structure well resembling 
a religion, in terms of influencing and directing a society, can mean 
social secularization, at least as it is defined in this thesis.
36 In Turkish: Yaradan hey Yaradan!, Dört yıl değil bin yıl geçse aradan, Sensin 
ateş diye kanımızdaki, Sesin ışık diye önümüzdeki! Ey yanımızdaki, Beş on 
mermere, bir avuç toprağa sığan, Sınırsız mavi umman hey!
37 In Turkish: “Anıtkabre gidip de yürekten baş eğmeyen, Günü gelir çarpılır, dü-
şer, yere serilir.”
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Conclusion
The secularization paradigm is based, primarily, on the assumption 
that scientific developments, capitalism and urbanization cause a 
decrease not only in the influence of religion, but also in religion-like 
mechanisms, superstitious beliefs and beliefs based on folkloric tra-
ditions. All these should lose ground in such a process:
This is what is at the heart of the secularization thesis. What is re-
quired in the contrast between the past and the present is that there 
be an identifiable differences between then and now in the popular-
ity and salience of beliefs, actions, or impersonal powers or process-
es possessed of moral purpose” (Bruce, 1997: 679).
This is the core of the paradigm that, in my opinion, can be not 
only preserved, but also, if revised, expanded.
However, making clear what the paradigm is all about can some-
times not be sufficient to clearly define the desired stance. For this 
reason there was also the need to underline those points that the 
paradigm did not advocate. While Steve Bruce uses the secular-
ization paradigm to specify the relationship between religion-so-
ciety-modernization within a specific time interval and a specific 
region, the extended secularization paradigm is not limited to a 
specific time or region. Furthermore, neither it is a secularist nor 
a progressivist ideology. It does not consider atheism an end point 
for modern societies and does not assert that modernizing societies 
secularize within the same time frame, in the same way, at the same 
speed, or in every minor detail. For this paradigm, frequency of wor-
ship should not be the only parameter to measeure the degree of 
secularization. Finally, besides other religions as well as monotheis-
tic religions, deification or transcending of worldly “things” should 
also be taken into consideration.
In the following part of the study it will be illustrated whether 
the paradigm defined in the theoretical part can empirically provide 
an insight into the transformation that the Alevi communities in 
Turkey have experienced.
PART B
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
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CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL STUDY
The extended secularization paradigm is based on the idea that there is a non-accidental and direct correlation between mod-
ernization and the level of secularization in society. The paradigm 
claims that the diffusion of modernization, comprising three devel-
opments, viz. scientific development, capitalist economic structure 
and urbanization restrains the power of religion, folk religions, re-
ligion-like mechanisms, and superstitious beliefs at the social level. 
Alevi communities in Turkey were chosen as a case study for this 
extended secularization paradigm. Essentially, the purpose of this 
study is to examine secularization in the context of Turkish soci-
ety. However, such a study could have caused serious problems with 
respect to the population, sample compliance and budget. There-
fore, focusing on a non-Protestant religious subgroup in Turkey was 
much more convenient for the purposes of this thesis. It would have 
been also possible to prefer Sunnis over Alevis, but as Sunni-Islam 
is the official religion of the Turkish state, it is compulsorily taught 
in schools in Turkey and the number of followers is in the range of 
tens of millions, selecting Sunnis would also have challenged the 
limitations of the thesis in terms of budget, population and sample 
relationship. Although Alevis constitute a much smaller group than 
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Sunnis, they constitute the second largest religious subgroup within 
the country.
Alevism is not only a belief, but is expressed mostly as an iden-
tity based on its own history. The Alevi massacres that happened 
both in the Ottoman Empire and in Turkey in the 20th century 
have made them very sensitive about their identity. Alevis who have 
been forced to learn Sunni beliefs in compulsory religion classes at 
school, held on to their beliefs behind closed doors for years. They 
have been humiliated based on whispers in the social arena about 
having incestuous relationships and not having family bonds.38 Their 
existence had not been acknowledged by the state until the begin-
ning of the 21st century, and these social dynamics have made Alevis 
extremely sensitive about their identity. On the other hand, Alevis 
live in different regions of the country which provided a convenient 
environment to distinguish between generations in these structures 
and to understand social changes from the past to the present.
For the aforementioned reasons, I use a qualitative approach 
and conduct fieldwork research. Fieldwork, as part of ethnographic 
study, is one of the main methods used in the social sciences today, 
particularly for the discipline of anthropology and sociology. Al-
though the concept of ethnography does not have a standard usage, 
it has extensive overlap with these labels: qualitative inquiry, field-
work, interpretive method, and case study (Atkinson & Hammers-
ley, 2007). Examining “behavior that takes place within specific so-
38 The basis for the accusation voiced against Alevis is their Cem worship (Ayin-i-
Cem). Because in Cem worship, Alevis conduct worship together as women 
and men. Historically, Alevis who had supported the Safavid State against the 
Ottoman Empire were seen as dissidents in Ottoman Society following the 
defeat of the Safawid State at the Çaldıran War (1514 AD) and they were ob-
liged to continue their existence as closed community in places far away from 
the centers. Living as a closed community, not including those who do not 
belong in their worship, and participating in these worship services together 
as women and men have led to enemies of the Alevis spreading rumors about 
them turning the lights off and committing sexual acts without any regard to 
relationship of affinity (Kaplan, 2014: 46-47).
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cial situations, including behavior that is shaped and constrained by 
these situations” (Wilson & Chadda, 2010: 549), studying cultures 
through close observation, interviewing and interpretation help re-
searchers learn and understand more deeply the components of any 
culture. Therefore, I have decided to carry out fieldwork research 
which might enable me to observe respondents in their natural hab-
itat. Since the subject itself is quite sensitive and no such study has 
ever been conducted heretofore, face-to-face communication in the 
respondents’ own hometown should provide a better insight into 
the aforementioned issues. In that way, I would avail of more de-
tailed data and profound insights into the subject, thereby helping 
me “to produce general patterns and … provide(s) an understanding 
of group life” (Önen, 2011: 111).
Therefore, for this study, I conducted three fieldwork researches 
in Adana, Çorum and Tunceli. I carried out my first fieldwork in 
Adana between August 4 and August 14, 2014. My second field-
work in Çorum was held between August 25 and September 4, 
2014. The last fieldwork in Tunceli was carried out between March 
9 and March 18, 2015.
Subsequently, during the fieldwork, two generations (parents 
and children) were asked the same questions with regard to mar-
riage since the aim of the study is to acquire insights into the gen-
eration gap with regard to faith and its impact on marital issues. A 
total of 30 pairs in three cities (with each city having ten pairs) were 
interviewed. A special coding was applied for them so their privacy 
could be maintained. For example, I used code A8P for a respon-
dent from Adana (A), is a parent (P), and of pair 8 (8), and code 
Ç4C for a respondent who is from Çorum (Ç), is a child (C) of pair 
4 (4). Respondents were asked 28 core questions during semi-struc-
tured interviews.
In semi-structured interviews, 28 core questions were posed to 
the parents and to their married children. Although I had planned 
to ask the same questions in the same order, due to the nature of 
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semi-structured interviews, sometimes I needed additional ques-
tions or could not ask all the questions as planned. The questions 
were classified into two sets. The purpose of asking the first group 
of questions is to understand possible diversity between generations 
in terms of three elements of modernization (scientific advances, 
industrial capitalism, and urbanization). With the second group of 
questions, I wanted to depict different secularization levels accord-
ing to generations with regard to marital issues.
After I decoded the interviews, I had hundreds of word docu-
ments. To analyse these large data, I used a qualitative data analysis 
software called MAXQDA which is very helpful, particularly for a 
large number of files. By means of MAXQDA, I was able to easily 
organize, codify, annotate and analyse my primary non-numerical, 
unstructured documents.
To identify the respondents, I used the chain referral sampling 
method (the snowball sampling method). This method is preferred 
particularly when it is not easy to identify potential respondents 
(hidden populations) due to various socio-political reasons (homo-
sexuals in conservative societies, unemployments, prostitutes, AIDS 
carriers, ethnic or religious minorities in not-so-liberal countries, 
drug addicts, etc.). It is called “snowball sampling” because
(…) the researcher accesses informants through contact informa-
tion that is provided by other informants. This process is, by neces-
sity, repetitive: informants refer the researcher to other informants, 
who are contacted by the researcher and then refer her or him to yet 
other informants, and so on. Hence the evolving ‘snowball’ effect, 
captured in a metaphor that touches on the central quality of this 
sampling procedure: its accumulative (diachronic and dynamic) di-
mension (Noy, 2008: 330).
Due to the reality of the Alevi communities, which is a reli-
gio-ethnic minority group that has been suppressed and massa-
cred throughout the history of Anatolia, it was inevitable for me to 
choose this sampling method. Otherwise, it would not have been 
easy to reach Alevi respondents or talk to them in a serious way 
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about their daily lives. Noy (2008: 331) uses the terms “safety net” 
and “fall-back alternative” to define the snowball sampling method, 
since it is used when other methods are not attainable. In compar-
ison with other sampling methods, it was easier to reach potential 
subjects in a very affordable and quick way in this method. If a re-
searcher thinks that enough data has been collected due to similar-
ities in the stories, i.e. if stories start to repeat themselves, s/he can 
stop at that point.
In the research fields in Çorum and Tunceli, I was first of all 
introduced by my personal connections to the reference persons 
who were known and respected in their cities. After that, with their 
connections and the chain referral sampling method, I established 
contact with my respondents. For the fieldwork in Çorum, I was 
introduced to many locally known people by a professor who had 
worked for several years at the University of Çorum. In Tunceli, 
through my close friends, I met a lady who was the general manager 
of the Post Office and had many contacts there: from the governor 
of the province to local people. In Adana, due to the family connec-
tions, it was not difficult to find respondents there.
A voice recorder was used to record the interviews, and just be-
fore the interviews, the respondents’ permission was sought for the 
process. Interviews were conducted at different locations such as 
cafés, respondents” houses, or workplaces. Since very respected and 
well-known people were my references and I used the chain referral 
sampling method, respondents did not treat me as a stranger and I 
did not observe any anxiety. Although they had the right to erase 
any statements they expressed during the interviews, none asked for 
this.
The in-depth interviews lasted between fifteen minutes (with 
very old people) and seventy-five minutes. For my study, I did not 
pay attention to differences in age, sex, education or jobs, but only to 
marital status. Because of the cross-generational nature of the study, 
I needed a parent and his/her married child. Very often, I had the 
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opportunity to hear life stories of respondents because of the scope 
of the questions. Through these life stories, I was able to better un-
derstand the transformation that has taken place within Alevi com-
munities. What is more, although the main issue was related to the 
generation gap between two generations, I generally asked respon-
dents to tell any stories about their neighbours, relatives, friends or 
acquaintances. For example, if a respondent expressed that s/he had 
had an affair before marriage, I asked them whether (or not) this 
kind of lifestyle was common among their friends. Or, if I learned 
that a respondent did not have access to hot water during his/her 
childhood, I also tried to learn whether this was the case for the 
whole community or just a specific case.
I also had the opportunity to observe respondents’ daily life and 
general lifestyles during fieldwork. I stayed at least ten days in each 
city and was wandering about, pounding the pavements during my 
free time. In that way, I was able to get impression on the accuracy 
of the things I had heard in the interviews by checking them against 
the daily lives of other community members. Besides, since most of 
the interviews were conducted in the respondents’ homes, I was able 
to get then an impression of their domestic living standards.
I also visited their religious or holy sites many times. In fact, 
some of the interviews I conducted in Adana and Çorum took place 
at such religious sites. I participated in some wedding ceremonies in 
Adana and Çorum as well, since the field research coincided with 
their wedding months. Moreover, since I myself am an Alevi from 
Adana, it was easier for me to review the transformation experi-
enced there. Having lived among the Alevis in the Adana region 
until eighteen years of age and having visited Adana continuously 
during the next fourteen years, this has helped in terms of observing 
the social transformation in Alevi society.
Besides the people I interviewed, I also asked questions in a 
semi-formal way to many people that I came across during my 
stays. These people could be public transport drivers or café waiters. 
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Therefore, it should be noted that although 60 interviews will be 
reflected upon in detail in the empirical part, the number of people 
I interviewed for the thesis is much larger than 60.
In this empirical part, I will discuss who Alevis are and are not, 
from a historical perspective. Then, I will discuss why the questions 
were selected in as far as they allow for understanding the differ-
ence between generations in terms of modernity. Subsequently, I 
will discuss the topics wherein Alevism has had the biggest im-
pact on marriage before presenting the respondents’ answers to the 
questions. Instead of marriage in Alevism, frequency of worship, or 
even belief could have been the topic of this thesis. However, due to 
the secularization paradigm as defined here, how the metaphysical 
realm gets reflected in the social life is reviewed in this thesis. Natu-
rally, frequency of worship or changes in the number of people with 
Alevi belief are also important in terms of secularization discussions 
and need to be taken into consideration. However, frequency of 
praying or statement of a person who says he/she is an Alevi is not 
sufficient as basis for secularization debates. The extended secular-
ization paradigm analyses the role played by the metaphysical realm 
in the daily social lives of individuals. Therefore, a belief which has 
lost its power to regulate social life and which interfers less with an 
individual’s daily life compared to past, may be conceived as strong 
evidence for secularization. For this reason, the marriage institution 
has been chosen as the subject of this thesis. I have chosen marital 
issues due to the central position of the marriage institution in Alevi 
life. The marriage institution is considered one of the most critical 
institutions for the continuation of Alevi culture. Important insti-
tutions such as those of the spiritual brotherhood and the people’s 
court (which continue to regulate Alevis’ social life) also happen to 
be institutions that are directly involved with marriage. If an Alevi 
adult individual is not married, they are not accepted as a full Alevi. 
In Alevi belief, those who stand to harm these institutions are faced 
with serious sanctions.
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ALEVIS
Even in terms of a very limited literature review on the subject 
of Alevism or its meaning, there are indeed numerous and differ-
ent sources (Bozkurt, 2000; Yaman & Erdemir, 2006; Bardakçı, 
1940/2012; Köse, 2013). However, investigating Alevism is not an 
easy job for a researcher due to the absence or insufficient reliabili-
ty of written documents about Alevis or Alevism (Demiray, 2004). 
However, it should be stressed that the question of what Alevism 
really is or what it is not is well beyond the scope of this study for 
several reasons. Consequently, any people who identify themselves 
as Alevi are included in the sample. This decision was inevitable 
since Alevis are not part of a homogeneous group and Alevism is 
not associated with only one way of faith. As Martin van Bruinessen 
(1996: 7) argues, the term Alevi is “a blanket term for a large num-
ber of heterodox communities.”
In terms of population, there are studies claiming that Alevis 
constitute 15 to 30 percent of the entire Turkish population (Er-
man & Göker, 2000: 99). It should be noted that this figure varies 
according to researchers and their own positions. The figures put 
forward by Sunni researchers are generally less than those asserted 
by their Alevi counterparts (Erdemir, 2004: 31; Üzüm, 2000: 19-
28). In addition, there are different ethnic Alevi communities such 
as Arabic, Turkish, Kurdish and they have different beliefs and rit-
uals (Erdemir, 2004): “Basically, Alevism is a protean that shows 
great variation according to geography and ethno-linguistic factors” 
(Demiray, 2004: 63). Not only do the ethnically different Alevi 
communities living in different parts of the country have varied tra-
ditions, customs, rituals or belief systems, it is also very common to 
come face-to-face with different belief systems, customs and other 
characteristic features within one and the same Alevi communi-
ty (Yaman, 2007). For example, according to a sociological survey 
conducted by Ali Aktaş (1999) among 1623 Alevis, Alevism is de-
scribed in different ways: 43,43 % of participants call it a denom-
SECULARIZATION OF ALEVIS IN TURKEY
199
ination, 16,88 % see it as a way of life, 16,14 % define Alevism as 
a culture, 10,41 % see it as a religious order, and 10,35 % accept it 
as a religion. In addition, according to another sociological survey, 
conducted by Kamil Fırat (2005: 55) among 208 Alevis from two 
Ankara neighborhoods, the term Alevism is percieved differently: 
While 52.4 % of Alevis consider the Alevism “the proper Islam”, 
1.9 % sees it as a separate religion out of Islam; 45.2 %, on the 
other hand, define it as a life style. In another survey, carried out by 
Nail Yılmaz (2005: 210) with 364 Alevis, while 89.8 % of the par-
ticipants said that Alevism was intertwined with cultural/religious 
values, the rest defined Alevism as “ethnic” or “religious and ethnic.”
All the more interesting, during my field research I discovered 
that the Alevis of the Adana region are subdivided into two groups: 
Haydris and Kalushs. Alevis who live on the Eastern side of the river 
Seyhan (the districts of Yamaçlı and Haydaroğlu) are called Hay-
dri, while the Western side of the river (the districts of Akkapı and 
Mıdık) is the home of the Kalush. And although these two Alevi 
communities belong to the same denomination (Arab Alevis) and 
their belief systems have a lot in common, in the 1970s-1980s it 
was not easy for a Haydri to marry a Kalush. A similar fractionation 
was also identified in the Çorum region during the field research. 
Slightly varied forms of Alevism are found in different villages of 
Çorum. Bayram Ali Soner and Şule Toktaş also emphasize different 
perceptions related to Alevism:
The traditionalist-religious sections of the community conceive of 
Alevism as the pure form of Islam in terms of theological roots and 
rituals. They are headed by the more state-friendly Alevi association 
of the Cem Foundation, and support a more religious definition of 
Alevism. (…) In contrast, modernist-secularist Alevis see Alevism 
as outside Islam and identify it more with non-Islamic elements. 
According to them, Alevism is a syncretistic belief system, a philos-
ophy, a culture as well as a lifestyle constructed originally as the 
community interacted with various religions, including Shamanism, 
Manichaeism, Hinduism, Christianity, Judaism and Islam, as well as 
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other polytheistic religions of Anatolia and the Middle East (2011: 
423-24).
Therefore, this study could not define Alevism or provide a de-
tailed answer to the question of what Alevism is, due to the lack 
of consensus in the literature and different lifestyles (traditions, 
customs, rituals) found even within the same region during field 
research. As Mehmet Demiray (2004: 63) states, that “ rituals and 
religious leaders show great disparities (and) such differentiations 
have so deep effects that the Alevi activists say that there are as many 
Alevisms as there are individual Alevis.” However, this reality does 
not hinder us from making some generalizations regarding Alev-
ism. Although this study is not aimed at identifying Alevism, it is 
still possible to mention some basic characteristic features of Alevis 
which differentiate them from Sunnis. And so, basically, I would 
like to give a thumbnail sketch of the beliefs, rituals and structure of 
Alevi communities in as far as they are relevant to this study.
First of all, in Turkey, Alevism is generally considered one of 
the denominations of Islam. I use the word “generally” because, as 
stated above, some Alevis do not consider themselves Muslim, but 
just Alevi. To them, Alevism is a separate religion from Islam, not a 
sect of it (Kehl-Bodrogi, 2012). Historically, to talk about the roots 
of Alevism, it would not be wrong to trace it back to the death 
of Prophet Muhammed. After the death of the Prophet of Islam, 
Abu Bakr took over the office of caliphate which created a lot of 
discontentment among the supporters of ‘Alī who was the son-in-
law of Muhammed and was considered the Prophet’s successor by 
his supporters. This conflict among Muslims and the dissatisfaction 
among ‘Alī’s supporters continued under the leadership of caliphs 
‘Umar and ʻUthmān.
The killing of ʻUthmān and ‘Alī taking over his position caused 
a more profound discontent among Muslims. Because of the death 
of ʻUthmān and ‘Alī’s new position, Aīsha, the daughter of Abu 
Bakr and wife of prophet Muhammed, took up arms against ‘Alī 
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with the support of some Muslim groups. That was the first time 
in history that Muslims went to war among themselves, namely, 
in the Battle of the Camel (656 AD) (Demircan, 2013). Hostility 
against the winner of the Battle of the Camel, i.e. ‘Alī, was main-
tained by Muʿāwiyah who had been appointed governor of Syr-
ia during ʻUthmān’s caliphate. The Battle of Siffin took place in 
657 AD between ‘Alī, who was supported by Arabian Arabs, and 
Muawiyah from the Umayyad clan, who was supported by Syrian 
Arabs (Demircan, 2013). After the Battle of Siffin, in which there 
was no winner, Muawiyah proclaimed his power over Syria, while 
‘Alī continued to govern Arabia and places nearby (Keser, 2013).
With the killing of ‘Alī in 661 AD, Muawiyah became unrivalled 
and seized power as the sole authority over the whole Islamic world. 
In addition, he ended the former regime and founded the Umayyad 
dynasty in which the office of caliphate passes from father to son 
(Keser, 2013). Faced with such a situation, the supporters of ‘Alī de-
clared Ḥasan and Ḥusayn (sons of ‘Alī) as the legitimate caliphs one 
after another. Ḥusayn seized full control after his brother Ḥasan was 
poisoned. However, Ḥusayn and all his family were killed by people 
from the Umayyad dynasty while on his way to Kufa in 680 AD 
(Demircan, 2013). The massacre of Ḥusayn and his family became 
the underlying reason behind the continuing conflict within Islam. 
The deaths in Kufa led to the emergence of new streams called Sun-
nism and Shiism (Shi‘a Islam) which were not only opponents in 
terms of aspects of the Islamic faith but also in the political sense.
Throughout history, various denominations came into being un-
der Sunnism and Shiism. Alevism in Anatolia is part of Shi‘a Islam 
which has found new expressions in different regions of the world 
with different rituals, aspects of the Islamic faith, customs, and tra-
ditions (Keser, 2013). Therefore, the question of the Alevis’ identity 
could be answered briefly by stating that they belong to the side of 
‘Alī and his family. It is no mere coincidence that dictionaries define 
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the word Alevi as ‘Alī’s supporter, ‘Alī’s lover or being attached to 
‘Alī (Moosa, 2009).
Some scholars and researchers consider Alevism part of Islam 
and describe Alevis as those “who embrace Islam, believe in mono-
theism, accept Muhammed as the prophet, and admit Qur’ān as the 
holy book and Ahl al-Bayt lovers” (Tiryaki, 2013: 13-14). However, 
Alevis in Turkey do not fast during Ramadan as a matter of prin-
ciple, do not perform salāt like Sunnis, do not go to mosques, Hajj 
is not something they do in the normal course of life and “do not 
make the saying of the Kalema (Creed of Islam) a condition to faith” 
(Shah, 2013: 265). In addition, they do not have a culture of zakāt 
as prescribed in the Qur’ān. Maybe not all of the Alevi communities 
in Anatolia, but especially Turkish and Kurdish Alevis fast during 
the first twelve days of the month of Muharram. The historical rea-
son behind this ritual can be traced back to the beginning of Islam. 
48 years after the death of the prophet Muhammad, Ḥusayn, his 
grandson and the son of ‘Alī, was killed by Yazid from the Umayyad 
dynasty in a rather cruel way. Since Ḥusayn was dehydrated and 
starved to death, Alevis fast in the first twelve days of the month of 
Muharram in memory of this incident. During these twelve days, 
they do not get married, do not go to wedding ceremonies, do not 
go to fun places, try to drink water as little as possible, do not eat 
particularly delicious foods and meat dishes, spouses abstain from 
sexual life in the first twelve days of Muharram. If it is possible, men 
do not shave (Tiryaki, 2013: 154-55).
Hatred towards the first three caliphs after Muhammed, namely 
Abu Bakir, ‘Umar and ʻUthmān, is common among Alevis since 
these three figures of Islam and their supporters are considered trai-
tors who persecuted ‘Alī and his family. The three caliphs are cursed 
violently all the time during the Alevis’ daily social life and wor-
ship. Parallel to this, these three names are never ever given to an 
Alevi child. In my field research in Çorum, one of the respondents 
expressed his expectations of his daughter with the following sen-
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tence: “I told her that now you are going to be a university student 
in another city, please do not choose someone there as a spouse 
whose name is ‘Umar or ʻUthmān.” Therefore, a great number of 
Sunni people see the Alevis
(…) as heretics [sapkın] and perverts [sapık]. They believe that the 
Alevis practice orgies in congregational ceremonies [mumsöndü] 
and practice incest [anabacı tanımazlar]. Conservative Sunnis see 
the Alevis as being filthy and ritually unclean arguing that they fail 
to perform the bodily ablutions following sexual intercourse. More-
over, some argue that the Alevis are not circumcised and that they 
eat pork and human meat (Erdemir, 2004: 31).
It is important to repeat here that this study does not pay atten-
tion to the status of Alevism - whether it is a religion or not, wheth-
er it is a branch of Islam or not – because this is not of interest for 
this study. It is obvious that theologians and other researchers from 
other disciplines than sociology would make a claim on this very 
interesting issue. But this thesis sees Alevis as members of a faith 
group, and investigates whether their daily practices related to the 
faith have changed with the transformation of Turkey as a whole. 
According to the hypothesis of this thesis, while secularization of 
the Alevis was expected as a result of the modernization experienced 
throughout Turkey, many academics have published studies which 
claim a revival of Alevism in Turkey (Çamuroğlu, 2003; Çaha, 2004; 
Shah, 2013). Therefore, Alevi revival, which has become a phenom-
enon accepted in the academic world, has to be discussed prior to 
getting into the details of the field study.
REVIVAL OF ALEVISM
In order to understand such a revival of Alevism which is reported 
to have started in the 1980s, it would be better to review the way in 
which Alevis had lived up until that time. When Alevis sided with 
the Safavid dynasty under the presidency of Shah Ismail against the 
Ottomans during the disputes that led to the Çaldıran War (1514 
AD), Alevis became an unwelcome community among the Otto-
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mans. Therefore, Alevis eversince were forced to live mostly in rural 
areas, hidden from public view (Çaha, 2004: 327). One of the res-
peondents from Çorum said that in the 1960s Alevis who wanted 
to travel to the city center of Çorum had to wear chador like radical 
Islamists so as not to be recognized as Alevis and only when they 
returned to their villages could they then take off the chador again.
When the New Republic was established in 1923, most Alevis 
supported Mustafa Kemal because of his secular principles and they 
thought they would get a better deal and be more free than during 
Ottoman rule. However, in the 20th century, due to the Kemalist 
modernization process, religion and religious identities within the 
public area were under state control and forced to be confined to 
a particular field. An identity policy was applied from top to bot-
tom during the process of constructing a new nation: a policy of 
Turkishness. Being a Turk became the sole legal identity of the new 
Republic according to the state. However, the Sunni exposition of 
Islam continued to be powerful both in politics and in public opin-
ion, while Alevism was ignored (Dressler, 2008: 287).
It would not be an exaggeration to say that Alevism and Alevis 
were ignored in Turkey up until the 1980s. Alevis think that they 
are forced to be melted into the pot of mainstream Sunni Islam, 
which is attempted through the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
(DRA). The DRA budget is rather high compared to many minis-
tries’ budgets, and the DRA “defines and organizes legitimate public 
Islamic practice and is responsible, among other things, for Islamic 
education, mosque construction and maintenance, issuing of legal 
opinions [fatwas], and the pilgrimage to Mecca” (Dressler, 2008: 
289). Therefore, Alevis could never have an official status and their 
actions in the public arena were deemed illegal. During his speech 
in 1994, Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz, the President of the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs of that time, stated that “Alevism is not a religion. 
Nor is it a sect of Islam. Alevism is a culture complete with its own 
folklore” (Şahin, 2005: 481).
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Before 1980, not only the state, but also Alevis themselves were 
not so sensitive about the problems related to their own identity. 
Particularly during the conflicts between the right and left wings 
during the 1970s, Alevis fell within the left wing, such that labour 
rights were the most important rights they had to fight for. They 
were fighting for socialism, but not for the rights of Alevis. Most of 
the Alevis internalized socialism and rejected their Alevi beliefs as 
the symbols of obscurantism, as with all other religious faiths and 
symbols (Shah, 2013: 266).
Alevis, who were entrapped in rural areas for centuries during 
the Ottoman Empire and had to hide themselves, who could not 
display their identities in the public arena after the establishment 
of New Republic, and then ran after the socialist ideal, finally took 
the scene at the end of the 1980s. If there is any Alevi Question or 
Alevi Initiative that finds a response currently at the state level, it 
would not be an exaggeration to assert that the reason for this is the 
resurrection of Alevism at the end of the 1980s. The Alevi Question 
became one of the most discussed issues in the country since then. 
Voluntary Alevi associations have started to rise in every part of the 
country while Alevi NGOs started to promote Alevi identity for 
the new generations and to organize cultural and religious activi-
ties. Such associations played a great role in reinforcing solidarity 
amongst Alevis as well as raising awareness about Alevism (Soner 
& Toktaş, 2011: 422).
Alevis politicized historical figures such as Alī, Ḥasan, Ḥusayn, 
Hacı Bektaşı Veli, Pir Sultan Abdal, and Karacaoğlan who were im-
portant for them and their values by redefining them in festivals, 
symposiums, television or radio programs, and in printed publica-
tions. This process, which started with radio programs, allowed the 
broadcasting of Alevism to extend to local and national television 
channels, and more recently also by means of social media, in or-
der to reach a larger audience. Although Alevis do not have their 
own daily newspaper, they have found place in dailies by means of 
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articles by Alevi and left-wing journalists (Çaha, 2004: 332-33). 
Cems, which had been prohibited since 1925, began to be organized 
in Cem Houses that are constructed in various parts of the cities. 
Books about the history, doctrines, and rituals of Alevism started 
to appear by Alevi intellectuals. All of these developments brought 
certain changes to the nature of Alevism. The belief system, which 
had been hidden for centuries and fully closed for the outside com-
munity, was inter-generationally transferred from mouth to mouth 
and then appeared on the stage of Turkish public opinion with its 
written precepts and rituals (Van Bruinessen, 1996: 8). Besides 
this, the DRA also internally changed its discourse with respect to 
Alevism. When in 1994 a president of the DRA stated that he sees 
Alevism as outside of Islam, ten years after that statement, in 2004, 
the new president of DRA, Ali Bardakoğlu, stated that Alevism is a 
part of Islam and should be honoured as much as any other sub Is-
lamic groups. Alevism has become part of the culture of the Turkish 
part of the world and has made contribution to the religious life of 
the country (Dressler, 2008: 290).
The AKP, which has a Sunni Islamic core, organized seven work-
shops, in which Alevi leaders, Alevi intellectuals, researchers who 
are not Alevi but have studied Alevism, members of non-govern-
mental organizations, academics, and political party representatives 
participated between 2009 and 2010. The aim of those workshops 
was to bring the problems of Alevis to the table and to find solutions 
to their demands. These workshops caused an affirmative effect on 
normalization and awareness of Alevi identity in the public arena.
Still, the question is how has Alevi revival been experienced since 
the 1980s. Jamal Shah (2013: 266) examines this change under six 
headings: urbanization, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 
1991, the rise of radical Islam, the Kurdish problem, the Europe-
an Union membership process, and the proliferation of the media 
sector.
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Urbanization: Rural-urban migration commenced particularly 
at the end of the 1960s due to economic and political reasons, and 
is found to be the most important factor in the revival of Alevism. 
After having lived in rural areas of the country for centuries, Alevis 
started to reveal new forms of Alevism that are adapted to cities 
and that became public with their migration to cities. The migration 
process that came to pass very rapidly caused great changes in the 
social lives of Alevis. Increase in the number of educated Alevis and 
the rise of an Alevi middle class have caused a new social stratifica-
tion (Çamuroğlu, 2003: 79). Alevis who have moved to cities have 
to coexist with the Sunni majority that has not been fully aware of 
their existence hitherto. By contrast, Alevis, who had to pray in se-
crecy in their Cem Houses before the 1980s, constructed new Cem 
Houses or dervish lodges for gathering in cities with a large Alevi 
population (Çaha, 2004: 333).
Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Political conflicts in Turkey in 
the 1970s arose under the headings of right and left wings. During 
a period when all aspects of the country were politicized and which 
led to coups, Alevi youths participated particularly in the move-
ment towards socialism. However, this ideologic movement lost its 
importance with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. After the 
collapse of the USSR, this void was filled with Alevi identity and 
Alevi rights (Çamuroğlu, 2003: 80). Ömer Çaha believes that the 
disintegration of the socialist block had great importance, particu-
larly in making the Cem Houses the center of attraction:
(…) the collapse of the socialist regime made them [Alevi Youth] 
turn to their traditional identity, and when they did so, they faced 
cem houses. Cem houses, today, function not only for ayin-i cem 
[worship of Alevis], but also for a number of different cultural and 
charity activities. They became the prominent centres for the organ-
isation of various protests in large cities like Istanbul and Ankara 
(2004: 333).
Rise of Radical Islam: The Alevi massacres in Çorum and Maras 
at the end of 1970s just before the Iranian revolution were experi-
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enced under the name of left-right conflicts. In 1993, 33 Alevis in 
Sivas were burnt to death in a hotel by fundamentalists. The Welfare 
Party, the policies of which were oriented towards Islamic sensitiv-
ity, won the general election of 1995 and hold nearly one-third of 
the seats in parliament. These historical events made Alevis more 
sensitive with respect to their identities. Shah (2013: 266) thinks 
that the rapid rise of Alevi organizations was partly the result of the 
increase of radical Islam.
Kurdish Problem: The conflicts commenced after the PKK (Par-
tiya Karkeren Kurdistane – Kurdistan Workers’ Party) murdered 
three Turkish soldiers in the Eruh district of Siirt in 1984. It led to 
Kurdish words being used with negative meanings more than ever 
before in Turkey. Expressions like separatist, collaborating with the 
enemies, baby killers, etc., were used for PKK, whereas the Kurdish 
people also took their share. Therefore, particularly among Alevis 
with Kurdish ethnic origin, they started to put their religious iden-
tities in the forefront, rather than their ethnic origin:
Ordinary Alevi Kurds tend to feel threatened by the strong feelings 
against Kurds in society where Kurds are stigmatized by associat-
ing them with the ‘PKK terrorists’, and some tend to suppress their 
Kurdish identity and distance themselves from those Alevi Kurdish 
groups who stress their Kurdishness; they instead emphasize their 
integration into Turkish society (Erman & Göker, 2000: 107). 
European Union Process: Having their identities recognized 
during the European Union membership process of Turkey allowed 
Alevis to assert themselves. Legal restrictions against associations 
that depend on ethnic, religious or regional varieties were lifted due 
to demands from the European Union on Turkey. In the Progress 
Reports of the European Commission in 1998 and 2000, Alevis and 
their demands were also mentioned within the context of human 
rights (Şahin, 2005: 478). Alevis who did not have any collective 
identity previously and who had been ignored, now were identified 
as a Muslim minority in the EU Regular Report on Turkey’s Prog-
ress towards Accession, released on 6 October 2004 (Göner, 2005: 
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108). Due to the reforms implemented in line with EU demands, 
Alevi-based NGOs, which have not been permitted to function af-
ter the 1980 coup d’état were opened and allowed to carry out their 
activities. These were the leading ones: Pir Sultan Abdal Associa-
tion, Cem Foundation, Karacaahmet Association, and Hacı Bek-
taşi Veli Association. Lobbying activities by Alevis who migrated 
to Europe and their financial support to the Alevi associations in 
Turkey were some of the factors that accelerated this process:
In consequence, several Alevi associations were re-established that, 
prior to the legal amendment, had been closed down several times. 
It was in this legal and political context that the Federation of Alevi–
Bektashi Associations was for the first time granted legal recogni-
tion in April 2003. This was followed by the recognition of a number 
of other associations, including the Cem Foundation and the Pir 
Sultan Abdal Cultural Association. In addition, Turkish governments 
started to allocate resources from the state budget to the use of a 
few state-friendly Alevi organizations, and political authorities reg-
ularly attended the Alevi festival annually held in Hacı Bektas. (…) 
The state broadcasting institution TRT (Turkish Radio-Television 
Corporation) began to show an interest in Alevi music and started 
broadcasting documentaries on Alevi cultural heritage. (…) A num-
ber of municipalities have already granted licenses for the construc-
tion and operation of cem houses (Soner & Toktaş, 2011: 422).
Privatization and Proliferation of the Media: In the 1980s, Tur-
key saw the emergence of new social and political groups such as 
Greens, feminists, and Alevis. Narrow-scoped rights demanded by 
small groups took the place of street policy that had been used to 
change the regime in the 1970s (Çaha, 2008: 328). One of the most 
important elements that allowed Alevis to come to the stage, defend 
their rights, create an agenda, and to commence the revival of Alev-
ism was indeed the media. Privatization and proliferation of the 
media supplied new means to leaders of Alevi groups to have public 
visibility (Soner & Toktaş, 2011: 422). The article by Çaha under 
the title of “The role of the media in the revival of Alevi identity in 
Turkey” briefly summarizes this process as follows:
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The relatively free environment of the 1980s provided for the prolif-
eration as well as privatization of the media in Turkey. The visual as 
well as the sound media channels, i.e., TV channels and radio sta-
tions, were under the monopoly of the state until 1989. Moreover, 
there was very strong governmental control on the privately-owned 
newspapers and journals. Articles 141, 142, and 163 of Turkish Pe-
nal Law made it almost impossible to touch upon secret issues, i.e., 
any issues implying different identity or culture or way of life than 
the one drawn by official ideology. The elimination of these arti-
cles (…) in 1989 created a new environment for the expression of 
opinion. This gave media groups the opportunity to draw attention 
to Alevism — for instance the Alevi way of life, their rituals, their 
problems — (…) Media groups opened the closed wall of the public 
sphere. It can be claimed that uncovering officially hidden issues 
has raised the public consciousness about the government, politics 
and the state in general. (…) newly rising media groups have devel-
oped a ground table for intellectuals from different ethnical or even 
religious and political/ideological backgrounds (2004: 329-330).
As a result of these social, economic and political transforma-
tions, Alevis gained so much self-confidence that an Alevi family 
brought a case to European Human Rights Court (EHRC) about 
mandatory religion class in which their children had to participate 
in the early 2000s. EHRC resolved this case in 2007 by ruling that 
Turkey has discriminated against Alevis due to the mandatory re-
ligion class. In the end, Alevis’ self-confidence has been reinforced, 
and has become more at peace with their identities, having become 
part of the country’s agenda as they had never been before. It would 
seem obvious that Alevi revival that had commenced in the 1980s 
has led to Alevis being included in the agenda of Turkey as much as 
never before and the new Alevi generations are starting to express 
their identities more bravely than previous ones.
Starting from this point, can we draw a conclusion that Alevism 
touches the daily life much more than ever, and that the rituals and 
doctrines of Alevism are observed much more in the daily life of 
new generation? To answer this question, the next sections of the 
chapter will be about the social transformation that Alevi commu-
nities in Adana, Çorum and Tunceli regions have been experiencing 
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due to the modernization and its relation with the revival of Alev-
ism.
Why are the regions of Adana, Çorum and Tunceli chosen for this 
study?
The aim of this study is to examine whether changes in the three 
elemenets of modernization have any kind of effect on the secular-
ization process in Alevi communities. This study would have been 
based on the Alevis of cosmopolitan centres because of the rather 
vigorous social transformation among them. However, conducting 
interviews with migrated Alevis in cosmopolitan cities, who live a 
materially and spiritually hectic life with less chance to meet people 
with the same background (same rituals, traditions, customs), and 
who are deprived of a social setup where they can maintain their 
culture, is considered unsuitable for the purpose of this study.
Migration itself can have a very positive impact on seculariza-
tion (Feijten, van Dijck & Boyle, 2010), especially if people migrate 
from the rural areas of Anatolia to Istanbul, Ankara or İzmir where 
millions of people live. Maybe not for the first generation of im-
migrants, but definitely for the second and third generations who 
were born into a different social setup than their parents, it might be 
said that they would be estranged from the customs of their parents 
since the values of their parents do not easily preserve themselves in 
such a new social environment (Levin, Markides & Ray, 1996; Ali, 
2008). That is why this thesis has chosen Alevis’ traditional strong-
holds as its research locales, such as the Adana, Çorum, and Tunceli 
regions. In these regions, the Alevis have been living in certain key 
areas where their daily life is shaped by Alevi beliefs and rituals for 
hundreds of years. Therefore, the characteristics of these areas are 
more appropriate than cosmopolitan areas for illustration.
The second reason is that Alevis living in these areas hail from 
different ethnic backgrounds: Arab Alevis, Turkish Alevis, and 
Kurdish Alevis are concentrated in Adana, Çorum, and Tunceli, re-
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spectively. In this way, I have had the opportunity to cover more 
than one Alevi community. The main reason behind the selection of 
these three regions is related to the scope of this research in terms 
of sampling. Being composed of different ethnic groups, it would 
be more appropriate to include all three regions in this study. Still, 
it is important to highlight that each Alevi region will be evaluated 
separately. In other words, the thesis will examine the potential gap 
between generations of a particular region. There will be no compar-
ison between generations from two different regions. Elderly peo-
ple in the region of Adana will be compared with individuals from 
younger generations in the same region. In this sense, older genera-
tions living in and around Çorum and Tunceli, for example, will not 
be studied in terms of differences and similarities. The study also 
does not aim to provide an insight into the similarities and differ-
ences in terms of life styles of the younger generations in different 
regions. What is important for the study is to offer an insight into 
the differences/similarities among older and younger generations in 
a specific region in terms of the effect of their faith on marital issues.
Questions Related to Modernization
In semi-structured in-depth interviews, conducted with 60 Alevis 
in the Turkish regions of Adana, Çorum and Tunceli, respondents 
were asked some pre-set questions to acquire insights into the gen-
eration gap with regard to the modernization level. Questions relat-
ed to the following topics were posed to the interviewees to acquire 
insights into the generation gap with regard to get modernization 
level:
• Education Level
• Line of Work
• Number of Children
• Place of Birth
• Infant Mortality
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• Ownership of Durable Goods
• Supply of Daily Needs
• Heating Methods
• Hot Water Access
• Modern Medical Facilities
• Social Environment
• Independent Home Life and City Visits
• The Average Age of First Marriage 
• Types of Marriage
It can be said that education level is one of the most influential 
factors accelerating the transition from a traditional way of life to-
wards modernity in developing countries (Meleis, El-Sanabary & 
Beeson, 1979). Many studies suggest that an increase in society’s 
level of modernization is directly linked to the level of education, 
and that people with higher education are more likely to become 
secular than those who have relatively little education (Becker, 
Nagler, Woessmann, 2014, March 10). Since the potential gap in 
educational levels is assumed to underpin differences in terms of 
modernization level, respondents’ educational backgrounds were in-
vestigated.
Since one of the main aims of this study is to investigate the 
possible impact of urbanization on the secularization process, the 
new generation, unlike their parents, should be brought up in urban 
areas and/or their professions should be different than those of ru-
ral jobs. On the other hand, the older generation should consist of 
people who earned money through agriculture or animal husbandry 
at least before marriage.
The number of children per woman has gone down in modernizing 
societies (Akmam, 2002). Some studies reveal that the more peo-
ple have religious sensibility, the more likely they are to have more 
children (Blume, Ramsel & Graupner, 2006; Norris & Ingleharth, 
2008). Therefore, the difference in the number of children and in the 
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tendency towards having more children should provide clues with 
regard to respondents’ modernization level.
Giving birth in a medical institution and receiving profession-
al help during pregnancy would be worth considering as indices 
of modernization. Studies reveal that the number of births taking 
place in a medical institution is higher in modern countries com-
pared to traditional societies (Gallagher, 1988).39 Therefore, birth 
place is another element to be discussed in terms modernization.
Infant Mortality Rate and Under-Five Mortality Rate are much 
higher in traditional societies compared to modern societies (UN-
DATA, n.d.). For example, “the risk of a child dying before com-
pleting the first year of life was highest in the WHO African region 
(60 per 1000 live births), about five times higher than that in the 
WHO European region (11 per 1000 live births)” (World Health 
Organization, 2013). Therefore, the statements of respondents from 
different generations about infant mortality (whether they were ex-
perienced personally or having become witnesses of infant losses) 
might well be a hint as to their modernization levels.
The usage level of durable goods and their quality are expected to 
be much higher in modern societies compared to traditional ones 
due to technological advancements and industrial development. 
Therefore, the generation gap with regard to ownership of durable 
goods might provide an important hint as to the modernization 
level among the various generations.
Household heating method is an important criterion in ascer-
taining the living standards of individuals. Heating systems be-
39 The Netherlands might be an exception at this point due to the fact of very 
high home birth rate comapared to other modern countries. However, the rate 
of birth at home has steadily decreased also in the Netherlands since 1965. 
While two-thirds of all births occured at home in 1965, the situation has chan-
ged drastically and the rate decreased from two-third to 38.2% in 25 years. But, 
the rate of home birth continued to decrease and just fewer than one-fourth 
births occured at home by 2010 (Chervenak, McCullough, Brent, Levene & 
Arabin, 2013; Wiegers, Van Der Zee & Keirse; 1998).
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come more effective and efficient in modern and welfare societies in 
comparison to traditional societies (United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2015, February 26). Therefore, any differences between 
generations with regard to heating methods might provide a hint at 
the modernization level of both generations.
Having instant access to hot water can be seen as an important 
indicator of the level of individual living standard. If instant hot 
water access becomes readily available in a cheaper and easier way 
due to the diffusion of technological developments, then individual 
living conditions may be supposed to have improved.
Improvement in modern medicine is one of the obvious pillars of 
the modernization process. Increase in average life expectancy, de-
veloping treatments for incurable diseases, decrease in the tendency 
to associate diseases with supranatural powers, showing less interest 
in alternative medicine, increase in the number of medical insti-
tutions, and improved conditions are some of the transformations 
experienced by modernizing societies.
A comparison of Alevi generations with regard to their social en-
vironments is crucial for this study. In comparison to rural areas, the 
structure of urban areas is more heterogeneous. Because of that, it is 
not abnormal for a person living in a city to encounter people from 
different backgrounds during daily activities like shopping, working, 
studies, and so forth. That is why modern urbanites are more in 
touch with people from different cultures. Living with different cul-
tures, be they ethnic or religious, may even erode the decisive role of 
identities in daily activities. Ethnic and religious differences become 
less decisive for harmony in daily life (Wilson, 1976).
How and where individuals obtain their daily needs can provide a 
clue with regard to their level of modernization. In traditional soci-
eties, individuals are much more inclined to produce what they con-
sume or use, i.e. they supply their daily needs mostly by themselves; 
due to the lack of industrial production they have few alternatives 
with regard to products. On the other hand, mechanization and 
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mass production, diversity in products, increase in specialization, 
division of labour and welfare are the primary features of modern 
industrial societies (Erdoğan, 2002). The more a society becomes 
modern, the fewer individuals become involved in the production 
of their own needs.
Having independent home life and being in different cities may give 
some impressions with regard to the respondents’ modernization 
level. While close relatives (members of extended family) share the 
same living spaces and each member stays with his/her extended 
family until marriage in traditional agriculture-based societies, in-
dividuals would start to live apart from their families (not extend-
ed, but nuclear) even before marriage in modern urban life. Due 
to structural and social differentiations, individuals have become 
forced to lead a faster life. Unlike their traditional or rural counter-
parts, they have to be more mobile and need to visit or live in places 
other than their hometown due to various reasons such as educa-
tion or business. Therefore, while individuals are more inclined to 
live with their parents until they get married in traditional societies, 
living away from family before marriage is mostly seen in modern 
urban life because of education, business, holidays, etc.. So, it is not 
surprising to find that the number of studio apartments is increas-
ing by the day in modern cities (Tosun & Fırat, 2012; Kaya, 2014). 
That is why differences with regard to generations’ modes of living 
might also give a clue as to the level of modernization.
Transformation from traditional to modern society also raises 
the average age of first marriage (Garenne, 2004). Industrialization, 
increase in educational level, individualization, freer sexual relations, 
severe criticism of the paternalistic approach might be seen as the 
key reasons for the increase in the marriage age in modern societies.
Types of marriage and marriage ceremonies have changed 
throughout history due to various sociological reasons. For example, 
while arranged marriages are more common in traditional societies, 
autonomous marriages are considered part of more modern individ-
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ualized societies (Bahramitash & Kazemipour, 2006; Zang, 2008). 
In this study, arranged marriages are defined as those “marriages 
in which the decision to marry is not made by the groom and the 
bride” (Nedoluzhko & Agadjanian, 2015) but by their parents. Au-
tonomous marriages, on the contrary, are marriages in which the 
decision to marry is made by the partners themselves.
Questions Related to Marital Issues
In semi-structured in-depth interviews, respondents were asked a 
second group of questions related to their marital life. Although 
other sub-topics could be determined regarding marital issues to be 
investigated, I confined myself to the sub-topics below due to their 
direct connection with the respondents’ faith (Alevism):
• Premarital Dating
• The Faith of (Potential) Partner
• Divorce
• The Institution of the People’s Court
• The Institution of Spiritual Brotherhood
In all Alevi communities, premarital datings or premarital sexual 
intercourse are not condoned. Being in any kind of intimate rela-
tionship outside marriage is considered one of the biggest sins in 
traditional Alevi communities. Not only premarital datings or sexu-
al intercourse/intimacy between two independent persons, but even 
any kind of intimacy among engaged people is forbidden. Engaged 
people may not stay alone in a room or go to any place on their own 
except with their relatives. Having been a researcher on the Alevi 
communities, Osman Bayatlı (1957) says that being married is one 
of the most vital issues for Alevis, such that anyone who does not act 
in the correct way in light of Alevi traditions on this subject will pay 
for this with her/his own life. In my own field research, I noted that 
many Alevis who are observant of Alevi customs expressed similar 
views. The reality in some settlements where traditional Alevi cus-
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toms and duties are very strong is that the bride does/may not see 
the groom until the first night of their marriage.
Divorce among Alevis will be another crucial issue to be investi-
gated in this thesis due to it being taboo in traditional Alevi com-
munities. An Alevi is not considered complete if s/he is single, as 
full social approval for an Alevi is only possible with marriage. Par-
ents and other elderly persons in the family have quite a significant 
influence on all kinds of decisions related to marriage. Generally, 
it is the parents who must find a suitable spouse according to their 
own taste, culture, and belief, and such a spouse has to be accepted 
by the Alevi bride/groom to live together until death. Alevi woman 
is supposed to stay with her husband even if she faces very harsh 
conditions and lives in great difficulty. In traditional Alevi commu-
nities, the right to choose is not even an option, particularly for girls 
(Yaman, 2007). A divorce may result in social exclusion similar to 
that in traditional Catholic or Calvinist faith. As one respondent 
said from Adana region, a divorced Alevi woman is considered a 
prostitute for those who are closely attached to Alevism.
The institutions of spiritual brotherhood and the people’s court will 
be a subject of this thesis too, because these two social institutions 
of the Alevis are closely related to marriage itself, both of which 
help Alevism regenerate and maintain its own customs, beliefs and 
rituals. Therefore, any pointed changes in these institutions may give 
crucial insights into secularization of Alevis.
As a concept, spiritual brotherhood might be defined as the 
building up of a covenant relationship between two Alevi men. 
These men go through a kind of social process and rituals in which 
they become closer than brothers. It may be depicted as a kinship 
that is not based on blood. Terms such as “hereafter fraternity,” “fel-
lowship of the road,” “holding brotherhood,” etc. are used as syn-
onyms of spiritual brotherhood (Yaman, 2007). In the traditional 
Alevi faith, each man has to have a spiritual brother after marriage. 
Otherwise, it would not be appropriate to participate in religious 
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ceremonies. People do not eat even his lokma, which is a highly 
symbolic religious food shared in religious ceremonies. Spiritual 
brothers are obliged to help each other throughout their lives; each 
one has to pay the other’s debt if it is necessary; and they should 
handle even very private issues of other’s family (Melikoff, 2012). 
As Demiray defines it,
it is the basic mechanism that keeps the solidarity among the mem-
bers alive. In terms of religious doctrine, it constitutes the first step 
towards the initiation to the esoteric doctrine of the Alevi faith, i.e. 
without having been bound by the tie of musahiplik [the institution 
of spiritiual brotherhood] no one can be initiated to the community 
and can participate in the collective rituals (2004: 60).
The history of spiritual brotherhood can be traced back to the 
age of the prophet Muhammed. The statements expressed by the 
respondents and information in the sources seem to support each 
other with regard to the origin of spiritual brotherhood. By an-
nouncing fraternity between a Muslim who migrated from Mecca 
to Medina and another Muslim who was from Medina, the prophet 
Muhammed established an institution of social solidarity (Tiryaki, 
2013). Alevis believe that after everybody had found a spiritual 
brother except ‘Alī, the prophet Muhammed declared himself the 
spiritual brother of ‘Alī. Here is the same story vocalized by a re-
spondent from the Çorum region:
Our lord, Hazrat ‘Alī and our dignified prophet Muhammad were 
spiritual brothers. Why? During the migration of Muslims from Mec-
ca to Medina, Muslims had left their properties behind. They had ar-
rived in Medina in very poor condition. During that time, the Proph-
et said, “Each wealthy person of Medina will be the spiritual brother 
of a poor Meccanian.” But after everybody had found his spiritual 
brother, our lord Hazrat ‘Alī was left without a spiritual brother. The 
Prophet asked him, “What happened ‘Alī, why are you sad?” Our lord 
[‘Alī] said, “You have found spiritual brothers for everyone except 
me.” Thereupon, the Prophet said this: “You are my spiritual brother 
in this world and hereafter.” That is the main story behind spiritual 
brotherhood (Ç4C, a respondent from Çorum, September 2, 2014).
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In this sense, it would not be wrong to claim that the social func-
tion of the institution of spiritual brotherhood is highly effective. 
These verses, which are related to the institution, belong to one of 
the seven holy minstrels of the Alevis, Pir Sultan Abdal (1480-
1550), whose poems have been transmitted from one generation to 
another for hundreds of years:
If you ask what real religious duty is,
It is being a spiritual brother.
Is it possible for those to enter the House of Cem,
If they do not have a spiritual brother.
Is it possible for those to be forgiven,
If they do not have a spiritual brother.40
House of Cem is the name of places where Alevis hold their 
worship service called Ayin-i Cem (hereafter, Cem) and gather for 
social or religious reasons. Cem is a ritual that especially stands at 
the core of Turkish and Kurdish Alevi communities in Anatolia. 
It is generally held during the winter months in houses with wide 
spaces with the participation of women and men altogether. People 
perform traditional religious dances to the rhythm of melodies per-
formed by the Saz, the traditional instrument, and drink beverages 
with alcoholic content. The traditional Alevi belief has it that those 
who do not have a spiritual brother, and therefore are excluded by 
the community, are not allowed to take part in these rituals. These 
rituals of Cem, where the religious guides assume the leading func-
tion, aim, through religious sermons, songs or hymns, to strength-
en the loyalty in the community reinforcing the Alevi tradition by 
re-creating its collective history.
Another crucial institution related to marital issue is the institu-
tion of the people’s court. This institution has been used to dismiss 
people who are considered harmful to social harmony. Particularly, 
40 In Turkish: “Eğer farz içinde farzı sorarsan, yine farz içinde farzdır muhasip, 
Musahipsiz kişi ceme gelir mi, Ettiği niyazlar kabul olur mu”
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among others, having sexual relations prior to marriage or outside 
marriage (adultery), having relations with outsiders (non-Alevis) 
and divorce are among those that have been used as grounds to 
excommunicate people (Yıldırım, 2013) and they are considered 
among the biggest sins in traditional Alevi communities. In such 
cases, people are marginalized or excommunicated and called “de-
cayed ” by their religious leaders, the dedes (religious guides). The dede, 
“literally means Grandfather, is the practitioner of the Alevi faith. 
Basically the dede is the holy man of Alevism, which is the only 
person capable of conducting religious ceremonies. In this sense, the 
dede occupies the central position within the community” (Demir-
ay, 2004: 60). The duties of the dedes, among others, are to teach 
the doctrines and creeds of Alevism to their followers, to guide 
them in hard times, and to conduct collective religious ceremonies 
(Shankland, 2009: 112). However the dedes do not only assume re-
ligious duties, but also have a leading position in the judicial system 
of the community (Erdemir, 2004: 32). The tradition in the Alevi 
belief has it that the decisions taken by the dedes during the rites 
of Cem have an unquestionable character. The dedes are entitled to 
provisionally or continuously discard a community member out of 
the community.41 David Zeidan explains the act of excommunica-
tion among Alevis as follows:
Alevis were forbidden to proselytise, and Alevism regenerated itself 
internally by paternal descent. To prevent penetration by hostile 
outsiders, the Alevis insisted on strict endogamy, which eventually 
made them into a quasi-ethnic group. Alevi taboos limited inter-
action with the dominant Sunni political-religious centre. Excom-
munication was the ultimate punishment threatening those who 
married outsiders, cooperated with outsiders economically, or ate 
with outsiders. It was also forbidden to use the state (Sunni) courts 
(1999: 76).
41 Dedes do not exist in the tradition of Alevis in the region of Adana. People who 
are considered to descend from the ancestry of Muhammed, the Prophet, and 
locally called hocca or sheikh assume the function the dedes perform elsewhere. 
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Decayed (excommunicated) people are not accepted in the House 
of Cem, and every relationship with them is terminated. No one 
visits them; they are not helped even in very difficult situations; and 
no one, even their close family members, salutes or talks to them, 
which amounts to being totally despised. If a spiritual brother is ex-
communicated, the other spiritual brother starts to live in a morally 
troubled situation as well (Tiryaki, 2013: 144-45).
In light of all this information, it should be stressed that mar-
riage as a social institution occupies a very significant place in Alev-
ism, and it is used as a kind of tool for the continuation of the com-
munity. Throughout history, Alevis have faced severe sanctions and 
social exclusion whenever they incurred damage on this institution. 
That is why this study has chosen to investigate the institution of 
marriage and related issues with regard to the secularization process. 
Therefore, during the fieldwork, the same questions in relation to 
marriage were posed to two generations (parents and children) in 
order to see in how far marriage issues have witnessed a process of 
secularization due to the process of modernization.
GENERATION GAP WITH REGARD TO MODERNIZATION LEVEL
We can say, speaking of Turkey specifically, that it has become a 
more modern country especially since the 1960s (the period where 
the country experienced immigration from rural areas to urban ones 
and developments in the capitalistic system supported by foreign 
resources). However it is a common impression of the people in 
Turkey that the poor get poorer more and more (Apak, 2012) or the 
poor get poorer and the rich get richer parallel to the globalization 
process (Kahraman & Bolışık, 2014). For this reason, in this section 
we will discuss in detail whether the scientific developments and 
modern medicine have become widespread to such an extent that 
they have an improving effect on the life of people with limited fi-
nancial means, whether a transition is underway from an economic 
system basing on agriculture to an economic model based on in-
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dustry and service sector, and whether, finally, the rural areas lose in 
power, day after day, in the face of the urbanization.
Education Level
It was noted that, compared to the older generation, the new gener-
ation have enjoyed better educational facilities, and their education 
level is indisputably much higher than that of the older generation 
in each region. During the field research, no one was found to be 
less educated than his/her parents.
Table B1. Educational Background of Respondents
Illiterate Primary School
Elementary 
School
High 
School
Graduate 
Studies Total
Older 
Generation 6 14 2 6 2 30
New 
Generation - 1 1 7 21 30
What is more, it was learnt that friends and siblings of the new 
generation, apparently, have also better educational levels when 
compared to their parents. Besides, although the older generation is 
poorly educated compared to their children, their educational level 
is still higher than that of their own parents (the previous genera-
tion). Many respondents from the older generation admitted that 
their own parents had no education.
The trend towards a better education among Alevi communities 
is similar to that in Turkey as a whole. Likewise, the level of educa-
tion in Turkey has been rising, albeit gradually.
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Table B2. The Enrolment Rate in Turkey (%) 
Academic 
Year
Pre-School
Primary 
Education
Secondary 
Education
Higher 
Education
Age 4-5 Age 5
1998/’99 - - 89,26 38,87
2003/’04 - - 90,21 53,37 14
2008/’09 - - 96,49 58, 52
2013/’14 37,46 42,54 99,57 76,65 Between 40-45
Source: National Education Statistics 2013/2014.
Line of Work
As seen in the table below, all respondents from the new generation 
earn their living through urban jobs, while a considerable part of 
the older generation had been busy with rural jobs before marriage.
Table B3. Line of Work before Marriage
Tunceli Çorum Adana
Older 
Gen.
New 
Gen.
Older 
Gen.
New 
Gen.
Older 
Gen.
New 
Gen.
Rural Jobs 7 - 8 - 9 -
Urban Jobs 3 10 2 10 1 10
D10P: At the present time, everybody lives in the city centre. From our 
family, only my brother-in-law still lives in my old village. That’s it.
Ç5C: When I was a child, there were a lot of people busy with agricul-
tural production, but right now since all their children had gone to 
schools in the city centres, they have set up their lives in the cities.
Ç9P: My parents were preoccupied with agricultural production. When 
I visited them during the summer holidays, I also did those kinds of 
rural works. I worked on their lands with a sickle or scythe in my hands. 
A5P: No one was working in urban areas; they were all in the fields. 
Then, they started to work in factories, and that was the turning point. 
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Everybody started to have a job in the city, from the textile sector to 
beauty salons. Right now, no one is working in agriculture anymore. 
No, no. Never. Because everybody now has a job in the city centres. 
But in the past, everybody worked on the land.
It should be stressed that the picture drawn above seems to be 
consistent with the reality in Turkey. After the 1950s, there was a 
very serious movement from rural to urban areas. In parallel, the 
economic structure of Turkey, once dominated by the agricultural 
sectors, has now been transformed into a new structure dominated 
by the industrial and service sectors.
Table B4. Ratio of Labour Sector in Turkey
Year Agriculture Industry and Service
1955 82 % 18 %
1980 61 % 39 %
2013 23,6 % 77 %
Source: Koç et al., 2009; TSI Household Labour Force Statistics, 2014
Number of Children
As a result of the interviews, it might be said that each generation 
(the previous, the old, and the new) seems to have a lower fertility 
rate compared to the generation before it.
Table B5. Fertility Rate of Respondents
Previous Generation Older Generation New Generation
Tunceli 7,9 4,6 1,1
Adana 7,8 3,7 0,8
Çorum 3,7 2, 8 1
It goes without saying that a considerable number of people 
from the new generation do have the possibility to bear children. 
Therefore, the number in Table B5 for the new generation will con-
ceivably rise in the near future. For that reason, the question “How 
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many children do you want to have in the future?” was posed to 
respondents who were still able to have more children. In light of 
the interviews, it is highly likely that there will be an increase in the 
fertility rate of the new generation, but there seems to be no hope of 
reaching the level of the older generation. The number specified by 
respondents from the new generation does not exceed the number 
of children that their parents have. Economic situation was present-
ed as one of the main - and sometimes the only - reasons for ques-
tions such as the following: Why do you want to have fewer children 
compared to your parents? Why do you want to have only one child?:
T1P: People decide the number of children according to their econom-
ic situation. And do you know why the fertility rate was so high in the 
past? Because, no one was aware of the methods of birth control. 
Right now, having ten children means that the expenses for higher 
education or all other cost-items have to be multiplied by ten. Another 
ten plates on the dining table… How can it be possible for a man to 
feed all of them now?
T2C: We do not want to have more than one child right now. But of 
course no one knows what will happen in the future. Now, I and my 
spouse are both working.
It could be said that the answer of Ç2C, father of one who had 
never ever thought of having a second child, and of Ç6C, who 
would like to have two children at most, might provide some kind 
of a framework for the notions among the new generation on the 
subject of fertility:
Ç2C: I have to say that our economic situation is not good enough for 
another child. We live our lives in the fast lane. To raise a child or to 
take care of him/her is really a tough job. Now I have a 16-year-old 
child, a son who is totally preoccupying my life. I do not know what I 
can do if I would have had three of him. I guess we cannot, it would 
have been really difficult.
Ç6C: Actually I want to have only one child so as to direct all my en-
ergy towards that child, to provide the best education, and to ensure 
a promising future. But to be honest, I do not want to see my child 
alone; therefore I wish to have two children at most, so that they 
would complement each other.
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Respondents from Adana gave similar answers just like their 
counterparts in Çorum and Tunceli:
A2C: Right now, I do not want any children. But if I can overcome my 
sense of uncertainty in this regard, I prefer to have only one child. I 
think “being married” is a very tedious and troublesome thing. Giv-
en that it is already difficult enough to maintain one’s marriage with 
just two people, I cannot imagine adding another person to it, even a 
child. I am not ready to bear the responsibility of raising a child.
A8C: I think to ensure a good education and healthier life, the ideal 
number is two.
A9C: For the moment I want to have only one child because I do not 
know what to expect from the future. Our business may go bad, and 
then we would have hard times.
It should be emphasized that the transformation that Alevi 
communities have been going through with regard to fertility rate 
is coherent with the overall transformation in Turkey as a whole. 
Since 1960, the number of children per woman in Turkish society 
has decreased from 6 to 2.26.
Place of Birth
In field research, this kind of modernizing process was observed and 
noted for Alevi communities, too. The births of the new generation 
mostly take place in a medical institution, while the older genera-
tion was almost all born at home/fields/caves.
In addition, when the question of “Where did/will you/your 
spouse give birth?” was posed to respondents from the new genera-
tion, everybody - without exception - said that they either went to 
the hospital or will go there. That is to say, if it is necessary to make 
a general overview, almost all respondents from the older genera-
tion were born at home without professional help, while almost all 
children of the new generation were/will be born under professional 
help in a health institution.
VOLKAN ERTİT
228
Table B6. Births in a Medical Institution (Out of 10)
Older Generation New Generation Newer Generation
Tunceli - 5 10 (Expected)
Adana 1 7 10 (Expected)
Çorum - 7 10 (Expected)
It should be stressed that if a birth did not take place in a medi-
cal institution, this does not mean that that child was born at home. 
Agricultural fields (where they were working) or caves (before 
modern-style houses) were mentioned several times by respondents 
from the older generation as birth places:
T1P: My birthplace was a cave. But my children were born at home. I 
have three grandchildren and they were all born in a hospital.
T2C: My children were born in hospital.
T3P: In those times, there were no doctors or someone to be responsi-
ble for them. I was born at home, so were my children.[All grandchil-
dren of T3P were born in a hospital.]
Ç4P: I was born at home while my children were born in hospital.
Ç8P: I was born at home while my children were born in hospital.
A1C: If I become pregnant, I would like to give birth at a private hos-
pital because I will get better service.
A1P: I was born at home with the help of a midwife (wise woman).
A5P: In olden times, women were giving births in the fields. My first 
two children were born at home while the last two births took place 
in a medical institution. And God knows where I was born. Because 
during the summer times, my families had to move somewhere to work 
in agricultural areas, which were everywhere.
A5C: I was born at home but my daughter was born in a private hos-
pital. It was my wife’s choice. She thought that it might be more hy-
gienic.
On the basis of answers from the respondents, it might be said 
that the main reason why modern-day births take place in medical 
institutions without any exception is because of an increase in the 
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number of medical institutions and healthcare professionals, in ad-
dition to the urbanization process, welfare state (related to births), 
and better financial situation to cover private hospital expenses.
Infant Mortality
The questions of “Have you lost any child because of disease? Or 
have you seen people that lost their children because of childhood 
diseases?” were asked to both generations in the interviews. Almost 
all respondents from the new generation said that either they have 
never run into infant deaths or the cases they have seen were not 
related to diseases but accidents. On the other hand, most of the 
respondents from the older generation said that they had often 
experienced infant deaths either because they had lost their own 
children or that relatives, neighbours and acquaintances had expe-
rienced the same thing. Some of the answers given by respondents 
are as follows:
Ç3P: My brother died, too. I was twelve years old and he was 1 year 
old when he died. There were many neighbours whose children also 
died. So we ran into infant deaths often. But today, of course, that has 
changed. Of course, there has been an improvement. Our public health 
was not that good in the past. [However, Ç3C, who is the child of Ç3P, 
said that s/he does not remember the death of any baby.]
T2P: Of course. For example, my two siblings died. Rumour has it that 
one of them had a fever. I don’t know what it was, maybe measles, I 
was only five or siz years old at the time. Another sibling died because 
our mother died while giving birth. Due to want of care, after two 
months, he also died. A son of my uncle died, a grandson of my other 
uncle also died. These all happened in our village. [Nevertheless, T2C, 
who is the child of T2P, answered that question in this way: “No, I 
have never heard of the death of a baby.”]
A2P: Children would die if they were diagnosed with measles. Men-
ingitis was another reason for such deaths. It was said then that the 
disease affected the brain. If it was the case, children became perma-
nently disabled or died [Unlike his/her parent, A2C said that s/he 
does not remember any infant death case.]
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When the older generation was asked for the possible reasons 
behind infant mortality, many metaphysical reasons were noted:
T6P: Since his body was bruised, people of our lands said that a bad 
angel called “Heleke” had hit him.
In addition, the lack of convenient means (vehicles) to carry sick 
infants from rural areas to the city centres was noted as another 
key reason for the increase in infant deaths. A respondent from the 
older generation said that they had tried to carry his/her very sick 
sister to the hospital, but since they used a horse-drawn vehicle, they 
could not reach the hospital on time, so she died of a fever.
Ç4P: My sister had not been immunized against tetanus. One day her 
mouth jammed, she could not say anything. It was such a very severe 
winter day, I remember it very well. They brought a horse-drawn car-
riage and then put things over the carriage. Snow was everywhere; our 
knees were covered in snow. Roads were closed. On one side of the 
carriage, my father was walking while my uncle was on the other side. 
But they could not continue further than the village of Ovasaray.
Besides, measles and whooping cough, against which all children 
are vaccinized in our day, were noted as leading causes of infant 
deaths:
T4P: Yes, I remember infant deaths because I have lost one of my sib-
lings. Our neighbour also lost his/her two children. All of them died 
because of measles.
T9P: For example, one of my sisters, two daughters of my uncle, and 
one daughter of my aunt, all died of measles.
A2P: My sister became crippled because of measles. But unfortunate-
ly, our neighbors’ child died. They were told: “Do not take your child 
to the doctor. It is a sin. Going to doctor at that time meant that you 
are committing a sinful act. “Everybody has to endure that disease; 
it was some kind of obligation.” They sentenced their child to death.
It was noted that some of the respondents were deprived of the 
facilities or possibilities to diagnose the reasons behind the infant 
deaths. For example, A3P and A4P used similar expressions to de-
scribe the possible cause: “They died because of temperature. That’s 
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it.” It seems that what A4P related about his/her two dead infants 
might typify those experiences of the past:
V: Have you ever lost any of your children?
A4P: Two of them.
V: Why did they die?
A4P: They had temperature, and died.
V: How old were they?
A4P: Each of them was one year old.
V: Did your acquaintances lose any of their children in those days?
A4P: My sister lost two of her children. A sister-in-law lost hers, too. 
A similar conversation was made with A5P:
V: Well, do you remember anyone who lost his/her child?
A5P: Of course, my mother lost four of her children. She gave birth to 
twelve but she had to bury two of her girls and two of her boys.
V: Did your acquaintances lose any of their children in those times?
A5P: A lot of my acquaintances did. For example, my sister-in-law 
lost five of her children, my uncle lost six children, and another sis-
ter-in-law and my aunt both lost children. There were too many cases 
of infant deaths in our times. You know why? Because there were a 
lot of births. Each year, there were plenty of births. Each year, each 
year. With the dead ones, they were still able to give birth to four-
teen-fifteen children. [A5C, who is the child of A5P, answered the 
same question as follows: “Infant deaths? No, I do not remember.”]
I think the notions of A9P about the decreasing level of infant 
mortality might be the summary of this part:
A9P: There were lots of infant deaths in the olden days. But at this 
moment, because of developments, hospitals, doctors, care services, 
education, family physicians... If something happens, we immediate-
ly take the children to the family physicians first. If it is necessary, we 
carry them to hospitals, which was not the case in the past.
It should be noted that this drastic decrease in infant mortality 
rate among Alevi communities is in line with general developments 
in Turkish society.
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Table B7. Infant Mortality Rate and Under-Five Mortality Rate in 
Turkey
Year Infant Mortality Rate 
(probability of dying by 
age 1 per 1000 live births)
Under-Five Mortality Rate 
(probability of dying by 
age five per 1000 live 
births)
1960s 163 223
At the beginning 
of 1980s
121 152
At the beginning 
of 1990s
66 84
2008 17 24
2011 11,7 15
2012 11,6 No data
2013 10,8 No data
Source: Koç et al., 2009; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2013, February 19; 
2014 April 30; World Health Organization, 2013
Ownership of Durable Goods
Based on the information given by two generations, it was noted 
that the new generation have had almost all necessary and primary 
durable goods just before marriage, while the older generation had 
been living in relatively empty houses or spent their first years of 
marriage in those empty houses. But, this contrast is a kind of man-
datory diversity because even if members of the older generation 
could have covered the costs of durable goods, for most of them 
there was no chance of having a refrigerator, washing machine, 
dishwasher, etc., because none of those goods were sold in Turkey at 
the time. What is more, even if all of them were on sale, there would 
have been no possibility to use them, because many villages in Ana-
tolia lacked electricity and water facilities until recently.
Therefore, the answers given to the questions of “How did you 
keep your food cool?” and “How did you wash your clothes?” by 
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the older generation reflect very sharp differences between the two 
generations:
Washing clothes:
T3P: We were setting up big pots to wash our clothes outside the 
house, along the river sides. There were no water fountains. As wash-
ing agent, we used ash.
Ç6P: To wash clothes, we used to make fire to get ash from oak trees. 
That ash was used as detergent. Sometimes, it was also used to wash 
the dishes.
Keeping food cool:
A2P: We had no refrigerators. We put our foods into a kind of small 
cage made of string. Let’s say if there is a plate of food left, we put it 
into that cage up on the wall. Foods were bought daily. Tomatoes were 
picked up from our own garden.
A5P: In my time, there was no refrigerator in my mother’s house. I 
did not have any even after marriage. I bought a wire-floored cage 
instead of a refrigerator. In my mother’s house, we did not have any 
electronic devices.
It was noted that no one from the older generation owned a 
motor vehicle before marriage. After hearing my question, a respon-
dent from Tunceli astonishingly said that in the 1950s there was 
only one car in Tunceli. Another respondent from Adana recounted 
that right now, his/her neighbours are fighting for a parking lot on 
a street where there were no cars at all in the past:
T5C: No, no. When I was eighteen years old, my mother got sick, she 
caught a terrible disease and we had to go to Elaziğ [a city next to 
Tunceli]. The problem was related to her gallbladder. But there was 
only one car in Tunceli in the 1950s, a taxi. Think about it.
Ç2P: How do you get the car! You couldn’t find even a bike. Who could 
find a car at that time, not possible! When I got married 48 years ago, 
there were only three cars in Çorum. At the moment, even we have a 
car.
Ç2C: Obviously there are a lot of cars today. It is clear. I remember we 
had a very hard time finding a bridal car for our wedding ceremony. 
But now, when I organized a ceremony for my son’s circumcision, we 
almost blocked the traffic in the city.
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A5P: There was no car in the neighbourhood. Nowadays, neighbours 
are fighting for a parking space.
In addition, there are considerable differences between gener-
ations in terms of household living conditions. While most of the 
older generation had to live in a boxy room with other relatives in 
the same house, those of the new generation are living in houses of 
their own, independent of relatives:
D10P: I was living with three sisters-in-law, three brothers-in-law, 
mother-in-law, everybody. One room for us, the other rooms for them.
A1P: The house had four rooms, and they gave us two rooms. One 
room was for my sister-in-law, the other was for my mother-in-law and 
father-in-law.
A2P: In those days, we had big financial problems. My family or his 
family could not manage to buy or build a new house for us. My moth-
er-in-law told me: “I will give you two small rooms, one big room, and 
a kitchen. There is a room outside the house, we ourselves will live 
there.” In the end, we split their house in two.
A3P: I lived with my mother-in-law for nine years.
I think the answers below of some respondents from the older 
generation and those of their children are the key element of this 
section:
 T2P: Before getting married, we had only a tiny black and white televi-
sion. Except of that, we did not have any electronic devices.
T2C: Before getting married, I had had almost every durable goods.
A8P: Before getting married, I hadn’t had anything at all. There was 
only a radio.
A8C: When I was single, I was living with my family. We had almost ev-
erything: refrigerator, washing machine, and later – dishwasher. So, I 
continued to have all of them after I got married.
Supply of Daily Needs
The interviews indicate that Alevi communities have gone through 
a similar process, i.e. from being part of a traditional structure to 
being in a more modern structure. Having been brought up in rural 
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areas, most of the older generation respondents had experienced a 
lifestyle in which they produced what they consumed with a limited 
variety in food, clothes and other daily needs. For instance, many 
older generation respondents expressed that in their childhood they 
had never ever seen cheese, jam or olives, which are currently con-
sidered normal parts of an Anatolian traditional breakfast. Each 
family had had its own livestock, and unmachined agricultural and 
animal products had been the main food sources. In contrast to the 
lifestyle of the older generation, the new generation had seen gro-
ceries during childhood. At present, both generations go to grocery 
stores, supermarkets or other shops in city centres for all their daily 
needs. In parallel, there is more variety in food and other daily items 
and needs because of industrialization. The question of “How did/
do you meet your daily needs?” was distinctively answered by the 
two generations:
T2P: We did not know what cheese or jam was. One day, when I visited 
my uncle’s house, a son of my uncle brought olives to his family. We 
stared at them, trying to understand what they were. After I got home 
I cried. I told my father, “There were black things like goat-shit. Go 
and ask my uncle, get their name, I want them.” I was around eight/
nine years old at the time. The taste was pretty different. We did not 
know the taste of chocolate such as Nutella or Sarelle at all. What we 
knew were eggs and chicken. If we had a cow or goat, then we could 
have produced yogurt, milk, curd, buttermilk. We also used to make 
lentil soup. There was nothing else.
T4P: We had only curds, yogurt and buttermilk. My mother used to 
make our breads. We ourselves used to produce them. We produced 
vegetables. I do not remember whether we had to buy anything be-
cause we all had our own homemade products.
T5P: We had never seen cheese or jam. We used to buy only products 
which were sold in our village such as eggs or curds.
T6P: Since we were living in a village, our economic situation was not 
good. What we had were only potatoes or wheat bread. We couldn’t 
find even the simplest things. We used to grow our own foods.
Ç1P: We used to supply our own daily needs. We had livestocks.
Ç3P: We had flocks of sheep, we had cows, chickens.
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Ç5P: When we were living in our village, we had vineyards and or-
chards.
Ç7P: They were grown naturally.
A5P: There was a cow in front of each house. 
A8P: We had a plot of land for growing plants. Our cheese was home-
made, made from our own cow’s milk. Today, we do not produce any-
thing anymore.
The answers given to the same questions by respondents from 
the new generation are much shorter:
T8C: Grocery.
A8C: Grocery.
A6C: Grocery.
Ç3C: Grocery.
Ç7C: Grocery.
It was noted that no one produces his/her own food at present 
time due to the modern urban life. I think what Ç6P said about 
being able to supply their own daily needs might well summarise 
this discussion:
Ç6P: Animal husbandry was so common in our days. Therefore, we 
didn’t know what vegetable oil was. The only thing we ate was butter. 
We had bees, so we had plenty of honey. We were growing our own 
tomatoes and cucumber in our garden. There was no grocery. Curd, 
honey, butter, milk, cheese were all homemade.
Heating Methods
Although both generations have the same heating systems at the 
moment, the older generation used to apply very traditional and 
primitive systems of heating in their young days. Based on the per-
sonal narratives told by the respondents from the older generation, 
it was noted that wood, animal dung, coal and rubbish were used as 
fuel to heat up houses during their childhood. These materials had 
been burned in grills, paca (very traditional cooking place, used for 
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heating as well) or in quite primitive stoves. But nowadays, highly 
sophisticated stoves, air-conditioning technology and central heat-
ing systems have replaced those old methods:
A4P: No heating stove, no nothing. All siblings had to sleep together 
side by side to warm themselves up.
A5P: When I was little, we used to have a kind of tool that resembles 
a grill. It was made of mud. We were burning coal on it to heat our 
rooms. And we put our quilts over us. Those were our stoves.
A6P: My mother used to buy some kind of coal to burn. While she was 
kneading them like kneading flour, we were helping her. That kneaded 
coals were shaped like rings and then dried. Besides, we used to burn 
dried dung. Our heating tool was a kind of primitive grill. Those grills 
were made of mud and were placed in the middle of the room with 
dried coal or dung in them. Every morning and evening, one coal was 
broken and then burned on it. That was how we heated ourselves. Now, 
we all have air-conditioners and electric stoves to warm ourselves.
T1P: With a heating stove. We called them a sheet metal stove in Erz-
incan. We used to put wood on the stove. For a very long time we used 
this system. There was no coal, no cabin heater, up until the 70s and 
80s. After that, we started getting central heating systems.
T3P: We used to light fire on a cooker using very thick woods. Some-
times, we used to burn rubbish. Then stoves were invented, and every-
body started to use them. Now, we have central heating systems.
T6P: With stove.
T8P: Wood-burning stove.
Ç6P: Generally, we used wood burning stones, and sometimes we used 
dried dung and chaff.
Ç7P: In our childhood, we used to heat ourselves with wood or dried 
dung.
Some of the respondents from the new generation confirmed 
that they were born in houses with central heating:
T6C: I do not remember any of our houses having a stove. As far as I 
can remember, I have only been living in houses with a central heating 
system.
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T8C: When I was little, we had central heating at home, and we still 
use it.
Table B8. Changing Heating Methods and Their Fuels in Alevi 
Communities
Time Heating Methods Fuels
Long Ago Grill, Paca, Primitive Stoves Woods, Dried Dung, Rubbish, 
Coal
Before More Sophisticated Stoves Woods, Coal, Gas, Electricity, 
Propane cylinder
Now Central Heating System, Air-
Conditioner
Electricity, Oil, Water
Hot Water Access
In the field research, very striking differences between the two gen-
erations were noted on the subject of hot water accessibility. How-
ever, after conducting a number of interviews, it did not take long 
to realise that not only hot water but even instant accessibility to 
potable water was not the case for many respondents from the older 
generation. Although I had not thought about investigating the ac-
cessibility of instant potable water just because I had already de facto 
assumed that there would have been no differences between genera-
tions on this subject, it was noted that the two generations also have 
a widening gulf with regard to instant potable water. Many respon-
dents from the older generation said that they had been obtaining 
water either from the fountains in the village square or from wells 
dug in their own gardens. But, at the present time, all respondents 
from both generations have access to both instant hot and potable 
waters. Water heaters, solar energy and central heating boilers have 
emerged as the most widely used methods. Some of the explanatory 
responses from both generations to the question of “Did you have 
instant access to hot water in your childhood?” might provide an 
overall general impression with regard to the generation gap:
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T2P: There was none. We took a bath in rivers or fountains. Our family 
members were all doing the same thing there. A big pot was built to 
boil water by riversides or fountains.
T2C: Currently, we are using water heaters and solar energy, we have 
all of them.
T6P: No, we didn’t have any.
T6C: Whenever we wanted, we had access because we had water heat-
er. Now we are also using solar energy.
C3P: No, we did not have any hot-water system. Actually, we did not 
have a tap water system either. If we needed water for drinking, taking 
a bath, cooking, we went to the village fountain and carried our water 
with buckets. The tap water system of our village was set up in 1994, 
which was something new. Currently, thanks to modern facilities like 
bath heater and water heater, we have instant access to hot water.
C7P: We did not have even instant cold water. We carried buckets of 
water from fountains.
A2P: We heated up water outside the house using woods during winter 
time. In summer, we put water outside the house under the sun, and 
we used those for showers. In those days, we did not have solar tech-
nology on the roof of houses.
A4P: There were no fountains near to us at the time; therefore, every-
body dug a well right next to their houses.
A5P: Thanks to the wood burning stove, we had hot water in our bath-
room, made of mud. The stove was set up inside but we lit it outside to 
heat up the bathroom. Since there was not even a fountain, we got our 
water from the well via a pump.
Modern Medical Facilities
Interviews conducted with Alevis indicate that they have also ex-
perienced similar transformations in medical facilities. Generations 
exhibit clear-cut differences with regard to the diagnosis of diseases 
and treatment modalities. The new generation seems to enjoy mod-
ern medical facilities much more than the older generation and it is 
more inclined to talk about the causes of diseases within the frame-
work of modern medicine. Besides, remarkable differences in the 
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treatment of diseases between generations were noted. For example, 
the thoughts and actions of the older generation (e.g. punching for 
headache, dying due to bad angels, using salivary juice as antibiotic, 
staunching blood flow via melted belt fabric, having thought that 
going to hospitals is a sin, going to Alevi men of religion for dental 
inflammation) are not familiar to the new generation. Analogously, 
most of the older generation respondents said that they had never 
ever visited a doctor or been to a medical institution in their child-
hoods. Not surprisingly, the following metaphysical explanations 
with regard to diagnosis of the diseases were stated by the older 
generation respondents:
T1P: If someone was discoloured, it was said that s/he had been hit 
by demons. No one knew what a heart attack was. Let’s say a woman 
died of bleeding during childbirth, but in those days it was believed 
that a jinni called “heleke” actually came and took her lungs. Because 
of that belief, people were waiting with the woman for three days after 
childbirth to prevent the jinn from taking her lung.
T3P: In those times, people could not diagnose the diseases. They did 
not know what they are. Heart attack was assumed as being hit by 
jinn. Nobody knew what the diseases were.
A5P: For example, at the present time, people know what blood pres-
sure is, but not in the olden days. They kept on saying, “my brain was 
hit by blood.”
Ç7C: For example, when I was little I had jaundice and my family be-
lieved that it happened because of the birth of my little brother. For 
them, being jealous of my brother was the reason for having jaundice.
It was noted that having used religion-related alternative meth-
ods of treatment due to the lack then of modern medical facilities 
was common among the older generation respondents. Visiting men 
of religion, wearing an amulet, using salivary juice of men of religion 
were verbalized as methods of treatment for the cases of dental in-
fections, facial paralysis, mumps, warts, psychological problems and 
situations of paralysis among older generation respondents:
T4P: For example, if our teeth were infected, we visited the men of 
religion to ask them to say a prayer for us.
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T7P: If the case was facial palsy, then my parents used to say, “Oh, 
let’s go to a dede before anyone sees it.”
Ç1P: For instance, my sibling’s mouth was distorted one day, and his/
her mouth was rubbed by the dede. That was our belief. If someone 
was paralyzed, could not walk or could not have a baby, then they were 
all taken to the Alevi men of religion.
Ç2C: If anyone had wart on his/her body, they asked my father to spit 
on those warts. Besides, he used a razor blade to scratch those warts. 
Since it was assumed that this healing power was passed on from one 
generation to another, I would have been supposed to have the same 
healing power if I happen to replace my father. I remember my father 
had to spit at least ten-fifteen times in a week.
Ç5P: I remember, since a pregnant woman had problems while giving 
birth, she was taken to the higher places on the back of an ox-driven 
cart. But it didn’t work. After that, people came to my school and got 
permission from my teacher to take me. They took me from school be-
cause they wanted me to rub the pregnant woman’s backside. They 
thought that, being son of a dede, if my hand would touch her, it 
might help her in the childbearing.
Ç7C: There was a shrine for people having jaundice.
A4C: I was taken to a man of religion after I got mumps. He scratched 
my cheek with a razor blade and then recited some verses.
A2C: As far as I remember, when my aunt became severely sick with 
typhoid with severe fever, she was not taken to the hospital because it 
was thought that going to the hospital was a sinful act.
Some members of the older generation respondents said that al-
though they had wanted to use more secular methods of treatment, 
the secular methods they managed to use were quite different from 
modern medicine due to the lack of doctors and medical institu-
tions at the time. Besides, having the chance then to visit a doctor 
did not mean that there would be sufficient treatment. Since there 
was no specialized treatment as well as a general lack of doctors, the 
entire town would visit the same doctor for completely different 
diseases. Moreover, using punching as a painkiller, treating wounds 
with tobacco leaves, melting animal fat to prevent cold, or cutting 
swelling parts with a razor blade, had been considered secular alter-
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native methods of treatment that had nothing to do with modern 
medicine:
A5P: We did not have money to take medical treatment. We produced 
our own pills; it was a kind of self-medication. For example, my mother 
fell from a grapevine and her foot became swollen and discoloured. 
I swear to God if that would happen today, we have to call an am-
bulance. But she just held a razor blade in her hand and made a cut 
several times into that swollen foot.
A6P: There was only one doctor and all of us went to him for every 
disease. Dermatology, internal medicine, broken foot… since there 
was no specialization, we would go to him for everything. But now the 
situation is different.
T1P: Let me tell you the way to stop bleeding. First, you need to pierce 
a belt and take a tiny piece of cloth from it to burn. And if you put that 
melt cloth on the wound, then you stop the bleeding.
T2P: My brother always had a headache. To prevent his headache, my 
father used to cut the head of the witch-grass and put it into the nose 
of my brother. After that, he used to tap my brother’s nose with his fist 
to make it bleed and then his headache would subside.
T4P: When I was little I had black spots like acne under my knees. We 
used dried tobacco leaves to heal them. Our neighbour used to have 
dry tobacco leaves on his ceiling. Then we used to put oil on those 
dried leaves. Those leaves were used to put on the spots under my 
knees. I writhed for at least a month. I still have the scars.
T5P: I could not go to the hospital. How can you go to a hospital if 
there is no such place? A woman melted the fat of fried meat and add-
ed ash to it. Then she put it on my chest. I was relieved. My fever was 
brought down.
Ç4P: Measles, mumps and malaria were the diseases we had often. 
For treatment, I used to take a rest, no treatment at all. We had no 
chance of treatment. Men of religion used to scratch our cheek. If we 
had measles and malaria, we just had to stay in bed without treat-
ment. No treatment, no doctor.
When respondents from the older generation were asked, “What 
would you do if the same diseases were to happen in your life?,” all 
of them - without exception - said that they would take advantage 
of modern medical facilities:
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T4P: If my children would have black spots under their knees like I had 
when I was a child, I would take them to the hospital instead of using 
dried tobacco leaves.
T7P: Right now, a person from my family has facial paralysis but he 
goes to a hospital in Istanbul. Of course, we take him to the doctor.
Ç2C: No, no one is coming anymore to be spitted on. As far as I know, 
this tradition has almost disappeared.
Ç7C: If my child would have jaundice right now, I would not take him/
her to a shrine anymore.
A5C: If my daughter injures her leg, she would be taken to an ortho-
paedic hospital immediately. Surely, an expert has to deal with it. She 
has to have an MRI scan or X-Ray as part of her treatment. It is not 
possible or wise to use the old methods anymore.
A2C: If I get sick now, of course I would benefit from social welfare. 
I can go to the hospital to be treated in the modern facilities there.
A4C: If my daughter would have mumps now, absolutely I would take 
her immediately to a hospital.
I think reading the answers by A6P and his/her child A6C to-
gether might give an overall impression of the generation gap on 
the subject of modernization of health care:
A6P: For instance, when my baby was born, s/he was crying all the 
time. My mom said that “you have never taken this child to the men 
of religion, or asked them to write verses. This is the reason behind all 
this crying.” After that, we visited a man of religion for an amulet and 
my baby became better. That was common at the time. We used to go 
for such things.
A6C: I think visiting men of religion for diseases is inconceivable. And 
I have never ever visited a man of religion for any reason nor had any-
one from my family, and I will never go.
Like previous transformations, this transformation experienced 
by the Alevi communities is in line with the transformation that 
Turkey as a whole has experienced. For example, while measles, 
whooping cough and malaria had been mentioned by the older gen-
eration respondents with great sadness due to the ensuing deaths, 
the new generation either does not know what they are or have al-
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ready been treated in modern medical facilities. The following table 
clearly illustrates the similar developments that Alevi communities 
and Turkey as a whole have both undergone.
Table B9. The Figure of Case and Deaths Related to Polio, Pertussis 
and Diphtheria, 1970-2003, Turkey
Population
Number of Cases Number of Deaths
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1970 35,321,000 701 7268 1110 39 21 63
1980 44,438,000 182 1520 86 7 9 8
1990 57,582,000 24 454 20 2 2 0
1999 65,819,000 0 528 4 0 1 1
2003 71,772,711 0 255 1 0 1 0
Source: Altun, 2008
In parallel to Table B9, Ç3P said that diseases like measles, ma-
laria or mumps are no longer seen in his/her social environment:
Ç3P: I do not encounter those diseases any more. They have disap-
peared. Major transformations have taken place.
It seems that what Alevi communities have experienced with 
regard to modern medicines is not independent from the rest of 
Turkey. What pregnant A7C said about modern medicine seems to 
explain quite well the transformation among Alevis as well as the 
rest of the country:
A7C: At present, due to the vaccination technology, diseases can be 
treated even in the womb. For example, now we have the technology 
that whether or not a foetus has any genetic diseases, it can be di-
agnosed. So if s/he has diabetes and if it is necessary, they can now 
inject insulin to a foetus in the effort to save it.
Those mentioned above quite clearly revealed the gap between 
the two generations. However, this gap does not mean that the new 
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generation has nothing to do with supranatural beliefs or they never 
ask men of religion for help. Even though it is a lot less, the new 
generation does visit holy places or goes to figures of religion as the 
last resort for incurable diseases like cancer, stroke, or warts. Firstly, 
they try to find solutions within the framework of modern medical 
facilities. If modern medicine is not sufficient to treat the disease, 
then they start to search for religious methods under the motto of 
“I have nothing to lose”.
It should be noted that with regard to usage of modern medi-
cine there seems to be no difference between generations as of the 
year 2015. On the basis of interviews, it might be said that welfare 
state facilities, the expansion of accessibility to medical institutions, 
and decrease in the cost of modern medical facilities have rendered 
alternative methods of treatment (secular or non-secular) and su-
pranatural powers less popular in terms of treatment of diseases for 
both generations.
Social Environment
From the interviews, it was reported that the new generation was 
more engaged in dialogue with non-Alevis. It seems that going to 
university and having a job in city centres are the key reasons for 
experiencing more diverse social environments than their parents. 
While 70 % of the new generation has a university diploma, this 
figure decreases to 6,6 % for the older generation. In addition, most 
of the older generation respondents had spent their time in villages 
or towns before marriage. Therefore, unlike the older generation, 
the new generation had become more open to having a non-Alevi 
friend, spouse or business partner. The answers that the generations 
had given to the question of “How was your social environment just 
before marriage?” are presented below, one after the other:
T6P: Before marriage, I only lived with Alevis. My village was full of 
only Alevis.
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T6C: When I went to Bolu for my university studies, my classmates’ 
backgrounds were all different.
T7P: There were only Alevis in my village.
T7C: Before I got married, there were Sunni people all around me in 
İstanbul during my university studies. I have lots of Sunni friends. I 
accept people as they are, without any bias. Therefore, their faith is 
not my business. There is no such thing as Alevis being genetically 
good people. There are very bad people among Alevis just as they are 
among Sunnis. Therefore, I do not discriminate. For example, my boy-
friend in İstanbul was a non-Alevi.
T10P: Our villages were filled with only Alevis.
T10C: Of course, I encountered non-Alevi people all the time because 
of my education and work.
Ç1P: There were no Sunnis in our village. Everyone was Alevi.
Ç1C: For example, our friends in high school were Sunnis. And we got 
along with them quite well.
Ç5P: We moved to the city centres. Then we started going to high 
schools where our classmates were Sunnis. While fulfilling our compul-
sory military service, our mates were also Sunnis. In our workplaces, 
we worked with Sunnis.
Ç5C: In high school, I enrolled in a tourism high school which was 
located in an area where mostly Sunni people live. In our class, there 
were only three or fourAlevi students while the rest of them, 20-25 
students, were Sunnis. But we had no trouble or discrimination. The 
experience at university was similar.
Ç6C: When I was a student in Konya, I had many non-Alevi friends. 
There were only two Alevis out of 42 students. When we became uni-
versity students, we encountered people from different backgrounds. 
I lived in a dormitory where I had no Alevi friends at all as most of the 
people were Sunnis. Our relationship was very good.
Ç7C: We had more Sunni friends at university.
A1P: By the time I got married, we only had Alevis, as everybody was 
Alevi.
A1C: By the time of my marriage, I had worked for the Finansbank 
Call Centre, Elçin Catering, and Garanti Pension Directorate General. I 
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mean, there were people from all backgrounds around you; I met lots 
of non-Alevi people.
A2P: Because we were living in a very homogeneous environment, all 
our colleagues were Alevis. The only place where we used to encounter 
non-Alevis was Çiftehan [Çiftehan is a spa area 100 km from Adana.]. 
Since they were staying in rooms next to us, we came across them of-
ten. Apart from them, there were no non-Alevis in our neighbourhood.
A2C: By the time of my marriage, my social life was mainly to do with 
non-Alevis. I generally encountered non-Alevis in workplaces or at uni-
versity.
A6P: There were only Alevis around us. Actually, we were not allowed 
to make friendship with Sunnis. So, marriage was also forbidden. But 
at present, even I myself do not prevent my grandson from making 
friendship with non-Alevis; no need for that kind of thing anymore.
A6C: Before marriage, I had been living in a heterogeneous social en-
vironment. I used to encounter Sunnis in high school since it was not 
possible to see them in other places. My district area was made up of 
just Alevis. But the school environment and school friends were mixed. 
There were Kurds, Sunnis, Lazs; you could find everybody at school.
A7P: There were no Sunnis at all around us. Everybody was Alevi.
A7C: Before marriage, our social environment was made of different 
groups. I was working and studying at the time.
A8P: Alevis were the main group in my environment.
A8C: 80% or 90% of the people around me were Sunnis because my 
university was in Ankara.
To finish this discussion, it is necessary to give a striking example 
of how people from a Sunni village had assumed that Alevis were 
abnormal. Ç9P said that villagers in his first work place, a small 
Sunni village in the district of Tirebolu/Giresun, had believed that 
Alevis were physiologically inhuman creatures. That was the reason 
why those villagers had not believed that Ç9P is an Alevi:
Ç9P: In 1977, I was working in a Sunni village. They did not believe 
that I am an Alevi. They did not expect to see an Alevi who physically 
resembles them. For them, an Alevi should have had a tail and horn. 
Let me tell you an interesting story. A young guy was expected to come 
to the village but he had been late. When he arrived, others asked him 
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for the reason why he had been so late. He said this: “We were running 
out of oil when we were passing Çorum. We had to wait in queue for a 
tanker truck. But when it arrived, an Alevi used force to take our place. 
He used his tail and horn to beat us. He held us with his tail, and threw 
us out with his horn.”
Independent Home Life and City Visits
In the field research, it was noted that the younger generation Alevis 
from the three regions had been more inclined to live away from 
their family before marriage, and the number of cities they had vis-
ited was much larger than the number of cities visited by their par-
ents. Having a chance to get a higher education away from home 
and increase in the age of marriage were noted as the key reasons 
paving the way for parents-free home life before marriage. On the 
other hand, a majority of the older generation respondents had only 
left their parents to live elsewhere after marriage.
Table B10. The number of people who lived apart from family be-
fore marriage (Out of 10)
Older Generation New Generation
Tunceli 1 5
Adana - 6
Çorum 5 10
Besides, answers given to the question of “Which cities did you 
visit before marriage?” are also important for indicating the strik-
ing difference between the generations. For example, while T4P 
had seen just one city (Elazığ) before marriage, his/her child T4C 
named seven cities (Trabzon, Kars, Aydın, Bingöl, Muğla, Ankara, 
İstanbul). Similarly, while Ç1P had not been to another city before 
marriage, his/her child Ç1C had been to İzmir, İstanbul, Kars, An-
kara, Samsun, and Kastamonu due to his/her higher education. It 
may be clearly stated that these figures reflect the general pattern:
Ç3P: Two cities
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Ç3C: Eleven cities (at least)
Ç7P: None
Ç7C: Seven cities (at least)
A1P: None
A1C: Ten cities (at least)
A2P: One city
A2C: Five cities (at least)
A5P: One city
A5C: Five cities (at least)
As a last remark, this subsection might be summarized by say-
ing that the new generation respondents, in comparison to their 
parents, had found more opportunities to live independently before 
marriage and to visit other cities on account of the expansion of 
higher education and development in the infrastructure regarding 
transportation, i.e. modernization.
The Average Age of First Marriage
When it comes to the respondents of this study, it was reported 
that the average age of first marriage among the new generation is 
higher than that among the older generation.
Table B11. Average Age of First Marriage
Older Generation New Generation
Tunceli 19 23,4
Adana 20 28,4
Çorum 19,2 (out of 5) 23,6 (out of 5)
In light of the interviews, it can be said that the most crucial 
reason behind these figures is higher education (70 % of the new 
generation had a university degree). After enrolling at university, 
VOLKAN ERTİT
250
young people, regardless of gender, want to get a diploma and then 
find a job before marriage.
Again, this transformation with regard to the age of marriage 
seems to be consistent with the reality in the rest of Turkey.
Table B12. Average Age on First Marriage in Turkey
Year Woman Man
1940s 19 23
2014 23,7 26,9
Source: Koç et al., 2009, TSI, 2014 March 26
Types of Marriage
Interviews reveal that most of the older generation respondents had 
to marry the persons that had been chosen by their parents. Oth-
erwise, they had been forced to run away with the person they love 
when there was no consent from their parents. It had been very 
common to marry a person they had never seen or loved. 83,3 % of 
the new generation had an autonomous marriage while this figure 
drops to 13,3 % for the older generation. In parallel, while the num-
ber of the older generation’s consanguineous marriages is 5 out of 
30, this figure drops to 1 for the new generation.
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Table B13. Types of Marriage42
Tunceli Çorum Adana
Older
Gen.
New
Gen.
Older
Gen.
New
Gen.
Older
Gen.
New
Gen.
Forced Marriage42 2 - 1 - - -
Arranged Marriage 4 3 9 1 8 1
Autonomous Marriage 2 7 - 9 2 9
Marriage without Family 
Consent43 2 - - - - -
To put Table B13 43more explicitly, respondents’ very own ex-
pressions might be helpful. As it is obvious from the older genera-
tion respondents’ statements, there was no right for them to choose 
the person to marry, and many of them had been married to a per-
son without seeing his/her face beforehand, even once:
T5P: No, no, of course not. We were living in a very conservative time. 
Girls and boys could not see each other. It was strictly forbidden to talk 
to a boy even on the street. I had never seen even my fiancé. We never 
talked. I think I saw him from a distance once when they came to our 
house to ask my parents’ permission for him to marry me. After one 
month of being engaged, we got married.
Ç2P: In the past, we had fear of our mother-father. Those times were 
different to today’s. I swear to God I married my wife without seeing 
her face even once. My mother went and chose her for me. That’s it. 
[However, Ç2C, who is the child of Ç2P, had lived in the same house 
with his/her partner before marriage.]
A5P: Neither I nor he was introduced to each other. We were engaged 
for a year but even our hands never touched. His big brother decided 
instead of him.
42 Forced marriage is a marriage where duress is used as a sanction by parents 
upon the person who does not give his/her consent for marriage. According 
to Phillips and Dustin (2004), parents plays a leading role in the selection of 
mates, and the potential spouse has no right to say no even though s/he may 
not want it.
43 Marriage without family consent is a marriage in which potential spouses get 
married in spite of their families’ wishes and preference.
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A4P: My mother told me that my aunt’s son wants to marry me. I swear 
to God I did not know. I told my mother, “Whatever you say.”
Ç4P: She was my uncle’s daughter, i.e. granddaughter of my father’s 
uncle. We grew up in the same houses and environments. We had nev-
er talked about this subject. But my grandfather had already decided 
to marry us. And if he said so, it meant that we did not have any other 
option. When I went to the Netherlands to work, my family had me 
engaged. I did not know that I had been engaged to anyone.
While forced marriages and marriages without family consent 
are not normally encountered among the new generation, those two 
types were added to the table due to certain expressions from some 
older generation respondents. It should be noted that while the 
number of forced marriages is not remarkable in Table B13, this is 
because in the time of the older generations, whatever the parents or 
elders of the large family decided, it was de facto accepted:
T10P: I did not want him, so I was crying. My cousin kept saying, “he 
is a good boy, don’t worry”. But we had never seen each other before. 
If he entered the room, I would leave. There was no talking between 
us. We married without seeing each other. [Unlike T10P, T10C had 
opportunities of being alone with her fiancé, of going to cinemas 
and cafés with her fiancé, of holding hands with him, and had not 
been pressured by her parents.]
To sum up, it might be said that Alevi communities have gone 
through a general process of modernizing societies in terms of types 
of marriages. That is to say, Alevis have been experiencing a trans-
formation in consciousness from the traditional approach to mar-
riage on the one hand (in which the person to marry is chosen by 
family elders and that individuals have almost no right to choose or 
even to express their opinion) to the more modern approach to mar-
riage on the other (in which people are relatively freer with regard to 
mate selection). In light of the interviews, it would not be wrong to 
claim that there has been an increase in the tendency among young 
Alevis toward a more individualistic lifestyle.
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GENERATION GAP WITH REGARD TO MARITAL ISSUES
Premarital Dating
In this study, dating is defined as a meeting between two persons 
beyond the level of friendship, with the aim of finding a proper mate 
or just for sexual reasons. Dating before marriage and all kinds of 
flirting between individuals out of marriage are considered some of 
the biggest sins in the traditional Alevi faith (Bayatlı, 1957).
On the basis of the interviews, it might be said that the frequen-
cy and intensity of datings had undergone a drastic change in three 
Alevi regions.
Table B14. Premarital Datings
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None 10 2 10 - 10 2
During 
Education - 7 - 10 - 7
At Work - 1 - - - 1
The reason why respondents of the older generation kept dating 
or that kind of relations at a distance is not because they themselves 
had been against premarital datings or because they had not ever 
desired to be in that kind of relations, but rather because it had been 
forbidden by their Alevi communities in rural areas. Some answers 
given to the question of “Had you ever dated before marriage?” by 
the respondents of the older generation are as follows:
A3P: No, we couldn’t. We were so afraid. We didn’t want to dishonour 
our family.
A5P: Never. No one had ever dated before marriage in those times.
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A6P: We couldn’t have boyfriends because we were brought up like 
that. We were taught in that way. It was not possible. Neither I nor 
my friends could have dated. At the present time, yes it has become 
normal. My grandchildren have dates so do our neighbours’ grandchil-
dren.
A7P: No, I hadn’t. Those kinds of things were forbidden in those days. 
Our mothers were continually warning us (girls). We were constantly 
warned not to dishonour our families.
C3P: No, I had not. Those things had not been the case for children 
of our age. If a guy had fallen in love with someone, then they had 
to marry.
C7P: No, I had not. “Shame” and “sin” were the two words that 
shaped our lives.
C8P: It was forbidden of course. It was not possible to go out with a 
guy. We had always made friends with girls. We hadn’t flirted.
T9P: No, because in those days that kind of things could not happen. 
We were living in an environment in which everybody knew each oth-
er. Children had known the old people, and old people, likewise, had 
known the new generation. Even if a girl had been engaged to some-
one, she could not see her fiancé’s face. We were living with all our old 
people, grandfathers and fathers. These old people used to decide on 
our behalf. They used to communicate among themselves. So, it had 
been very difficult to see each other as engaged people. You could not 
sit next to your fiancé, or talk to her/him, especially next to an old 
person.
Ç3C: There was only one café called Divan. Having had three floors, 
we, as high school students, used to go there. Our dating style was 
different to what you think. You could not go to a café with your date 
alone; you had to be with your friends to camouflage your date. It was 
a bit bizarre but there was no other option. Our girlfriends could not 
attempt other types. The population of Çorum in 1983-84 was about 
100,000. Everybody knew each other. So there was no chance for an-
other kind of flirting.
While 63-year-old T5C belongs to the new generation in this 
study, because of her/his age he had also experienced those times in 
which premarital datings had been strictly forbidden (T5C’s parent, 
T5P, is 82 years old) due to the lack of urbanization:
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T5C: You could only watch, that was flirting. No movie houses, no 
cafés. Those things did not happen then. People were living all togeth-
er. The population was a lot less than today’s. Everybody was aware of 
what others were doing. Those kinds of flirts were seen as sinful.
In the Table B14., it seems that nobody had dated before mar-
riage among the older generation respondents. Actually some older 
generation respondents did answer the question of “Had you ever 
dated before marriage?” in the affirmative. However, with the help 
of further in-depth questions, soon after it became clear that the 
words dating or flirting they referred to were completely different 
from their meaning in this study. Secretly exchanging letters or hav-
ing a platonic love is considered dating/flirting among some of the 
older generation respondents:
Ç6P: Of course, every young person had had that kind of flirting.
V: So how had you established contact?
Ç6P: You just put a letter in a matchbox and you threw it. Girls used to 
do the same thing. Otherwise, it was not possible…
T10P: Very secretly. We were using letters in those days. There was no 
chance to meet face-to-face. A go-between sometimes helped.
V: Going out?
T10P: No, no, absolutely not. They were so conservative; girls-boys 
could not see one another. Talking to a boy on the street was strictly 
forbidden.
V: Had your friends been in those kinds of relationships?
T7P: Of course, they had been. Every young girl and boy used to have 
that kind of friendship.44
V: How had they met or seen each other?
T7P: By means of letters. Believe me, my spouse used to send letters 
to me before marriage. 
44 In Turkey, it is common for conservative people to use the word friendship in 
reference to dating.
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V: Why hadn’t you met at cafés?
T7P: Forbidden. Our parents had never permitted us to meet.
V: Had people at your age the chance to date before marriage?
A8P: Yes, of course they had.
V: What were the ways to meet?
A8P: For example, they used to send letters, or send message via 
go-between people.
It was noted that respondents’ social environments as well as 
their living places (urban or rural) and their educational levels had 
played a decisive role in the tendency towards premarital datings. In 
addition, having lived in the same house with a date before marriage 
was mentioned by some respondents who studied outside of their 
hometown or had business far away from family which is the result 
of urbanization and industrialism:
A2C: I and my date had been living together in Istanbul before mar-
riage. We had dated for six years. Our families knew that we were living 
together.
Ç2C: I was living independently from my family throughout my uni-
versity years and my girlfriend used to visit me all the time. We lived 
together in the last year of my study in Erzurum.
A1C: I used to visit my boyfriend frequently when I was living in Istan-
bul. He also came to my house. We spent nights together.
Here are some answers given by respondents to the questions of 
“What would be the reasons behind this transformation?”, “How 
would it become possible for the young generation to live with their 
dates in the same house while their parents had not even seen the 
face of their fiancées?”. Urbanization, educational opportunities, 
population growth, and development in technology were the ones 
mentioned with a capital letter:
Ç3C: Young people of this age are very free. They can walk hand in 
hand; they kiss each other at the parks. There are cafés all around 
us. They go to the gym together. Most of them are university students 
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who came to Çorum from other cities. But I have to say that Çorumian 
young people are also flirting.
T6C: We, I and my girlfriend, were using cell phones to communicate. 
Therefore, it was so easy to establish contact. We had never used let-
ters or other means. We often talked on the internet via MSN.
A5P: I got married when I was sixteen years old. At that time, there 
was no television, dailies. I am a primary school graduate. No inter-
net. No laptop. We did not know anything. We just learned how to read 
basic sentences.
Ç2C: Thinking about earlier times, there were only two main streets in 
Çorum. And if you would have tried to walk with your girlfriend side by 
side, 30 percent of the people on the street would already have known 
you, and all of them would have thought that there was something 
between you and your girlfriend even if the distance would be more 
than one meter. But, the city is much more crowded today. Population 
density is much higher now, particularly during summer time. There-
fore, it is easier to have a date today. Due to the new and modern 
environment, they would not be spotted easily.
To draw a clearer picture of the generation gap in terms of pre-
marital dating, answers from both generation to the question of 
“Had you ever dated before marriage?” are listed one after the other. 
As can be seen, when it comes to premarital dating the new genera-
tion seems to have experienced a very distinctive way of going about 
it in comparison to their parents:
T7P: No, I had not. It was forbidden. Our parents had never allowed us 
to have that kind of things.
T7C: Before marriage, I had had a date; I had met my date in high 
school. We had been going to cafés often. Sometimes movie houses… 
We also met privately.
A5P: Never. No one could have had a date.
A5C: Yes, I had. I had met her at preparatory school when I was seven-
teen or eighteen years old. We had held hands, spent time privately, 
kissed and hugged each other. I had had other dates also at university.
Ç2P: How was that possible! Not at all. In the past, we had fear of 
our parents. Those times were different to today’s. I swear to God I 
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married my wife without seeing her face even once. My mother went 
and chose her for me. That’s it. And you are asking me whether I had a 
chance to date someone in that time!
Ç2C: I had had a date in high school. There were several places to 
meet. We used to go to the movie houses so as not to be spotted. Or we 
used to sit in dark corners of the cafés. We spent time privately but of 
course she used to refrain from this situation. There were convenient 
places around school, we used to meet there, and sometimes we used 
to go to pinetums. The films had no importance at all in movie houses. 
It was dark and no one could see us. I was living independently from 
my family throughout my university years and my girlfriend used to 
visit me all the time. We lived together in the last year of my study in 
Erzurum.
A1P: My father was a very conservative person. We were not allowed to 
see even the sons of our uncle, i.e. our male cousins. He did not permit 
us to talk to anyone. After he went to work, we had to stay at home. 
There was no possibility to make a conversation with any person. Even 
a male fly could not enter our house. It was forbidden.
A1C: Right after graduation from high school, I started to date. I met 
my first date in a circle of friends. He asked my phone number, and 
it continued for nine months. Just before marriage, I had already a 
boyfriend for four years. I had met him on Facebook. I used to visit my 
boyfriend frequently when I was living in Istanbul. He also came to my 
house. We spent nights together. It wasn’t a problem at all.
A2P: Before marriage, I had never had a boyfriend.
A2C: I met my boyfriends through a friend, at university, and on the 
internet. Some of my boyfriends were introduced to my family. But 
not all of them. My family did not know my short-term dates, only the 
long-term ones.
A7P: No, that was forbidden. Girls were all the time warned by their 
mothers not to dishonour their families. That’s it. I married without 
having had any dates beforehand.
A7C: Before marriage I had had a few dates at university.
Regarding this issue, the question of “If your children or grand-
children had / have dated before marriage, what was / would be your 
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reaction?” is posed to the respondents. The answers run parallel to 
those expressed above. Since the new generation had already pre-
marital dates before marriage, they also did not object to their chil-
dren’s premarital datings. Some of the older generation respondents 
said that they had already started to consider datings/flirts as part 
of the reality of life and that they had stopped trying to lean against 
the wind. It seems that the answers given to the questions summa-
rize well enough the transformation in terms of consciousness:
T4P: I call it “age”, and would say nothing more than that.
T4C: Of course I want them to have flirts.
T7P: Now, there is too much freedom. No one wonders what elder peo-
ple think about their dates anymore. They are going out and meeting. 
The ratio of flirts has increased.
T7C: I think they should have some experience. It is good that I had 
had many flirts before my marriage and I had experienced many things 
before marriage. If there is no vital problem in my marriage now, I 
think it’s related to those experiences. Your decisions and choices be-
come much more solid. Therefore, I want my son to grow up immedi-
ately and to fall in love with a girl and to tell me, “I love a girl”.
T8C: I approach this affirmatively. If I restrict her/him, if I cross him/
her, if I say “you will not do this and this”, then s/he will hide every-
thing from me and start to tell lies. Therefore, I do not think that I will 
restrict my child on this subject.
T5P: For me it is normal. This is the new age. I go along with this.
T9C: There is no problem with my child flirting.
T10C: My daughter has already started to date.
Ç7C: I am not against it. I think it should be allowed.
A2C: Since I myself have done flirting several times, there is no prob-
lem for me. Of course they should be open to flirting.
A3C: Let’s talk about twenty years from now. My daughter will intro-
duce her boyfriend by saying, “he is my boyfriend.” And my son will 
introduce her girlfriend by saying, “she is the girl I will marry”. We 
cannot prevent this anymore because it is not an easy job to follow all 
their daily activities.
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A6P: No I do not oppose this. Having a flirt before marriage is better. 
They should know each other, and they should be allowed to meet.
A6C: It is surely normal to flirt. He has to have a flirt so as to know 
women. He has to flirt to find the best option.
A9P: I want them to date before marriage.
A9C: I should be sympathetic towards those relations because I have 
experienced them before. My spouse agrees with me.
Without any exception, all respondents from the two generations 
agree that the new generation is much more open to premarital re-
lations while the older generation has already considered premarital 
datings a rite of passage. I think this might be considered a drastic 
change in the mindset of Alevis. Besides, it is highly likely that the 
new generation will not consider premarital datings something to 
escape from or a sin or shame since they are already born into it in 
urban areas. In this case, it would not be wrong to say that there is 
no sign of this secular trend being reversed towards a religious one.
The Faith of (Potential) Partner
A strict endogamy is considered an obligation among traditional 
Alevi communities (Çem, 2010; Yaman, 2012). Getting married 
to a non-Alevi would result in crisis, i.e. it might even lead to the 
excommunication of that “traitor” if not capital punishment, as it 
happened countless of times in Anatolia (Bayatlı, 1957). But there 
are only just a few studies that investigate the problems of interfaith 
marriage (Çatlı, 2008; Balkanlıoğlu, 2012).
Zeidan (1999: 76) neatly explains how getting married to a non-
Alevi is a great crime in Alevism:
Alevis were forbidden to proselytise, and Alevism regenerated itself 
internally by paternal descent. To prevent penetration by hostile 
outsiders, the Alevis insisted on strict endogamy, which eventual-
ly made them into a quasi-ethnic group. Excommunication was the 
ultimate punishment threatening those who married outsiders, co-
operated with outsiders economically, or ate with outsiders. It was 
also forbidden to use the state (Sunni) courts.
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There is no quantitative data on Alevi/non-Alevi marriages, 
for the name of the sect is not asked for by registry offices. There-
fore, giving nationwide data on interfaith marriages is not possible. 
However, in light of the interviews and several academic works (Er-
demir, 2004; Çatlı, 2008; Balkanlıoğlu, 2012) it can be stated that 
the tendency among young Alevis to get married to a non-Alevi is 
higher than their parents.
Table B15. The Number of People Married to a Non-Alevi           
(Out of 10)
Older Generation New Generation
Tunceli - 1
Çorum - 2
Adana - 1
Respondents from both generations clearly stressed that there 
had been a steady increase in the number of interfaith marriages 
and at the present time a non-Alevi bride or groom might be found 
in almost every extended family.
Tunceli Region: 
T10P: If my husband was not an Alevi, my father would not have al-
lowed us to get married. My brother’s daughter ran away with a Sunni 
guy from a Sunni village next to our village. No one has ever seen that 
girl since then. Maybe she has grandchildren now.
What was said by the child of T10P on this issue is quite re-
markable in terms of highlighting the generation gap:
T10C: There have been mixed marriages in our family. No groom but 
brides. No one opposed those mixed marriages. I said there was no 
groom but actually back in the days my sister was engaged to a Sunni 
guy. Then they broke up. They were working together then in the same 
hospital as doctors.
T10C thinks that the key reason behind interfaith marriages is 
socialization among people from different backgrounds in the work 
place in urban areas, i.e. urbanization and capitalism. The impres-
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sions and observations of T1P and his/her child T1C show similar-
ities to those of T10C:
T1P: I can say that the number of mixed marriages is much higher at 
present. There has been an increase. Why? Because people have mi-
grated to İstanbul and Ankara. They met new people there; each side 
has embraced the other.
T1C: An educated person might be appointed to Tunceli, then s/he 
might meet a person from Tunceli. Sometimes these relations may end 
up in a mixed marriage. Because of my job45, I have observed an in-
crease in the number of mixed marriages.
Having been married to a non-Alevi and having two non-Alevi 
daughters-in-law, T5C seems to support what was described by 
T1P:
T5C: I did not pay attention to the denomination to which my daugh-
ters-in-law belong. My children are married to Sunnis. One is living in 
İstanbul and the other in İzmir.
Despite the desire of their parents, it was noted that there had 
been an increase in the number of new generation respondents who 
are religiously unmusical with regard to marriage. The answers of 
T7P and T7C might be given as examples:
T7P: My spouse is an Alevi, otherwise my family would not have per-
mitted it. For them, there was no other option except marrying an 
Alevi. The faith of my bride or groom is also important to me. I pre-
fer an Alevi one. If my child would have chosen a non-Alevi, I would 
have talked to or explained to her since I am not eager to see violence. 
Whether she would listen to my words, that depends on her. If she 
would not care at all, I wish that my God would help her realise her 
desire. I cannot prevent it.
T7C: My spouse is an Alevi but it did not play any role in our marriage. 
It was a coincidence. The denomination of my child’s flirt or spouse is 
not significant. It is his/her own choice.
45  He is owner of a white goods and furniture shop.
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Çorum Region:
Although this study does not make a comparison between regions, 
it should be said that the transformation in generations shares sim-
ilarities across all three regions. Compared to the previous genera-
tion, the new generation respondents give also a more favourable 
opinion on interfaith marriage in the Çorum region:
Ç1C: I was the first person to have gotten married to a non-Alevi in our 
family. After me, my cousins followed me and they also got married 
to non-Alevis. I and my spouse met at university. Before marriage, we 
had dated for approximately 5 years in İstanbul.
However, Ç1P, the parent of Ç1C, said that it had not been pos-
sible for him/her to marry a non-Alevi:
Ç1P: If my spouse was not an Alevi, then my parents would not have 
allowed me to marry him/her. Actually, I would not have married ei-
ther. But today, three grandchildren of my brother-in-law have gotten 
married to non-Alevis.
The expansion of higher education with urbanization process 
was steadily emphasized as the key reason behind the increase in 
the number of interfaith marriages in Çorum:
Ç5C: The number of mixed marriages and mixed flirts/datings is much 
higher today. For example, my spiritual brother’s date is a Sunni. And 
there are many people around me who are married to Sunnis. High 
schools and universities are the places where they meet.
Ç6P: The number of Alevi-Sunni marriages is higher today. The young 
generation go to universities and meet Sunni people there.
Ç6C had not married a non-Alevi but dated a non-Alevi be-
fore marriage. Besides, s/he had witnessed a gradual increase in in-
terfaith marriages in his/her family and social environment. Ç6C 
mentioned several friends getting married to non-Alevis despite 
protests from their families:
Ç6C: I think there has been an increase in the number of mixed mar-
riages. One of my friends met a non-Alevi in Samsun at the very begin-
ning of his/her career. They dated for two years. His/her family was 
strictly against their relationship and warned them by saying, “this 
marriage will never happen.” But now, they are married. Another 
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friend of mine met a non-Alevi at university and they got married. I 
think families have started to say this: “There is a friendship between 
me and my child. At the end, s/he is a mature person. S/he can make 
her/his own decisions.” And then they let them be. I have many rela-
tives who have been married to non-Alevis.
Ç7C explains the transformation towards a secular way of life 
that s/he had undergone as follows:
Ç7C: I had some flirts before marriage. They were all Alevis. I had never 
thought of flirting with a Sunni. But that was my old way of thinking, 
I am not thinking in that way anymore. Before anything else, I am 
trying to see whether s/he is a good person or not. We were influenced 
by our families in the olden days. There has been a drastic increase in 
the number of mixed marriages today. For example, if it comes to my 
family, I can say that mixed marriages were a matter of life or death in 
the past. Everybody was thinking that it was a disaster or black cloud 
over our family. But this perspective and understanding has recently 
changed. There are now non-Alevi grooms and brides in our family.
Ç7P confirmed what his/her child Ç7C had said, and then con-
sidered the expansion of higher education the main reason for this 
drastic change:
Ç7P: Mixed marriages are happening now. There are mixed marriag-
es in my family. My sibling’s bride is a non-Alevi. That kind of mar-
riage did not happen in the past. My uncle’s grandchildren have also 
married non-Alevis. Why is this the case? I think the new culture has 
changed our young generation. They moved out of Çorum, got educat-
ed. Maybe, in comparison to the new generation, having lived in a very 
isolated environment had made me more intolerant on this subject.
Adana Region:
Alevis in the Adana region seem to have undergone a transforma-
tion similar to that in Tunceli and Çorum. The expressions of A4P 
and child A4C deserve attention as they reflect the differences be-
tween generations:
A4P: My spouse is an Alevi. He is the son of my aunt. We could not have 
married if he wasn’t an Alevi. But this understanding has changed; it’s 
not like before anymore. It is even a kind of trend right now. There is 
no discrimination among us anymore.
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While confirming what his/her parent A4P said, A4C admitted 
that his/her daughter had already been dating a non Alevi and they 
had even gone on a holiday alone:
A4C: If my spouse was not an Alevi, we would still have gotten mar-
ried. If my daughter would like to marry a non-Alevi, his faith is not 
important to me. The crucial thing is his ethos and worldview. I care 
more for these kinds of things, not faith.
Just as in A4P and A4C, there is also a similar gap between A5P 
and A5C. Having had no chance or opportunity to marry a non-
Alevi due to the social structure, A5P said that his/her own child 
(this child does not refer to A5C, but another one) had married a 
non-Alevi. In addition, A5P said that the only way to get married 
to a non-Alevi in the olden days was to run away with that non-
Alevi person. And if a family had had a non-Alevi bride or groom, 
it was considered that their religious ceremonies or worship would 
not be accepted by God anymore. However, as most of the new gen-
eration respondents had said, A5C also highlighted that the faith 
or denomination of his/her spouse had not played a role in his/her 
decision to get married. What is more, A5C said that the sect of his 
18-year-old daughter’s boyfriend had not been a matter of discus-
sion at all:
A5P: If my spouse had not been an Alevi, my father would not have 
given me away in marriage, not for anything in this world, because he 
was too conservative. He used to read the Qur’ān. Throughout Rama-
dan, he used to read the Qur’ān from beginning to end three times. 
He used to fast when he was 75 years old and never gave up even 
if July was the Ramadan month. However, I have a non-Alevi bride 
now. At present, no one cares; everyone gets married to whoever s/
he wants. That’s better. In the past, with the exception of people run-
ning away, getting married to a non-Alevi was not possible. Unlike the 
past, parents now give their children away in marriage to non-Alevis 
with pleasure. Why? Because children love each other and if parents 
do not permit their marriage, then they are highly likely to run away. 
If your child runs away, this is disgraceful for parents. Therefore they 
do whatever their children want. What is more, every young person is 
now likely to enrol at university. They find each other at universities. 
In olden times, there were no universities. Besides, if anyone would 
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have decided to marry a non-Alevi, they were told that their Islam-
ic ceremonies would not be accepted by God. Non-Alevis were strictly 
forbidden to know our ceremonies. Until recently, non-Alevi brides or 
grooms were being sent to their parents during the secret religious 
ceremonies of Alevis. But now, even non-Alevi spouses are taking part 
in religious ceremonies. The daughter-in-law of my uncle distributed 
bread in their ceremony. These kinds of social behaviours were con-
sidered big sins in the past. But now, non-Alevi grooms and brides are 
both involved in our secret ceremonies.
A5C: If my daughter chooses a non-Alevi to marry, I have to respect 
her. If she is happy with him, that is the crucial thing for me. I do not 
care whether she is with a non-Alevi or not.
A6P and A6C seem to have undergone similar life experiences. 
Although it was not possible to marry a non-Alevi for A6P, her 
child (this child does not refer to A6C, but another one) had gotten 
married to a non-Alevi. A6P thinks that the new generation is more 
inclined to find a non-Alevi mate and she blames herself for having 
been narrow-minded on the subject:
A6P: If my spouse had not been an Alevi, my parents would not have 
given me away in marriage. No, no, they would not have. Surely, not. 
It was difficult. Giving an Alevi girl to a Sunni person, or accepting 
a Sunni girl as a bride was not possible in the olden days. But now, 
these have become a fact. I know it from my own experience. I have a 
Sunni bride. There has never been any discrimination. There has also 
been an increase in the number of Alevi-Sunni marriages. They are all 
around us. No one cares about these kinds of things anymore. Mixed 
marriages used to create lots of troubles in the past. I think we have 
become more open-minded. Time has extended our horizon. Older 
generations, our mother and fathers, were too radical. We were think-
ing the same way as they were, but we have changed albeit slowly.
Supporting what her parent said, A6C expressed that if her 
spouse would have been a non-Alevi, it would not have created a 
problem for her family. She emphasized that the faith of her child’s 
spouse or date does not have a place in her mind at all:
A6C: If my spouse was not an Alevi, my father would still have given 
me away in marriage. He was a different person on this subject. If I 
would have loved a non-Alevi, I would have married him. Of course I 
SECULARIZATION OF ALEVIS IN TURKEY
267
would have. This is not a criterion for me at all. The faith of the person 
that my child will marry is not important to me.
On the basis of all interviews, it might be said that what A9P 
and A9C said about interfaith marriages can well be seen as a sum-
mary of this part:
A9P: There is no way my mother would have given me to a non-Alevi. 
And that has influenced me a lot. I have never wanted to have a Sunni 
groom. But now, young people do not listen to anyone these days. 
They do not discriminate; due to their education level, they are more 
progressive.
A9C: The number of mixed marriages is much higher today. Young 
people like us are very self-opinionated. They do not care much about 
what their parents say. Maybe, having gone away from Adana for uni-
versity education had affected young generation. They attach more 
importance to their freedom than their parents did.
Divorce
Divorce is considered a taboo in traditional Alevi communities. As 
in Catholicism and the more traditional branches of Protestantism 
and Orthodoxy, a divorce may result in social exclusion. There is an 
aphorism among women in Anatolia which remains a reality even 
today for many elderly Alevis: “You can only return with a white 
shroud to your mother’s home from where you left with a white 
wedding dress”. Alevi women learn this aphorism from childhood. 
The word shroud represents death, and so Alevis are supposed to 
stay together till death. They are taught in childhood that divorced 
women are condemned and not allowed to enter shrines or other 
sacred places. In light of the interviews, it can be said that although 
the institution of marriage is still of vital importance to Alevis, 
which ought to be maintained even in hard times, divorce is no 
longer seen as a taboo in Alevi communities.
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Table B16. The Figure of Divorced People (Out of 10)
Older Generation New Generation 
Tunceli - 3
Çorum 1 1
Adana - 1
As seen in the Table B16, although divorce is not an option for 
the older generation, 16.6 % of the new generation had already got 
divorced. But it should be noted that these are couples just at the 
beginning of their marriage, which means that the number of di-
vorced persons in the new generation might actually increase in the 
future.
All respondents, without exception, agree that the number of 
divorces in Alevi communities has increased in recent years. While 
the older generation respondents noted that there was no divorced 
person among their peers, respondents from the new generation 
emphasized that they were already aware of many divorced people 
among their friends and relatives. Without exception, the question 
“When it comes to divorce, which generation is more inclined to 
divorce, old or new?” is answered in the same way by respondents:
T1P: There has been an increase in the rate of divorce.
T1C: Since we sell household furniture and white goods, I have ob-
served such a transformation [increase in divorce cases] over the last 
twelve-thirteen years.
T5P: It happens more often today.
T8P: It happens more often today in comparison to the past. People 
decide to divorce after only three months of marriage. There were no 
such cases in the past. But I do not know what changed; youths of 
today get divorced without hesitation.
T9P: In the past, you were supposed to stay with your spouse till death.
Ç1C: In the past, it was not possible to encounter divorced people. But 
now, even my cousins have gotten a divorce.
Ç3P: Divorces have become much more common today.
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Ç4C: They are increasing.
Ç7C: It is much more tolerable now.
A4P: No, there were no divorce cases in the past. But today, a lot of 
couples are getting divorced.
A5P: I swear to God I had never ever heard of any divorcement case in 
the past. Now, each family has two divorce cases at least.
A6P: People are much more prone to divorce at present. It was really 
rare to see any divorced couple in the past.
A6C: They are happening more often in our time. There are examples 
in my own family.
A8C: I think it happens more often in recent years.
A8P: Much more often in our age.
The question “What would have happened if an Alevi decided to 
divorce in the olden days?” was put to the older generation respon-
dents. Their answers indicate that divorce was one of the biggest 
sins in Alevism and divorced people, particularly women, had been 
socially excluded:
T1P: In the past, the act of divorce was not condoned in Alevi tradi-
tion. If an Alevi woman decided to divorce, this decision would not be 
taken lightly and kindly. Marriage itself was seen as a sacred thing. 
Although people had problems in their marriage, they were to put up 
with it or find solutions to them.
T9P: In the past, nobody had any idea what was going on inside the 
house. No one would publicize their family problems. If there was a 
very big and significant problem, then our elders or religious authori-
ties would get involved to solve the problem.
T10P: There was no divorce at all in the past. Even if women were beat-
en and kicked out of their homes by their husbands, they had to stay 
there without any objection or challenge. Our elders used to tell us 
that only our dead body could leave our husband’s house.
Ç3P: In a traditional Alevi community, divorce is something that was 
never approved by the community. The community was not cool with a 
divorced woman or man. Commitment in marriage looked more like a 
commitment in Catholic tradition.
Ç3C: Being divorced meant being decayed. It was that serious.
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Ç7P: In the past, if you got married to a daughter of a divorced person, 
then you would be decayed.
A1P: In our tradition, a woman cannot return to her father’s home if 
she gets divorced.
A4P: There was no one from our generation that I can remember who 
was divorced. Divorced people were not thought of highly. But now, 
people can easily get divorced. There are many divorced people around 
us.
A5P: I have never thought of divorce. Divorce was considered a very 
shameful act. Everyone used to condemn divorced people. People used 
to stop communicating with a divorced woman. She was not allowed 
into sacred places. She was seen as a dirty and decayed person. But 
now, divorced people have red-carpet treatment. Why? Because it is 
not considered a shameful act anymore.
A6P: It was even considered shameful for an engaged person to break 
off his/her engagement. Now, there are a lot of divorced people 
around us. There was no such reality in the past. Divorcet could not be 
an option for a woman even if she had hard times in her marriage. It 
was not common to see a broken family. At present, it is really so easy 
to break up a family. It has become so easy for the young generation, 
and it does not matter whether it relates to a girl or boy. Both girls and 
boys divorce easily nowadays.
A8P: Just before marriage, my parents used to warn their daughters 
like this: “If you marry, your husband becomes your everything. Since 
then, your husband becomes your father, mother, everything. And 
never ever try to return to this house as a divorcee. Be obedient to your 
husband.”
Questions like “Why has there been an increasing divorce rate 
among Alevis?” and “Why is divorce not seen as a taboo by the 
young generation?” were posed to respondents to ascertain the rea-
sons behind the transformation in Alevis’ consciousness from tra-
ditional-religious approach to a more modern secular approach re-
garding the issue of divorce. There are some common points in their 
answers that should be emphasized: individualization of women 
with more economic freedom in urban areas, paying more attention 
to the demands of children (unlike the past, new parents no lon-
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ger force their daughters to put up with unhappy marriages), social 
breakdown regarding the concepts of sin and immorality:
T5P: Everybody has a job now. The husband has a job, but so does his 
wife. Since everybody has economic freedom, they may break up even 
for very minor problems. I know a couple who broke up because of just 
one word. It is rumoured that the husband had insulted his wife by 
using the word “maniac”. The wife broke up with him after not more 
than two months of marriage.
T6C: First, women are now involved in business more than ever. They 
have started to stand on their own two feet. And the idea that “this life 
could be managed without a husband” has become widespread. I be-
lieve that all these have led to an increase in the number of divorces.
Ç1C: Modern-day people think that if their marriages are unbearable, 
they are still able to continue as singles. They are more self-confident 
than their parents. Regardless of gender, they get divorced somewhat 
easily.
Ç7C: I believe that the main reason behind this transformation is eco-
nomic freedom. Women stand on their own two feet. The view of life 
has also changed. Feudal traditions were much more taken into ac-
count in the past, but modern-day generation is busy with its own very 
personal issues. They seem to be much more selfish.
A5P: Since women have become self-supportive, they pay no attention 
to their marriages anymore. In addition, modern-day young people 
are much freer.
A5C: I think the first reason behind the increased rate of divorce is 
related to women’s financial situations. They have become financially 
independent in the last fifteen/twenty years. They do not want to live 
under the control of men. They can’t put up with oppression anymore. 
What is more, parents have started to support their children. They do 
not want their children to be beaten by any man.
A6C: Today’s women have economic freedom. Our horizons have ex-
panded. We believe that we have the right to get divorced. If my moth-
er had the same rights as I have now, if she did not suffer oppression, 
if she lived in a more open-minded environment, she would have di-
vorced my father, too. Maybe all beaten women around me would get 
a divorce.
A8C: People do not want to bear with each other. They protect their 
privacy better than their parents did. Their self-confidence is much 
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higher, particularly among working women. If they do not want to put 
up with a bad situation, if they get upset, then they get a divorce. It 
has become very normal.
In parallel to these statements, the approach of the new gener-
ation to the possibility of divorce (divorce relating to their children 
or to themselves) indicates that the act of divorce itself has been 
normalized and internalized as part of city life:
T4C: If my child wants to get divorced, I would approve it. The import-
ant thing is that my child is happy. If s/he is happy, then I do not care 
where s/he is or whom s/he lives with.
T6C: If two people do not get along with each other very well, then 
there is no reason to make life miserable. Why should people stay to-
gether and give each other a hard time? Divorce is a situation that 
may happen in those cases.
T7C: If you cannot continue in your marriage, if you and your spouse 
have quarrels all the time and if you are not happy with your marriage, 
then you should break up.
T8C: I think getting divorced is as normal as getting married. Especial-
ly we, the new and young generation, are very impatient, and we do 
not care for anything but ourselves.
Ç1C: I think getting divorced is understandable. Nobody belongs to 
anyone else.
A2C: There are no obstacles to divorce. It is meaningless to continue 
in marriage if two persons do not get along with each other. Of course 
my family do not force me to stay married, even though they would 
support my decision if I am not happy. I don’t care what people say if 
I decide to get divorced.
A3C: I will definitely divorce if violence is involved.
A4C: If there are irreconcilable differences, or they cannot bear with 
each other, then it is better to divorce.
A5C: If my daughter decides to divorce, I will definitely question her. 
Actually I do not think that this might happen only in a single day, and 
there must be some clues about their quarrels. And if I find that she 
has a point, then I would support her.
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A7C: I think if a couple does not get on well with each other, and if 
there is always stress at home, and children are influenced by this un-
easy situation, they should divorce.
A10C: Certainly, I am not against the act of divorce. If it is really nec-
essary, it should happen.
It should be mentioned that these transformations regarding di-
vorce in Alevi communities follow a path similar to Turkish society 
as a whole. The general statistics in Turkey also confirm these obser-
vations and statements of the participants. While the crude divorce 
rate increased 22 per mill from 2001 to 2013, a decrease in the rate 
of eight per mill was observed in the crude marriage rate (Ünal, 
2013: 593; Turkish Statistical Institute, 2014, March 26). To sum 
up this part in one sentence, it can be said that Alevism has been 
losing its cohesion as a society when it comes to the issue of divorce.
The Institution of the People’s Court46
The institution of the people’s court is one of the most important 
social institutions in Alevi communities. This institution has been 
used to dismiss people who are considered harmful to social harmo-
ny. Particularly, among others, having sexual relations prior to mar-
riage or outside marriage (adultery), having relations with outsiders 
(non-Alevis) and divorce are among those that have been used as 
grounds to excommunicate people (Yıldırım, 2013) and they are 
considered among the biggest sins in traditional Alevi communities. 
In such cases, people are marginalized, excommunicated or called 
decayed by their religious leaders, the dedes (religious guides). On the 
basis of the interviews, it might be said that the power and prestige 
of the institution had undergone a drastic change.
While Ç3P draws an analogy between excommunication in Ca-
tholicism and being decayed in Alevism, Ç5P said that being de-
clared as a decayed means your right to life is taken away:
46  Alevis in the Adana region do not have the institution of the people’s court.
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Ç3P: If a person is declared decayed, then s/he is excluded from our 
community. It looks like ostracization in Catholicism. An excommuni-
cated person does not belong to the Church anymore. Similarly, de-
cayed people are not allowed to enter Cem Houses. In addition, no 
one collaborates with them on any subject, and people do not talk to 
them.
Ç5P: For decayed people, it can be said that they have no more right 
to live. In the past, if there was a decayed person in our village, no one 
would salute him/her, or people would restrain from making any kind 
of contact with him/her.
When respondents were asked about the power and prestige 
of the institution of the people’s court, without exception they all 
stated that it has drastically lost any such social power and pres-
tige. They highlighted that this institution is deprived of suitable 
conditions to make itself relevant in the urban life. Besides, some 
of the new generation respondents emphasized that they had nev-
er heard of this institution. So, it might be said that after having 
been the body that ensured social justice and order in society until 
very recently, the institution of the people’s court has turned into 
something without voice or validity in Alevi communities. These are 
some of the answers given to the question: “Have you ever heard of 
the institution of the people’s court?”:
T1C: No. Our parents know it, because it happened in their time. At 
present, there is no such thing as a decayed person at all.
T2P: If someone makes a very huge mistake, then s/he is excluded. 
I have never seen such a person in my entire life. I do not remember. 
This institution was more important in the past. But today, it has dis-
appeared. I have not heard of such a case.
T3C: Long time ago, some cases related to decayed people had been 
mentioned.
Ç5P: Although people have started to behave much more wildly in 
comparison to the past, no one is called decayed anymore. You cannot 
see a decayed person anymore.
Ç5C: As an institution, it was powerful in the past. Nowadays, it is not, 
perhaps, not even as much as a tenth of its former power.
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Ç3P: I do not think that such an institution has any influence over 
people anymore.
The answers given to the question of “Why has the institution no 
longer been functional?” share some common points. As the main 
cause of the decline in the power of the institution of the people’s 
court, respondents particularly emphasized the immigration process 
from rural (in which almost all people are acquainted with each oth-
er and adverse consequences of social sanctions might be devastat-
ing) to urban (in which individuals are relatively more independent 
since it is no longer an easy job to know the details of individuals’ 
daily activities in city life). Besides, people seem to realize that being 
declared as a decayed in the city would not lead to the devastating 
consequences that it would have in rural areas. Therefore, individu-
als do not seem to care anymore about this institution particularly 
after they have settled in cities. I think the following statements 
about the institution clearly indicate structural changes that Alevi 
communities have gone through.
Ç5P: No one is able to know who is decayed or not. In the past, every-
body knew each other very well in the villages. But in cities, you do not 
know the individual’s private life. And if you announce someone as 
decayed, then s/he can easily find new places to socialize or go to the 
mosques.47 In the past, education, law and faith were taught in our 
Cem Houses, but now the state is providing education, and Alevis are 
subject to the law of the state.
 Ç9P: Alevi communities used to live in closed environments. They ex-
cluded themselves from the rest of the country but everybody in the 
community knew each other. Therefore, it was much easier to have an 
effective social institution in such a rural setting. But due to urbaniza-
tion, no one knows who has sinned or decayed. Therefore, Cems of the 
olden days used to ensure social justice and order in the community, 
but they have lost this power in city life.
Ç5C: In the past, everyone regularly organized their Cems in the villag-
es. The dedes participated regularly in all those Cems. Villagers were 
all acquainted with each other. Therefore, if there was a Cem, they 
would inform each other over who actually misbehaved or broke the 
47  Unlike Sunnis, Anatolian Alevis do not accept mosques as holy places.
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unwritten rules of the community, as in “he is decayed because he 
eloped with a girl” or “s/he is decayed because s/he has got divorced” 
or “this person cheated on his/her spouse”. In the past, Alevis did 
not go to the state courts, but nowadays even an ordinary Alevi can 
bring an action against the dede. It happened to my father, I know 
it. Being decayed or excommunicated in the Cems was very bad in the 
past because everybody in the village was there and they saw you. It 
was humiliating. No one talked to you anymore. Decayed people had 
fallen behind in just about everything.
Ç3P: The people’s court has lost its power because the population has 
increased drastically. The worldview of the people has also changed. 
People have started to live individually and no longer in a community.
T2P: We used to solve our problems by consulting the dedes, but now, 
we go to state courts to settle matters.
Without exception, all respondents agree that the institution is 
on the verge of becoming totally irrelevant. I think the most cari-
catured form of this transformation is that some respondents from 
the new generation are not even aware of the existence of this insti-
tution. For example, T2C and Ç6C did not understand what I was 
talking about when I mentioned the institution of the people’s court 
and decayed people:
Ç6C: I have just heard the word “decayed” for the first time in my life.
V: Hmm, as an adjective, “decayed” is used for people who misbehave 
according to Alevi traditions.
Ç6C: Oooh, yes I remember that. Yes, yes.
V: For example committing adultery and getting divorced are two rea-
sons for being decayed. They are not allowed to enter the Cem Houses. 
How often do you go to the Cems?
Ç6C: I have never been there.
V: Never?
Ç6C: Even I am very strict on the identity of Alevism, I haven’t been 
there yet.
V: Have you ever seen a decayed person? Does the institution of the 
people’s court have an effect on your daily life?
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T2C: When you say “decayed”, do you refer to old people? [In Turkish, 
decayed also means old needy people semantically.]
V: No, no, in Alevi traditions there used to be an institution called the 
people’s court, and this institution has the right to judge Alevis. And 
if necessary, the guilty person is announced as decayed.
T2C: I have never seen and never heard of one in Tunceli. Maybe be-
cause of my age, there has been no such case in my life.
To sum up, in this day and age, it might surely be said that this 
institution is outdated at least for urban Alevis.
The Institution of Spiritual Brotherhood48
Spiritual brotherhood is a very crucial social institution related to 
marriage itself, and it helps Alevis to regenerate and maintain their 
own customs, beliefs and rituals. As a concept, spiritual brotherhood 
may be depicted as a kinship between two Alevi men that is not 
based on blood. In the traditional Alevi faith, each Alevi man is 
forced to have a spiritual brother with his marriage. After they get 
married, these two Alevi men become closer than their own broth-
ers or their other relatives.
In the research field, while Ç9P defines spiritual brotherhood as 
“banding together”, T7P explains the significance of being spiritual 
brother as follows: “Our forebears used to tell us ‘Do not walk on 
the roof of your spiritual brother so that nothing falls down from 
his roof ’”:
Ç3C: If someone does not have a spiritual brother, he cannot be an 
Alevi. Without a spiritual brother, we cannot talk about Alevism. Two 
families unite. This is the belief in our land.
The history of spiritual brotherhood could be traced back to the 
age of the prophet Muhammed. The statements expressed by the re-
spondents and information in the sources seem to support each oth-
er with regard to the origin of spiritual brotherhood. By announcing 
48 Alevis in the Adana region do not have the institution of Spiritual Brotherho-
od.
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fraternity between a Muslim who migrated from Mecca to Medina 
and another Muslim of Medina, the prophet Muhammed estab-
lished an institution of social solidarity (Tiryaki, 2013). Alevis be-
lieve that after everybody had found a spiritual brother except ‘Alī, 
the prophet Muhammed declared himself as the spiritual brother 
of ‘Alī.
What are the responsibilities of a spiritual brother? Respon-
dents often stressed that a spiritual brother has to place his spiritual 
brother before his own brother, sister and family members. He must 
take care of his spiritual brother’s wife and children as much as he 
takes care of his own wife and children:
Ç9P: Your spiritual brother is much more important than your own 
brother. The wife of your spiritual brother is as important to you as 
your wife, and more important than your own sister.
T1P: There could not be marriages between the descendants of spiritu-
al brothers up to five or six generations.
T2C: It is said that you can beat your sibling, or use bad language 
against him/her, but you cannot do that kind of things to your spiritu-
al brother. Otherwise, you cannot see heaven.
T4P: Your spiritual brother is one of the most precious persons in your 
life. He is a part of you. You can share with him all your secrets.
Ç2P: If there was only one plate of food on the table, we would share 
it. If there was a suit bought for one of our children, then both his and 
my children would use that suit. All properties belonging to us were 
shared.
Ç3P: Spiritual brothers share all their tools, livestocks and facilities. 
But their children or grandchildren are not allowed to marry. It is 
strictly forbidden.
T1P: Being parents, we have to warn our children about the rules of 
being spiritual brothers. We have to say, “You will see him as a real 
brother, his wife is your sister, you will never ever look at her. He is 
your friend in the hereafter.”
T8P: Let’s say you argued with your wife at home, then it is your spir-
itual brother who would come and smooth things between you and 
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your wife. You, all the time, must consult him. He has to know your 
bad or good times. He is a part of you, you can tell him everything.
So, the questions “What kind of changes has this institution 
undergone?”, “Has it become more influential?” or “How do the 
young generation approach it?” are the questions that I need to find 
answers for. On the basis of the interviews, it seems that the insti-
tution still maintains its presence – though symbolically – in the 
Tunceli region but not in Çorum.
Table B17. Being in Spiritual Brotherhood
Tunceli Çorum
Older Generation New Generation
Older 
Generation New Generation
10 10 7 3
However, it should be noted that formally having a spiritu-
al brother does not mean that the institution is still powerful or is 
able to affect people’s daily lives. Without exception, all respondents 
agreed that the institution was much more powerful in the past. The 
new generation respondents from Tunceli said that although they 
have spiritual brothers, they do not observe the tradition anymore. It 
has been reduced to a symbol, i.e. individuals choose to be involved 
in spiritual brotherhood but they do not fulfil its obligations as their 
parents did in the past. While having been seen as a means of family 
unity in the past, the institution itself had turned into a concept that 
close friends use as an adjective when they get married but without 
any further obligation. It had transformed from a socially dissuasive 
institution into a non-functional social symbol in the Tunceli region:
T1P: There has been a decrease in the number of spiritual brothers due 
to the way society is nowadays. Today, it is not easy to see the level of 
faith and commitment in the past. Now, if you have a good friend you 
call yourselves as spiritual brothers but no one knows anymore how 
sacred it once was.
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T1C: My spiritual brother lives in Istanbul; we see each other once ev-
ery two months. If he lives in Tunceli, maybe we might see each other 
every day.
T2P: It was much more powerful and common in the past. Faith was 
powerful then. Spiritual brotherhood has turned out to be something 
like a good friendship. But it was not something like that in the olden 
days. If your spiritual brother had visited you, the height of your sit-
ting place couldn’t be higher than your spiritual brother’s sitting place 
in the room. In the same way, you used to get the same attention and 
treatment during your visit. But you cannot run into this kind of feudal 
connection or faith among young people today.
T4C: In our tradition, being spiritual brother is very important. People 
in the past honoured the concept of spiritual brotherhood much more 
than today’s generation. You cannot see such an attachment in our 
generation.
T5P: It’s over now. Maybe there are still some people who attach im-
portance to it, but it is completely over for many.
T5C: It was much more powerful in the past.
T6P: It was forceful in the past. Being spiritual brothers was a heavy 
duty for people. But no one has continued to carry that tradition any-
more.
T6C: I think it was more powerful in the life of our parents.
T7P: There is an expression that was used by old people in relation to 
spiritual brotherhood. They used to say, “Do not walk on the roof of 
your spiritual brother so that nothing falls down from his roof”. But I 
do not see such a tradition anymore. I do not know how this transfor-
mation has happened, but it is obvious that spiritual brotherhood is 
not as important as it was in the past. It is terrible, particularly for our 
young generation.
T8P: In the past, your spiritual brother had to be with you in good 
times and in bad times, through thick and thin. He should be more 
than a brother. But I have never seen my spiritual brother since I got 
married.
T8C: We do not see each other very often due to the workload.
T9P: Spiritual brotherhood was powerful in the past.
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As T2C and T4P said, the new generation has chosen their spir-
itual brothers among their close friends without consulting their 
families which had been an obligation in the past:
T2C: In the past, without consent of your parents, you could not be 
involved in spiritual brotherhood. However, today, the children them-
selves decide who will be their spiritual brother.
T4P: The youths of today suppose that the spiritual brother is someone 
like a close friend or a person that you get along with fairly well. They 
get their own way. It was not like that in the past.
When it comes to the Çorum region, it might be said that the 
new generation had already become indifferent to the institution, 
and a majority of the young generation had not even chosen a spir-
itual brother. As is the case in Tunceli, all respondents agree that 
the institution was much more powerful and influential in the past.
Ç3P: I am not talking of a decline but rather the disappearance of a 
tradition.
Ç2C: I do not see any spiritual brotherhood in the new generation. 
Maybe it is just me, but there isn’t any case that I have come across. 
In the past, almost everybody had a spiritual brother.
Ç2P: It was much more common in the past. People do not trust each 
other anymore. They cannot maintain such an institution; they do not 
trust, they do not believe, and they do not rely on each other.
Ç4C: It was common in the past, but not today.
Ç5P: There are not many if there are any at the present time. Our 
fathers were resplendently enjoying this spiritual brotherhood. How-
ever, when you talk to people of today about spiritual brothers, it’s 
almost impossible because they do not see their spiritual brothers or 
they do not come together.
Ç6P: It was experienced much more by the older generation. Nowa-
days, you cannot see it.
Ç7C: I hope the young generation find the right thing by understand-
ing the value of this institution. We do not see this institution any-
more.
Alevis from Çorum and Tunceli agree on the point that this in-
stitution has lost its significance and it is no longer able to affect the 
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daily activities of individuals. The answers given to the question of 
“what would be the main causes that led to a decrease in the social 
power of the institution” share some common points: urbanization, 
decrease in the number of people who visit Houses of Cem, at-
tending religious services less often, increase in the development of 
technology, the hustle and bustle of daily life, etc.
T5C: Development of technology, changes in the worldview of people, 
bad reputation of the dedes, and so forth… I think if spiritual broth-
erhood is not as popular as it once was, it is a kind of reaction to the 
Alevi men of religion.
T6P: I believe that we should blame ourselves, i.e. older generation. If 
spiritual brotherhood does not appeal to young people, then it means 
that we have not explained it clearly to our children.
T6C: Because developments in technology have rendered people es-
tranged from each other. Back in the day, people used to come togeth-
er to talk to each other. But today, mobile phones and the internet are 
deemed enough for communication. People used to make home visits, 
not only to their spiritual brother but also to all their acquaintances. 
But for the new generation, a phone call seems enough for commu-
nication. People used to know the value of being a spiritual brother, 
but unfortunately people have started to move away from these insti-
tutions.
T8P: The dignity of the spiritual brotherhood has been disappearing, 
and urbanization and technology might be the reasons behind this 
transformation.
Ç2C: Why do people keep spiritual brotherhood at a distance? I think 
they do not want to give meaning to their friendship, good fellowship 
or relationships through this institution. It does not make sense to 
them.
Ç7C: For example, I am not living where I was born. I am in Konya. 
Therefore, there has to be a distance between me and my spiritual 
brother. What we share becomes superficial due to the distance. Ur-
banization is another factor; in villages, people were much more in-
timate.
Ç3P: There is no need for spiritual brotherhood. There are now NGOs to 
take the place of that institution. Political or semi-political communi-
ties are coming together. There are no people protecting, applying or 
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checking whether this institution works properly. It is over. This insti-
tution belongs to the past.
Ç3C: Spiritual brotherhood is such a rigid institution. That’s the rea-
son why it has not been able to continue. Actually, these kinds of in-
stitutions are the institutions of feudality. It strengthens the kinship, 
and adds more people to your family. You become stronger against 
your enemies. Because of the feudal culture, kinship was very effective 
and rigid. But today, it has turned out to be only a symbol. Can you ask 
for your spiritual brother’s car, house, or his wife’s jewellery? Being a 
spiritual brother directly influences your own future.
Ç4C: Young people do not go to the Cems anymore. We don’t go. We 
are supposed to learn it from the dedes in Cems. But we do not. If our 
community had gone to the Cems, we would have had a more effective 
spiritual brotherhood.
Ç5C: My brother does not have a spiritual brother, and as far as I can 
say, there is no such person near me. I would not use the word dis-
tance but unfamiliarity. They do not know this institution. Or maybe 
they know, but they consider it unnecessary.
Based on all these stories and statements, it can be concluded 
that the institution has been losing its power and prestige by the day, 
and there is no clue as to whether it could be part of Alevi life once 
again. While being a spiritual brother was a kind of raison d’être for 
the older generation, the new generation seems not to want to live 
their marriages under the roof of such an institution. And I think it 
would not be an exaggeration to suggest that as is the case for the 
people’s court, the institution of spiritual brotherhood is also slowly 
but surely disappearing into oblivion.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
TOWARDS MODERNIZATION ALMOST IN EVERY WAY
The extended secularization paradigm is grounded on the notion 
that there is a non-accidental direct correlation between modern-
ization and secularization. The paradigm asserts that scientific de-
velopments, industrial capitalism, and urbanization process create 
problems for religions, folk religions, religion-like mechanisms, and 
superstitious beliefs at the social level. In order to illustrate the ex-
tended paradigm, I have researched the case of Alevi revival, aiming 
to find out if this case fits the paradigm. Therefore, in semi-struc-
tured in-depth interviews, respondents, firstly, were asked some pre-
set questions to gain insights into the generation gap with regard to 
the level of modernization. In light of those interviews, it can surely 
be said that compared to the older generation, the new generation 
has experienced a more modern life.
1. The new generation has much better educational facilities, and 
their level of education is undeniably higher than that of their par-
ents. In my research, no parent was found to be more educated than 
his/her child.
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2. It was found that all respondents from the new generation 
work in urban areas throughout their working life while a substan-
tial part of the older generation had worked only in rural areas.
3. When it comes to fertility rate and infant mortality rate, it 
was noted that each generation (the previous, the older, and the 
newer) has a lower fertility and infant mortality rate compared to 
the generation before it. Respondents from the new generation said 
that they had never run into infant deaths or the cases they had 
seen were not related to diseases, but to accidents. On the other 
hand, many respondents from the older generation were noted as 
having lost their own children. Does this say something? As Table 
C1 (Norris & Inglehart, 2008: 232) indicates, infant mortality rate 
and fertility rate are much higher in religious societies.
Table C1. Demographic Indicators by Type of Society
Type of Society
Fertility (Rate) Infant Mortality 
(Rate) Nations
1970-75 2000-05 1970-75 2000-05
Most Secular 2.8 1.8 35.4 12.4 25
Moderate 3.3 1.7 43.5 15.7 24
Most Religious 5.4 2.8 94.5 39.1 24
All Nations 3.8 2.1 56.8 22.4 73
NOTES: Type of society: Based on macro-level mean religious values measured 
on the 10-point “importance of God” scale. Fertility: Total fertility rate 
per woman. Infant mortality: Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births). 
Nations: Number of societies.
Source: World Bank 2003 World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: 
World Bank, available online at: www.worldbank.org
4. Instead of the homes, fields or sometimes caves which were 
the standard birthplace for the older generation, for the new gener-
ation medical institutions are the new birthplace. Going to medical 
institutions to give birth or get professional help during pregnancy 
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is now the norm in modern countries and it seems that Alevis have 
also caught up with this transition.
5. Due to technological advancements and industrial develop-
ment, the new generation has acquired almost all necessary durable 
goods before marriage while their parents had been deprived of even 
the most basic durable goods. In addition, when it comes to daily 
needs, while most respondents from the older generation used to 
produce themselves what they consume or use, and with less variety 
in terms of food, clothes and other daily needs, the new generation 
seems to be less involved in the production of their own needs due 
to the modernization process. Grocery stores, supermarkets or malls 
in city centres were mentioned as the places wherefrom all their 
daily needs are being supplied.
6. Transition in usage of durable goods is also observable for 
household heating systems and instant hot water access. While 
the older generation could only apply very primitive ways to heat 
their houses and were not able to instantly access hot water, the new 
generation, thanks to the diffusion of technological developments, 
can access hot water in a cheaper and easier way, and can now use 
technologically more advanced and efficient methods to heat their 
houses.
7. The new generation also enjoys improvement in modern health 
care. I noted very remarkable differences in terms of the diagnosis of 
diseases and treatment modalities among generations.
8. The interviews indicate that the new generation is more in 
touch and more engaged in dialogue with people from different 
cultures because of higher education and/or getting a job in city 
centres.
9. The new generation does not share the same living spaces with 
members of their extended family as their parents did. While the 
older generation used to stay with their large family until marriage, 
respondents from the new generation emphasized that they prefer 
to live apart from their families even before marriage.
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10. From the interviews, it can be concluded that the average 
age of first marriage among the new generation is higher than that 
among the older generation. While the average age of first marriage 
for new generation is 25,44, this figure decreases to 19,04 for the 
older generation. In addition, the fertility rate of the generations 
(the previous, older and new generations) has sharply decreased 
from 6,4 to 0,9,49 which indicates that the new generation is more 
inclined to have smaller families. Like other modernizing societies, 
the new generation is waiting to marry a lot later, modern couples 
are not inclined to have more children than their parents, and mod-
ern women are spending more time outside the home.
11. The types of marriage and marriage ceremonies for Alevis 
have changed throughout history due to various socio-economic 
reasons. For example, while arranged marriages are more common 
among the older generation, autonomous marriages are mostly pre-
ferred by the new generation.
All these transitions tell us that Alevis have become much more 
modern compared to past in almost every way.50 In this situation, we 
49 Since new generations currently have the physiological conditions to have 
children, an increase in birth rates is possible in the near future. However, it has 
to be said that from the interviews and observations done, there is no probabi-
lity of approaching the birth rates in earlier generations.
50 It should be stressed that, the transition of Alevi communities of Turkey run 
parallel to the transition of Turkey as a whole. Should it be deemed necessary 
to indicate the socio-economic transformation of Turkey with figures, it may 
surely be stated that while average life expectancy at birth, literacy rate, secon-
dary school attendance, the number of universities and university students, the 
rate of employees in the industrial and service sector, privatization implemen-
tations, the number of household durable, the average age at first marriage, 
the number of women who receive prenatal care and the number of births 
births happened in a health institution have increased in Turkey. On the other 
hand the population growth rate, the rate of agricultural workers, fertility rate 
(Total Births per Woman), the figure of case and death connected to the polio, 
whooping cough and diphtheria, the rate of infant mortality and under-five 
mortality rate have decreased. In addition, food poverty, complete poverty and 
maternal mortality ratio have been reduced in 40 years. All these statistics can 
be seen in Appendix A.
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are faced with a conclusion as such. On the one side, there is a pe-
riod of revival where Alevis expressed their identities more openly 
compared to the past, when they fought for their rights and identity 
by getting themselves organized, when they attained enough power 
to conduct lobbying efforts domestically and also in Europe in order 
to be recognized at the state level, when they established their own 
television and radio channels, and overall when they experienced a 
period during which they were modernized in every facet of life. In 
this situation, the claim of this thesis that societies which modern-
ize become secular and the revival of Alevism taking place at the 
same time may seem contradictory at first glance. Consequently, an 
explanation has to be provided primarily regarding the relationship 
between the secularization process among Alevis and the Alevi re-
vival.
SECULARIZATION OF ALEVIS OR REVIVAL OF ALEVISM
With regard to all the subheadings that this thesis is interested in 
researching, it is observed that the new generation of Alevis, in con-
trast to the previous generation, has led a more secular lifestyle on 
the subjects of premarital dating, mate selection, marriage rituals, 
divorce, the institution of spiritual brotherhood, and the people’s 
court.
The frequency and intensity of datings before marriage among 
young Alevis tend to increase. Although strict endogamy had been 
accepted as an obligation by the older generation, the new gen-
eration seems to accept getting married to a non-Alevi. “(…) in 
practice increasing numbers of Alevi women [and men] do marry 
Sunnis” (Erdemir, 2004: 257). Having conducted an ethnographic 
study of the Alevis in southern Turkey, Muharrem Erdem (2010) 
also found that exogamy has become more widespread among Alev-
is. When it comes to divorce, Alevis follow the paths of other mod-
ernizing societies. While divorce might mean social exclusion for 
the older generation, in light of interviews, it may be claimed that 
VOLKAN ERTİT
290
divorce is no longer seen as a taboo for the new generation and the 
number of divorced Alevis has been increasing. Since religious sub-
groups are not recognized by the state in Turkey, accessing statistical 
information for Alevis only in case of the mentioned marriage and 
divorce is not possible. However, it has been observed in both the 
fieldwork done for this thesis and some qualitative studies on Alevis 
(Balkanlıoğlu, 2012; Çatlı, 2008) that divorce is no longer a taboo 
for Alevi communities. What is more, making the claim that Alevis, 
who are part of Turkish society, also share the same divorce rate 
which has increased by 43% in Turkey (Turkish Statistical Institute, 
n.d.) during the last fifteen years would not be far-fetched.
In our field research, it was found that the institution of the peo-
ple’s court is not responsible anymore for ensuring justice and order 
as it once did. The new generation does not pay attention anymore 
to this institution for their daily activities and particularly marital 
issues. The dedes (religious guides) have lost their spiritual and po-
litico-judicial power and prestige among young Alevis. The institu-
tion of the people’s court, which has played an important role for 
centuries in the protection of the disciplined structure of traditional 
Alevi society, seems to have lost such a key role at the present time. 
It was a very powerful control mechanism in rural areas and used to 
alienate people who were supposed to threaten the harmony of the 
community. However, it has become a non-applicable institution 
within the complex structure of the cities. Therefore “the endoga-
mous justice system of Alevism was not able to compete with the 
modern judiciary system and gradually faded away” (Demiray, 2004: 
76).
In light of the interviews, it can be concluded that besides the 
institution of the people’s court, the social power of the institution 
of spiritual brotherhood has also eroded. Demiray (2004: 76) states 
that the institution of spiritual brotherhood that was a part of the 
feudal order could not be continued by the persons who struggle 
within urban life and compete with each other in capitalist eco-
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nomic system. That institution was used by Alevis to reinvent and 
maintain their own customs, beliefs and rituals throughout their 
history. Today, the institution of spiritual brotherhood has also lost 
its previous role and importance, much like other institutions of 
Alevism, due to modernization. It is also possible to say that the 
former spiritual brotherhood tradition is not relevant anymore for 
the young generation. 
Although these two institutions are considered part of a faith 
system, by their very nature, I think it would be more convenient to 
see them as the institutions of traditional society. These institutions 
have for centuries helped Alevis extend their family and protect 
themselves against enemies. Through them, Alevis become more 
powerful and secure in the face of non-Alevis in an agricultural cul-
ture. Kinship culture is much stricter in traditional societies than in 
modern ones, and new modern-life structures have been undermin-
ing those traditional institutions. Industrial capitalism, urban life 
style, and technological advancements have encouraged Alevis to 
move away from traditional institutions. There still are Alevis who 
try to keep those institutions alive, but their endeavours may not be 
enough to stop the erosion of the power and prestige of those insti-
tutions or to prevent them from becoming mere symbols.
Although this thesis only focuses on the institutions of the peo-
ple’s court and spiritual brotherhood, there are other studies sug-
gesting that other institutions in Alevism have also lost social power 
and prestige, such as the institutions of kivrelik (Yaman, 2007) or 
unclehood (Erdem, 2010). Kivrelik is an institution takes place be-
tween two families who love each other and are confident that they 
will continue to do so. That happens with hearts and consent of the 
parties. In addition, to put an end to the hostilities between families 
or tribes, and in order to sustain peace and frienship, the institution 
of Kivrelik is established among parties. Blood feuds or hostility end 
after the parties reconciled and interconnected by the bonds of the 
institution of Kivrelik (Yaman, 2007). The institution of Unclehood, 
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on the otherhand, is an institution by which Alevi males in Adana 
region learn their religion and be a member of the community. They 
have to pass secret initiation rituals which are very crucial in terms 
of social, religious and cultural life. They spend a particular time in 
another house under a religious guide’s care and that guide is called 
as “uncle” (Erdem, 2010). Compared to the older generation, the 
new generation is less interested in rituals and other religious du-
ties. They are not eager to participate in public worship or religious 
meetings (Erdem, 2010: 166).
It is still possible to argue against the result of this thesis by 
claiming that people see themselves still as Alevis and they do not 
deny that they are Alevi. In addition, it might be asserted that the 
changes in their daily lives are still within the boundaries of a new 
Alevi form. The second possible objection might be this: If there 
have been changes in the prestige and power of folk beliefs, this 
does not relate to Alevism. Therefore, it is not meaningful to assert 
that they have been secularized. 
These two objections may be responded as follows: It is true that 
they would still call themselves as Alevis and it would be possible 
that they may not conceive their new life styles outside of Alevism. 
However, this perception does not change the fact that Alevism 
touches daily life practices less than in the past. Certainly new forms 
of Alevism may have emerged, but whether or not individuals call 
themselves Alevi, or whether or not there are new forms of Alevism 
is not the crucial point for secularization debates. What should be 
highlighted at this point is whether Alevism or metaphysical realm 
is reflected less or more in daily social life. This thesis defends the 
idea that the concept of secularization does not equal becoming ir-
religious. Therefore, emergence of new forms of any belief systems 
should not be used to disproof secularization paradigm unless those 
new forms touch daily life activities more than in the past. 
The second objection was that Alevis cannot be assumed to have 
been secularized because only folk beliefs have lost their power and 
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prestige, not Alevism itself. The concern with this point of view is 
that it, again, oversimplifies secularization by equating it with dis-
belief. The issue being researched in the present dissertation is the 
question of which generation is most affected by the metaphysical 
realm (sometimes in the name of Alevism and sometimes in the 
name of folk beliefs). From this point of view, if a new Alevi gener-
ation does not adopt the old tradition of “watching over pregnant 
women to prevent evil spirits from taking their lungs,” then this is 
considered secularization since such a belief also belongs to meta-
physical realm.
It should be noted that, secularization does not posit the behav-
iors/beliefs of Alevis (about Alevism) at the center. There are still 
many towns and villages in Anatolia where non-Alevi traditional 
beliefs dominate daily life, and it is possible that Alevis have been 
affected by these beliefs throughout their history. What is import-
ant for the secularization discussion is not to completely abandon 
Alevism as defined by certain specialists or theologians. The crucial 
point is how metaphysics is reflected in the daily lives of two differ-
ent Alevi generations (parents/children). Whether such metaphys-
ics is considered to belong to Alevism or not is an issue for Alevi 
specialists or theologians and is well beyond the scope of this thesis.
Another example of this issue is whether to consider the increas-
ing number of marriages between Alevis and Sunnis as seculariza-
tion. This thesis asserts that today’s increasing number of marriages 
between Alevis and Sunnis compared to the past are indeed ex-
amples of secularization. In the past, religious attachments were 
so strong that it was almost impossible to marry someone with a 
different belief/religion. Today, the number of such marriages has 
increased hand-in-hand with the process of urbanization. New gen-
erations consider these details with much less import than former 
generations. Those who do not call this change part of seculariza-
tion claim that these marriages do not contradict real Alevism and 
thus do not relate to secularization. It should be emphasized that it 
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is not the duty of a sociologist to determine if a certain social be-
havior belongs to Alevism or not. In the past, the reason for people 
not recognizing these marriages was their faith. Today, increasing 
marriages or partnerships between people of different beliefs point 
to a diminished impact of religion on daily life. The fact that cer-
tain behaviors, which were once impossible for religious reasons, 
can now be openly exhibited, is indicative of secularization. What 
is considered part of Alevism tends to be construed differently by 
different sources and people. For a sociologist then, claiming to pro-
vide the most accurate definition of Alevism is not very meaningful. 
Rather, it is the transformation of behaviors as allowed or restricted 
by religious beliefs that matters more.
At the beginning of the thesis, I stressed that Bruce’s secular-
ization paradigm may be valid not only for West European coun-
tries and their offshoots, but also in terms of providing valuable 
insights into the secularization process in other non-Protestant so-
cieties. In light of the interviews, it seems that the transformation 
among Alevi communities in Turkey may also be explained by the 
secularization paradigm. Alevis in Turkey have become much more 
modern compared to bygone days, and at the same time a rather 
pervasive secularization process touches upon all marital issues due 
to the very structure of modern life.
Due to the scientific advances, capitalism and urbanization pro-
cesses, information is disseminated no longer in a top-down pro-
cess but in lateral fashion. The new Alevi generations can access 
information more easily and speedier than their elders. While the 
former generation experienced communal socialization in their 
families, the new generation is learning the good, the bad, and their 
morals from people or groups (universities, social media) that can-
not be controlled by their families. According to the Young Turkey 
Research of Intel (Demirok, 2012, October 9), 13% of the young 
generation in Turkey go on the internet before they visit the toilet 
when they get up in the morning, and 28% have already been online 
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before they leave home. That study was conducted in 2012; there-
fore, as the smartphone market expands, this rate will continue to 
increase accordingly.
Parallel to all these transitions, the concept of authority is also 
being transformed. The social moral codes (transferred to new gen-
erations by the old) are first of all filtered and assessed parallel to the 
general trend in the social environment that have been established 
outside the family as a result of the advances in communication 
technology and educational institution.
During the olden days when faith was dominant, marriage was 
accepted as a way towards integration and strengthening of ties be-
tween families. As Tayfun Amman (2010: 45) has explained, the 
family has been removed from its holiness, has lost the integrating 
and strengthening power of community, and is now reduced to the 
individual happiness of the (Alevi) couples.
Bruce (2002) tries to relativize the issue when defining the age 
we live in. In a traditional community, some privileged people (dedes 
and other leading figures of the community) had determined what 
is the best and the most accurate for social life. However, at present, 
it would not be easy to mandate “the accurate” to the new gener-
ation with respect to particular belief or moral systems, as it was 
in former days. As Ural Manço of Aksaray University (2014: 298) 
has stated, while ancient collective identities are on the wane, social 
institutions are losing their legitimacy:
Official institutions, mandated absolute belongings, structured re-
ligions or traditional religious conceptions, inarguable ideologies, 
official history conceptions, international institutions, justice, 
schools and even social institutions like families can be questioned 
and not accepted as much as they were. Representatives of these 
corporate structures experience loss of reputation and authority 
(like politicians, public administrators or teachers).
Unlike their own parents, the new generation tends to accept 
or reject the identities or lifestyles that are mandated to them after 
they have questioned them. If somehow they are forced to accept 
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former lifestyles, they are inclined to create new forms of those 
lifestyles by adding their own interpretation. This is sometimes re-
flected in their religious clothing and sometimes in their attitudes 
towards faith or religious symbols. They are more inclined to select 
the group or belief system that they are willing to accept after they 
research, question, and discuss. Young Alevis, as a part of Turkey, 
are now part of a very different social setting in comparison to their 
parents (Akşit, Şentürk, Küçükkural and Cengiz, 2012). That means 
they interiorise different values, norms and attitudes: “(…) as a re-
sult of the global communication technologies, the public sphere is 
released from the control of the nation-state and is transformed into 
a transnational communication flow sphere which enables differ-
ent cultures and civilizations to have close communication contact” 
(Göle, 2012: 24).
Therefore, it is not a mere coincidence that Y and Z genera-
tions are both more suspicious and more tolerant than their parents. 
Today, there are Alevi families wherein children have a more hor-
izontal relationship with their father despite coming from families 
with seven/eight members, where children used to see their fathers 
as if they were gods. Starting from this point of view, of course it is 
not possible to assert that all individuals from this new generation 
are in this category. To define a trans-generational change does not 
mean that all individuals of a particular generation become part of 
that change without exception. However, interviews and some other 
studies (Erdemir, 2004; Çatlı, 2008; Erdem, 2010) on Alevis indi-
cate that when we look to the near future, there is no impression 
that this process is about to change anytime soon.
Based on these findings, it would not be an overstatement to 
say that Alevis have become more secular compared to times past. 
However, unlike those referred to above, academics both at home 
and abroad share the same opinion that there has been an ongoing 
revival of Alevism since the 1980s. Alevi revival, which started in 
the 1980s, has made Alevis part of Turkey’s agenda. The new gener-
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ations have begun not to feel the need to keep their identities secret. 
Alevi belief and rituals have reached wide audiences through both 
social media and traditional media. With the Alevi Initiative of the 
AKP, the Alevis now have the chance to communicate their rights 
and freedoms at the highest levels of the state. So, how do secular-
ization of Alevis and revival of Alevism take place at the same time?
To give plausible answers to these questions, it is crucial to un-
derstand that there is a democratization process going on in Tur-
key since the 1980s, albeit at a snail’s pace. This comes to the fore 
sometimes due to political reasons (EU membership process) and 
sometimes particularly as a result of the effects of urbanization and 
capitalist articulation process: “There is a growing constituency in 
contemporary Turkish politics that is more responsive to identity 
claims, the political recognition of social differences and enhance-
ment of liberties” (Soner and Toktaş, 2011: 431). Just as homosex-
uals, feminists, Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, and Orthodox Chris-
tians became more visible after the 1980s and their rights came to 
the front in the country’s agenda, Alevis likewise took their share 
during this democratization process. With the spread of social me-
dia in the 2000s, Alevis, who had used to hide and keep their identiy 
confidential for centuries, started to reveal their faiths and rituals 
(Erdemir, 2010). However, the secularization process among Alevis 
accompanied this Alevi revival. Although this study tried to deter-
mine the impact of the secularization process based on marriages, it 
would seem that the secularization of Alevis has not been realized 
only in marriages.
Adaptation to urban conditions unavoidably has undermined 
the traditional Alevi lifestyle, rituals, and hierarchic order. The dedes, 
who were believed to be the representatives of ‘Alī and were the 
sole authority in rural life with respect to beliefs, rituals, social life 
and judiciary issues in Alevis’ lives, no longer possess their prestige 
and power particularly in urban settings: “Today, especially in urban 
environments, the mediating functions of the dede seem to be gone; 
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they had been tied into the socio-economic fabric of traditional 
Alevism, which largely eroded due to urbanization and seculariza-
tion” (Dressler, 2008: 295). The dedes, whose authority is decreasing 
by the day, could not adapt to the new environment and thus started 
to focus more on various professions within the rush of metropol-
itan life and losing their traditional charisma in the process. While 
they could assert their authority in rural life, it would seem that 
the young educated Alevis are no longer interested in the ancient 
myths and tales of the Alevi dedes. These dramatic transformations 
in relation to the dedes are mentioned by scholars who are convinced 
that there is an Alevi revival (Bozkurt, 2003: 86; Demiray, 2004: 
76; Shah, 2013: 263). The dedes, who once played a critical role on 
almost all issues such as social, economic, and judicial ones, are now 
almost reduced to a mere symbol.
The most caricatural case of this transformation (losing power 
and prestige in an urban setting) was that of a lawsuit filed against 
a dede by his follower: “An Alevi from the city of Burdur brought 
a libel suit against the dede who denounced him as ‘decayed’ due to 
adultery. The Court ruled that the citizen was right” (www.haber-
turk.com, 2010, July 7). Besides, as Fuat Bozkurt stated (2003: 86), 
new dedes are not so keen to substitute the old dedes, and in place 
of being a dede they prefer to find jobs that may provide them with 
a better and attractive living standard. Cems also seem to have lost 
their power together with that of dedes. As Shah (2013: 267) argues 
about the Cem, “the meetings and gatherings that used to occupy 
the long winter nights have now been replaced by weekend meet-
ings. However, they have not gained any cultural level capable of 
satisfying the needs of urban life.”
In line with all of the aforementioned issues, it should be stated 
that Alevi revival and Alevi secularization continue to survive to-
gether without alienating each other. Alevis still wish to be legally 
recognized at state level, and struggle to have an independent au-
thority for themselves either within the DRA or at state level. They 
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try to mold public opinion in order not to participate in mandatory 
religion classes, make Cem Houses gain legal status, and have dedes 
put on salary by the state. However, the new generations are moving 
more and more away from traditional Alevi beliefs, precepts and 
rituals due to urbanization, capitalism, and scientific developments. 
The following statement below by David Shankland provides a fit-
ting summary to this section:
It appears to me that over perhaps the past four or five decades, 
the efficacy of Alevi religion as an instrument of social control has 
declined, but “Aleviness” as a culture, as a collection of interlocking 
ideals and symbols which people may use to assert their identity has 
strongly emerged (2003: 134).
As Shankland states, actual experienced reality is not an Alevi 
religious revival but an Alevi identity revival. Therefore, if the term 
revival is used to mean religious revival by any scholar, it should be 
pointed out that this is not consistent with the revival experienced 
by the new generation of Alevis. The faith system of Alevism affects 
fewer aspects of life and never before in their history have Alev-
is openly demonstrated and promoted their identity. Therefore, we 
should emphasize that it is not an Alevi religious revival but Alevi 
identity revival that coexists with the secularization process in Alevi 
society.
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CONCLUSION
The objectives of this thesis are to revise and extend Steve Bruce’s secularization paradigm and to illustrate the extended para-
digm by means of a case study in a non-Protestant and non-Euro-
pean society, i.e Alevis in Turkey. The ten questions presented in the 
introductory part underpin this study, throughout which answers to 
those questions have been ascertained. Therefore, it is worth intro-
ducing here, albeit briefly, those questions and the answers found in 
this study.
1) What does the concept of secularization mean?
From the outset, scholars who write on secularization try to clarify 
their definition of secularization and emphasize the dynamics pri-
oritized when it comes to measuring secularization. The concept of 
secularization used in this thesis, unlike its widespread use in other 
academic works and even daily life, is not just based on religion 
or religious affiliation. Secularization is here defined as the relative 
decrease in the social prestige and social influence of the metaphysi-
cal realm, i.e. religions, folk religions, religion-like mechanisms, and 
superstitious beliefs, within a defined period of time and in a par-
ticular society.
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The reason for extending the scope of the concept is that discus-
sions solely based on religion but not on the metaphysical realm do 
not offer a satisfactory context for secularization. Due to the defi-
nition suggested in this study, excluding other belief systems such 
as folk and superstitious beliefs which are independent of orthodox 
religions but have power to influence the daily lives of individuals, 
may not lead to a comprehensive discussion of secularization. In 
addition, sacralizing or deifying worldly leaders, places, nations, etc., 
is also part of the secularization debates. In line with this, it has also 
been stated that secularization should not be confused with laiciza-
tion, the separation of state and religion by law, or with becoming 
irreligious.
2) Is it possible to explain the secularization process among 
modern or modernizing societies in light of an extended 
paradigm?
As a result of being defined as above, and in order to understand 
the secularization process among Alevis in Turkish society, Bruce’s 
paradigm which is based on the classical secularization theory, i.e. 
that modernization and secularization have gone hand in hand, was 
used as the basis. Hence, the answer to the second research question 
is precisely the extended version of Bruce’s paradigm.
There are two fundamental reasons for which Bruce’s seculariza-
tion paradigm has been adopted as the foundation of this disserta-
tion. At the very beginning of this study, it was stated that the con-
cept of secularization is related to changes in the effect of religious 
belief on daily practices, not whether one has faith in the supernat-
ural or not. Although Bruce conducted studies which put forward 
religious affiliation and being a believer as vital criteria, generally 
this is not what dominates Bruce’s studies. Bruce’s paradigm and 
studies, based on his paradigm and samples, are all grounded on a 
system that accorded privilege to this point of view. Secondly, apart 
from experiencing the Protestant Reformation, which is at the top 
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of Bruce’s paradigm, it is highly likely that the transformation of 
modern or modernizing societies on account of the secularization 
processes may be explained through Bruce’s paradigm. Although 
scientific developments, industrial capitalism and urbanization are 
the dynamics triggered by the Protestant Reformation in Western 
Europe, such dynamics may be the results of different undercurrents 
in various places. Such innovations are not always triggered by the 
same reasons, especially if those social innovations will improve so-
cieties’ standards of living. 
Therefore, it is asserted that Bruce’s paradigm, which explains 
the secularization process in West European countries and their 
modern offshoots with fairly consistent and empirical data, can be 
applied to other modern or modernizing societies which have not 
experienced the Protestant Reformation. To extend the scope of the 
paradigm, parts strictly related to the Protestant Reformation have 
been blurred if not removed. Moreover, other dynamics, free from 
the dominant religious culture, which can be realized within any 
society are brought to the fore. For this reason, a paradigm which 
is based on Bruce’s theory and at the same time purports to ex-
plain the social transformations of other non-Protestant countries 
is presented. The main pillars of this extended version of Bruce’s 
paradigm consist of scientific advances, industrial capitalism, and 
urbanization.
3) Why is the Protestant Reformation vital for Bruce’s 
paradigm?
For Bruce, if the main reason for European countries being sec-
ularized is modernization, then the initiator of modernization is 
the Protestant Reformation. Bruce, basing his argument on We-
ber, stresses that the Protestant Reformation changed the ethic of 
working and this led to the accumulation of capital. Bruce states 
that after the Protestant Reformation, other-worldly asceticism was 
abandoned and the idea that one does not have to desert worldly 
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affairs to be blessed by god became widespread. According to Bruce, 
the Protestant ethic, which stresses the importance of success in this 
world in order to win the approval of god, becomes the trigger of 
economic development. Bruce also emphasizes that social and func-
tional differentiations, which are the initiators of the secularization 
process, are the results of economic developments coupled with in-
dustrialization. Bruce argues that the domination of religious au-
thorities in the fields of education, social aid and morals declined 
due to the secular experts, new perceptions, and the new classes 
which emerged through the economic developments triggered by 
the Reformation. For Bruce, behind the developments that caused 
disintegration of traditional religious communities was the Protes-
tant Reformation.
In addition to this, according to Bruce, the Reformation led 
to an increase in individualization. To him, that Protestantism is 
highly open to fragmentation in comparison with Catholicism, 
that various perceptions and religious organizations for salvation 
arose, that individuals became more equal in the eyes of God in 
comparison with Catholicism caused the rise of individualism. In 
parallel, the rise in religious diversity led to constructions that were 
once unique and unquestionable becoming “one of the alternatives”. 
Bruce asserts that the cogency of belief decreases if that belief is not 
accepted collectively by all individuals; and for that reason, Bruce 
emphasizes that the Protestant Reformation has knocked down a 
heap for European societies who had had “unique and unquestion-
able truth” for centuries. Bruce claims that the trend in mass literacy 
increased along with the Reformation. He claims that through the 
proliferation of a new current of thought such as “answering to God 
individually”, the Bible was translated into local languages, and read 
by large masses.
It is not that easy to assert that Bruce’s reading of the Protestant 
Reformation and its effect on Western Europe is wrong. However, 
when it comes to the secularization process of Western Europe, it is 
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necessary to stress that Bruce underestimates the Renaissance that 
began well before the Reformation. It is required to emphasize on 
the new way of thinking, new methods for science, a new approach 
to the nature of human, a new architectural view together and the 
fact that Ancient Greece and Roman Empire were inspirational for 
education and cultural revival.
Even if any of the details asserted by Bruce regarding European 
history is valid, it is possible that the same processes may not bring 
the same results in other parts of the world. For example, as frictions 
among various groups of believers weaken the power of a certain 
belief in European history, conflicts among different communions 
in Muslim communities may have led to the rise of an intolerant 
religious culture. It seems that similar social upheavals may have led 
to diverse results in various geo-political settings.
4) Why not use other models as a starting point (i.e. Religious 
Market Model, Secure Secularization Theory, or Religious 
Individualization Theory) rather than Bruce’s paradigm?
But why not use other models as a starting point rather than Bruce’s 
paradigm based on CST? Because either the assumptions put for-
ward by the other theories or the claims they have raised concerning 
the definition and measurement of secularization were not suffi-
ciently persuasive.
For example, the Religious Market Model (RRM) has two fun-
damental claims. The first is that in case of the existence of monop-
oly in the religious sense, where there is domination by any given 
belief system and additionally if it is supported by the state, it pre-
cludes vitalization in the religious sense. According to the second 
claim, every human being is born with the need to believe as part 
of one’s nature, and this need has to be met. On the other hand, 
the Secure Secularization Theory (SST) claims that social distur-
bances, anxieties, worries and risks push people towards religion. 
The proponents of this theory defend the notion that uncertain-
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ties and insecurity concerning the future make people turn towards 
the metaphysical realm. And finally, the Religious Individualization 
Theory (RIT) claims that the modernization process has modified 
the social form of religion but this change does not mean a decrease 
in religion’s power or prestige. According to the defenders of RIT, a 
drop in church attendance in conjunction with modernization does 
not mean a corresponding drop in piety. On the contrary, in con-
junction with the rise in individual piety, the loss of power among 
traditional religious institutions occurred in the same period. 
It should be emphasized that academic research have not verified 
the assumptions and hypotheses of RRM and RIT. We do not have 
hard evidence at hand to support the conclusions of these studies. 
Nevertheless, a sufficient number of studies that verify SST’s claims 
have been published but it is not clear whether SST deviates from 
the classical secularization theory. 
It has to be stated additionally that while these three theories 
constitute important cornerstones of the secularization discussions, 
there are some important differences between the definition and 
measurement methods of secularization in these theories and the 
definition and measurement methods used in this thesis. Church 
attendance rates and changes in the number of pious people have 
been used as the most important and sometimes the only criteria for 
secularization in these theories, but this is not consistent with the 
secularization concept as used in this thesis. Being defined as such, 
instead of focusing on the frequency of worship or the number of 
believers, the increase or decrease in the influence of the metaphys-
ical realm on daily life was reviewed during the measurement phase 
of secularization in this thesis. However, what is emphasized is not 
that the frequency of worship, rate of going to church, and changes 
in the number of believers are unimportant. What needs to be ex-
pressed is that insistence on the frequency of worship in order to de-
termine if the metaphysical realm is included in daily life practices 
could prevent the attainment of sufficient results in particular soci-
SECULARIZATION OF ALEVIS IN TURKEY
307
eties. What is important is not whether one is a believer or not, but 
how frequently belief touches the daily life of believers. Therefore, 
the secularization paradigm proposed by Steve Bruce constitutes 
the baseline of the extended secularization paradigm presented in 
this study.
5) What are the pillars of such an extended secularization 
paradigm?
To apply Bruce’s paradigm to a non-Christian community or a com-
munity that has not been affected by the Protestant Reformation 
in its history, parts of the paradigm that are specific to Europe or 
Christianity were blurred while parts that are applicable on a more 
general basis were emphasized. That is the way in which Bruce’s 
paradigm is extended. For that reason, the three dynamics borrowed 
from the old paradigm, i.e. scientific developments, industrial capi-
talism, and urbanization, are claimed to have caused secularization. 
There were two important reasons for focusing on these three 
dynamics. First, these three pillars are common to modern societies 
which can be observed independently of those societies’ religious, 
historical and political culture. The emergence of these three dy-
namics may take different paths in different countries. At times they 
may emerge as a result of socio-economic reasons that develop by 
themselves, and at other times as a result of support by the state. 
Technological developments, industrial capitalism and urbanization 
do not have to be the product of a single historical process. They are 
the reality faced by different societies that have experienced diverse 
modernization processes.
Another reason for which these three dynamics are adopted is 
that social, structural and cultural differentiation, economic devel-
opment, egalitarianism, religious diversity, technology and techno-
logical consciousness and other such sub-dynamics in Bruce’s para-
digm are without exception the results of these three main dynamics.
VOLKAN ERTİT
308
In short, this dissertation argues that secularization tends to 
accelerate in societies where scientific developments have become 
widespread and affecting daily practices, industrial capitalism is 
dominant, and where urbanization is increasing when compared to 
the past. That is to say, based on these three dynamics, it is argued 
that the social prestige and power of the metaphysical realm will 
decrease.
6) Why does the secularization process accelerate with the 
diffusion of scientific knowledge and advancements in daily 
life?
The contribution of scientific development to secularization is not 
a direct but an indirect one. In other words, the reason why scien-
tific developments accelerate secularization is not because scientific 
knowledge refutes the arguments asserted by religion. At least, that 
is not a result claimed by this study. According to the paradigm, 
there are two reasons why scientific developments have led to sec-
ularization.
The first reason is the increasing rational consciousness in light of 
scientific developments. Rational consciousness, in this study, refers 
to perceiving the natural events in a cause-effect relation, and pur-
gation of supernaturalism which dominates the social behaviours 
of individuals. Scientific developments have broken the spell of the 
known universe as they find explanations for mysterious natural 
events. In times when scientific developments had no radical effects 
on life, natural events such as the eclipse of the sun and natural 
disasters (floods and earthquakes), as well as wars wreaking great 
destructions were all taken as messages from the supernatural realm. 
Since the causes and treatments of many illnesses were not known, 
they were believed to be the anger of the gods. However, new data 
and improvements in modern medicine, brought forth by scientific 
developments, have brought about an increase in the level of ratio-
nal consciousness let alone a more mechanical world view.
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The second reason for which scientific developments acceler-
ate secularization is that issues in need of the metaphysical realm 
have either completely dissipated or their frequency has decreased 
as new technology becomes a part of daily life. The increase in tech-
nical data, great developments in calculation, and improvement in 
the tools that enable to see far and nearby distances have allowed 
people to have more control of nature, thereby rendering the mys-
teryof nature less intimidating than it once was. The “darkness/ob-
scurity” of nature leaves one with problems that cannot be solved 
by possibilities on earth, and so it forces people to turn towards 
the supernatural realm. With improvements in technology, some 
natural disasters have become predictable or preventable or at least 
the ability to take precautions beforehand is now possible. All such 
improvements have led people to depend less on the metaphysical 
realm in case of disasters.
Parallel to these improvements, developments in medicine have 
also led to a decrease in the need for god. As diseases become con-
trollable and treatment centres have increased in number, all these 
have made treatment processes faster and cheaper compared to the 
past. That process has contributed to less dependency on other alter-
natives (supernaturalism, alternative medicine, places and people as-
sociated with holiness, etc.) as people rely more on medicine. There-
fore, religious people, who once helped people with their illness, are 
not being asked for counselling anymore.
In short, scientific developments have given rise to secularization 
not because they refute religious arguments but because they have 
reduced the need for religion. 
7) Why does the secularization process seem to be accelerating 
in capitalist countries?
Capitalism, in which production tools are subject to private owner-
ship and where free market mechanism works while voluntary ex-
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change of goods and services is vital, limits the power of the meta-
physical realm at the social level in at least four different aspects. 
Firstly, the rules upon which capitalism is built in order to re-
produce itself prevent any religious discipline from intervening with 
the economy. In capitalism, the commercial success of man – reli-
gious or not – is not related to his relation to other-worldly power 
but related to making the right decisions at the right place and at 
the right time. As they search for ways of presenting high quality 
goods at cheaper prices than their competitors, religious teachings 
and practices are mandated to stay away from economic life. Things 
that are religiously improper (such as interest in Islam) have been 
normalised and become an essential part of economic life because 
of capitalism.
Secondly, the new working conditions have led to the disintegra-
tion of the traditional family structure. A cultural shift in the way 
women are perceived is taking place in religiously-dominated agri-
cultural societies that now transform into a modern society in which 
secular-rational values are dominant. Together with economic gains 
and increasing education level, women become relatively free from 
the domination of traditions shaped by religion. Such a change has 
led to a fall in birth-rates and an increase in divorce, leading to a 
fall in the average age of extramarital sex and an extramarital baby 
boom.
Thirdly, the wealth and prosperity caused by capitalism tends 
to reduce loyalty to absolute authorities, religious or otherwise. In 
countries where the free market has become widespread, it is not 
a coincidence that income per capita increases, rate of literacy in-
creases, housing becomes more hygienic and comfortable, average 
life expectancy increases, baby death rate decreases, communication 
becomes easier, and a more democratic way of life takes hold. The 
increasing level of welfare leads to a decrease in dependency on su-
pernatural powers among individuals.
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Finally, as a result of state being pulled back from the economy, 
its domination in the political sphere also regresses and its imposi-
tion of a certain value on society becomes more difficult. Since qual-
ification becomes prominent in the capitalist system, individuals are 
hired or fired depending on their success. When the government 
has the means of productions, individuals need to share the same 
mentality as the government’s or act in accordance with govern-
ment leaders’ political views. The reason is that the government who 
is powerful economically can become totalitarian in the political 
sphere. It can be seen that countries with a protective economy 
throughout the 20th century have dictated certain collective values 
to their communities or have attributed holiness to a certain ideolo-
gy or founder of such ideology. However, the capitalist system both 
forestalls monopolization and makes disposing individuals difficult 
for those in political power. If individuals do not need the support 
of the government in order to earn money, then they can also be free 
from the government on other aspects of life. As the government 
shrinks and loses its position as the power that be, it also loses its 
dictating power on matters that its people can believe in.
8) Why does urbanization lead to an increase in the level of 
secularization?
Because of the urbanization process, people have begun to live in a 
mobile way and have more alternatives compared to those in rural 
life. In addition, private spaces which are relatively free from pres-
sure from neighbour, religious sanctions, customs and traditions are 
created. Such changes in people’s lives restrict the social power of 
the metaphysical realm.
Mobilization: the mobilization process in the city, interurban 
and from rural to urban, gives rise to coming into contact with var-
ious cultures for the individuals. The individual who comes across 
different cultures becomes less conservative with respect to cultural 
differences compared to the one who has been in touch with only 
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one culture throughout his/her life. In the city, pluralism and toler-
ance become structural factors, while groups such as homosexuals 
that are excluded by religion become more prominent. The process 
of mobilization also leads to encountering new power groups and 
their followers. Finding out that values considered unquestionable 
for the individual are in fact meaningless for another can lead to 
psychological effects that accelerate the secularization process. An-
other reason that mobilization accelerates secularization is that as 
people move away, religion also moves away from its holy places. 
In rural areas, people move away from the sacred spaces they have 
used for worship for centuries, and for other social reasons. New job 
opportunities in urban areas, long working hours because of aggra-
vated competition circumstances, socializing possibilities, parents 
care more about their children, going on vacation more often, etc. 
all mean less spare time for religious activities. Such a new way of 
life makes way for focusing more on “this world” rather than “the 
other world”.
Access to Different Alternatives: the second reason for suppos-
ing that urbanization leads to the acceleration of secularization is 
that the individual has begun to live in a structure that provides 
him/her with various alternatives on any matter. When compared to 
people in rural areas, those living in urban areas have the opportu-
nity to choose from among diversified (even religious) alternatives. 
The freedom of choosing in the urban setting leads to the construc-
tion of a new way of awareness. A belief that people in rural areas 
tend to accept religion without question ends up becoming only 
one of many alternatives for those in urban areas to choose from. 
Because of the alternatives available to those in the urban setting, 
not only proselytizing but also moving away from religion – not 
possible for those in a rural setting – is highly probable. It can be 
asserted that since one still believes in a religion, proselytizing is 
not related to secularization. However, secularization does not mean 
being a nonbeliever. What is crucial for the arguments in favour of 
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secularization is that religious identity, which is held from birth to 
death and not open to question in the rural area, is loosened because 
of other alternatives in the urban setting. Proselytizing in rural areas 
can end up in death, whereas choosing any of the alternatives in the 
urban setting would not disturb the social roles of the individuals, 
and thus would create less problem for an individual if not at all.
Privatization of Personal Life: the third reason that causes the 
acceleration of secularization is the appearance of private spaces 
that are void of traditions justified by religion with less social pres-
sure. Traditions are decision mechanisms for deciding how, where 
and when one can socialize with others in the rural area, but in 
the urban setting individuals decide relatively freely where, how 
and with whom to socialize. In contrast to the rural setting, in the 
urban area coming together depends on common interests and en-
joyments. While people in rural areas need to communicate with 
their neighbours much, that is not the case for the ones in the urban 
area because of different life-standards. For that reason, individuals 
living in the same neighbourhood or even in the same apartment 
block do not know each other. With new possibilities, people do not 
need neighbours as much as they did in a rural setting; therefore, in-
terference by the neighbours in one’s private space is kept to a mini-
mum or none at all. Urban life indirectly makes people interfere less 
in other’s life space on matters of friendship, dress, and belief.
9) What does the extended secularization paradigm not assert?
However, revealing the meaning of the paradigm may not always 
have been enough as an explanation. For that reason, putting for-
ward what the paradigm did not defend was necessary in order to 
avoid possible misunderstandings.
Firstly, the extended paradigm, contrary to Bruce’s paradigm, is 
not restricted to a certain time and place. Although the extended 
secularization paradigm is not a steady law of nature, its claim cov-
ers a wider range of settings when compared to Bruce’s paradigm. 
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For sure, to understand the secularization process in a society, it 
seems preferable to explain it through the inner dynamics of that 
society rather than through a universal paradigm. As the question 
involves the ups and downs between religions and society, then var-
ious dynamics may change the course of that relation at different 
times. Yet still, if the question is scientific developments, capitalism 
and urbanization, it is expected that societies , irrespective of domi-
nant metaphysical realm, would become more secular. 
Secondly, the extended paradigm does not itself disapprove or 
favor secularization, meaning that it is not a progressive or secularist 
ideology but one that tries to give a plausible explanation for the 
social transformation. For that reason, the paradigm does not seek 
answers to these questions: Are secularized societies happier? Does 
secularization, as compared to the past, mean having better living 
conditions? Do individuals become part of a high-quality life in sec-
ularized societies? Arguments within these questions as well as their 
answers can neither verify nor falsify what the paradigm asserts.
Thirdly, becoming non-religious or atheist does not suggest that 
the last stage has been reached by the paradigm. Since the paradigm 
does not question the subjective belief of the individual, it does not 
claim or foresee that religion will disappear due to modernization. 
However, it questions the apparent effects of order, prohibition and 
advice of the individual’s belief on his/her life experiences. The sec-
ularization process is not a process about the disappearance of reli-
gion. Decrease in the social power and prestige of any religion may 
lead to a decrease in the number of people believing in that reli-
gion. Yet, the secularization paradigm does not refer to a final point. 
Those who are secularized may still believe in a religion.
Fourthly, the paradigm does not claim that all modernizing so-
cieties are secularized in the same way, in the same direction, within 
the same time period, and with the same circumstances. The sec-
ularization paradigm does not assert that each and every society 
secularizes in the same way as water ballet athletes do. To assert that 
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secularization actualizes in a synchronized way, or any individual 
living in a modern society becomes part of the secular culture or 
that no one will be devout in such a society is simply unreason-
able. In the course of social changes, various social components may 
tend towards a more diversified way of life. What is meant by so-
cial transformation is the new social structure that emerges in the 
course of such tendencies. 
Fifthly, frequency of worship is not placed at the heart of the 
paradigm. The literature on secularization with focus on Christi-
anity uses the rate of going to church or increase in the number of 
believers or nonbelievers as almost the only parameter. Within the 
secularization discussions, all parameters that are thought to offer 
an impression on the matter of social transformations should be 
taken into consideration. However, using the same method for oth-
er religious groups, i.e. placing emphasis on just the frequency of 
church attendance, frequency of praying or the number of believers, 
might not give a comprehensive picture of the secularization pro-
cess. It cannot be asserted that the rate of praying is not a parameter 
worth considering. Yet, when it comes to a country with a Muslim 
majority, it would be difficult to get healthy results if the rate of 
praying or the rate of going to the mosque is taken as determin-
ing factors of the secularization process. Being different from mod-
ern-day Christianity, modern-day Islam still wants to have the right 
to comment on individuals’ selection of partner, job, city, dress, food 
and beverage, sexuality, etc..
Finally, the paradigm takes into consideration the deification or 
transcendence of worldly “things” besides celestial belief systems. 
Secularization does not only mean the loss of power for monothe-
istic religions. Apart from the monotheistic religions, polytheistic 
folk beliefs with multi-symbols that are in touch with daily life 
or superstitious beliefs are also part of secularization discussions. 
Moreover, since some leaders are deified, and divinity is attributed 
to them, the social prestige and power of such sacralised leaders or 
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another worldly structure are regarded as the field study of the sec-
ularization paradigm, too.
10) Can the extended secularization paradigm provide a 
plausible explanation for Alevi communities in Turkey even if 
there has been a revival of Alevism?
This thesis claims that an extended version of Bruce’s contradictive 
secularization paradigm may provide valuable insights into the sec-
ularization process, not only in Western Europe and its offshoots, 
but also in other non-Christian communities, as well as Christian 
communities that did not experience the Protestant Reformation. 
For that reason, the Alevis living in the Adana, Çorum and Tunceli 
regions of Turkey have been chosen as the primary focus of this the-
sis. There were two crucial reasons behind this choice: firstly, to focus 
on a non-Christian religious subgroup in Turkey which is not part 
of Europe or one of its offshoots, and which has not experienced 
the Protestant Reformation in its history. The second reason is the 
claim of an Alevi revival to have taken place in the 1980s despite 
being part of a modernizing society. Alevis, who were assumed to 
be non-existent at the state level and social arena, became Turkey’s 
most important agenda item after the 1980s. The start of Alevis’ 
struggles for their rights when they arrived in cities, the establish-
ment of Alevi associations, the opening of Cem houses of worship 
in central parts of large metropolitan areas, sharing of their worship 
rituals and rites at these Cem houses with millions watching via 
state televisions, having their own radio and television stations, and 
the fact that the new generation of Alevis do not hide their Alevi 
identity in contrast to the previous generations – these are examples 
put forward by researchers in favour of the existence of such an 
Alevi revival. These two reasons, i.e. being part of a non-Protestant 
society and having experienced such a revival, have made the social 
transformation experienced by Alevis in terms of the secularization 
discussion quite interesting.
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The results of the field study demonstrate that the extended ver-
sion of Bruce’s paradigm is applicable not only to West European 
societies but to Alevi society as well. The Alevis have increasingly 
been part of a more modernized and secularized society with regard 
to the issues of premarital dating, mate selection, marriage rituals, 
divorcement, the institutions of spiritual brotherhood and people’s 
court. 
It can be observed from the issues which this thesis aims to in-
vestigate that the new generation of Alevis has been experiencing 
a more secularized lifestyle compared to the previous generation. 
The intensity and frequency of flirting/dating have increased among 
the new generation of Alevis. Divorce, which previously resulted in 
having been completely excluded from society, has ceased to be a 
taboo subject and become something normal in their lives. The in-
stitution of the people’s court, which is responsible for social justice 
and order, no longer has any say on the issue of wedding. New gen-
erations do not anymore refer to this institution for daily or marital 
advice. “Dedes”, who traditionally are the religious leaders among 
Alevis, have lost their spiritual and political power to guide the new 
generation of Alevis. Besides, the social prestige and power of the 
institution of spiritual brotherhood have also waned. This institu-
tion, which survived for centuries and ensured the existence of Alevi 
society, has lost its power due to the experienced rapid moderniza-
tion process. 
It is also found that the Alevi identiy revival and secularization 
do not alienate each other. Alevis have campaigned to be legally 
recognized at the state level and be allowed to have an indepen-
dent form of governance. For the foreseeable future, it would not be 
surprising if mandatory religion classes are abolished, Cem Houses 
have gained legal status, and dedes are recognized and paid for by 
the state. However, these indicators of Alevi identity revival do not 
mean that the new generations are becoming more and more Alevi. 
On the contrary, because of the three pillars of the extended secular-
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ization paradigm, it actually seems that they are far-removed from 
traditional Alevi beliefs, precepts, and rituals compared to previous 
generations.
Last Words
It should be stressed that this thesis can be further expanded by fu-
ture studies of other regions and religions, both in and outside Eu-
rope, i.e. Christian, but not having experienced the Protestant Ref-
ormation or non-Christian socieities. The result of this thesis should 
be corroborated by other works so as to allow for generalization. 
I have conducted fieldwork research using a qualitative approach. 
Due to the nature of the snowball sampling method, control over 
sampling was somewhat restricted. In fact, in order to test a theory 
in social sciences whether it is secularization or any other thing, it is 
clear that it is required longitudinal studies, sufficiently large num-
bers of samples and quantitative studies as well as qualitative ones. 
A sample group consisting only 30 pair, and qualitative study may 
not be enough to test a theory. Hence, the empirical study of this 
thesis was not carried out to test the extended version of seculariza-
tion theory, but an illustration of it. 
Therefore, I am confident that any research with a qualitative 
approach or an ethnographic study within a large scale will substan-
tially contribute to this discussion. In addition, a comparative study 
on Alevis and Sunnis would also be very beneficial. Such a study 
might be helpful in strengthening or revising this study’s extended 
paradigm. My study also does not include Alevis who have migrat-
ed to cosmopolitan cities such as İstanbul; therefore, the impact of 
migration on the secularization process among Alevis also remains 
to be sorted out. It would be very exciting and informative to ac-
quire insights into the situations of Alevis living in cosmopolitan 
areas. This study selected a faith group in Turkey as its field of study 
due to time and financial restrictions of a doctoral thesis. In the 
future, studies based on different faith groups in Turkey or studies 
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to be made in another country not dominated by Protestantism will 
expand the discussions in this respect.
At the very beginning of the theoretical part, it was stressed that 
the secularization process of non-Protestant societies may also be 
conceived in light of Bruce’s secularization paradigm, if it can be 
extended. In light of interviews, this thesis supports the idea that 
in societies where dynamics such as scientific developments, capi-
talism and urbanization arise, the social prestige and power of the 
dominant metaphysical realm diminishes. The findings of the thesis 
support the idea that Bruce’s paradigm is valid not only for West-
ern-Europe, but it also offers insights into the secularization pro-
cess happening in other modern or modernizing societies outside 
Western Europe. The extended secularization paradigm provides 
a reasonable explanation for the secularization process happening 
in Alevi communities. Alevis in Turkey have become much more 
modern compared to bygone days, while at the same time a rather 
pervasive secularization process is impacting even marital issues due 
to the very structure of modern life itself.
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APPENDIX A
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF TURKEY
Table AA1. Level of Population Growth Rate
Year 1970 1980 2000 2023
Population Growth 
Rate 2,5 % 2 % 1,5 % 0,9 % (Expected)
Source: Koç, Eryurt, Adalı & Seçkiner, 2009.
Table AA2. Average Life Expectancy at Birth
Year Woman Man
1940 33 Year 30 Year
2008 79 Year 73 Year
2014 79 Year 75 Year
Source: Koç et al., 2009; Hacettepe University Institute of Population 
Studies, 2013.
Table AA3. Literacy Rate
Year Woman Man
1935 10 % 29 %
1980 55 % 80 %
2012 92,2 % 98 %
Source: Koç, et al., 2009; Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI), 2015, March 5.
Table AA4. Secondary School Attendance Ratio
Year Girls Boys
Beginning of 1990s 21 % 32 %
2008 56 % 61 %
2012 66,1 % 68,5 %
Source: Koç et al., 2009; TSI, 2015, March 5.
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Table AA5. The Number of University51
Year The Number of University
1967 9
2013 175
Source: Çetinsaya, 2014.
 Table AA6. Ratio of Labour Sector 
Year Agriculture Industry and Service
1955 82 % 18 %
1980 61 % 39 %
2013 23,6 % 76,4 %
Source: Koç et al., 2009; TSI, 2014 March 6.
Table AA7. Privatization Implementations
Year Amount ($)
1923-1983 0 $
1983-2003 8 Billion $
2003-2015 55 Billion $
Source: Doğan 2012; Privatization Administration of Turkey, 2015.
Table AA8. Food Poverty & Complete Poverty
Year Food Poverty 
(Hunger)
Complete Poverty 
(Food+Nonfood)
2002 1,35 % 26,96 %
2009 0,48 % 18,08 %
Source: Çilingiroğlu, 2009.
 
51 While only 41,574 students out of 466,963 were enrolled at a university in 
1980, this figure has risen to 877,784 out of 1,923,033 in 2013 (Çetinsaya, 
2014).
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Table AA9. Share of Total Income of the Top 20 %
Year Total Share of the Top 20 %
1960 57 %
2008 47 %
2013 46,6 %
Source: Koç et al., 2009; TSI, 2014 September 22.
 Table AA10. Households Durables (%)
1998 2003 2008 2014
Refrigerator 93,2 94,3 97,6 98,6
Oven 67,6 71,3 77,0 78,5
Washer 63,6 78,3 91,8 95,9
Iron No Data 85,1 87,7 89,3
Vacuum Cleaner 65,1 75,6 85,1 89,0
TV 91,4 94,7 95,9 97,9
Cell Phone 13,3 67,2 91,8 95,6
Microwave Oven No Data 7,2 12,4 19,9
Food Processor No Data 39,2 50,3 No Data
Dishwasher 16,4 22,1 35,2 57,2
Notebook/Desktop Computers 4,2 11,6 40,2 58,1
Transportation Vehicles
Private Car No Data 25,8 32,3 37,6
Number of Household 8,059 10,836 10,525 11,794
Source: Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies, 1999; 2004; 
2009; 2014
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Table AA11. The Average Age at First Marriage
Year Woman Man
1940s 19 23
2014 23,7 26,9
Source: Koç et al., 2009; TSI, 2014 March 26
 Table AA12. Fertility Rate (Total Births per Woman)
Year Number of Children
1960s 6
1970s 5
End of 1980s 3
2013 2,26
Source: Koç et al., 2009; Hacettepe University Institute of Population 
Studies, 2014.
Table AA13. The Rate of Birth Control Methods for Married Women
1963 22 %
2008 73 %
2013 93 %
Source: Koç et al., 2009; Hacettepe University Institute of Population 
Studies, 2014.
Table AA14. The Rate of Prenatal Care
Year Figure out of 100 Mothers
At the beginning of 1980s 38
At the end of 1990s 68
2008 92
2013 97
Source: Koç, et al., 2009; Hacettepe University Institute of Population 
Studies, 2014. 
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Table AA15. The Rate of Births Happened in a Health Institution
Year Figure out of 100 Mothers
1980s 42
2008 90
2013 97
Source: Koç, et al., 2009; Hacettepe University Institute of Population 
Studies, 2014.
Table AA16. The Figure of Case and Death Connected to the Polio, 
Whooping Cough and Diphtheria in Turkey between 1970-2003
Population
The Figure of Case The Figure of Death
Po
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1970 35.321.000 701 7268 1110 39 21 63
1980 44.438.000 182 1520 86 7 9 8
1990 57.582.000 24 454 20 2 2 0
1999 65.819.000 0 528 4 0 1 1
2003 71.772.711 0 255 1 0 1 0
Source: Altun, 2008.
Table AA17. Maternal Mortality Ratio
Year Maternal deaths per 100.000 live births
1975 208
1995s 56
At the beginning of 2000s 49
2005 29
2011 14,8
Source: Koç et al., 2009; Directorate General for Health Research, 2013.
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Table AA18. Infant Mortality Rate and Under-five Mortality Rate
Year Infant Mortality Rate 
(Probability of dying 
by age 1 per 1000 live 
births)
Under-five Mortality Rate 
(Probability of dying by age 
5 per 1000 live births)
1960s 163 223
At the beginning of 
1980s
121 152
At the beginning of 
1990s
66 84
2008 17 24
2011 11,7 15
2012 11,6
2013 10,8
Source: Koç et al., 2009; TSI, 2013 February 19; 2014, April 30; World 
Health Organization, 2013.
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APPENDIX B
THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SAMPLE WITH A PARENT
The interview conducted with A2P on 05.08.2014 in Adana
She was born in 1957. Having completed primary school, she then 
worked in the agricultural and textile sectors.
V: How many children do you have?
A2P: Two.
V: How many siblings do you have?
A2P: I have five, but two of them have died. One of them died 
from meningitis, while the other died due to a wrong injection when 
he was only eighteen months old.
V: Where were you born?
A2P: At home. There was a midwife in our district.
V: How about your children?
A2P: One was born in hospital, the other at home. My second 
child was born at home.
V: Why were they born in different places?
A2P: It was my own choice at the time. I think doctors and nurs-
es were not usually consulted at the time. Someone suggested a very 
qualified midwife to me, and so I had a private midwife present. She 
was very good at her job.
V: If you would give birth to a baby today, would you prefer to go 
to the hospital or stay at home?
A2P: The conditions are very different today compared to the 
olden days. In the past maybe there was a lack of opportunities and 
facilities. But right now, we have better conditions and private hos-
pitals.
V: How did you heat up your home when you were child?
A2P: My mother used coal, we all used coal.
V: What were the methods of treatment when you were sick?
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A2P: My family were not making conscious choices when we 
were children. They took us to the doctor if we were seriously ill. In 
those days, there were only general practitioners. I mean, if we were 
really sick, then we could see the doctors. Having a fever was not a 
good enough reason to be taken to the doctor.
V: Did you ever work before your marriage?
A2P: Yes, in agriculture.
V: What was your job there?
A2P: I was moving earth. There were wealthy landowners, and 
we moved earth for cotton seeds, and during the cotton seasons we 
picked them up. Our neighbors were also fellow workers.
V: Were there people whose religious identities were different 
from yours among your workfellows?
A2P: No, everybody belonged to the same religious group.
V: How about your working conditions?
A2P: Our working conditions were better than those of the 
workers before us. Previous workers did not have the facility to heat 
up their foods, but we did. We lit fires using stalks. Even we had 
forks. If we wanted to have Kebab, sometimes the foreman would 
bring us Kebab. We had days off as well. We went to the cinemas 
or restaurants.
V: Before marriage, what kind of durable consumer goods did 
you have?
A2P: Till I was thirteen/fifteen years of age, we did not have 
many house goods. For example, we had no refrigerator. We put our 
foods into a kind of small cage made of string. Let’s say if there is 
a plate of food left, we put it into that cage up on the wall. Foods 
were bought daily. Tomatoes were picked up from our own garden.
V: Where do people (around you) work, in the agricultural sector 
or other sectors?
A2P: In agriculture.
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V: Have you lost any child because of diseases? Or do you know 
people who have lost their children because of childhood diseases?
A2P: Children would die if they were diagnosed with measles. 
Meningitis was another reason for such deaths. It was said then that 
the disease affected the brain. If it was the case, children became 
permanently disabled or died. My sister became disabled because 
of that. But unfortunately, our neighbors’ child died. They were told: 
“Do not take your child to the doctor. It is a sin. Going to doctor 
at that time meant that you are committing a sinful act. Everybody 
has to endure that disease; it was some kind of obligation.” They 
sentenced their child to death.
V: Have you seen anyone whose child has been diagnosed with 
measles these days?
A2P: Yes, my nephews. They were taken immediately to the doc-
tors.
V: Did you have access to hot water?
A2P: We heated up water outside the house using woods during 
winter time. In summer, we put water outside the house under the 
sun, and we used those for showers. In those days, we did not have 
solar technology on the roof of houses.
V: Which cities have you visited up till now? Why?
A2P: Hatay and Çiftehan. There are religious places in Hatay. 
My aunt, Sabiha, was a very religious woman. She took us to Hatay. 
We visited shrines or tribes there. Apart from Hatay and Çiftehan, 
I visited the pool of Abraham in Urfa, too.
V: Have you ever spent time with non-Alevis before marriage?
A2P: Some friends of mine in Adana were non-Alevis. We met 
them in the thermal spring of Çiftehan. Sometimes we organized 
meetings just for women who were invited. We went to them. Being 
non-Alevis was not a problem for us. We did not bring up that kind 
of subject. They were happy to be with us, and it was the same for 
us, too. We did not want that kind of subjects to ruin our friendship.
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V: Were there non-Alevis people apart from those you met in 
Çiftehan?
A2P: No, because we were living in a very homogeneous envi-
ronment, all our colleagues were Alevis. The only place where we 
used to encounter non-Alevis was Çiftehan52. Since they were stay-
ing in rooms next to us, we came across them often. Apart from 
them, there were no non-Alevis in our neighbourhood.
V: Have you ever lived alone (free from your family) before mar-
riage?
A2P: No.
V: Were there any non-Alevis among your neighbors?
A2P: No.
V: Did you ever have a boyfriend before marriage? 
A2P: No.
V: May I kindly ask how you met your husband?
A2P: I knew him from our district. He knew me, too. He already 
had a girlfriend, and they loved each other. They even got engaged 
but his family did not want him to marry her since she was not 
Alevi. And they stood by their decision. Recai (husband), firstly, did 
not care about his family’s attitude but soon after he did not want 
to marry as well. Then, his ex-fiancée started to discredit him due to 
his belief. They met while working in a factory and dated for two-
three years. After that girl, he then found another girl. But before 
he could decide on this girl, he wanted to marry me. I refused him, 
and so he found another girl from another district. I think she was 
Sunni, I am not sure exactly. It was an arranged marriage. But, it did 
not go well and they broke up. Afterwards, my mother-in-law and 
his sister suggested me to him once again. He said ok. They came 
to our house, and insisted on marrying me. Although I was not so 
eager to marry him, since my heart was empty at the time I accepted 
52  Çiftehan is a spa area 100 km from Adana.
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his proposal. If I loved someone – and I was very finicky - it could 
not have happened. Although he was not handsome, Recai was a 
good person and a poet. That’s the story.
V: How did his family come to ask for your hand in marriage?
A2P: My mother-in-law came and said to my father: “We want 
your daughter, what do you say?” We were also distant relatives. My 
father gave his consent. He asked me whether I was in love with 
anybody at the time. I said “no”. Then he said, “Recai is a good per-
son, do you want him?” At first, I did not like him much but then 
love eventually happened between us.
V: Was “being Alevi” important in your decision?
A2P: Maybe my family would not have accepted such a case, but 
it was no problem for me. To be honest, it did not even enter my 
mind at the time. If he would have been Sunni, maybe my family 
would have gone against him. My mother would have been sad. But 
we never talked about it because we never encountered such a case. 
The people asking for my hand for their sons were all Alevis.
V: So, what would be your reaction if one of your children would 
like to marry a non-Alevi?
A2P: If my son Serhat marries a Christian, I will not argue 
against it. I do not object to my daughter’s decisions as well. If that 
what she wants, I will say nothing. She once dated a Kurdish Alevi 
and I liked him very much. Then she dated a Sunni guy for a short 
time and we said nothing.
V: Do your children listen to your wishes in terms of their mate 
choice?
A2P: No. Since their mother and father do not discriminate, 
they need not worry about such things.
V: Could you give some details of the ceremonies before your 
marriage like the engagement process, etc.?
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A2P: First, they came to ask for my hand. We said ‘yes’. Af-
ter that, dessert was shared among family members and we began 
wearing rings. After a while, we got engaged.
V: Did any religious man/woman interfere in these ceremonies?
A2P: At our wedding.
V: We will talk about it later, but how about your engagement?
A2P: No.
V: Could you elaborate a little more?
A2P: It happened at home. Like the wedding, the engagement 
rings were worn then. There was nothing related to religion. After 
four months, our wedding took place.
V: What kind of religious rituals were performed?
A2P: Not much. A Hocca was visited. One person from my 
family, and another from his family visited a hocca. From my family, 
it was my father; from his family, Cevdet, the brother of Recai, went 
to the hocca. In there, they told the hocca, “We are here to formalize 
an agreement. They will marry in the presence of Allah.” After that, 
a holy agreement was sealed. Since this is a secret act, I didn’t know 
that it was done.
V: Did you do this religious act for your children?
A2P: My mother-in-law asked whether we did such an act or 
not. She thought that if we did not do it, my daughter could not be 
“halal” to her husband. I said to her, “Yes, we did.” But actually we 
did not.
V: How about your son-in-law’s family?
A2P: Yes, the mother of the groom wanted to have a hocca act. I 
said to her, “Yes, we did, we solved it.” My son-in-law did not let her 
talk much about this subject.
V: Was there any religious ceremony that the groom’s family 
would have liked to do but you did not?
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A2P: No. My daughter and her husband did not want us to in-
terfere in their wedding process.
V: Where did you start living after marriage?
A2P: In those days, we had big financial problems. My family or 
his family could not manage to buy or build a new house for us. My 
mother-in-law told me: “I will give you two small rooms, one big 
room, and a kitchen. There is a room outside the house, we ourselves 
will live there.” In the end, we split their house in two. By the way, 
when we were engaged, they had told me that Recai had already 
initiated the process of buying a house. And it was true, for he was 
working in SASA (biggest factory in Adana), but the building con-
tractor did not keep his promise. Because of that, Recai withdrew 
his money and said, “I will not continue to pay you from now on.” 
After that decision, we could not buy a house anymore and “under 
obligation” we lived with his family. After that, he went to Saudi 
Arabia. He quitted his job and received material compensation for 
political reasons. With the sum of money from his material com-
pensation, we bought a piece of land on Kenan Evren boulevard. I 
moved in with my family after he went to Saudi Arabia and gave 
back our rooms to my mother-in-law. They were already living one 
on top of the other. I was going back and forth between my family 
and his family for seven years until we built our own house.
V: How about sharing work at home?
A2P: It is me who does everything. He knows only how to make 
a cup of tea.
V: You have two children. Is there any reason behind this deci-
sion?
A2P: I was against too many children in those days. I just want-
ed one child. The second one was an unintended pregnancy. My 
mother and mother-in-law expressed their hope for a second one. 
And people around me were not thinking like me. Many of them 
have more than three children. 
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V: How about your mother and father? Do you know how many 
brothers/sisters they had?
A2P: My mother had seven siblings, my father three. The reason 
why my father had only three siblings had nothing to do with his 
parents being against many children. Health problems prevented it.
V: What was the reaction towards having a “girl” or “boy”?
A2P: Boys were more valuable. If a newborn was a boy, people 
celebrated it like a festival because boys were thought important for 
maintaining the ancestral line. For me and my husband, such ideas 
were meaningless.
V: How do you solve problems related to your marriage?
A2P: We solved it together. Apart from us, no one can interfere 
in our family problems. Even I do not tell my own family members. 
Since Recai and I get on quite well, I am not eager to tell people of 
our own family issues.
V: Have you ever been divorced?
A2P: No.
V: Have you ever come to that point of wanting to seek a di-
vorce?
A2P: No, never. I have been the person who is dominant in our 
marriage. What would I do after divorce? I have a house. I have 
children. Even though I may have problems with my partner, we 
can solve it together. This talk of divorce is therefore meaningless. 
I have never thought of divorce or the possibility of going back to 
my mother’s house. Even though love between us is no longer how 
it used to be, I have a house, home, and children. Hence, there is no 
need for divorce whatsoever.
V: What are the names of your children? Why did you name 
your children like that?
A2P: Senem and Serhat. I chose their names. I took my spouse’s 
advice too, but I did not fancy the names he suggested. Both our 
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mothers’ name was Sabriye. That is why he offered the name Sabriye 
for our daughter. I said, “No way”. They did not want it as well. For 
the name Serhat, I do not remember, I think I heard it somewhere.
V: Did you give any religious education to your children? If yes, 
how?
A2P: We did not want to give any. But since other children were 
receiving religious education, my son wanted to have one. We said 
‘ok’, and sent him to an amca (a person who teaches religion to Alevi 
children in the Adana region). He was not taught one hundred per-
cent but for the sake of formality we sent him. We never encouraged 
him to pray, but sometimes he wanted to go. Apart from that, no 
one prays in our family.
Turkish version of the interview with A2P:
1957 doğumlu, ilkokul mezunu, Önce tarım sektöründe ardın-
dan 20 sene tekstil işinde çalıştı.
V: Kaç çocuk sahibisiniz.
A2P: 2.
V: Kaç çocuklu aileden geliyorsunuz.
A2P: 6 kardeş. 2 tane de ölen çocuk var. 1 menenjit hastalığı 
diğeri de iğneden öldü. İkisi de 18er aylıktı.
V: Nerede doğdunuz
A2P: Evde doğdum. Mahalledeki ebe aracılığı ile.
V: Sizin çocuklarınız?
A2P: Biri hastanede, diğeri evde. 2. Çocuğum evde doğdu. Ben 
öyle istedim. Hastane çok fazla ilgilenmediklerini duşundum. Eve 
özel ebe getirttim. Bu konularda uzmanlaşmış bir kişi getirttim. Biri 
tavsiye etti.
V: Şu anda bir çocuk yapma durumunda olsaydınız hastane mi 
yoksa yine ebeyi mi getirdiniz?
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A2P: O zamanın şartları ile şimdinin şartları değişik. O zaman 
öyle imkânlar vardı ama şimdi daha özel hastaneler daha iyi koşullar 
vardır.
V: Küçükken nasıl ısınırdınız?
A2P: Annem kömür yakardı, kömürle ısınırdık.
V: Hastalandığınızda çözüm olarak ne yapardınız?
A2P: Küçükken ailelerimiz çok fazla bilinçli değildi. Ancak 
çok ağırlaştığımız zaman doktoralara götürürlerdi. O zamanlar 
pratisyen doktoralar vardı. Yani böyle tam ölümcül olduğumuzda 
götürürlerdi. Bir ateş için falan götürmezlerdi.
V: Evlenmeden önce çalışmış mıydınız?
A2P: Evet tarlada çalışırdık.
V: Neydi göreviniz tarlada?
A2P: Kazma kazardık. Büyük ağaların tarlalarında pamuk 
zamanı kazma kazardık, pamuk toplardık. Çalışma arkadaşlarımız 
mahalledeki arkadaşlarımızdı.
V:Beraber çalıştığınız kişiler arasında sizden farklı dini kimliğe 
sahip olan kimseler var mıydı?
A2P: Yok, herkes aynı dini kökenden geliyordu.
V: Çalışma koşullarınız?
V: Bizden öncekilere nazaran daha iyi çalışma koşullarına sa-
hiptik. Bizden öncekiler örneğin yemeklerini ısıtmadan yerlerdi, biz 
ısıtıyorduk. Ateş yakardık kazma sapını koyardık, ısıtırdık. Çatal 
dahi götürürdük. Eğer canımız kebap isterse ırgat basını gönderir 
kebap isterdik. Tatil günlerimiz vardı, sinemaya giderdik, lokantaya 
gider kebabımızı yerdik.
V: Dayanaklı tüketim mallarına sahip miydiniz evlenmeden 
önce?
A2P: Ben 13-15 yasına kadar yoktu. Sonra hepsi oldu. 
Buzdolabımız yoktu, kafes koyardık telli kafes. Bir tabak yemek art-
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tı diyelim, onun içine koyardık. Gıdalar günlük alınırdı. Domatesler 
bizim bağdan gelirdi.
V: Etrafınızda tarımla mı yoksa sanayi ile mi uğraşan insan sayısı 
daha fazla idi.
A2P: Tarımla.
V: Etrafınızda ufak çocuklar ölür müydü?
A2P: Kızamık olduğunda ölürlerdi. Ya menenjit hastalığı diyor-
lar ona, beyne vururdu o. Ya sakat kalırlardı, ya da ölürlerdi. Benim 
kız kardeşim sakat kaldı. Ama komşumuzun çocuğu öldü. Dediler 
ki doktora götürmeyin, günahtır. Doktora götürmek günah demek-
ti. Herkes bunu geçirecek, geçirmese olmaz. Ölüme mahkûm ettiler.
V: Şu anda çocuğu kızamık olan biri ile karşılaşıyor musunuz?
A2P: Evet, yeğenlerim vardı örneğin, onlar doktora gittiler.
V: Sıcak su erişiminiz var mıydı?
A2P: Biz kendimiz dışarıda ısıtıyorduk ya da yazın güneşte 
bekletiyorduk. Onlarla duş yapardık. Kışın ateşte ısıtırdık odun 
ateşinin üstünde. Güneş enerjisi yoktu.
V: Evlenene kadar hangi şehirleri gördünüz?
A2P: Antakya ve çiftehan. Antakya’da ziyaretler vardı. Sabiha 
halam vardı, dine düşkündü, bizi götürürdü oraya. Orada türb-
eye geçerdik tabii. Antakya ve Çiftehan harici Urfa’ya balıklı gölü 
görmeye gittik.
V: Evlenmeden önce Arap-Alevisi olmayanlar var mıydı, nasıl 
tanışmıştınız?
A2P: Adana’daki kimi arkadaşlarımız öyleydi. Onlarla Çiftehan-
daki kaplıcalarda tanışmıştık. Gün yapardık, kendiler gelirdi. Biz gi-
derdik. Alevi olmamaları sorun teşkil etmezdi. Böyle konulara gir-
mezdik. Kendiler bizi seviyordu, biz onları seviyorduk, hiç aramıza 
girmesini istemiyorduk arkadaşlığımız iyi idi.
V: BU kız arkadaşlarınız haricinde etrafınızda Sünni kimse yok 
muydu?
VOLKAN ERTİT
362
A2P: Yoktu. Çünkü dar bir çerçevede idik, çalışma arkadaşlarımız, 
ırgatlar falan hep buralardan idi. Alevi olmayanlar ile karşılaşılan tek 
mekan Çiftehandı, çünkü yan odada idiler, tanışıyorduk.
V: Evlenmeden önce ailenizden bağımsız ev hayatınız oldu mu?
A2P: Yok.
V: Komşularınız arasında Arap Alevisi olmayan kimse var mıy-
dı?
A2P: Yok.
V: Evlenmeden önce erkek arkadaşınız hiç oldu mu?
A2P: Yok olmadı.
V: Eşinizle nasıl tanıştığınızı anlatabilir misiniz?
A2P: Ben onu tanıyordum mahalleden. O da beni tanıyordu. 
Kendinin kız arkadaşı vardı, seviyorlardı birbirlerini, hatta nişan-
landılar, ama aile karşı çıktı. Kız Türk olduğu hatta Kürt olduğu için. 
İstemediler. Direttiler. Recai önce ailesine uymadı, ama sonra kendisi 
istemedi. Sonra kız da ırk ayrımı yapmaya başladı, sonra Recai iste-
medi. Fabrikada tanışmışlardı. 2-3 sene sürmüştü. Sonra başka bir 
kız ile nişanlandı. Ama bu ikinci kızdan önce benimle nişanlanmak 
istedi, ben istemedim. Ben istemeyince gitti başka bir mahalleden 
kız ile nişanlandı. Sünni biri ile, ama tam emin değilim. Görücü 
usulü ile tanıştı o kişi ile. Ama anlaşamadılar, ayrıldılar. Daha sonra 
kayınvalidem ve kız kardeşi demişler ki Miyesseri tekrar isteyelim. 
O da tamam demiş. Geldiler, bastırdılar, benim çok niyetim yoktu, 
ama bastırınca benim de sevdiğim yoktu, hani birini sevmiş olsam, 
zaten çok fazla birilerini de beğenmiyordum, o zaman dedim ki boş 
ver, olsun dedim. Recai iyi bir insan, şairdi, ama görüntü olarak çok 
beğenmiyordum. Öyle bir evlilik yaptım.
V: İsteme bölümünü biraz anlatır mısınız?
A2P: Kayınvalidem geldi, babama kızını istiyorum dedi, ne di-
yorsun? Akrabalık da var arada. Babam uygun gördü. Sevdiğin var 
mı, yok dedim, Recai iyi efendi bir insan olsun mu? Önce çok sev-
medim, ama sonra sevgi oluştu aramızda.
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V: Mezhebi önemli miydi eşinizin?
A2P: Belki ailem çok kabul etmezdi ama benim için çok önem-
li değildi. Aslında hiç aklıma bile gelmiyordu. Sünni olsaydı belki 
ailem karsı çıkardı, annem de üzülürdü. Ama bunu hiç konuşmadık. 
Çünkü böyle bir şey ile karşılaşmadık. Beni isteyen herkes Arap idi.
V: Peki sizin çocuklarınızın başka bir dini kimlikten biri ile be-
raber olmasına nasıl bakıyorsunuz?
A2P: Eğer serhat şimdi bir Hristiyan ile evlenirse kesinlikle karsı 
çıkmam. Kızıma da karışmazdım, karsı çıkmam eğer kendisi isterse. 
Daha önce Kürt alevisin ile çıkıyordu, çok da sevmiştim onu, ama 
hiç karşılaşmadım ama. Sünni biri ile kısa süreli bir ilişkisi oldu, ama 
hiç karışmadık.
V: Çocuklarınız eş seçiminde kendi anne babalarından bir talep 
ile karşılaştılar mı?
A2P: Yok, çünkü anne baba çok ayrım yapmadığımız için çok 
fazla şey yapmıyorlar.
V: Kısaca söz ve nişan nasıl oldu anlatır mısınız?
A2P: Önce geldiler istediler. Anne baba evet dedi, ben de evet 
dedim. Aile içi akrabalar ile tatlı yendi, yüzük takıldı. Daha sonra 
nişan oldu.
V: Bu sürede herhangi bir dini şahıs dahil oldu mu?
A2P: Nikahta oldu.
V: oraya geleceğiz, söz ya da nişanda oldu mu?
A2P: Yok.
V: Nişanı anlatır mısınız?
A2P: Nişan salonda oldu. Düğün gibi. Orada nişan yüzükleri 
takıldı. Nişanda da dini motifli herhangi bir sey olmadı. 4 ay sonra 
düğün oldu. Söz kesiminden 1 ay sonra nişan, 3 ay sonra da düğün 
oldu.
V: Düğün zamanı dini motifli bir şey oldu mu?
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A2P: Olmadı. Sadece hocanın yanına gidildi, bizden bir kişi on-
lardan bir kişi. Bizden benim babam, onlardan Recai’nin abisi Ce-
vdet abi hocanın yanına gittiler. Diyorlar ki hocaya akit yapacağız. 
Bunlar Allah huzurunda evlenecek. Ondan sonra yapılıyor akit. 
Ben bunu duymuyorum bile. Kendi aralarında yapmışlar ben sonra 
duyuyorum.
V: Kendi çocuklarınıza yaptınız mı?
A2P: Kayınvalidem sordu yaptınız mı diye, helal olsun diye. Evet 
yaptık dedim ama yapmadık.
V: Karşı taraf istemedi mi?
A2P: Karşı taraf istedi. Damadın annesi. Ona da yaptık hallettik 
dedim. Dediler ki bizden de gitmesi gerekir. Damadım annesine 
söyledi biz hallettik diye, çok konuşturmadılar.
V: Peki onların istediği ama sizin yapmak istemediğiniz bir şey 
oldu mu dini motifli?
A2P: Yok olmadı, gençler çok karıştırtmadı.
V: Ev eşyaları nasıl alındı ve nerede yaşadınız?
A2P: Benim eşim fabrikada çalışıyordu. Çalıştığı için gittik 
bütün eşyaları taksitle aldık. O zaman kredi kartı yoktu. Mobilyayı 
beyaz eşyaları. Bana düşenleri ben almıştım zaten. Annemler aldı 
bana.
V: Size düşen bir şey mı vardı?
A2P: Öyle bir ayrım vardı. İlk nişanlandığında soruyorlar. Siz 
bunu alacaksınız, biz bunu alacağız diye. Mesela bize düşen ney, 
koltuk takımını aldık biz mesela, iki halı, bütün halılar. Herkes öy-
leydi. İki kanepe, koltuklar kız tarafı alırdı. Örtüler, yataklar, yastıklar 
ile ilgili şeyler kız tarafı alırdı. Erkek tarafı buzdolabı, fırın, çamaşır, 
televizyon, yatak odası, perdeler erkek tarafı alırdı.
V: Bunlar alınmadığı takdirde sorunlar yaşanır mıydı?
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A2P: Bir eşya alınmadığı takdirde ciddi sorunlar yaşanırdı. Diy-
orlar ki bu eşyayı ben almam, siz alacaksınız. En ufak bir tüpün bile 
lafı olurdu.
V: Kuşak merasimi yapıldı mı?
A2P: Yapıldı. Benim 3 erkek kardeşim de yaptı. 3 de kuşak 
bağladı.
V: Anlamı nedir?
A2P: Bilmiyorum ama kuşak muhakkak bağlanır geline.
V: Düğün sonrası dönemde nerede oturma kararı aldınız bu 
kararın sebebi neydi?
A2P: O zamanlar maddi imkanlar tabii. Tek basıma bana ev 
yaptıramazlardı. Kayınvalidem dedi ki biz size iki oda bir salon 
ve mutfak size vereceğiz. Bizde ayrı oturacağız. Dışarıda ayrı oda 
vardı. bizim evden ayrı bir oda verdik kendilerine. Dışarıdan kapısı. 
Onarın yaşadığı eve böldük, bir bölümünü biz bir bölümünü on-
lar kullandı. Ama ben nişanlandığımda bana dediler ki Recai kata 
yazılmış o zamandan. Ve doğru yazılmıştı. Sasa da çalışıyordu, 
ama o zaman müteahhit oyun oynadı. Oyun oynadığı için Recai 
çekilmek zorunda kaldı. Parasını çekti, dedi ben yatırmayacağım, 
gitti parasını geri aldı. Geri aldığı için dairemiz olmadı, mecburen 
kayınvalide ile oturduk. Daha sonra Arabistan’a gitti. Sasadan çıktı 
siyasi olaylardan dolayı. Tazminatını aldı. O paranın bir bolumu ile 
gittik arsa aldık Kenan Evren’den. Kayınvalidemgile evi verdim o 
gidince. Ben de aileme geldim. Zaten onlar üst üste yaşıyorlardı. Bir 
orada kalırdım bir burada kalırdım. 7 yıl beraber yaşadım bir orada 
bir burada. Sonra evimizi yaptırdık.
V: evdeki iş bölümü?
A2P: Hepsini ben yapıyorum. Sadece çay demler.
V: İki çocuk yapmanızın sebebi karar mıydı, yoksa olmadı mı?
A2P: Ben fazla çocuğa karşıydım o zamanlar. Bir tane istiyordum 
2.si kaza oldu. Kayınvalidem ve annem olsun istediler. Ben iste-
memiştim. Tabii benim çevrem öyle değildi, çoğu 3-4 çocuk yaptı.
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V: Anneniz ve babanız
A2P: Annemler 7 kardeşti, babamlar 3 kardeşti. Ama isteyerek 
değil, isterlerdi daha fazla olsun. 
V: Kız ve erkek çocuklar arasında fark var mıydı?
A2P: Erkek daha değerli idi, erkek doğduğunda bayram yapar-
lardı soyun devamını getireceği için. Bizim için değil ama benim ya 
da eşim için bunun bir önemi yoktu.
V: Evlilik ile ilgili sorunların çözümünde neler yapmaktasınız?
A2P: Eşimle çözerdim, dışarıya taşırmazdım. Kendi aileme bile 
anlatmazdım. Gerek kalmazdı çünkü. Recai uyumlu idi, ben de çok 
fazla anlatmak istemezdim. Aramızda çözerdik.
V: Hiç boşanma yaşadınız mı?
A2P: yok.
V: Boşanma noktasına hiç geldiniz mi?
A2P: Yok, hiç o noktaya gelmedik. Ben daha hakimdim. Boşanıp 
da ne yapacağım diyordum. Benim bir evim var. Çocuklarım var. 
Eşimle sorunum olsa dahi çözeceğimi düşünüyordum. Onun için 
hiç yani. Boşanıp aileme gideyim diye hiç düşünmüyordum. Çünkü 
evim var, yuvam var, çocuklarım var, bu hayatı benimsiyordum 
her ne kadar çok büyük bir ask olmasa da arada. Gerek yok diye 
düşünüyordum.
V: Çocuklarınızın isimleri nelerdir, neden o isimleri koydunuz?
A2P: Senem ve serhat. İki ismi de ben koydum. Eşime danıştım, 
eşimin söylediği isimleri beğenmedim. Benim ve onun annesinin 
ismi Sabriye idi, Sabriye koymak istedi. Ben mümkün değil dedim, 
benim annemle kayınvalidem de istemedi. Serhat’ı da bilmiyorum, 
duymuştum bir yerlerden. Senemi de duymuştum bir yerlerden.
V: Çocuklarınıza din eğitimi verdiniz mi, verdiyseniz kim verdi?
A2P: Din eğitimi biz vermek istemedik. Benim oğlum herkes 
namaz öğreniyor diye ben de öğreneyim dedi. Tamam dedik. Öyle 
gönderdik kendini, gitti, tam öğrenmedi ama adet yerini bulsun diye 
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gönderdik. Namazlara gitmesi için teşvik etmedik, kendisi gitmek 
istedi. Onun haricinde dini ibadet edilmiyor.
V: Hangi hallerde boşanırdınız?
A2P: Beni ezse idi boşanırdım. Ama hep mülaim olduğu için hiç 
düşünmedim.
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APPENDIX C
THE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SAMPLE WITH A CHILD
The interview conducted with A2C on 05.08.2014 in Adana
V: How many siblings do you have?
A2C I have a brother who is younger than me. 
V: Do you know how many siblings your parents have?
A2C: My father has 9, my mother has 6.
V: Do you know where your mother/father was born?
A2C: My mother was born at home with the help of a midwife. 
No idea where my father was born but most likely at home, too.
V: How many children do you want to have?
A2C: Right now, I do not want any children. But if I can over-
come my sense of uncertainty in this regard, I prefer to have only 
one child.
V: Is there any special reason behind your decision?
A2C: Firstly, I think “being married” is a very tedious and trou-
blesome thing. Given that it is already difficult enough to maintain 
one’s marriage with just two people, I cannot imagine adding an-
other person to it, even a child. I am not ready to bear the respon-
sibility of raising a child with my husband. I do not agree with my 
husband on different subjects. And so it is not easy for us to decide 
together on anything. I am a kind of person who is more organized. 
In contrast, my husband is a person who takes each day as it comes. 
I always have to restrain or check him which makes me exhausted. 
If a child comes to our life, s/he will only bring more responsibili-
ties. Because of that, I am not that much eager to have a baby right 
now. If my husband’s disposition is like mine even just a little, I 
might have been more willing to have a child.
V: Do other people around you force you and your husband to 
have a child?
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A2C: I do not care about that kind of pressure. I really do not 
care. There are people who remind us of this all the time but this 
does not influence me at all.
V: If you give birth in the future, where will your child be born, 
home or hospital?
A2C: I prefer to give birth to a child in a hospital. It is more 
dependable and safer.
V: Do you have any idea how your mother/father were living - 
their house conditions - at your age?
A2C: Generally, they used a wood heater. The conditions at my 
father’s were much worse than at my mother’s. My father’s family 
was poorer and impoverished. This was the case because his family 
was larger than my mother’s. I think that my mother’s family used a 
wood heater as well. After electric heaters became widespread, they 
started to use it.
V: Have you any idea of their housing conditions?
A2C: My mother’s family had a wood heater, even in their bath. 
After that, they used a bath stove, and later water heater with gas. 
I do not remember the conditions at my father’s, for I was so little 
at the time.
V: What differences/similarities can you tell between their hous-
es and the house where you spent your childhood?
A2C: Before my time, everyone used the same parlour. In order 
to sleep, many small beds were placed together and all members of 
the family, apart from father and mother, slept together on the floor. 
When I look back at my childhood, there were three rooms and 
one big parlour. Each family member had one room for him/herself 
since there were only two children in the family.
V: Do you have any idea what kind of methods they used to seek 
healing?
A2C: They used folk remedies. As far as I remember, when my 
aunt became severely sick with typhoid with severe fever, she was 
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not taken to the hospital because it was thought that going to the 
hospital was a sinful act. She used medicine at home, and she was 
cured at home. On the other hand, my other aunt fell into hot oil 
and got burnt but she was not taken to the hospital immediately. 
She died. If they had lived in better conditions, she might still be 
living today.
V: What’s your methods of healing when you are diagnosed with 
a disease?
A2C: If I get sick now, of course I would benefit from social 
welfare. I can go to the hospital to be treated in the modern facilities 
there.
V: Did you ever work before marriage?
A2C: Yes, at a bank.
V: Where was the bank located?
A2C: At the city center.
V: With whom were you in communication?
A2C: Mostly businessmen, but actually people from all social 
classes. Let’s say they were mixed.
V: Do you have any idea which religious denominations the peo-
ple you were in contact with at the bank belonged to?
A2C: There were from different religious backgrounds. There 
were Armenians who were one hundred percent Muslim. I was in 
communication with Sunnis and there was no problem at all.
V: Before marriage, what kind of durable consumer goods did 
you possess?
A2C: I owned quite a lot before marriage. Actually, I had some 
of them in my mother’s house and some in my own home after 
marriage. 
V: Where do people (around you) work, in the agricultural sector 
or in others?
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A2C: They are working at the city center. My mother and father 
worked in the agricultural sector, but later became urbanized. 
V: Have you lost any child because of disease? Or do you know 
people who have lost their children because of childhood diseases?
A2C: Hmm, I think, it happened once. But it was not in my 
social environment; rather, it happened to one of my husband’s rel-
atives. His sister’s children died when she was pregnant for eight 
months. The reason was legal cruelty. In addition, one of my ac-
quaintances’ child died because of a wrapped cord.
V: Have you ever encountered any death because of disease or 
infection after birth?
A2C: Most probably, but I do not remember anymore.
V: Did you have access to hot water?
A2C: Yes, we had solar energy technology.
V: Which cities have you visited before marriage? And why?
A2C: I went to İstanbul to work there for one year. I was also 
in Ankara just for a visit. And I stayed one year in Mersin while 
preparing for my university entrance exam. Hmm, I have also been 
in İzmir.
V: Have you ever spent time with non-Alevis before marriage?
A2C: Most of them were already non-Alevis.
V: Where or how did you communicate with them?
A2C: Generally at work or university.
V: Have you ever lived alone (free from your family) before mar-
riage?
A2C: Yes. When I was working in İstanbul and living in Mersin, 
I was free then from my family. And when I went to university, I and 
my brother rented a house in Adana but lived apart from our family.
V: Do you remember the neighborly relations in those buildings?
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A2C: In those buildings, our neighborly relations were not warm. 
One of my neighbors in Mersin was a police officer. The other was a 
housewife. One of my other neighbors was accidentally my mother’s 
distant relative. In Istanbul, there was a student couple, and so I did 
not experience problems there with my neighbors.
V: Why did you not experience problems with them?
A2C: Because I had many visitors (women and men), and my 
neighbors did not bother me. Nobody was disturbing me.
V: Do you have any connection with those neighbors still?
A2C: No. Just with my mother’s cousin. Apart from her, I do not 
see any of them anymore.
V: Did you have boyfriends – except your husband - before mar-
riage?
A2C: Yes, I did.
V: How did you meet them?
A2C: Through a friend, at university, and on the internet.
V: Did your family members know your boyfriends?
A2C: Yes, of course. Some of my boyfriends were introduced to 
my family. But not all of them. My family did not know my short-
term dates, only the long-term ones.Yes, of course. But not all of 
them. If it was only a fling, they did not know.
V: Have you ever dated non-Alevis?
A2C: All of them were non-Alevis. One of them was Kurd-
ish-Alevi, and all the others were Sunni.
V: What were the reactions of your family in terms of their re-
ligious identity?
A2C: My family is very open-minded on this subject. There was 
no polemic on this subject between us. Since their approach is very 
humanistic, they do not care about the denominations of my boy-
friends. I was free to do it my way. Even once, my father told me that 
people from other denominations make our family colorful.
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V: Did your husband’s religious identity influence your decision 
in terms of marriage?
A2C: My husband is Alevi as well. But it did not affect my de-
cision. Being Alevi does not bring any advantage to my family. The 
important thing for my family was whether my husband makes me 
happy or not. My decision was not influenced by his religious iden-
tity. It took me one month to learn that he was an Alevi.
V: Could you say something about how you got married? How 
did your families meet?
A2C: We flirted for six years, from our university years to the 
time we got our jobs. We were engaged in a very simple way while 
flirting. At the engagement ceremony, our two families met. I had 
never met them before that engagement ceremony. They had not 
come to our house to ask for my hand before the engagement. But 
my family had met my spouse beforehand. Our engagement came 
into being in this way: we were working outside of Adana and were 
living together.
V: Did your families know that you were living together before 
marriage?
A2C: Yes, they did. In addition, they were supporting us materi-
ally and spiritually. So, we came to Adana just for one day to engage. 
After that, he went to do his military service. Wedding ceremony 
was done after he finished his military service. His family did not 
support us materially but my family did because they were closer to 
us and knew us better.
V: Who was responsible for the marriage contract?
A2C: The registrar general of marriage.
V: Was there a religious person in charge of your wedding/en-
gagement ceremonies?
A2C: We were absolutely against it.
V: Why did you not permit religious ceremonies?
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A2C: We are not believers when it comes to these subjects. Peo-
ple around us did not force us to do that kind of things as well. 
Maybe we did not allow them to force us.
V: Did not anyone suggest such a ceremony?
A2C: My husband’s family has a way with religious people but 
since we were not on good terms with them, they could not force us.
V: Could you tell me briefly about your wedding ceremony?
A2C: It was very unpretentious and modest. Not very long. Af-
ter that, we put on entertainment with people we like. It was not a 
wedding which was organized in light of traditions or customs.
V: Did your relatives tie a red band over your belly?
A2C: No, it did not happen. I did not want it. I think we should 
get rid of traditionalism.
V: Do you have any idea why red bands are tied onto the brides’ 
belly? Why were you against it?
A2C: Actually I do not know exactly why there is such a tradi-
tion. I think it is a kind of custom or a habit.
V: Where did you begin to live after marriage? What was the 
reason behind your decision?
A2C: We decided to live at the city center. We preferred a dis-
trict where we can find peace when we get home from work.
V: Did you ever think of staying with your family or your hus-
band’s family?
A2C: Never. But, right now we are living with my family because 
of our financial situation.
V: How about sharing chores at home?
A2C: My husband irons his own clothes. Sometimes, he hangs 
out the laundry. But everything else is done by me.
V: Why do you think your husband only does very few chores 
around the house?
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A2C: I do not think it has anything to do with my husband hav-
ing certain prejudices. If I want anything done, most likely he will 
do it. But I do not want him to do it. I do not give him that chance. 
Because right now, I am not working but he goes to work every day 
and is exhausted at the end of the day. However, to be honest, when 
we were working together, I was the person who does all the house-
work. Unfortunately, whenever he cleans somewhere, I have to clean 
that part again after he does it.
V: If you decide to have a baby, what would be your preference, 
boy or girl?
A2C: I do not have that kind of preferences but I think my hus-
band wants to be the father of a girl. He thinks that he can get along 
better with a girl than with a boy.
V: How do you solve problems related to your marriage?
A2C: Firstly, we prefer to fight. My husband does not want a 
third person to interfere in our marriage. But sometimes we share 
our problems with some of our friends.
V: Have you decided on the names of your children yet?
A2C: I do not remember exactly what we chose but we decide 
together on this subject. Dora, Armin - that kind of names I re-
member. My husband prefers Ege or Deniz. I like names which 
mirror me better. For example, Arya (Aria) since I am interested in 
music. Or maybe we can choose a name which matches our names 
well such as Arif - Arya - Alya.
V: How did you become interested in music?
A2C: Not right now, but at one time I was playing the guitar.
V: If you have a child in the future, are you going to give him/
her a religious education? If yes, what kind of education would it be?
A2C: I think religious education is not necessary. Knowledge is 
something that you can attain easily nowadays. Therefore I do not 
think that they need to have an education on religion. But my hus-
band thinks the other way around. For example, he wants to send 
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our child to do a course on the Qur’ān. And he thinks that if our 
child internalizes what the Qur’ān says, then s/he would be a very 
religious person. But if s/he does not agree with what the Qur’ān 
teaches, then s/he is free to be an atheist. It depends on what s/he 
wants. We haven’t decided yet, but since religious education might 
affect my child’s psychology, I might take a stand against it. İt might 
be a very good reason to have a fight.
V: Have you ever divorced?
A2C: No. Neither of us nor my parents have experienced such 
a case.
V: Are there any obstacles if you want to divorce?
A2C: There are no obstacles to divorce. It is meaningless to con-
tinue in marriage if two persons do not get along with each other. 
Of course my family do not force me to stay married, even though 
they would support my decision if I am not happy. I don’t care what 
people say if I decide to get divorced.
V: If you want to divorce, don’t you care about what other people 
think?
A2C: Of course we do care about their reactions. But if there is 
no happy marriage, what people think becomes secondary.
V: What would you say if you are asked to compare potential 
reactions to your divorce and that of your mother?
A2C: Because I have economic freedom, I think I now have the 
possibility to change my social circle. Or, even if I could not change 
my social environment, I can shut my ears to all gossips or social 
pressure. During my mother’s divorce, unfortunately there was no 
economic freedom then for women as the social environment was 
so oppressive. Compared to their time, our age is more free, our 
lifestyle easier, and people have gotten used to these kinds of things. 
My mother’s time was not open to welcoming different lifestyles. 
To be honest, I can say that I am luckier than my mother when it 
comes to divorce.
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V: So, in which situations would you prefer to divorce?
A2C: If I am cheated on. Or, if my husband loses money because 
of some secret initiatives of his. I can give him a second chance but 
if it happens again, then I would divorce him of course. Material 
discrepancy is crucial to me. For example, if he sells our real estate 
without asking me, that would be reason enough to divorce.
V: If you have a child in the future, are you disturbed if s/he flirts 
before marriage?
A2C: Since I myself have done flirting several times, there is no 
problem for me. However, I wish s/he will not make the same mis-
takes I did. I might warn her/him. Of course they should be open 
to flirting. But, sometimes ladies might be more sensitive and might 
be deceived by a man’s romantic innuendos. I can warn her against 
some potential disappointment.
V: If your child follows a different faith to yours, what would be 
your reaction?
A2C: We have to respect it since it is her/his own choice. If you 
react to it angrily, you won’t be able to change it, and you might even 
make it worse.
Turkish version of the interview with A2C:
V: Çocukluğunuz hakkında kısaca konuşabilir miyiz? Kaç çocuk-
lu bir ailede büyüdünüz? Anne babanız nasıl evlendi?
A2C: Annem babam görücü usulü ile evlendiler. Bir kardeşim 
var. 4 kişilik bir aileyiz.
V: Anne babanız kaçar kardeşliydiler.
A2C: Babam 9 kardeş. Annem 6.
V: Anne babanız nerede doğdular.
A2C: Annem evde doğdu babamdan emin değilim ama sanırım 
o da evde doğmuştur.
V: Siz kaç çocuk sahibi olmak istersiniz?
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A2C: Şu an için hiç çocuk sahibi olmak istemiyorum. Ama eğer 
karasızlığımı yenebilirsem belki bir tane olabilir.
V: Bu kararınızda ya da kararsızlığınızda etkili olan özel bir se-
bep var mı?
A2C: 1. Evliliği çok meşakkatli bir şey olarak görüyorum. 2 
kişi ile dahi evliliği sürdürmek zor iken 3 kişi bana fazla yorucu 
geliyor. O yüzden hani bazı endişelerim var bir çocuğun sorumlu-
luğu konusunda, eşimle olan çatışmalarda. Evlilikte çok çatışmalar 
yaşıyoruz her konuda. Karar verirken, karar alırken büyük sıkıntılar 
yaşıyoruz. Ben biraz daha planlı giden, eşim ise biraz daha günü anı 
yaşayan biri. Sürekli frene basma durumunda kalıyorum bu da beni 
yoruyor. Çocuk işin içine girince daha ağır sorumluluklar getirece-
ktir, o yüzden çocuk beni bayağı düşündüren bir şey şu anda. Ko-
camın karakteri biraz daha benzer olsa idi bana, çocuk konusunda 
biraz daha hevesli olabilirdim. 
V: Etraftan baskı görüyor musunuz çocuk konusunda?
A2C: Etraftaki baskı çok önemsiz benim için, hiç önemsemiyo-
rum. Sürekli söyleyenler oluyor ama bu beni hiç etkilemiyor. 
V: Eğer çocuk sahibi olursanız nerede doğurmayı düşünüyor-
sunuz? Evde mi yoksa başka bir yerde mi?
A2C: Hastanede doğurmayı tercih ederim. Daha güvenli ve ster-
il olması açısından.
V: Annenizin ve babanızın sizlerin yaşında iken yaşadıkları ev 
koşullarına dair bir fikriniz var mı?
A2C: Odunlu soba ile genelde ısınırlarmış. Babamların şartları 
annemlerin şartlarına göre daha ağırmış. Muhtemelen çok daha 
fazla çocuğa sahip olduklarından dolayı daha fakir ve yoksullardı. 
Annemler de odunlu soba ile ısınıyorlardı diye biliyorum. Elektrikli 
soba çıktıktan sonra ona geçmişlerdir.
V: Ev koşullarını hatırlıyor musunuz?
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A2C: Banyoda odunlu sobaları olduğunu hatırlıyorum, sonra 
termosifonlar çıktı ama şofben yoktu. Babamları tam hatırlamıyo-
rum çok küçüktüm onlarla yaşarken, anneannemleri hatırlıyorum. 
V: Sizin çocukluğunuzun geçtiği ev ile onların çocukluklarının 
geçtiği ev arasında ne gibi farklılıklar ve benzerlikler var?
A2C: Anne-babamın evlerinde bir salonu herkes kullanıyordu 
yer yatağı seriliyor ve herkes bir arada yaşıyordu. Benim çocukluğum 
ise 3 oda bir salonlu, banyosu ayrı, bir ev idi. 2 çocuktuk zaten.
V: Onlar hastalandığında çözüm olarak nereye başvuruyorlardı?
A2C: Kendi ürettikleri şeyler oluyordu. Hatırladığım kadarı 
ile teyzem rahatsızlandığı zaman, tifo geçirdi örneğin, hastaneye 
götürmediler günahtır diye. Hala ilaçlar alır bu yüzden. Evde tedavi 
ettiler. Ayrıca diğer teyzem yağın içine düşmüş, yetiştirememişler ve 
ölmüş. Eğer imkânlar sağlanabilseydi hayatta olacaktı belki de.
V: Siz hastalandığınızda ne yapıyorsunuz?
A2C: Şu an hastalandığımda tabii ki sosyal imkânlarımdan fay-
dalanıyorum. Hastaneye gidip modern tıp olanaklarını kullanabili-
yorum. 
V: Evlenmeden önce çalıştınız mı?
A2C: Evet, bankada çalıştım.
V: Nerede çalışıyordunuz?
A2C: Şehir içinde çalışırdım. 
V: Kimler ile diyalog kurardınız?
A2C: Genelde iş adamları vardı, ya aslında her kesimden kişi 
vardı, karışık diyelim.
V: Diyalog halinde olduğunuz kişilerin dini aidiyetleri sizinki ile 
farklılık taşıyor muydu?
A2C: Farklı dini gruplardandı. Ermeni de vardı, tamami ile 
Müslüman da vardı. Sünnilerle de diyalog halinde idim, aram da 
iyiydi.
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V: Evlenmeden önce dayanaklı tüketim eşyalarından hangisine 
sahiptiniz?
A2C: Evlenmeden önce birçoğuna sahiptim. Hem annemlerin 
evinde iken sahiptim hem de evlenmeden önce yaşadığım evde de 
vardı.
V: Sosyalleştiğiniz insanlar tarımla mı ilgilenirlerdi yoksa şehird-
eki iş kollarında mı çalışırlardı.
A2C: Şehirdeki iş kolları. Annemle babamlar tarımla ilgilenirle-
rdi ama sonra yavaş yavaş şehirleştiler.
V: Yakın çevrenizde ya da etrafınızda çocuk ölümleri yaşandı mı?
A2C: Oldu diye hatırlıyorum, benim çevremde değil de eşimin 
çevresinde. Ablasının çocukları öldü. Hamile iken ablası koca şid-
detinden dolayı 8 aylıkken bebekler karında öldüler. 1 tanıdığımın 
da çocuğu kordon dolanmasından dolayı öldü.
V: Doğduktan sonra yaşadığı hastalık ya da enfeksiyondan dolayı 
ölen bir çocukla karşılaştınız mı?
A2C: Muhakkak vardır ama hatırlamıyorum.
V: Sıcak suya erişiminiz var mıydı?
A2C: Evet, güneş enerjimiz vardı.
V: Evlenmeden önce Adana dışına çıktınız mı? Evet ise hangi 
şehirlere neden gittiniz?
A2C: İstanbul’a gittim 1 sene çalışmak için. Ankara’ya gittim 
gezme amaçlı. Ayrıca Mersinde 1 sene kalmıştım üniversite sınavı-
na hazırlanmak için. İzmir’de de bulunmuştum.
V: Evlenene kadar bulunduğunuz ortamlarda alevi olmayan in-
sanlar var mıydı?
A2C: Zaten çoğunluğu alevi değildi.
V: Nerelerde karşılaşıyordunuz?
A2C: Genelde iş ortamı veya okul ortamlarında oluyordu.
V: Evlenmeden önce ailenizden bağımsız ev hayatınız oldu mu?
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A2C: Oldu. İstanbul’da çalışırken oldu, Mersinde olmuştu. Ad-
ana’da üniversite okurken de kardeşim ev tutmuştu, onunla kal-
mıştık.
V: Bu evlerdeki komşularınızla ilişkileriniz nasıldı?
A2C: Genelde seçtiğim apartmanlar böyle çok fazla komşuluk 
ilişkileri yakın olmayan yerlerdi. Mersindeki bir komşumuz polisti. 
Diğer komşumuz ev hanımı idi. Bir komşum da tesadüf annemin 
kuzeni idi. İstanbul’da bir öğrenci çift vardı. O nedenle sorun çık-
mıyordu?
V: Neden sorun çıkmıyordu dediniz?
A2C: Çünkü benim de evime giden gelenler oluyordu. Kimse 
rahatsızlık vermiyordu erkek olsun kız olsun.
V: O dönemden kalan komşularınızla hala diyalogunuz var mı?
A2C: Yok hayır. Bir tek annemin o kuzeni var, onun haricinde 
herhangi bir diyalogum yok.
V: Evlenmeden önce erkek arkadaşınız olmuş muydu şu andaki 
eşiniz haricinde?
A2C: Evet olmuştu.
V: Nasıl tanışmıştınız?
A2C: Biri ile arkadaş vasıtası ile, diğeri ile üniversiteden, diğeri 
ile internet üstünden.
V: erkek arkadaşlarınızı aileniz biliyorlar mıydı?
A2C: Tabii biliyorlardı ama hepsini değil. Kısa süreli olanları 
bilmiyorlardı ama uzun süreli olunca tanışıyorlardı.
V: Bu ilişkileriniz içinde sizinle aynı dini kökenden olmayanlar 
var mıydı?
A2C: Hepsi farklı mezheptendi zaten. Bir tanesi Kürt Alevisi 
idi, ben Arap Alevisiyim, diğerleri Sünni idi.
V: Aileniz onların dini kökenleri hakkında olumlu ya da olum-
suz bir geri bildirimde bulundular mı?
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A2C: Bu konuda ailem çok esnektir, hiç zıtlaşma olmadı. Daha 
hümanist yaklaştıkları için olaylara mezhepsel bakmıyorlardı. Bana 
bırakmışlardı kararı. Babamın dediğine göre farklı bir renkti onlar 
için farklı mezhepten olan biri.
V: Eşinizin dini kimliği evlilik kararınızda etkili oldu mu?
A2C: Eşim de Arap Alevisidir, ancak bir etkisi olmadı. Onun 
Arap olması ailem için bir avantaj değildi. Onlar için o insanın beni 
mutlu etmesi önemliydi. Beni de hiç etkilemedi zaten ben bir ay 
sonra öğrendim onun Arap Alevisi olduğunu.
V: Kız isteme olayı yaşandı mı, yaşandı ise nasıl oldu?
A2C: Eşimle biz 6 yıl flört ettik. Üniversite sürecinden iş bula-
na kadar. O flört içerisinde kısa bir nişan yaptık. O nişan zamanı 
tanıştık ailesi ile. Daha önce tanışmışlığım olmadı. Bir isteme falan 
olmadı, aileler de o zaman tanıştılar. Ama eşim ile ailem tanışıyor-
lardı. Nişan şu şekil oldu, biz çalışıyorduk şehir dışında, beraber 
yaşıyorduk.
V: Beraber yaşadığınızdan ailelerinizin haberi var mıydı?
A2C: Evet vardı. Ayrıca destek oluyorlardı zaten maddi manevi. 
İşte bir günlüğüne adanaya gelip nişan yaptık. Sonra eşim askere 
gitti döndü sonra düğün yaptık. Onun ailesi maddi anlamda çok 
destek olmadı ama benim ailem çok destek oldu maddi oldu. Çünkü 
benim ailem bizimle daha sıkı fıkı idi, ilişkimizin boyutunu onlar 
biliyordu.
V: Ev eşyalarını nasıl aldınız?
A2C: Maddi olarak ikimiz de çalışıyordunuz ayrıca benim aile-
min desteği çok oldu. Ev eşyalarına ben ve eşim karar verdik, kimse 
müdahale etmedi. Erkek tarafı kız tarafı olmadı, ortaya bir para 
kondu ve onunla alındı. Ailesi ile problemler yaşadığımız için biz 
ikimiz ortadaki parayı kullandık benim ailemden gelen.
V: Nikâhınızı kim kıydı?
A2C: Nikâh memuru.
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V: Nikahınızın öncesinde ya da sonrasında herhangi bir dini 
şahıs gelip dahil oldu mu, dini tören düzenlendi mi?
A2C: Buna kesinlikle izin vermedik.
V: Neden izin vermediniz?
A2C: Bu konularda çok inançlı olmadığımız için yapmadık. 
Etraftan da baskı görmedik, izin vermedik böyle bir baskı yapma-
larına.
V: Hiç kimse telkin etmedi mi?
A2C: Eşim ailesinin biraz hacı hocalarla işleri vardır ancak on-
larla aramız çok iyi olmadığından onlar da karışamadılar.
V: Düğün töreninizi kısaca anlatabilir misiniz?
A2C: Sakin bir tören, çok uzun sürmeyen, ardından da sevdiğimiz 
insanlar ile bir eğlence düzenledik. Çok gelenek göreneklere bağlı 
bir düğün değildi.
V: Kuşak merasimi yapıldı mı?
A2C: Olmadı, ben istemedim. Gelenekçilikten vazgeçilmesi ge-
rekiyor bence.
V: Kuşak merasimi neden yapılmaktadır, ve siz neden karşı çık-
tınız?
A2C: Kuşak merasiminin tam olarak ne olduğunu da bilmiyo-
rum. Bana gelenek gibi geliyor. Bağımlılık gibi geliyor.
V: Düğün sonrası nerede oturma kararı aldınız? Ve bu kararı 
almanızın sebebi nelerdir?
A2C: Merkezde oturma kararı aldık. İşten geldiğimde huzur bu-
lacağımız bir yer tercih ettik.
V: Aile ile oturmayı düşünmediniz mi?
A2C: Hiçbir zaman düşünmedik. Şu anda aile ile beraberiz ama 
maddi durumlardan dolayı.
V: İş bölümünü nasıl gerçekleştiriyorsunuz?
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A2C: Eşim kendi ütüsünü yapar, bazen çamaşırları serer, evin 
geri kalan bütün işlerini ben yaparım.
V: Eşinizin yapmamasının sebebi nedir diğer işleri?
A2C: Eşimin belli kalıpları olduğu için değil de, istesem yapardı 
hani, ona bu fırsatı vermiyorum. Çünkü ben su an çalışmıyorum 
ve o yorulduğun için ona yaptırmak istemiyorum. Ancak ikimizin 
çalıştığı dönemde de ben yapıyordum ancak hep onun üzerinden 
gidiyorum o yapsa da o nedenle yapmasını istemiyorum.
V: Kız ya da erkek çocuk yapma tercihiniz var mı?
A2C: Benim yok ama eşim sanırım kız çocuk istiyordu kız 
çocukları ile daha iyi anlaşacağını düşündüğünden dolayı.
V: Evlilik ile ilgili bir sorununuzun çözümünde hangi yöntem-
lere başvuruyorsunuz?
A2C: Öncelikle kavga etmeyi tercih ediyoruz. Eşim 3. Kişileri 
tartışmaya dahil etmeyi kabul etmiyor. Ama arkadaşlarımıza bazen 
danışıyoruz.
V: Çocuklarına vermek istediğiniz isimlere karar verdiniz mi?
A2C: Tam hatırlamıyorum ama isimlere ortak karar veriyoruz. 
Dora vardı, Armin vardı. O tarz isimler vardı. Eşim Ege Deniz gibi 
isimleri tercih ediyor. Ben daha çok beni yansıtan isimleri tercih 
ediyorum. Arya gibi, müzikle ilgiliyim diye. Ya da ismimizle alakalı 
olsun diye, Arif Arya Alya gibi.
V: Müzikle nasıl ilgileniyorsunuz?
A2C: Şu anda çok değil ama zamanında gitar çalıyordum.
V: Çocugunuz olunca din eğitimi verecek misiniz, verirseniz 
nasıl bir eğitim düşünüyorsunuz?
A2C: Bence din eğitimi verilmemeli. Zaten bilgiye kolayca 
ulaşabiliyor, ayrıca eğitime gerek olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Ama 
eşim tam tersini düşünüyor. Örneğin o çocuğumuzun kuran kur-
suna gitmesini istiyor. Zamanla bunu benimserse o yöne gitsin, 
istemiyorsa diğer yöne gitsin diyor. Henüz buna karar vermedik ama 
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eğer açıkçası çocuğun psikolojisi açısından istemediğim için onun 
karşısında dururum. Bu iyi bir kavga nedeni olabilir.
V: Hiç boşanma yaşadınız mı? Anne babanız ?
A2C: Yok. Bizde de onlarda da böyle bir şey yaşanmadı.
V: Sizin boşanma konusunda önünüzde engeller var mı?
A2C: Boşanmaya hiçbir engel yok. İki insan anlaşamıyorsa bunu 
sürdürmeleri saçma tabii ki. Ailemde tabii ki bu konularda boşan-
ma konusunda baskı yapmazlar ve destek bile olurlar eğer sonuç 
alınamıyorA2C:
V: Boşanma kararı alırken çevreyi çok umursamayacak mısınız?
A2C: Tabii ki çevreyi umursayacağız. Ama mutlu bir evlilik yok-
sa bu ikinci plana giriyor.
V: Annenizin boşanmak istememesinin sebepleri ile sizinkiler 
paralel miydi?
A2C: Annemlerin boşanmama sebebi çevre değildi.
V: Sizin boşanmanız durumunda karşılaşacağınız olumlu ve 
olumsuz tepkiler ile annenizin boşanması durumunda karşılaşacağı 
tepkileri kıyaslamanız istense ne söylerdiniz?
A2C: Benim ekonomik özgürlüğümden dolayı benim çevre 
değiştirme şansım olabilir. Ayrıca çevre değiştirmesem bile çevreye 
kulağımı kapatabilirim. Annemin dönemindeki zamanda ise hem 
ekonomik özgürlük kısıtlı hem de çevre kabuğundan çıkmamış. Şu 
anda benim çevrem biraz daha o döneme göre yaşayış tarzları girmiş 
oldukları ortamlar alışılagelmiş şeyler var artık. O döneler yoktu o 
kadar. Şu anda daha şanslı hissedebilirim kendimi anneme göre söz 
konusu boşanma olduğunda.
V:Hangi hallerde boşanırsınız?
A2C: Aldatma söz konusu ise, eşimin benden habersiz cid-
di anlamada maddi kayıpları varsa o anlamada 2. Şansı verip aynı 
kayıpları veriyorsa bu nedendir. Maddi tutarsızlıklar yani. Örneğin 
bir gayrimenkulün satısı benden habersiz yapılıyorsa gibi.
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V: Çocuğunuz olursa, evlilik öncesi flörtü sizi rahatsız eder mi?
A2C: Ben flörtler yaşadığım için benim açımdan hiçbir sakıncası 
yok. Ama benim yaptığım kimi yanlışları yapmasını istemem tabii 
ki, uyarılarda bulunabilirim. Tabii ki flörte açık olmalı gençler. Ba-
zen bayanlar daha duygusal olabiliyor, erkelerin duygusal olduğuna 
kanabiliyorlar. O yönde uyarabilirim hayal kırıklığı oluyor diye.
V: Çocuğunuz farklı bir inanışa sahip olursa tepkiniz ne olurdu?
A2C: Onun seçimidir diye saygı duymamız gerekiyor zaten. Ona 
tepki verdiğinizde zaten değiştirmeyeceksiniz, hatta onu daha katı 
hale getirebilirsiniz.
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APPENDIX D
Interview Form
Research Object: Examination of the effects of religious be-
liefs/identities to individual/social field in the marriage process.
Date: ??/??/2016 Time: (Start/End)_______/__________
Intro
Hello, my name is Volkan Ertit. I am a research associate in Aksaray 
University Sociology Department and a doctoral student in Rad-
boud University, the Netherlands. I’m doing a research about the 
effect of religious beliefs on marriage rituals. I’m having this inter-
view for my doctoral thesis.
Before our interview, I do want to point out that our interview is 
confidential and what talked about in this interview will be known 
only by me. Your daughter (son) / mother (father) will never heard 
and read what you tell. Additionally, the research report will certain-
ly not include your names, instead of this, pseudonyms will be used 
or your names will be encrypted.
Do you have any questions or any opinion you want to ask or 
state before our interview?
What do you think about our conversation to be saved? We may 
remove information, which you don’t want, at the end of the inter-
view.
I guess our interview will take about 45 minutes. If you excuse 
me, I want to start with questions.
QUESTIONS
Age:
Gender:
Education:
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Job:
Marital Status:
First Group Questions
1. How were you earning your living before marriage/after mar-
riage?
1.1. Where?
1.2. Working Conditions?
1.3. With whom?
2. How many children / (brothers/sisters)/ do you have? How 
many children do you want to have?
3. How many brothers /sisters does your mother/father have?
4. Where were you/your children/ your parents born? (House or 
a medical centre)
5. Have you lost any child because of disease? Or have you seen 
anybody that they lost their children because of childhood diseases?
6. Before and after marriage, what kind of durable goods (wash-
ing machine, television, dishwasher etc.) did you have?
7. What kind of heating systems do you use/ did your parents 
use?
8. Did you have access to hot water in your childhood?
9. What kind of illnesses did you catch when you were child? 
What kinds of ways were used to heal you? Did any religious man/
woman help you? Or have you tried any metaphysical ways to im-
prove your situation? (How about your child or your parents?)
10. Have you ever spent time with non-Alevis before marriage? 
Where do you meet or come across with non-Alevis? (Social En-
vironment)
11. How do you obtain your daily needs before/after marriage 
(bread, cheese, clothes, fruits, vegetables, jam, paying bills, etc.)?
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12. Have you ever lived alone (free from your family) before mar-
riage?
12.1. If yes, what was the religious origin of your neighbours?
13. Which cities have you visited until now? Why?
14. At what age did you get married?
15. What was the type of your marriage?
Second Group Questions
1. Have you ever had a boy/girl friend? 
If yes, 
1.1. How did you meet?
1.2. Did your parents or your close relatives know that you had 
a boy/girl friend?
1.3. What was the denomination of your partner?
1.4. If s/he would have been a non-Alevi, what would have 
been the reaction of your parents? Or if s/he was a non-
Alevi, what was the reaction of your parents?
2. How did you propose or get proposal?
3. Did religion play any role in the rituals of marriage from be-
ginning to the end?
4. Was it a religious or a civil marriage? Why?
5. How did you prepare yourself for the wedding ceremonies?
6. Where did you start to live after marriage? (What was the 
reason behind this decision?)
7. If you have problems related to your marriage, whom do you 
prefer to consult?
8. What is/are name(s) of your child(ren)? And why did you 
choose that/those name(s)?
9. If your children or grandchildren would date before marriage, 
what would be your reaction?
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10. Have you ever been divorced? What kind of reasons would 
cause you to divorce?
10.1. Which generation is more inclined to divorce, old or 
new?
11. Have you ever had a spiritual brother? / Has your husband 
ever had a spiritual brother?
11.1. Have you observed any change in the social power and 
prestige of the institution of spiritual brotherhood?
12. Have you ever seen a case held in the people’s court?
12.1. Does the existence of the institution of the people’s court 
influence your decision in terms of mate choice?
12.2. Have you observed any change in the social power and 
prestige of the institution of the people’s court?
13. What would you say if your opinion is sought about the dif-
ferences between the past and now in terms of marital issues in 
general?
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